JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This is Defendants' second appeal against the reversing judgment of the lower appellate Court arising out of a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or, in the alternative, recovery of possession in respect of the disputed homestead appertaining to plot No. 875. The husband of the Plaintiff who according to the Plaintiff was addicted to intoxicants sold away, the homestead in question - on the basis of a Kabala dated 24th April, 1942 in favour of Defendant No. 1. The Plaintiff's prayer is that the Kabala is ineffective, inoperative and invalid against her under the law revealing in the State of Dhenkanal where the parties are residents. Defendants 2 to 4 claim the disputed homestead on the basis of an exchange with Defendant No. 1. 2. Several points were raised in defence, But the points of controversy have been settled by the concurrent findings of facts of both the Courts below that the disputed property is the homestead of the Plaintiff's husband and they the Plaintiff and her husband had no other residential house. It has been found that the Plaintiff is still continuing in possession and further that the Plaintiff had not consented to the Kabala dated 24th April, 1942 executed by her husband in favour of Defendant No. 1. 3. It would be pertinent to quote the rule of law as was prevailing in the Dhenkanal State at the time of the execution of the Kabala- No transfer of a homestead area in actual occupation of wife or the minor children of a transferor shall create any right or title in favour of the transferee unless the wife if living she gives her express and written consent on the deed of transfer, and in no case if the wife is dead and the transferor has minor children living with him. It is therefore clear from this rule that a transfer of this nature of the home stead in the actual occupation of the Plaintiff is void as creating any interest or title in favour of the transferee as it was without the express consent of the wife in writing on the deed of transfer. It is further provided that there can be no transfer of a homestead when the wife is dead and the transferor has minor children living with him. It is further provided that there can be no transfer of a homestead when the wife is dead and the transferor has minor children living with him. In that case the question of consent does not arise at all, the children being minors. 4. It is however strongly contended on behalf of the Appellants that this rule of law in the Dhenkanal State must be taken to have been completely abrogated by the provisions of the Administration of Orissa States Order, 1948 (hereinafter called 'the Order). It is urged on behalf of the Appellants that the rules of law prevalent in the State of Dhenkanal which are repugnant to the provisions of the enactments scheduled in the Order must be deemed to be void. The provision "that the transfer of homestead without the consent of the wife is void" is repugnant to the provision of free transfer in accordance with the sections of the Transfer of Property Act. The defence do not stop here, but their main contention is that such a provision rendering this pertinent rule of law as repugnant and void contained in the Order is also retrospective, and, as such, the transfer of the year 1942, which is being assailed in the present suit, must be held to be a valid one being in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned Counsel for the Appellants relies upon a Bench decision of our Court reported in Daka Bagarli v. Mukunda Khamari 17 C.L.T. 27. This contention prevailed over the trial Court who dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. But in appeal preferred by the Plaintiff in the lower appellate Court this contention has been negatived. So the second appeal. In my view, the contention is manifestly without any substance whatsoever. This contention prevailed over the trial Court who dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. But in appeal preferred by the Plaintiff in the lower appellate Court this contention has been negatived. So the second appeal. In my view, the contention is manifestly without any substance whatsoever. This is made clear at a glance by reference to paragraph 4 (a) of the Order which runs as follows- The enactments specified in the first column of the Second Schedule hereto annexed shall, so far as circumstances admit and subject to any amendments to which the enactments are for, the time being generally subject, in the territories to which they extend, apply to all Orissa States and any provision of any law in force, whether substantive or procedural and whether based on custom and usage or statutes, in any of the Orissa States, which is repugnant to any provision of any of the said enactments shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, cease to have effect from the date of commencement of this Order. It does not admit of any double interpretation that the provisions prevailing in the States which are repugnant to any of the provisions of the said enactments shall, to the extent of repugnancy, cease to have effect from the date of commencement of this Order. That is to say, the Order makes the provisions of the scheduled enactments operative only from the date of commencement of this Order and not retrospectively. It is by far one of the elementary principles that vested substantive rights can be divested only by express terms of legislation, or on account of the position that arises by necessary implication. In the present case, not only there is no provision making substantive rights on the basis of the prevailing laws of the State of Dhenkanal nugatory, but, on the contrary I there is an express provision that the Order comes into force only from the date of its commencement. Regarding the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the defence, it is to be noted that this decision is of no help to support their contention. The main question involved in that case is as to the validity or otherwise of a transfer of an occupancy holding it the State of Sonepur without the consent of the Gaontia. Regarding the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the defence, it is to be noted that this decision is of no help to support their contention. The main question involved in that case is as to the validity or otherwise of a transfer of an occupancy holding it the State of Sonepur without the consent of the Gaontia. In that case, the Gaontia's consent not having been taken the sale was attacked as being invalid whereas it was contended by the transferee that the sale as valid according to the provisions of the new Orissa Tenancy Act. Their Lordships observed As I have already shown, by reference to the various provisions in the two Sections 22 and 23 of the Code of Sonepur, the formalities prescribed there are divided into two classes. The irregularity of not obtaining Gaontia's consent as a formality is a curable one, His consent is obtainable on payment of 10 percent of the consideration money, On his failure to grant it, a certificate could be granted by the Revenue Department. This cannot be compared with the compulsory nature of registration under the Indian Registration Act. Their Lordships further observed- On the contrary, transfers without Gaontia's consent can be compared to transfers of occupancy holdings without the consent of the landlord or proprietor u/s 31 of the pre-amendment of Orissa Tenancy Act, Such transfers, though not valid and binding against the landlord for purposes of proceedings for realisation of rent, were always considered to be binding against the transferor and his successors-in-interest. I do not think that in the circumstances of this case a different view can be taken. That was the most important feature that weighed with their Lordships in the decision of that case. I do not think that in the circumstances of this case a different view can be taken. That was the most important feature that weighed with their Lordships in the decision of that case. In the present case, as I have already mentioned, on the construction of the rule itself the transfer by the husband in respect of the homestead without the consent of the wife is void and not only that the absence of the consent is a mere curable defect, Indeed their Lordships, after quoting paragraph 12(c) of the Order which makes provisions for procedural matters, made a further observation "This means that the occupancy holding which is the subject matter of this appeal shall be taken to be one free to be transferred in an ordinary manner", But it can never be suggested for a moment that their Lordships have laid down as a general proposition that the provisions of the enactments scheduled in the Order are retrospective to the extent that all laws prevailing in the States repugnant to the provisions of the scheduled enactments must be deemed to have been never existed at all and that all settled positions on the basis of the law prevailing in the States prior to 1948 are to be unsettled if they are found to be repugnant to any of the provisions of the scheduled enactments. This interpretation, to my mind, will do a great violence to the provisions of the order which was never meant by their Lordships. In my view therefore, the sale-deed executed by the husband of the Plaintiff in favour of Defendant No. 1 on 24th April 1942 is void and as Defendant No. 1 had no title on the basis of this document, the exchange of the homestead with Defendants 2 to 4 must necessarily fall through. 5. In conclusion, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed