Wanchoo, C.J.—The following question has been referred by a learned Single Judge for answer by a Division Bench:— "Wether sec. 498 Cr.P. C. gives wider powers to the High Court or the Sessions Judge than those envisaged by sec 497 Cr.P.C.?" The question has arisen in connection with an application for cancellation of bail granted by the Session Judge under sec. 498. The contention of the Government Advocate is that the conditions laid down in sec, 497 Cr.P.C. govern the grant of bail by the High Court or the Sessions Judge under sec. 498 and that section does not confer any power on the High Court or the Sessions Judge to give bail irrespective of the conditions mentioned in sec. 497. 2. Chapter XXXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with bail. It beginst with sec. 496 which provides for bail in bailable cases. Then comes J sec. 497 which provides for bail in non-bailable cases and the main restriction provided by sec. 497 is that bail shall not be granted if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person asking for bail has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. There is an exception to this in the case of persons below 16 years of age, or a woman or any sick or infirm person. The contention of the learned Government Advocate is that sec. 498 does not give wider power to the High Court or the Sessions Judge, and that if an application is made for bail under that section, the High Court or the Sessions Judge has to consider whether the restriction provided in sec 497 applies, and it is not (open to the High Court to grant bail on any , other consideration. 3. Sec. 498 has been on the statute book in one form or another since 1861. The point raised in this reference therefore has been the subject of decision by various High Courts in India, and the consensus of opinion is that this section is independent of sec. 497, and gives wide powers to the High Court or the Session Judge to grant bail irrespective of the restriction in sec. 497. There are a large number of cases in support of this view, and we shall only cite a few leading ones for our purposes. 4. 497, and gives wide powers to the High Court or the Session Judge to grant bail irrespective of the restriction in sec. 497. There are a large number of cases in support of this view, and we shall only cite a few leading ones for our purposes. 4. In Ashraf Ali vs. Emperor(l) it was observed by the Calcutta High Court that the extended powers given to the High Court under sec. 498 are certainly not to be used to get rid of the very reasonable and proper provisions of law, namely sec. 497. 5. In King Emperor vs. Nga San Htwa(2), a full Bench of the Rangoon High Court decided that the discretion under sec. 498 is absolute, but the High Court must exercise it judicially and ought not to grant bail in cases punishable with death or transportation for life mentioned in s. 497 except for exceptional and very special reasons. 6. In Naranji Premji vs. Emperor (3) the Bombay High Court observed that:— "in exercising our discretion under sec. 498 we should of course have proper regard to what is laid down in sub-sec., (1) Sec. 497 that bail shall not be granted in a case where there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life" This clearly shows that the learned (Judges were of the view that the powers of the High Court under sec. 498 were not fettered by the restriction laid down in sec. 497, though the High Court should give proper regard to that restriction. 7. In K.N. Joglekar vs. Emperor (4) a Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that sec. 498 was not controlled by the limitations of sec, 497 and confers upon the Sessions Judge and the High Court wider powers to grant bail, which are not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding section. They went on to say that though the discretion was unfettered it could not be exercised arbitrarily but must be exercised judicially and that any one single circumstance would not necessarily conclude the decision which must be based on the cumulative effect of all the combined circumstances placed before the court. 8. In Emperor vs. Krishan Gopal (5) it was held by the Lahore High Court that sec. 8. In Emperor vs. Krishan Gopal (5) it was held by the Lahore High Court that sec. 498 gave a much wider discretion to grant bail to the Court of Session and the High Court than that given to subordinate courts by sec. 497, and sec. 498 is not controlled by limitations of sec. 497. 9. In Emperor vs. Mahanmad Panah(6) it has been held that the High Courts power to grant bail under sec. 498 is not limited by the restriction imposed by sec. 497 (1); it was added that the High Court will not, however," grant bail in non-bailable cases except in special circumstances, and according to the exigencies of each particular case. This is a Division Bench case, and may be taken to overrule the earlier Sind case, Gul vs. Emperor(7), in which the view was taken that sec. 498 must be interpreted being controlled by the provisions of sec. 497. 10. In Emperor vs. Rani Abhayaraj Kunwar(8), the Oudh Chief Court held that under sec. 498 the High Court had power to release a person on bail in any case, that is to say the power of granting bail in non-bailable offences is unrestricted, but that power has to be used judicially and not in an arbitrary manner. 11. A review of these authorities shows that the High Courts in India are unanimous that the power of granting bail conferred on the High Courts and the Sessions Judge under sec. 498 was unfettered by the restrictions contained in sec. 497, though that power must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily after taking all circumstances into consideration including the limitations under sec. 497 (1). 12. Learned Government Advocate however urged that in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Lala Jairam Das vs. Emperor (9) this view taken by the High Courts in India is incorrect, and that the power conferred on the High Court and the Sessions Judge under sec. 498 is controlled by the provisions of sec. 497. It may however be mentioned that Jairamdass case (9) was not directly concerned with the question whether the power granted by sec. 498 to the High Court or the Sessions Judge was controlled by sec. 497. The point there for decision w?s whether it was open to the High Court to grant bail to a convicted person under sec. 497. It may however be mentioned that Jairamdass case (9) was not directly concerned with the question whether the power granted by sec. 498 to the High Court or the Sessions Judge was controlled by sec. 497. The point there for decision w?s whether it was open to the High Court to grant bail to a convicted person under sec. 498 in a case where that person had been granted special leave to appeal by His Majesty in Council Their Lordships of the Privy Council in that connection reviewed the provisions of bail in Chapter 39 and pointed out that Chapter 39 was confined to cases of accused persons, and not to cases of convicted persons. Their Lordships also pointed out that the section dealing with convicted persons was sec. 426. It was further pointed out that sec. 561 A could not be used to grant bail to a convicted person who had been granted special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council as the Code provided for bails to accused persons as well as to convicted persons", and there was no provision in the relevant sections for grant of bail to a person who was granted leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. During the course of this judgment their Lordships while reviewing the provision of Chapter 39 remarked that the scheme of the Chapter is that sec.496 and 497 provide for the granting of bail to accused persons before trial, and the other sections of the chapter deal with matters ancillary or subsidiary to that provision. It is on these words that the learned Government Advocate strongly relies and urges that as the provisions in sec. 498 are ancillary and subsidiary, they could not have been intended to confer extended powers on the High Court and the Sessions Judge irrespective of sec. 497. There are not many cases of the period after this decision of the Privy Council on this point, but we may notice the views that are available. 13. In Cripa Shankar vs. Emperor(l0) it was held that the powers conferred under sec. 498 upon a Sessions Judge were not handicapped by the restrictions in sec. 497, though Jairamdass case(9) was not referred to in this case. 14. In Amir Chand vs. The Crown(11) a Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court was considering the question of, what is colloquially called, anticipatory bail. 498 upon a Sessions Judge were not handicapped by the restrictions in sec. 497, though Jairamdass case(9) was not referred to in this case. 14. In Amir Chand vs. The Crown(11) a Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court was considering the question of, what is colloquially called, anticipatory bail. In that connection. Das, C.J., as he then was in the referring order remarked that sec. 498 was ancillary or subsidiary to secs. 496 and 497 according to the Judicial Committee, and the first and the last sentences of sec. 493 were clearly ancillary or subsidiary to secs. 496 and 497 in that they worked out the provisions of those last mentioned sections, and it was rather curious, to say the least, that the legislature would introduce a far reaching provision conferring on the High Court and the Court of Session a wholly new and independent power for granting bail which was contrary to the etymological meaning of the term "bail" in sort of parenthesis sand-whiched between two provisions with which it had nothing to do and which two provisions were clearly ancillary or subsidiary to secs. 496 and 497. The full Bench took the view that their Lordships of the Privy Council had examined the provisions of sec. 498 Cr. P.C. in Jairamdass case(9), and came to the considered conclusion that this section did not confer any powers on the High Court or the Court of Session beyond the powers conferred by secs. 496 and 497. 15. Learned Government Advocate relies on this case also very strongly. But we must point out with all respect that their Lordships of the Privy Council had never said in Jairamdass case in so many words that sec. 498 did not confer any powers upon the High Court or the Court of Session beyond the powers conferred by sec. 496 and 467. What their Lordships said was that that section did not confer any power on the High Court to release convicted persons on bail. We may also point out that in the referring order Das C.J., as he than was, also seems to have con-fined his view, when he referred to a far reaching provision having been made in parenthesis, to the case of anticipatory bail, and not to the question whether any words in sec. We may also point out that in the referring order Das C.J., as he than was, also seems to have con-fined his view, when he referred to a far reaching provision having been made in parenthesis, to the case of anticipatory bail, and not to the question whether any words in sec. 498 gave powers to the High Court or the Sessions Judge unrestricted by the limitations of sec. 497 to grant bail to accused persons. 16. This Court also in two cases has followed the view held by other High Courts in India. In Manohar vs. Jagdish (12) it was observed that the Sessions Court and the High Court were not bound under sec. 498 Cr. P. C. by the provisions of sec. 497, yet they would not be justified normally to brush aside the said provisions. 17. In Kishan Singh vs. The Stated (3) the same view was reiterated. 18. Whatever authorities, therefore, are available support the view that the powers conferred under sec. 498 are not controlled by the provisions of sec. 497. 19. Let us now look into sec. 498 itself which reads as follows— "The amount of every bond executed under this Chapter shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case, and shall not be excessive, and the High Court or Court of Session may, in any case, whether there be an appeal on conviction or not, direct that any person be admitted to bail, or that the bail required by a police-officer or Magistrate be reduced." The section obviously has two parts. The first part lays down that the bail demanded shall not be excessive, The second part gives the High Court and the Court of Session two powers, namely:— (i) the power to direct in any case, whether there be an appeal on conviction or not, that any person be admitted to bail, and (ii) the power to direct that the bail required by a police officer or magistrate be reduced. The second part therefore of this section gives special powers to the High Court (i) of directing grant of bail in any case, and (ii) ordering reduction of bail demanded by a police officer or magistrate. There is nothing in sec. 498 to Show that its provisions are controlled by sec. 497. The second part therefore of this section gives special powers to the High Court (i) of directing grant of bail in any case, and (ii) ordering reduction of bail demanded by a police officer or magistrate. There is nothing in sec. 498 to Show that its provisions are controlled by sec. 497. The words "whether there be an appeal on conviction or not" have been interpreted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jairamdass case(9) as meaning that all accused persons are within the section, whether their case is appealable on conviction or not, thus giving powers to the High Court or the Court of Session to direct grant of bail in all cases whether any case is pending before them or not. Learned Government Advocate argues that this is all that sec. 498 means, and that when directing grant of bail under it the High Court or the Court of Session must take into account the provisions of sec. 497 before giving such direction. We have already pointed out that there are no words in sec. 498 which show that it is controlled by sec. 497. It is true that their Lordships of the Privy Council said in Jairamadass case (9) that the provision of sec. 498 was ancillary or subsidiary to sec. 496 and 497. At the same time however, it must be remembered that their Lordships were dealing with a case of bail of a convicted person, which would not fall under any of the provisions of Chapter XXXIX at all, and not with the case of an accused person which does fall under these provisions. It is difficult to hold that their Lordships were overruling, by the use of the words that sec. 498 was ancillary or subsidiary, the mass of authorities of the Indian High Courts to the effect that the power to grant bail under sec. 498 was not controlled by the provisions of sec. 497. It appears strange that their Lordships should have done so in this very indirect manner in a case where they were only concerned with a convicted person who had been granted special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, and were not concerned with the powers of the High Court under sec. 498 to grant bail to accused persons. It appears strange that their Lordships should have done so in this very indirect manner in a case where they were only concerned with a convicted person who had been granted special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, and were not concerned with the powers of the High Court under sec. 498 to grant bail to accused persons. It would, in our opinion, be reading too much into the words used by their Lordships of the Privy Council to say that they were in this manner overruling the mass of authority in India on this point. 20. The Indian High Courts have taken the view that the very general words used in sec 498, namely that the High court or the Court of Session may, in any case, direct that any person be admitted to bail, clearly shows that the limitations imposed by sec. 497 (1) were not to apply to this provision. If the intention of the legislature was to apply those limitations here also, it would have been very easy to add the words "subject to the provisions of sec. 497" in sec 498 after the words "admitted to bail". We are, therefore, of opinion that the meaning given to these words by practically all the High Courts in India should be accepted as the correct interpretation, and the direction of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jairamadass case(9) did not overrule that interpretation. We cannot also fail to point out that if the interpretation given to this provision of sec. 498 by the High Court was incorrect, the legislature would have intervened and made the position clear by a suitable amendment of sec. 498, particularly when we know that the Code has been amended a number of times after it was enacted in 1898. Particularly the amendments of 1923 were of a far reaching nature, but even then sec. 498 was not touched. We may also point out that in the recent bill which is before Parliament for amendment of various provisions of the Code, and which is also of a far reaching nature, this provision of sec. 498 has not been touched, though a specific provision has been made giving power to the High Court or the Sessions Judge to cancel bail granted under sec. 498. 498 has not been touched, though a specific provision has been made giving power to the High Court or the Sessions Judge to cancel bail granted under sec. 498. Under these circumstances, it seems to us only right that we should give the same interpretation to these words in sec. 498, which has been generally given to it upto now by the High Courts in India except for Amirchands case (11). We have already givens reason why we cannot, with all respect, agree with the learned Judges, who decided that case, in the extension that they have made of the Privy Councils decision in Jairamdass case (9) 21. We are, therefore, of opinion that sec. 498 Cr.P.C. gives wider powers to the High Court or the Sessions Judge than those envisaged by sec. 497, and it is not controlled by the limitations imposed by that section. At the same time, we should like to point out that the principle enshrined in that section, namely that a person accused of a non-bailable offence punishable with death or transportation for life should not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty, should, as far as possible, be respected by the High Court or the Sessions Judge in granting bail under sec. 498. In any case, the question whether there appear reasonable ground for believing that a "person has committed an offence punishable with death or transportation for life should always be gone into, and if there are reasonable grounds for such belief, bail should not generally be granted unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail in spite of such belief. It is not possible to make a list of such exceptional circumstances, and each case will have to be decided on the cumulative effect of all the circumstances put before the court. But the court should never lose sight of the restriction to be found in sec. 497(1), and should only overrule it if there are clear circumstances of an exceptional nature justifying such a course. 22. Our answer therefore to the question put to us is that sec. 498 Cr. P. C. gives wider powers to the High Court or the Sessions Judge than those envisaged by sec. 497(1), and should only overrule it if there are clear circumstances of an exceptional nature justifying such a course. 22. Our answer therefore to the question put to us is that sec. 498 Cr. P. C. gives wider powers to the High Court or the Sessions Judge than those envisaged by sec. 497; but such powers should be exercised in a judicial and not in an arbitrary manner keeping in views the considerations which we have mentioned above. Let this answer be returned to the Bench concerned.