JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - This is an appeal by the Defendant against the concurrent decisions of the two courts below decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for ejectment. The Plaintiffs are the owners of a house which was let out on a monthly tenancy to the Defendant on a rent of Rs. 4/-. per month. The house belongs to Ramachandra, Plaintiff No. 1, Lakshman Sahu, Plaintiff No. 2 and Susila Bewa, Plaintiff No. 5 the widow of Jagannath who died in 1949. The Plaintiffs filed a small cause court suit No. 45049 claiming arrears of rent from the Defendant from July, 1946 to may, 1949. The defence was that at the time of the death of Jagannath certain articles were taken on credit from his grocery shop which he was holding in the disputed house by the Plaintiffs and it was agreed that the price of the articles should be adjusted towards the arrears of rent. After contest that suit was decreed on 22-12-49. In the meantime the Plaintiffs served notice to quit on the Defendant on 11-7-49 asking him to quit by the end of July, 1919 and they also claimed arrears of rent for June and July, 1949. On 16th of January, 1950, the present suit for ejectment was filed, and there was a claim for rent for June, July and August, 1949, and damages from September, 1949 to January, 1950. The Defendant, it appears, had deposited the dues of the Plaintiff,; under the S.C.C. Suit on the 24th. January, 1950, that is, soon after the institution of the present suit, for ejectment. On the 3rd of May, 1950, the Defendant also deposited the rent claimed in the present suit. The case for the defence was that the Defendant was not a habitual defaulter and he was ready and always willing to pay the rent and although he tendered the rent it was refused. His further plea was that without an exemption order from the House Rent Controller, the present suit was not maintainable. 2. The learned Munsif after a consideration of the entire evidence, oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the Defendant had deliberately withheld the rent for the period in respect of which the previous suit was filed, and he was a habitual defender, and as such no order of exemption was necessary from the house rent controller. 2. The learned Munsif after a consideration of the entire evidence, oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the Defendant had deliberately withheld the rent for the period in respect of which the previous suit was filed, and he was a habitual defender, and as such no order of exemption was necessary from the house rent controller. He accordingly decreed the suit for ejectment, and he also passed' a decree for arrears of rear and damages. Thereupon the Defendant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. Hence the Defendant has come up to this Court in Second Appeal. 3. The main ground urged by Mr. S.N. Dasgupta, the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that he is entitled to rely upon Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act for relief against forfeiture as he has deposited the entire rent claimed in the suit together with the rent decreed in the previous suit. The simple answer to this argument is that Section 114 pas no application to the fact of the present case. Section 114 says that "where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent and the lessor sues to eject the lessee if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear together with Interest thereon and his fun costs of the suit, or gives such security as the court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the court in view of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture, and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred. "A bare reading of the section will convince anybody that the section provides for relief against forfeiture, that is, to say, when a lease determines by forfeiture under Clause (g) of Section III. "A bare reading of the section will convince anybody that the section provides for relief against forfeiture, that is, to say, when a lease determines by forfeiture under Clause (g) of Section III. Section III, Clause (g) says that "A lease of immovable property determined by forfeiture (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, or (2) In case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event, and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease." It is clear from the facts of the present case that this is not a suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant has violated any express condition of the terms of the tenancy and which has entitled forfeiture. This is simple suit fore evicting the monthly tenant after service of notice to quit In accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The question of existence of arrears of rent becomes material only to avoid the bar of Section 5 of the House Rent Control Act, which provides that no tenant can be evicted in execution of a decree except for arrears of rent. The facts found by the two courts below make it perfectly clear that the Defendant is a habitual defaulter and he was in arrears of rent. That being so, the further requirement of Section 5 that an excepting order from the House Rent Controller was necessary, cannot be Insisted upon In this case. In my opinion the courts below having found that the Defendant was a habitual defaulter, and was in arrears of rent, rightly decreed the suit. 4. There is no merit in this appeal, and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. 5. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed