JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. These are four applications under Art.226 of the Constitution of India by persons who until recently were engaged in working certain forest areas of the former Jagir of Palpur, for the manufacture of charcoal and kattha. The petitioners pray for the issue of an appropriate direction to restrain the State of Madhya Bharat from interfering in anyway with the petitioners' rights to work the forest areas and to deal with the manufactured charcoal and Kattha, which the petitioners claim to be their property. 2. The undisputed facts are that on 15-11-1952 Jagirdar of Palpur entered into an agreement with the petitioner Satya Prakash permitting him to manufacture charcoal by felling trees in certain 900 acres of forest land in his Jagir during the period from 15-11-1952 to 30-6-1955. Satya Prakash paid a premium of Rs.5400 to the Jagirdar for the contract. On the same date the Jagirdar entered into a separate agreement with the applicant Akbarali for the manufacture of 300 handies' of Kattha from other forest land in his Jagir, for a consideration of Rs.6000. He also granted leases of still other forest areas for the manufacture of charcoal and Kattha during the period from 15-11-1952 to 30-6-1955 to Fate Singh and Satendra Prakash, who transferred their rights in a part of the area leased out to them to the petitioner Surendra Nath Chaddha. The Jagirdar yet entered into an another agreement on the same date with the applicant Ambrikrai for the manufacture of 150 Handies of Kattha in still other "forest area" in his Jagir during the period from 15-11-1952 to 30-6-1955. A few days after the leases had been granted the Palpur Jagir was resumed under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 which came into force on 4-12-1952. But even before the resumption of Jagir and at the time when the Jagirdar of Palpur entered into various agreements with the petitioners, the Jagirdar's power with regard to the cutting of trees in the Jagir forest area was not unrestricted. But even before the resumption of Jagir and at the time when the Jagirdar of Palpur entered into various agreements with the petitioners, the Jagirdar's power with regard to the cutting of trees in the Jagir forest area was not unrestricted. Section 3, Madhya Bharat Jagir Forest (Prevention of Indiscriminate Cutting) Act, 1950 (Act No.55 of 1950) provided that "except for his own bona fide nistar purposes or those of the villagers residing in the Jagir Area concerned, no Jagirdar shall cut, or cause to be cut or authorise any person to cut or cause to be cut any tree in the forest area of his Jagir without the previous sanction obtained in writing of the Commissioner for Jagirs". Section 4 of the Act prescribed the maximum area for which the Commissioner for Jagir could give sanction to any Jagirdar in any one year. It appears that the Jagirdar of Palpur was granted permission under S.3 of Act No.55 of 1950 in respect of 5000 Bighas in Samvat 2007, 5000 Bighas in Samvat 2008 and 5698 Bighas in Samvat 2009. The Jagirdar did not utilize the sanction granted to him for the years Samvat 2007 and 2008. In Samvat 2009 he granted leases to the petitioners and other persons for the working of forest areas in his Jagir in excess of the area for which he had obtained sanction for the year Samvat 2009 and far beyond the period for which the sanction had been granted. On 25-2-1955 the Conservator of Forests, Southern Division reported to the Jagir Commissioner that the Jagirdar of Palpur had leased out forest area in his Jagir in contravention of the provisions of S.3, Madhya Bharat Jagir Forest (Prevention of Indiscriminate Cutting) Act and praying that action under S.6 of the Act be taken by the Jagir Commissioner. This section authorises the Jagir Commissioner to stop the cutting of any tree or trees in the forest area of any Jagir on receiving information of the non-compliance or breach in the forest area of any Jagir of any of the provisions of the Act or orders issued under it. On 28-2-1955 the Jagir Commissioner made an interim order directing the stoppage of the working of the forest areas by the Jagirdar and the persons working under contracts given by the Jagirdar. On 28-2-1955 the Jagir Commissioner made an interim order directing the stoppage of the working of the forest areas by the Jagirdar and the persons working under contracts given by the Jagirdar. Subsequently after hearing the contractors concerned, on 24-3-1955 the Jagir Commissioner modified his order dated 28-2-1955 by making the following directions : "(i) There will be no further cutting of any tree standing within the coupes; (ii) the felled material is allowed to be collected, stacked and stored by the contractors concerned with due regard to safety from pilfering and fire etc; (iii) the Bhatties in operation (already burning) are allowed to continue so that the operation is completed; (iv) the felled wood may be burnt into charcoal by the D.F.O. or he may, within his discretion, allow the contractors to bum the wood for preparation of charcoal; (v) no extraction of either timber, wood, charcoal or any other material from these coupes is permitted except under the written sanction of the D.F.O. and on payment of the value of the material determined by the D.F.O.; and (vi) the operation of Katha Handies in progress may be completed by the D.F.O. either through his own agency or the agency of the contractors whichever is found convenient by him. The produce of the Katha Handies will remain at the disposal of the D.F.O." The order dated 24-3-1955 was again modified by the Jagir Commissioner on 12-4-1955. The Jagir Commissioner classified the persons who held contracts from the Jagirdar for the working of various forest areas into two groups, namely, (i) those who held contracts for the working of the forest area for which the Jagirdar had obtained sanction in Samvat 2009; (2) and those who had been working in the various areas not covered by the sanction. In regard to former group of contractors; the Jagir Commissioner directed : "1. There will be no further cutting of trees still standing in the coupes. 2. The felled material is permitted to be collected, stacked and stored within the coupe areas according to the convenience of the contractors concerened with due regard to safety from pilfering and fire etc. 3. The contractors are permitted to burn wood already felled into charcoal within their coupe areas and the burning already commenced is allowed to be completed; and 4. 3. The contractors are permitted to burn wood already felled into charcoal within their coupe areas and the burning already commenced is allowed to be completed; and 4. Timber and fuel wood already cut and charcoal prepared is allowed to be extracted and taken out of the coupe area after furnishing security considered sufficient by the D.F.O. 5. The operation of Katha Handies has proceeded considerably and if this is not completed there is danger of the material becoming a total waste. With a view to prevent this, cutting of Kher trees may be allowed by the D.F.O. to the minimum extent necessary for completing the operation within his discretion. The prepared Katha may be allowed to be taken out of the coupe area after furnishing security considered sufficient by the D.F.O." With regard to other group of contractors, the Tagir Commissioner affirmed the order passed by him on 24-3-1955. 3. On 6-5-1955 the Jagir Commissioner pronounced his final opinion in the matter after hearing the parties. He came to the conclusion that those contracts given by the Jagirdar which were covered by the sanction of the Jagir Commissioner for the year Samvat 2009 were valid "to the extent they were covered by the sanction; "that the Jagirdar had committed breaches in respect of contacts "inasmuch as the period of working specified in the order conveying sanction has been exceeded and certain conditions laid down have not been shown to have been fulfilled. These breaches do not, however, invalidate the contracts altogether." The Jagir Commissioner then stated the circumstances in which the Jagirdar gave contracts for period beyond that specified in the sanction given and after pointing out that the contractors had invested large sums of money and had started work after obtaining permission of the forest authorities in November and December 1954, suggested to the forest authorities that "any request by these contractors for extension of the period of working beyond Samvat year 2009 on payment of surcharge may be sympathetically dealt with by the forest department. The actual amounts to be paid as surcharge and the period of extension may be determined by the forest department." He then proceeded to say that no special sanction for the cutting of Kher trees for preparation of Katha was necessary for coupes covered by the sanction and that no Kher tree standing in forest areas outside such coupes could be cut by the Jagirdar or his contractors, and further that Act 55 of 1950 did not empower him to take any action with regard to "felled material". As regards the contracts of areas not covered by any sanction under S.3 of the Act, the Jagir Commissioner expressed the ipinion that these contracts created no right in favour of the contractors and the operations started by them were unauthorised and that "the Jagir forest area having been vested in the State after resumption of Jagirs and no valid contracts having been created in favour of these contractors prior to the resumption, it is no interference on the part of the Government authorities in preventing them from operating in the State forests." In regard to these contractors also the Jagir Commissioner made the suggestion to the forest authorities that as they had invested large sums of money in the operations and had paid to the forest authorities sums demanded by them for renewal of contracts, the Forest Department should "consider with sympathy any request from them for entering into freseh contracts with the Department." The Jagir Commissioner did not make any direction against the petitioners in his final order dated 6-5-1955. Nor did he indicate whether the order passed by him on 12-4-1955 was discharged or modified or varied. It must be mentioned here that according to the classification of contracts made by the Jagir Commissioner the petitioners Surendra Nath Chaddha, Akbarali and Ambrikrai held contracts for the working of forest areas covered by the sanction given by the Jagir Commissioner to the Jagirdar for the year Samvat 2009. The petitioner Satya Prakash was included amongst those contractors who were working forest areas for which the Jagirdar had not obtained sanction for year Samvat 2009. 4. The petitioner Satya Prakash was included amongst those contractors who were working forest areas for which the Jagirdar had not obtained sanction for year Samvat 2009. 4. The petitioners state that due to shortage of labour and other difficulties they could not commence work for nearly two years in the areas for which they had obtained contracts from the Jagirdar; that, therefore, towards the end of 1954 they applied to the Divisional Forest Officer concerned for permission to work the forest areas; that this permission was granted and when the petitioners paid to the forest authorities the amount of premium demanded, the agreements which they had entered with the Jagirdar were "renewed, confirmed and novated" by the D.F.O. and that, therefore, they have been working the forest areas under valid contracts which were binding on the Government. The petitioners claim that the Jagir Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the orders that he did in respect of these contracts, that under the contracts renewed and novated by the D.F.O. and binding on the Government, they have a right to work the forest areas, and are the owners of the charcoal and Katha manufactured by them and that the action of the Government and the Jagir Commissioner in prohibiting them from working the forest areas and in dealing with the manufactured material except on certain conditions, amounts to an infringement of their fundamental rights to property guaranteed by Arts.19 and 31 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. In the returns filed by the State it has been averred that the agreements between the petitioners and the Jagirdar being in contravention of S.3 of Act No.55 of 1952 were void ab initio; that the D.F.O. concerned by permitting the applicants to work the forest areas after paying certain premium amount and by counter signing the agreements executed between the applicants and the Jagirdar did not renew and confirm the contracts between the petitioners and the Jagirdar; that there was no agreement between the petitioners and the State and that the opponent State had not recognised or ratified the action of the D.F.O. in allowing the petitioners to work the forest areas on payment of certain amounts; that the D.F.O. was not empowered to validate or ratify any unauthorised agreement made between the Jagirdar and any of the contractors and that his action was unauthorised and in excess of the powers conferred on him and was being enquired into in a departmental enquiry; that as there were no binding agreements between the State and the petitioners in accordance with the requirements of Art.299 (1) of the Constitution, the petitioners were mere trespassers and had absolutely no right to exploit the forest resources and that, therefore, quite apart from the question of the competency of the Jagir Commissioner to make the orders that he did, the State had every right to take the property which belonged to them. 6. These petitions were heard by us on 29-6-1955. At the close of the arguments of counsel for the petitioners and the learned Advocate-General, we rejected these petitions with costs postponing the statement of detailed reason for our conclusion to a later date. We proceed to do so now, 7. Before us Mr. Inamdar learned counsel for the applicants realising that the contracts entered into between Jagirdar and the petitioners not being in conformity with the sanction obtained by the Jagirdar under S.3 of Act No.55 of 1950, were void, did not make them the basis of his contentions. He took up the stand that when in 1954 the D.F.O. concerned permitted the petitioners to work the forest areas on payment of the premium demanded and countersigned the agreements executed between the petitioners and the Jagirdar, new contracts between the applicants and the opponent State came into existence and that these contracts were binding on the State. He took up the stand that when in 1954 the D.F.O. concerned permitted the petitioners to work the forest areas on payment of the premium demanded and countersigned the agreements executed between the petitioners and the Jagirdar, new contracts between the applicants and the opponent State came into existence and that these contracts were binding on the State. It was conceded that these contracts did not comply with the provisions of Art.299(1) of the Constitution of India. But it was said that none-theless the State was bound by those contracts and that, therefore, the State had no right to interfere with the rights of the petitioners under the contracts. To support his contention that though the contracts did not conform with the requirements of Art.299 (1) yet were binding on the State, learned counsel placed reliance on Attorney-General for - 'Prince of Wales v. Collom', (1916) 2 KB 193 (A), and - 'Robertson v. Minister of Pensions', (1949) 1 KB 227 (B). Learned counsel proceeded to argue that under S.6, Madhya Bharat Jagir Forest (Prevention of Indiscriminate Cutting) Act 1950 it was only in the event of non-compliance or breach in the forest area of any Jagir of any of the provisions of the Act or orders issued under it, that the Jagir Commissioner could takes action under that section; that for an action under S.6 it was essential that the forest area should be a Jagir area; that after the resumption of the Palpur Jagir by the State in December 1952, there could be no question of any breach of the provisions of Act 55 of 1950 in the forest area of any Jagir and that, therefore, the Jagir Commissioner had no power to pass the orders dated 28-2-1955, 24-3-1955, 12-4-1955 and 6-5-1955. Learned counsel also advanced the argument that after the resumption of the Jagir the Government did not issue any notification under the Madhya Bharat Forest Act, 1950 declaring the forest areas as "reserved forest" or protected forest" or "village forests" and that in the absence of any such notification Government could not prohibit the petitioners from working the forest areas and removing the felled material and the charcoal and Katha manufactured by them. 8. 8. In reply the learned Advocate-General said that in fact there were no agreements between the petitioners and the State; that the action of the D.F.O., which was the subject-matter of a depart-mental inquiry, in. permitting the applicants to work the forest areas on payment of certain amounts and in countersigning the agreements between the applicants and the Jagirdar was wholly unauthorised; that assuming that the D.F.O. had authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the Government and that he did so by permitting the applicants to work the forest areas on payment of certain amounts as premium, the agreements not being in compliance with the mendatory requirements of Art.299 (1) were not binding and enforceable against the Government and that the petitioners could not, therefore, say that they had legal and enforceable right under the contracts. Learned Advocate-General placed reliance on -'Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar', AIR 1954 SC 236 (C); - 'Dharmeshwar v. Union of India', (S) AIR 1955 Assam 86 (D); - 'Ram Nagina Singh Governor-General-in-Council', AIR 1952 Cal 306 (E), which was affirmed in appeal in - 'Union India v. Ram Nagina Singh', AIR 1955 NUC (Calcutta) 506 (F). It was further said that the forest areas were the property of the State; that as the petitioners had no legal right to work the forest areas, they were mere trespassers and had no right to work the forest areas or to remove the forest resources unlawfully exploited by them; that the State could exercise their powers in dealing with the State property and restrain the persons concerned from working the forest areas and removing the manufactured material. 9. In my view this is not a case in which any order or a writ or a direction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India can be issued by this Court. At the outset it seems to me necessary to restate, at has been already said in many decisions of this Court, that Art.226 of the Constitution of India can only be invoked for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights if the petitioner has no other specific remedy which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective. At the outset it seems to me necessary to restate, at has been already said in many decisions of this Court, that Art.226 of the Constitution of India can only be invoked for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights if the petitioner has no other specific remedy which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective. In the case of - 'State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal', AIR 1952 SC 12 (G), their Lordships of the Supreme Court stressed the point that the existence of a legal right was the foundation off the exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.226. In - 'Election Commission, India v. Venkata Rao' AIR 1953 SC 210 (H), Patanjali Sastri C.J., observed that Art.226 conferred wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, orders or writs "for any other purposes" being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Courts of King's Bench in England. In - 'Harendranath Sharma v. State of Madhya Bharat', AIR 1950 Madh-B 46 (I), it was observed that the words "any other purpose" must be construed to refer to all purposes for which at English Common law the high prerogative writs are issued to wit, for the protection of the rights of the individuals to check excess or abuse of powers. The first question that, therefore, arises for determination is whether the petitioners have succeeded in showing that they have a legal enforceable right to work the forest areas and to the material manufactured by them. The petitioners found their claim on the fact that when the D.F.O. permitted them to work the forest areas after accepting certain premium amounts countersigning the agreements between them and the Jagirdar, there came into existence new contracts between them and the State, and that though these contracts were not in the form required by Art.299, yet they were binding on the State. Leaving aside the question whether the D.F.O. was within his power in permitting the applicants to work the forest areas and had the power to enter into an agreement on behalf of the Government, and assuming that when he permitted the petitioners to work the forest areas he entered into contracts on behalf of the Government, the contracts are clearly invalid and not binding on the Government as admittedly they did not comply with Art.299(1). The provisions of Art.299(1) are mandatory and if a contract on behalf of the Government does not satisfy the requirements of that article the contract is not binding on the Government and unenforceable against it. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in ' AIR 1954 SC 236 (C) which was also cited on behalf of the petitioners as supporting their contention that the contracts were binding on the Government. In 'Chaturbhuj's case (C)' the question that was considered was whether for purposes of S.7(d), Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was necessary that the contract disqualifying a person from being chosen as a member should be enforceable against the Government. The Supreme Court held that S.7(d) did not require that the contract at which it strikes should be enforceable against the Government and that all that is necessary is that the contract should be for the supply of goods to the Government. In connection with this question the Supreme Court dealt with Art.299(1) of the Constitution and pointed out that the provisions were inserted in the Constitution not for the sake of mere form but for safeguarding Government against unauthorised contracts and that if a contract does not satisfy the requirements of Art.299(1), it is not binding on the Government and is not enforceable against it. The Supreme Court no doubt observed that the contract is not void simply because the Government cannot be sued upon it by reason of Art.299(1). The petitioners pressed into service this observation and sought to suggest that the agreements between the petitioners and the Jagirdar were valid and binding though they did not fulfil the requirements of Art.299(1). I am unable to agree with the petitioners' reading of the observation. In the context in which it has been made, it cannot clearly mean that a contract on behalf of the Government though it does not comply with Art.299(1) is yet binding on the Government. I am unable to agree with the petitioners' reading of the observation. In the context in which it has been made, it cannot clearly mean that a contract on behalf of the Government though it does not comply with Art.299(1) is yet binding on the Government. The Supreme Court made the observation only to emphasise the point that though on such a contract the Government could not be sued, there was nothing to prevent the Government from ratifying the contract, and that the Government would be bound by the contract if it ratifies it. The view that if an agreement does not satisfy the requirements of Art.299(1) of the Constitution, it is not enforceable against the Government is also supported by the decisions in AIR 1952 Cal 306 (E) and (S) AIR 1955 Assam 86 (D) where it was held with regard to the analogous provisions of S.175(3), Government of India Act, 1935 that the provisions were mandatory and their non-compliance rendered a contract on behalf of the Government unenforceable. The English decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no applicability here. In none of those cases did the question of non-compliance with any statutory requirements for a contract on behalf of the Government, arise for consideration. In '(1916) 2 K.B. 193 (A)', the principle that was applied was that if a stranger puts up a house on a land supposing it to be his own, and the real owner perceiving his mistake abstains from setting him right and leaves him to persevere in his error, a Court of Equity will not allow the real owner afterwards to assert his title to the land on which the stranger had expended money on the supposition that the land was his own. In (1949) 1 K.B.227 (B) it was held that an assurance by the War Office to a serving army officer that a certain "disability" of his had been accepted as attributable to military service was binding on the Crown and enforceable and that the army officer was entitled to assume that the War Office had consulted other departments concerned before he gave the assurance. In the present case the petitioners have not cited any instance to show that the Government ratified the contracts and is estopped from saying that the contracts are not binding. In the present case the petitioners have not cited any instance to show that the Government ratified the contracts and is estopped from saying that the contracts are not binding. In my view a contract on behealf of the Government which is not in the form required by Art.299(1) of the Constitution of India is not binding on the Government and is unenforceable against it. Here ex concesso the agreements on which the petitioners rely did not satisfy the requirements of Art.299(1). The petitioners ca not, therefore, claim that under those contracts they have a legal and enforceable right to work the forest areas, and to the manufactured charcoal, Katha and the felled material. It may be that if the D.F.O. was authorised to enter into contracts on behalf of the Government and if he did so conclude any agreements with the petitioners for the working of the forest areas, the petitioners may be entitled to the relief of compensation. But that is a matter with which we are not concerned. Here, the petitioners claim to enforce a right to work the forest areas and to the manufactured material under contracts which are unenforceable. The contracts being unenforceable, they have no legal right which can be enforced by any direction or a writ under Art.226. 10. This renders it unnecessary for me to consider the question whether after the resumption of Palpur Jagir under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 the Commissioner for Jagirs could take any action under S.6 of Act No.55 of 1950 on the ground that before resumption the Jagirdar had leased out forest areas in contravention of S.3 of that Act. The petitioners themselves do not now rely on agreement executed between them and the Jagirdar in 1952. Before us they rested their claim to work the forest areas and to possess the manufactured material on agreements said to have been concluded between them and the State in 1954. That to such alleged agreements with the State the provisions of Act No.55 of 1950 have no application is plain enough; and the Jagir Commissioner's orders in relation to the agreements now set up are clearly without jurisdiction. That to such alleged agreements with the State the provisions of Act No.55 of 1950 have no application is plain enough; and the Jagir Commissioner's orders in relation to the agreements now set up are clearly without jurisdiction. I must, however, say that if the petitioners had taken before the Jagir Commissioner the stand that they did take before us, the Jagir Commissioner would have easily seen that he could make no order under S.6 of the Act 55 of 1950 in respect of agreements said to have been concluded between the petitioners and the D.F.O. on behalf of the State. There is, however, no question of these orders being quashed. The applicants themselves say that Jagir Commissioner has not made any final order against them. They say that the Government should not give effect to the orders of the Jagir Commissioner, and at the same time make a grievance that the Government has not taken any notice of the suggestions made by the Jagir Commissioner in his order dated 6-5-1955. In fact a declaration that the orders passed by the Jagir Commissioner on 28-2-1955, 24-3-1955, 12-4-1955 and 6-5-1955 were on the position now taken by the petitioners, without jurisdiction can be of no avail to the petitioners. For, if as I think there are no enforceable contracts in favour of the petitioners for the working of the forest areas, they are more trespassers so far as Government is cocerned and the State would be within its right in prohibiting the petitioners from working the forest areas and dealing with the manufactured material. 11. As to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no notification declaring the forest areas of the former Jagir as "reserved forest" or "protected forest" was issued under the Forest Act, it is sufficient to say that it is not the declaration of a forest areas as 'reserved' or 'protected' that confers proprietary rights on the State in the forest area. The forest area of the former Jagir became State property under S.4(1), Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 1951 when the Jagir was resumed. The notification of a forest area as 'reserved' or 'protected' under the Forest Act, only involves certain peculiar consequence. The forest area of the former Jagir became State property under S.4(1), Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 1951 when the Jagir was resumed. The notification of a forest area as 'reserved' or 'protected' under the Forest Act, only involves certain peculiar consequence. It does not mean that in the absence of any such notification a forest area which is the property of the Government can be exploited by any person without any restriction. The objection taken in Ambrikrai's petition as to the validity of Act No.55 of 1950 was not pressed before us. 12. For all these reasons I would dismiss each of these petitions with costs assessing counsel's fees at Rs.75/-. If the petitioners have removed and taken possession of charcoal or and Katha in pursuance of interim orders passed by this Court in these petitions, they shall place the charcoal and Katha so removed at the disposal of the State. 13. SAMVATSAR, J.: I agree. Petitions dismissed.