Judgment Imam, J. 1. The appellants are the plaintiffs in the suit, and the respondents are the defendants. The court of the first instance decreed the plaintiffs suit. The defendants preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court which set aside the judgment and decree of the first court and dismissed the plaintiffs suit and allowed the appeal of the defendants. Against this order of the lower appellate court, the appellants preferred this second appeal. 2. The plaintiffs had brought the suit for a declaration of their title over the palas trees and jungle in plots Nos. 713 and 1053 in village Chuna. The entire village including the disputed plots, it is admitted, belonged to the deity, Madan Gopal .Tiew Thakur. It is further admitted that Rohini Debya was the former sebait of the deity and Bireswar Kishore Deb was, the sebait after her. The case of the plaintiffs is that Bireswar Kishore had settled the palas trees as well as the jungle with the plaintiffs by virtue of a patta dated 7-4-1941, and as a result of this, they, the plaintiffs, were to be in possession of the jungle from that date. The plaintiffs brought the suit because the defendants, it is alleged, were interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the disputed plots. 3. The case of the defendants, on the other hand, is that the disputed jungle as well as the palas trees were in their possession in their own right, and that the sebait could not settle the said jungle and the palas trees with the plaintiffs. It is alleged that Kinu Mahto had possessed the palas trees in the village, and the then sebait, namely, Rohini Debya, had brought a suit against Kinu Mahto, but it was dismissed. It is also alleged that Rohini Debya had brought another suit against Kinu Mahto, which was Title Suit No. 1616 of 1906, for possession over the palas trees. It is further alleged that during the pendency of this suit, Kinu sold half his interest to Ramdhan Mahto. That suit was compromised, and as a result of the compromise it was agreed that Kinu Mahto and Ramdhan Mahto were to remain in possession of the palas trees on payment of an annual rental of Rs. 11/-. It is further alleged that during the pendency of this suit, Kinu sold half his interest to Ramdhan Mahto. That suit was compromised, and as a result of the compromise it was agreed that Kinu Mahto and Ramdhan Mahto were to remain in possession of the palas trees on payment of an annual rental of Rs. 11/-. It is alleged further that Kinu Mahto then sold the remaining half to Ramdhan Mahto by means of a sale deed dated 22-4-1908, and that thereafter Ramdhan Mahto got the entire sixteen annas share in the palas trees of the said village and that he remained in possession till his death, The defendants who are the heirs of Ramdhan Mahto, claimed to be in possession of the palas trees since the death of Ramdhan Mahto. The defendants, therefore, amongst other grounds, resisted the plaintiffs claim on the ground that the shebait had never settled the disputed two plots with the plaintiffs, and that these two plots had been incorporated fraudulently in the so called settlement with the plaintiffs. 4. The appellate court found that no fraud had been practised. It also found that the defendants were in possession of the disputed plots in question and that the sebait had no right to settle these plots with the plaintiffs. 5. So far as the question of possession is concerned, it is concluded by the finding of fact, and the question cannot be reopened in second appeal having regard to the facts that the lower appellate court has considered the evidence on the question of possession and then came to its finding. 6. The learned lawyer for the appellants has raised the following points in the course of the hearing of the appeal: that before any property can be transferred, it must be in existence; that the said compromise decree required registration; that the plaintiffs had got the statutory right to rear lac; that the right to rear lac is not immovable property, but movable property; and finally, that there was no lease and the defendants at the very most were mere licensees. 7. As to the first point, the learned lawyer referred us to Sec. 5, T. P. Act. In my opinion, Sec. 5, T. P. Act has no application to the facts of this case. 7. As to the first point, the learned lawyer referred us to Sec. 5, T. P. Act. In my opinion, Sec. 5, T. P. Act has no application to the facts of this case. We were referred in this connection to the case of -- Aveline Scott Ditcham V/s. James Miller", AIR 1931 PC 203 (A). That was a case from Newfoundland from the decision of the Supreme Court. The relevant passage is to be found at p. 206, column 2, where their Lordships have observed as follows: "That deed poll, remarkable as it is, and it is a notable example of salvage convincing, was not in their Lordships judgment, effective for its purpose. The Supreme Court took the view that as between the company and the three persons whose title it purported to confirm, it amounted to a legal assignment in writing of the leasehold interest in the property with all rights appurtenant thereto which included the right to obtain payment of compensation under the Act of 1921. It certainly did not purport to be more than this. But, so regarded it was at Taw quite inoperative, inasmuch as the estate or interest which it purported to assign had at the date of the deed no existence, and it is well settled that neither at law nor in equity can the assignment of such an interest operate according to its tenor." In my opinion, this decision of the Privy Council cannot help the plaintiffs for the simple reason that that is a decision for the proposition that if the property does not exist at all, then obviously there can e no transfer of such property. In this second appeal, there is no question of non-existence of any property at all. The compromise decree is on the record, and it is clear from that that defendant 1 shall by rearing lac on the palas trees enjoy the same under the plaintiffs on payment of an annual jama of Rs. 11/-, subject to enhancement and reduction together with cess at the rate of six pies per rupee. At this stage, I should point out that the lower appellate court has observed as follows: "As a matter of fact, it appears that a permanent lease of all the Palash trees was given, to the defendants of the suit and they were to remain in possession generation after generation By paying the rental. At this stage, I should point out that the lower appellate court has observed as follows: "As a matter of fact, it appears that a permanent lease of all the Palash trees was given, to the defendants of the suit and they were to remain in possession generation after generation By paying the rental. The compromise as already noted is supported by the village note (Ex. F) which shows that the Palash trees of the village were actually in possession of the tenants who were paying Rs. 11/-as its rental." The lower appellate court then refers to the rent receipts which support the case of the defendants a, well as the compromise petition, Ex. B, and the compromise decree, Ex. E; and taking all these into consideration, finally it, observes that "all taken together lead to the irresistible conclusion that the palas trees in question are within the tenancy of the defendants and are in their possession and the Sebait had no right to settle them with the plaintiffs." In other words, as a result of the compromise, the permanent right of the defendants was accepted, and all that was done as a result of this compromise was that the annual rental had been enhanced. It cannot, therefore, be said in these circumstances that no property existed at all before the transfer. What was, however, submitted was that the new palas trees that may grow up cannot be said to have been transferred as a result of the compromise. In my opinion, there is no substance in this point, because the compromise decree which is on the record does not talk of only the existing trees but talks of the trees in the village which, to my mind, must be said to include not only the existing trees but also the trees that may Home into existence. If one was to agree with the submission of the learned lawyer for the appellants that the new trees are not covered by the compromise decree, then an absurd position would arise in the case of the right to fish in a pond. It would be preposterous to hold that because A is given the right to fish in a pond he can only fish that fish which existed at the time when the right was given and he cannot fish that fish which came into existence after the right was given. It would be preposterous to hold that because A is given the right to fish in a pond he can only fish that fish which existed at the time when the right was given and he cannot fish that fish which came into existence after the right was given. The coming up of the new trees only means that I there is an increase in the number of trees, and that being so, it cannot be said that the defendants have no right to rear lac on the new trees. Furthermore, from the compromise decree, it appears that the right given to the defendants was of a permanent character, that is to say, the right was to continue from generation to generation by paying the rental. In my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said in these circumstances that the defendants have no right to rear lac on the new trees, if there be any, by virtue of the compromise decree. 8. The next point for consideration is whether the compromise decree required registration. It was submitted that as the right to rear lac was reduced to writing, the document, therefore, required registration, and as that was not done, the defendants had no right to rear lac on the trees. But I have already pointed out that no new lease was created by means of this compromise decree as there was already a lease existing before, and that being so, there was no necessity for registration. The compromise decree only amounts to varying the terms of the existing tenancy, and thus it created no new lease. It is only in the event of a new lease having been created that registration is necessary. The learned lawyer for the defendants referred to certain rulings in support of the view that there was no necessity for registration in the circumstances of this case, because the compromise was in recognition of an anterior interest. He has referred to -- Shaila Bala Devi V/s. Ganganarayan Bhakat, AIR 1933 Pat 457 (B). It was observed in that case that a compromise which merely defines or varies some of the terms of an already existing tenancy does not require registration and is admissible even though unregistered. He has referred to -- Shaila Bala Devi V/s. Ganganarayan Bhakat, AIR 1933 Pat 457 (B). It was observed in that case that a compromise which merely defines or varies some of the terms of an already existing tenancy does not require registration and is admissible even though unregistered. He has referred us to -- Ananta Lal V/s. Bibhuti Bhusan, AIR 1944 Pat 293 (C), where it was observed that a compromise decree merely varying rent payable under registered lease & not itself creating a lease does not require registration if the property is part of the subject-matter of the suit. It is thus clear that there is no substance in the point raised, namely, that under the compromise decree the defendants did not get the right to rear lac as the compromise decree was not registered. 9. The next point for consideration is whether the plaintiffs got the statutory right to rear lac. The case of the plaintiffs, as I have already pointed out, was that Bireswar Kishore Deb had settled the palas trees and the jungle with them through the patta dated 7-4-1941. But the case of the defendants was that the disputed jungle and the palas trees were in possession of the defendants in their own right, and that the Sebait had no right to settle them with the plaintiffs. According to them. Rohini Debya the sebait previous to Bireswar Kishore Deb, had brought a suit against Kinu, Mahto which was dismissed, and then Rohini Debya brought another suit against Kinu Mahto, which is title Suit No. 1616 of 1906, for possession over the palas trees, and during the pendency of the suit, Kinu Mahto sold half his interest to Ramdhan Mahto. In other words, before the plaintiffs settlement by Bireswar, the right to the palas trees had already been given to Kinu Mahto who sold his interest to Ramdhan Mahto. The plaintiffs, therefore, cannot claim the right to rear lac on the palas trees as against the defendants who had already got this right before the plaintiffs settlement. The question, therefore, of the plaintiffs having statutory right to rear lac, in my opinion, just does not arise. The plaintiffs, therefore, cannot claim the right to rear lac on the palas trees as against the defendants who had already got this right before the plaintiffs settlement. The question, therefore, of the plaintiffs having statutory right to rear lac, in my opinion, just does not arise. The learned lawyer for the appellants submitted that the right to rear lac is a movable property, and for this purpose, -- Venugopala Pillai V/s. Thirunavukkarasu, AIR 1949 Mad 148 (D) and --Ratnaswami V/s. Abdul Kuddus Sahib, AIR 1926 Mad 978 (E) were cited. But in view of the ruling of this Court reported in -- Ramlal Ganjhee V/s. Lodha Munda, AIR 1952 Pat 201 (F), it is not necessary, to discuss the Madras cases. In the Patna case, it was observed that the right to rear lac is an interest in immovable property. 10. Finally, it was submitted that the defendants are nothing more or nothing less than licensees. A ruling of the Allahabad High Court was cited, namely, -- Mohammad Yusuf V/s. Suraj Bali Singh, AIR 1930 All 338 (G). In that case it was observed as follows: "One or more inhabitants of a village taking wood from the landlords jungle without the latters knowledge cannot by so doing for any length of time acquire a right to cut and appropriate wood contrary to the wishes of the latter. Similar acts done with the permission or acquiescence of the owner being referable to a license express or implied cannot likewise confer a right as against him." In my opinion, this ruling has no application to the facts of this case. On a mere perusal of the compromise decree, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the defendants were not mere licensees. No other point has been raised in this appeal. 11. In my opinion, I see no reason whatsoever to interfere with the order of the lower appellate court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Das, J. 12 I agree.