Judgment :- 1. This suit relates to the Kaipancheri Vishnu Temple situated in the Nedumpura Village, a village in the Cochin State portion of the Travancore-Cochin State. The plaintiff is the karnavan of the Pazhur Mana, Panayalikara, to which according to him the temple and its properties were entrusted in 1041 M.E. in pursuance of a Theettooram of His Highness the Maharaja of Cochin. 2. The defendant is the Cochin Devaswom Board, Trichur and the immediate cause of the suit is the decision of the Board under S. 114 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, to the effect that the temple is an 'institution' as defined in Part II of that Act. After some discussion at the Bar the issues for decision as far as this court is concerned were settled as follows: 1. Does the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, offend Art. 14 of the Constitution? 2. Is the Devaswom Board a local or other authority within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution? 3. Is the right of the plaintiff to be an Ooralan "Property" within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution? 4. Do Ss. 63 and 64 of the Act offend Arts. 14,15(1),19(1)(f) & (g) and 26 of the Constitution? 5. Does S. 66(vi) of the Act offend Arts. 19, 26 and 254 of the Constitution? 6. If either S. 63 or S. 66(vi) of the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution, will that invalidate the entire Act or the constitution of the present Devaswom Board? 7. Does S. 61(6) of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution in view of S. 2(b) of the Act which exempts institutions belonging to and under the sole management of a single family? 8. Are Ss. 79, 81, 83, 84 and 86 ultra vires of the Constitution or alternatively will exercise of supervision by the Board before an enquiry and a finding of 'proved mismanagement' as provided in S. 36 of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution? 9. Does S. 114 of the Act offend Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution? Are the notification and order of the Board dated 12.1.1951 invalid and inoperative? 3. Issue No. 1. Does the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, offend Art. 14 of the Constitution? 9. Does S. 114 of the Act offend Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution? Are the notification and order of the Board dated 12.1.1951 invalid and inoperative? 3. Issue No. 1. Does the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, offend Art. 14 of the Constitution? This issue relates to the validity of the Act as a whole and not of any specific section or sections of the Act. The contention is that it singles out the followers of the Hindu faith for special control and restrictions and thus violates Art. 14 of the Constitution which provides that : "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". 4. A similar contention was argued before the High Court of Madras and negatived by that Court in A.I.R. 1952 Madras 613. The judgment stated the principles to be borne in mind when applying Art. 14 in the words of Fazl Ali, J. in A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 315: "(1) The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. (2) The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class. (3) The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment of circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. (4) The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes. (5) Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough. (6) If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. (6) If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. (7) While reasonable classification is permissible such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object to be attained and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. and said: "The gravemen of the charge is that while the Christian and Muhammaden religious and charitable institutions and endowments were excluded, Hindu religious and charitable endowments and institutions alone were selected for special treatment and that such a discrimination is unwarranted, unreasonable and unjust. The classification of institutions and endowments based on religion, Hindu, Muhamedan or Christian, cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable having regard to the object sought to be attained, viz., the better administration and management of such institutions. It is not a classification or division made for the first time by the State Legislature. The distinction existed for nearly a century. As the incidents and the nature of the institutions and endowments of different religions differ in several respects, it cannot be said that the classification is based solely on religion as the institutions included in the classification are religious as well as secular and having regard to the object in view, the institutions having several common features are rightly classified under one group. Art. 14 does not prevent the legislature from taking one set of institution for legislative consideration at one time and enacting laws in respect of them reserving the other types of institutions for consideration to a future date". We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the High Court of Madras and answer the issue in the negative. There was an appeal from A.I.R. 1952 Madras 613 to the Supreme Court, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 and though there is no specific discussion of this point in the judgment of the Supreme Court the Madras view should be taken as having been approved by the Supreme Court when after striking down certain specified sections of the Madras Act the judgment went on to say: "The rest of the Act is to be regarded as valid". 5. Issue 2. 5. Issue 2. Is the Devaswom Board a local or other authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution? Art. 12 of the Constitution provides that for the purposes of Part III (Fundamental rights) of the Constitution the expression "the State" unless the context otherwise requires, includes "all local or other authorities within the territory of India". Entry 5 in List II of the Seventh Schedule gives an indication as to what are "local authorities" and there can be no doubt that the Cochin Devaswom Board constituted under the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 cannot be considered as a "local authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. It seems to be equally clear that it will come within the ambit of "other authorities". In its literal sense the word "authority" means "a body exercising power" and in the context of Art. 12 that power must be considered as the power to issue rules, by-laws or regulations having the force of law. Sub-s. (1) of S. 122 of the Act provides: "The Board may make rules to carry out all or any of the purposes of this Act no inconsistent therewith"; Sub-s. (2): "In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Board shall have the power to make rules with reference to the following matters: (a) all matters expressly required by this Act to be prescribed; (b) regulating the scale of expenditure of incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and institutions under the management of the Devaswom Board; (c) the maintenance and auditing of the accounts of the institutions, the appointment of certified auditors and their remuneration; (d) submission of budgets, reports, accounts, returns, or other information by the Devaswom Department to the Board; (e) the method of recruitment and qualification, the grant of salaries and allowances, discipline and conduct of officers and servants of the Board and of the Devaswom Department and generally the conditions of their service; (f) the establishment of provident funds and the grant of pension for the officers and servants of the Board and of the Devaswom Department". and in view of the powers thus conferred we must hold that the Cochin Devaswom Board is an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. 6. Issue 3. and in view of the powers thus conferred we must hold that the Cochin Devaswom Board is an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. 6. Issue 3. Is the right of the plaintiff to be an Ooralan 'property' within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution? The question involved in this issue has already been dealt with by us in 1954 K.L.T. 551 wherein following A.I.R. 1954 Madras 385 we have held that the nature and incidents of hereditary trusteeship are well settled by authority, that there is ample support for the view that trusteeship where hereditary is in the nature of property and that hereditary trusteeship is within the protection afforded by Art. 19(1)(f) even in cases where no emoluments are attached to the office. The case was argued on the basis that the plaintiff was a hereditary trustee and in the light of the decisions above cited, we must hold that his rights as an Ooralan constitute 'property' within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. 7. Issue 4. Do Ss. 63 and 64 of the Act offend Arts. 14,15(1),19(1)(f) & (g) and 26 of the Constitution? S. 62(1) of the Act vests the administration of the incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and Hindu Religions Institutions specified therein and "all their properties and funds and of the estates and all institutions under the management of the Devaswom Department of Cochin" in the Cochin Devaswom Board. S. 63 provides: "The Board referred to in sub-s. (1) of S. 62 shall consist of three Hindu members one of whom shall be nominated by the Ruler of Cochin, one by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers and one elected by the Hindus among the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Travancore-Cochin" and S. 64 deals with the procedure to be adopted for the election "by the Hindus among the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Travancore Cochin". There is no complaint as regards that portion of S. 63 which provides for the nomination of a member of the Ruler of Cochin. There is no complaint as regards that portion of S. 63 which provides for the nomination of a member of the Ruler of Cochin. The complaint is as regards the election of a member "by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers" and another "by the Hindus among the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Travancore-Cochin" the argument being that the provision confining the vote to the Hindus among the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly violates Arts. 14,15(1),19(1)(f) & (g) and 26 of the Constitution. 8. It is not possible to accept this contention. What S. 63 has done is to create two electoral colleges, one consisting of the Hindus from among the Council of Ministers and the other from among the Hindu members of the Legislative assembly and considering the nature and functions of the Board the restriction of the membership of the electoral colleges to members of the Hindu faith appears to be eminently reasonable. Whether the voting should be by all the adults professing the Hindu faith or by an electoral college is but a matter of policy. So also are the qualifications which the members of an electoral college should possess and there is apparently nothing wrong in saying that the members of the college shall be not merely Hindus but also Members of the Cabinet or of the Legislative Assembly thus emphasising the ability and aptitudes implicit in the membership of such democratic institutions. In imposing such a qualification no wedge is being driven between the Hindu members of the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly, and those who do not follow the Hindu faith. The special needs of a situation will always demand a special treatment and so far as we can see there is no violation of the right to equality guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. 9. Art. 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth and we are also not able to appreciate how that prohibition is given the go-by by the provision of a special qualification for the membership of an electoral college for the election of members of the Cochin Devaswom Board. 10. Art. 19(1)(f) deals with the right "to acquire, hold and dispose of property" and Art. 19(1)(g) with the right "to protect any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business". 10. Art. 19(1)(f) deals with the right "to acquire, hold and dispose of property" and Art. 19(1)(g) with the right "to protect any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business". These rights are subject to the provisions of Art. 19(5) & (6) which permit "reasonable restrictions" on the exercise of the rights in the interests of the general public. The expression "general public" is wide enough to include a section of the public and provisions for the safeguarding of the religious institutions of a particular faith and the avoidance of friction and mismanagement will have to be considered as "reasonable restrictions" in the interests of the general public. 11. Art. 26 provides that: "Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right: (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire moveable and immoveable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law". Ss. 63 and 64 cannot possibly affect (a) and (c) because there is nothing in the Act which prohibits the establishment and maintenance of institutions for religious and charitable purposes or the owning or acquiring of moveable and immoveable property. The only question will be whether those sections violate (b) and (d), namely, the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and the right to administer the property of the institutions concerned in accordance with law. 12. Religion in its broadest sense includes all forms of faith and worship all the varieties of man's belief in a Superior Being or a Moral Law transcending the things that are Caesar's and demanding his affection and obedience. In A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388 the Supreme Court said that "the language of the two clauses has clearly brought out the difference between them" and: "In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away. On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law. On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law. This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted; but here against it should be remembered that under Art. 26(d) it is the religious denomination itself which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State may validly impose. A law, which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which is guaranteed by Art. 26(d) of the Constitution". There is nothing in Ss. 63 and 64 which can be considered as an interference with the right of the Hindus to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. We are also not prepared to say that the provision violates the right of the Hindus to administer according to law the property of their religious institutions and in the light of what is stated above our conclusion is that the restrictions imposed by Ss. 63 and 64 in the choice of the members of the Cochin Devaswom Board do not violate the provisions of any of the Articles specified in this issue, namely, Arts. 14,15(1),19(1)(f) & (g) and 26. 13. Issue 5. Does S.66(vi) of the Act offend Arts. 19, 26 and 254 of the Constitution? According to S. 66(vi) a Member of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State is not eligible for election or nomination as a member of the Board and the contention is that such a provision violates Arts. 19, 26 and 254 of the Constitution. Art.19 guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably and without arms, to form associations or unions, to move freely throughout the territory of India, to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, and it is difficult to understand how S. 66(vi) could possibly affect those fundamental rights. If it is assumed that they do not affect some of those rights, it cannot also be denied that considering the demands on the time and attention of a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State that the working of a modern democracy involves, it is only a reasonable restriction to debar him from becoming a member of the Board and thus becoming liable to discharge the duties of that membership as well. It is also difficult to understand as already stated in dealing with issue No. 4 how such a provision can offend Art. 26 and the freedom of the Hindus to manage their affairs in matters of religion or to administer the properties of their religious and charitable institutions in accordance with law. 14. Legislation regarding charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions come under Entry 28 of the Concurrent List and according to Art. 254 of the Constitution which corresponds to S. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1936: "(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, then, subject to the provisions of Cl. (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then the law so made by the Legislature of such State, shall if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State". The Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act I of 1081, did not provide for the creation of a Devaswom Board. The Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act I of 1081, did not provide for the creation of a Devaswom Board. The provision in that behalf was made for the first time in Ordinance No. IX of 1124, and then in Ordinance No.1 of 1950 and the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950. S. 61(2) of Ordinance No. IX of 1124 and S. 63 of Ordinance No.1 of 1950 detail the disqualifications which preclude election or nomination as a member of the Board. Those sections, however, did not take in the two disqualifications given in S. 66(v) & (vi), namely: (1) Conviction by a criminal court of any offence involving moral turpitude; or (2) membership of Parliament or of the Legislature of any State. and the contention before us was that the addition of fresh grounds of disqualifications is repugnant to the "existing law" which in this case should be taken to be Act I of 1081 (which though under suspension since the promulgation of Ordinance No. IX of 1124 was repealed only by S. 130 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950) and Ordinance No. IX of 1124 and that as a result, the constitution of the Board and all actions taken by it should be considered as bad and inoperative. 15. An argument was advanced before us by the learned counsel for the respondents that the "existing law" contemplated by Art. 254 can only be a piece of central legislation and not a State enactment like Act 1 of 1081 or Ordinance No. IX of 1124. This is directly against the definition of the term "existing law" in Art. 366 of the Constitution which corresponds to the definition of the term "existing Indian Law" in S. 311 of the Government of India Act, 1935: "Existing Law" means any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any legislature, authority or person having power to make such law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation". The question agitated before us arose for discussion in A.I.R. 1941 Madras 533, a case in which a provision of the Madras Prohibition Act, X of 1937, was held to be repugnant to an earlier Madras Act which formed "the existing Indian Law" on the subject. The question agitated before us arose for discussion in A.I.R. 1941 Madras 533, a case in which a provision of the Madras Prohibition Act, X of 1937, was held to be repugnant to an earlier Madras Act which formed "the existing Indian Law" on the subject. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer, Advocate General, frankly conceded that in view of the definition in S. 311(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the repugnancy of a piece of provincial legislation to another piece of provincial legislation which came under the definition of "existing Indian Law" will avoid the former under S. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935. 16. The difficulty in the way of the plaintiff, however, is not that repugnancy with a piece of State Legislation anterior to the 26th January 1950 will not suffice but the difficulty is in saying that the addition of the two new grounds of disqualification are repugnant to the four that already existed, namely (1) unsoundness of mind, being a deaf-mute or suffering from leprosy; (2) being an undischarged insolvent; or (3) being an office-holder or a servant of a Devaswom or the trustee of any institution; or (4) being interested in a subsisting contract for making any supplies or for executing any work on behalf of the Devaswoms. 17. Repugnancy has to be founded on the impossibility of co-existence. The new grounds of disqualification will certainly affect persons convicted by a criminal court of offences involving moral turpitude and the Members of the Legislature, but that does not necessarily mean that the two new grounds of disqualification are anything more than an addition or supplement to the four that already existed when the Constitution came into force. 18. It follows that our finding on this issue is that S. 66 (vi) of the Act does not offend Arts. 19, 26 and 254 of the Constitution. 19. Issue 6. If either S. 63 or S. 66(vi) of the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution will that invalidate the entire Act or the constitution of the present Devaswom Board? In the light of our conclusion that Ss. 63 and 66(vi) of the Act are intra vires of the Constitution this issue does not arise for consideration. 20. Issue 7. If either S. 63 or S. 66(vi) of the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution will that invalidate the entire Act or the constitution of the present Devaswom Board? In the light of our conclusion that Ss. 63 and 66(vi) of the Act are intra vires of the Constitution this issue does not arise for consideration. 20. Issue 7. Does S. 61(6) of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution in view of S. 2(b) of the Act which exempts institutions belonging to and under the sole management of a single family? The Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, consists of three parts, Ss. 2 to 60 forming the First Part, Ss. 61 to 130 forming the Second Part and S.131, "repeal and savings", forming the third part. According to S.1(3), Part I extends to Travancore, Part II to Cochin and Part III to the whole of the State of Travancore-Cochin. 21. S. 2(b) defines the term "Hindu Religious Endowment" occurring in Part I of the Act as: "(i) Every Hindu temple or shrine or other religious endowment dedicated to, or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof; and (ii) every other Hindu endowment or foundation, by whatever local designation known, and property, endowments and offerings connected therewith, whether applied wholly to religious purposes or partly to religious and partly to charitable or other purposes, and every express or constructive trust by which property or money is vested in the hands of any person or persons by virtue of hereditary succession or otherwise for such purposes; but shall not include any Hindu religious institution belonging to and under the sole management of a single family; Provided that, where the management of a religious institution as passed into the hands of several branches by division among the members of the original family, the institution may nevertheless be considered as being in the management of a single family for the purpose of this part. Explanation:- The expression 'hereditary succession' shall include succession to a 'Guru' by a disciple by nomination or otherwise". Explanation:- The expression 'hereditary succession' shall include succession to a 'Guru' by a disciple by nomination or otherwise". and according to S. 61(6) the term 'institution' occurring in Part II reads: "A Hindu Religious Institution other than an incorporated or unincorporated Devaswom by whatever designation known, dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu Community or any section thereof and shall include (a) every Hindu Temple or shrine as dedicated or used as of right by the Hindu Community or any section thereof as a place of religious worship and all property belonging to or given or endowed for the benefit or support of such temple or shrine or for the purpose of any service or charity; and (b) Samooham or Samooha Madhom (of the Paradesa Brahmins) or Sabha Madhom, Sanyasi Madhom, Yogan or Brahmaswom Madhom (of the Nambudiri Brahmins) or any other endowment or foundation of a Hindu religious nature or both combined, by whatever designation known and all property belonging thereto whether applied wholly to religious purposes or partly to religious and partly to charitable or other purposes and any express or constructive trust of a Hindu religious nature by which property is vested in the hands of any person". We are unable to see any vital difference between the two definitions. Emphasis was placed on the words "but shall not include any Hindu Religious Institutions belonging to and under the sole management of a single family". The provision only means that any religious institution which is not dedicated or used as of right by the Hindu Community or any section thereof is outside the purview of Part I and the same is the position as far as we can see in part II as well. 22. It follows that this issue has to be decided against the plaintiff. 23. Issue 8. Are Ss. 79, 81, 83, 84 and 86 ultra vires of the Constitution or alternatively will exercise of supervision by the Board before an enquiry and a finding of 'proved mismanagement' as provided in S. 38 of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution? It follows that this issue has to be decided against the plaintiff. 23. Issue 8. Are Ss. 79, 81, 83, 84 and 86 ultra vires of the Constitution or alternatively will exercise of supervision by the Board before an enquiry and a finding of 'proved mismanagement' as provided in S. 38 of the Act offend Art. 14 of the Constitution? S. 79 of the Act provides: "(1) The trustee of every institution shall maintain in such manner as may be prescribed, registers showing: (a) particulars of all immoveable property belonging to or given or endowed for the support or benefit of the institution and all property given or endowed for the performance of any service or charity; (b) particulars of all moveable properties belonging to the institution with their estimated value and of all investments made by the institution; (c) particulars of the items and scale of the ordinary and recurring expenditure in the institution; (d) particulars of all the liabilities of the institution; (e) the names of all offices to which any salary, emolument or perquisite is attached and the nature, time and conditions of service in each case; and (f) such other particulars as the Board may from time to time fix;" S. 81: "The trustee of an institution shall maintain regular and proper books of account disclosing correctly the head of income and expenditure of the institution from day to day": S. 83: "(1) The trustee of every institution shall furnish such accounts, returns, reports or other information relating to the administration or management of the institution in his charge to the Board within such time, as it may prescribe or require. (2) Where a receiver or other officer appointed by any court is in management of an institution, such court may, on the request of the Board, direct the receiver or other officer to furnish the Board from time to time, with the accounts of income and expenditure of the institution so as to enable the Board to bring to the notice of such court objections, if any, relating to such accounts;" S. 84: "(1) The trustee shall prepare or cause to be prepared an annual balance sheet giving such particulars as will disclose the nature and extent of the income, expenditure, outstandings, and savings of the institution and send a signed copy of the same to the Board not later than the last day of the first month of the succeeding financial year. The trustee shall promptly furnish the Board with such information as may be required by him to explain correctly doubts, if any, arising on an examination of the balance sheet. (2) The scale of expenses of an institution shall be so adjusted as to provide for an yearly saving of at least 21/2 per cent of the gross income after paying the interest on debts, in any, as may be determined by the Board from time to time by notification in the Gazette. The savings so made shall be ear-marked as a reserve fund to be drawn upon to meet unexpected and unavoidable expenditure and for purchase of immoveable properties at prices to be approved of by the Board. (3) The reserve fund shall within 10 days of the submission of the annual balance sheet be invested in the name of the institution in the manner provided for the investment of trust funds under the Trust Act for the time being in force. Where however the Board is satisfied that an institution has such a sufficiency of reserve funds as can be conveniently utilised for the payment of any debt outstanding, it may direct the trustee of the institution to utilise the whole or any portion of the reserve fund for the payment of such debts. The trustee who has been so directed shall pay off the debts accordingly and shall forthwith satisfy the Board that such debts have been so paid off. The trustee who has been so directed shall pay off the debts accordingly and shall forthwith satisfy the Board that such debts have been so paid off. (4) A contribution not exceeding one per cent of the annual gross receipts of each institution may be levied for supervision charges and credited to the Board in accordance with orders specially issued by the Board from time to time. Such amounts may be recovered by the President of the Board as if they were arrears of revenue under the Revenue Recovery Act, for the time being in force;" and S. 86: "(1) Any exchange, sale, mortgage, pledge, lease or other alienation of the property of an institution executed or made or any debt contracted on its behalf shall be void unless it is executed or made or contracted with the previous sanction of the Board or with the previous sanction of the civil court when in any suit, appeal or other proceedings in relation to the institution a Receiver has been appointed by the civil court for the management of the properties of the institution: Provided that the court shall before granting or refusing such sanction give notice to the Board and hear the objections, if any, of the Board. (2) The Board may prefer an appeal to the High Court from the order passed by such court within thirty days of the order and such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of not less than two judges. (3) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-s. (2) may appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the date of publication of the order in the Gazette and such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of not less than two judges. (4) Every order of the Board under sub-s. (1) shall be published in the Gazette". and the argument was that these provisions make such large inroads into the proprietary rights of a hereditary trustee as to violate Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that any such inroad has been made and we take the view that the provisions extracted above are only regulatory in character and have no such effect. and the argument was that these provisions make such large inroads into the proprietary rights of a hereditary trustee as to violate Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that any such inroad has been made and we take the view that the provisions extracted above are only regulatory in character and have no such effect. If the provisions reduce the hereditary trustee to the position of a dummy or anything like it as under the scheme discussed in 1955 (1) M.L.J. 243, the position would be entirely different. But such is not the case before us and we must hold that the sections mentioned above are intra vires of the Constitution. 24. The alternative case is that the provisions regarding supervision and assumption are different in Parts I and II of the Act and that the difference violates the right to equality guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In Part I the provisions are: (1) for a general supervision under S. 36; and (2) for an assumption of management or the exercise of superintendence in lieu thereof under S. 37 after an enquiry under S. 38. In Part II the provisions are for a general supervision under Chapter IX and for assumption of management under Chapter X after an enquiry as contemplated in S. 99 of the Act. There is no provision for the imposition of superintendence in Part II while there is a provision in that behalf in Part I of the Act. This is the only real difference between the two Parts and as we do not consider the difference material the issue also has to be decided against the plaintiff. 25. Issue 9. Does S. 144 of the Act offend Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution? Are the notification and order of the Board dated 12.1.1951 invalid and inoperative? S. 114 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 provides that: "(1) If any dispute arises as to whether an institution falls within the term 'Institution' as defined in Part II of this Act, such dispute shall be decided by the Board and the decision of the Board shall be published in the Gazette. S. 114 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 provides that: "(1) If any dispute arises as to whether an institution falls within the term 'Institution' as defined in Part II of this Act, such dispute shall be decided by the Board and the decision of the Board shall be published in the Gazette. (2) Any person affected by a decision of the Board under sub-s. (1) may within six months from the date of publication of the decision of the Board in the Gazette, institute a suit in the court to modify or set aside such decision. (3) Subject to the final decree in the suit provided for in sub-s. (2) the decision of the Board shall be final". There is no case that the petitioner was not given adequate opportunities to present his case or that any canon of natural justice has been violated. The contention is that by allowing the Board to decide the matter and by throwing the burden of having its decision modified or set aside on the person aggrieved the section violates Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. We cannot agree that the conferring of a power to give an effective decision on an administrative body in the first instance subject to its being modified or set aside by the ordinary courts on the motion of the person aggrieved - which is all that is done by S. 114 - is a violation either of the right to equality guaranteed by Art. 14 or the freedoms given by Art. 19 of the Constitution. 26. In quasi-judicial proceedings the maxim that a man shall not be judge in his own cause is very difficult to apply. As stated in Koir & Lewson's Cases in Constitutional Law p. 340, it may be easy to insist that a public officer shall not exercise discretionary power in a case where he has a pecuniary interest or where he has already shown that he has a definite bias. "But beyond this it is almost impossible to go; for in all cases of this kind the person deciding between the claims of the public and the private individual is himself a public officer, and, therefore, a judge in his own cause. "But beyond this it is almost impossible to go; for in all cases of this kind the person deciding between the claims of the public and the private individual is himself a public officer, and, therefore, a judge in his own cause. Moreover, in contrast to the judge, who can do nothing until someone bring a dispute before him, a public officer entrusted with quasi-judicial functions may regularly be empowered to take the initiative himself. In fact, he must be constantly on the watch, ready to act whenever, in his opinion, the public interest requires it. The more zealous he is as an administrator, the more likely he is to favour the public interest. The difficulty is inevitable, and no satisfactory solution has yet been suggested". The Board's order of 18.1.1951 is in the following terms: "No statement was put in as promised. On the evidence and facts already gathered, the Board are satisfied that the Kypancherry Vishnu Temple, situated in Nedumpuram Village, Talapilly Taluk is a public institution. The temple is, therefore, declared as an institution falling within the ambit of Part II of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, XV of 1950. Copy of the notification of even date issued under S. 114(1) of the Act is herewith forwarded. 2. The Trustee Sree P.M. Ravi Brahmadattan Nambooripad will submit immediately the balance sheets of the Devaswom for the years 1124 and 1125 and the budget for the year 1126". and the notification of the same date reads as follows: "In virtue of the powers conferred on the Cochin Devaswom Board by S. 114(1) of Part II of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, XV of 1950, the Cochin Devaswom Board are pleased to decide that the Kypancherry Vishnu Temple, situated in Nedumpuram Village, Talapilly Taluk, is an "institution" as defined in Part II of the said Act". and if S. 114 is intra vires of the Constitution, as we have held it to be, the order and notification should also be held to be binding and effective. 27. These being our decisions on the issues dealt with above the suit must now go back to the District Court of Trichur for trial and disposal of the other points involved in the case and we direct accordingly.