Judgment :- 1. This appeal was referred to Full Bench by the following order: "The first defendant in O.S. No. 18 of 1123 on the file of the District Court of Parur against whom a decree for past and future maintenance has been passed in favour of his wife, the first plaintiff, and one of his daughters, the second plaintiff, appeals, and the main question for consideration is whether a Christian wife (Syrian Roman Catholic) is entitled to separate maintenance from her husband. So far as the decree granted to the daughter, second plaintiff, is concerned, learned counsel for her in this court does not support the decree of the court below in view of the decision of this court in 1952 K.L.T. 595. The question is important as affecting the entire community and the only precedent appears to be the one in 24 T.L.J. 281. We consider that the case is an important one and that there should be an authoritative decision of a Full bench of this court on the point. We, therefore, refer the case to a Full Bench for disposal. P.K. Subramonia Iyer, J. M.S. Menon, J." The first plaintiff is the second wife of the first defendant. Second plaintiff and third defendant are their children. The second defendant is the son of the first defendant by his first wife. The first defendant and the first plaintiff were living in the house in plaint item No. 2 with their children. The first defendant had executed a will bequeathing this property to the plaintiffs and the third defendant. It was alleged in the plaint that at the instigation of the second defendant and acting under the influence of liquor the first defendant began to ill-treat the first plaintiff and that in Makaram 1120 he assaulted her and drove her away from the house. Soon afterwards, the third defendant also was sent away from the house and the house was dismantled by the first defendant. The plaintiffs and the third defendant went and lived in the first plaintiff's father's house and they were being maintained by her relations. Form the plaint schedule items which belong to the first defendant he is getting an annual income of not less than Rs. 1,000/-. Plaintiffs are entitled to get at least Rs. 175/- per annum for their maintenance from the first defendant. Form the plaint schedule items which belong to the first defendant he is getting an annual income of not less than Rs. 1,000/-. Plaintiffs are entitled to get at least Rs. 175/- per annum for their maintenance from the first defendant. Arrears of maintenance from Makaram 1120 and future maintenance at that rate were claimed in the suit. There was also a prayer to have the maintenance made a charge on the plaint schedule properties. It was further alleged in the plaint that Rs. 200/- and movables worth Rs. 447/- belonging to the first plaintiff were kept in the house in plaint item No. 2 and that they were misappropriated by defendants 1 and 2. The money and the value of the movables were claimed from defendants 1 and 2. 2. All the three defendants filed separate written statements in the case. The first defendant denied the allegation in the plaint that he ill-treated and assaulted the first plaintiff and drove her away from his house. He contended that the plaintiffs deserted him without any justifiable cause at the instigation of the first plaintiff's brother. The house in item No. 2 was not dismantled by him. It got dilapidated as it was left unoccupied. He was not bound to maintain the plaintiffs since they went away from his house without any valid reason and he is prepared to maintain them according to his means if they return and live with him. The income from the plaint schedule properties will not exceed Rs. 200/- a year and the claim for Rs. 175/- per annum as maintenance is, in any case, excessive. The allegation in the plaint that the first plaintiff had kept Rs. 200/- in the house in plaint item No. 2 was denied. The movables that belonged to the first plaintiff were taken away by her when she left the house. In the written statement filed by the second defendant he supported the first defendant and denied liability for any of the amounts claimed in the plaint. The third defendant supported the plaintiffs. She was married but is now a widow. She contended that she was entitled to get her Streedhanam charged on the plaint schedule properties. She had no objection to a decree being given to the plaintiffs for maintenance charged on the plaint schedule properties subject to her right to Streedhanam. 3. The third defendant supported the plaintiffs. She was married but is now a widow. She contended that she was entitled to get her Streedhanam charged on the plaint schedule properties. She had no objection to a decree being given to the plaintiffs for maintenance charged on the plaint schedule properties subject to her right to Streedhanam. 3. The main question that was considered by the court below was whether there was valid reason for the plaintiffs to leave the house of the first defendant and to claim separate maintenance from him. The court found that the first plaintiff was being ill-treated by the first defendant, that the plaintiffs were driven away from the house in plaint item No. 2, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were justified in refusing to live with the first defendant. It was accordingly held that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim separate maintenance from the first defendant. The income from the plaint schedule properties was found to be only Rs. 200/- a year and it was held that the first plaintiff was entitled to get maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100/- a year and the second plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 331/3 a year. A decree was given for arrears of maintenance at that rate from 15.10.1120 till 31.12.1124 and the first plaintiff was allowed to recover future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100/- per year from 1.1.1125 her death or re-marriage. Maintenance was not, however, made a charge on the plaint schedule properties. Interest was allowed on arrears of maintenance at 6 per cent per annum. The claim for Rs. 200/- and value of movables was disallowed. The second defendant was not made liable for any portion of the plaint claim. Plaintiffs were allowed to recover proportionate costs from defendants 1 and 2. 4. The main ground taken in the memorandum of appeal was that the court below went wrong in finding that there was valid reason for the plaintiffs to refuse to live with the first defendant and to claim separate maintenance from him. The rate of maintenance was also questioned. The second defendant filed a memorandum of objection in which he objected to the decree making him liable for the costs of the plaintiffs. The rate of maintenance was also questioned. The second defendant filed a memorandum of objection in which he objected to the decree making him liable for the costs of the plaintiffs. As can be gathered from the order of reference, at the time of arguing the appeal before the Division Bench, learned counsel for the appellant contended that, according to the personal law of the parties, a wife is not entitled to claim maintenance from her husband. The parties are Syrian Catholics. Since the question is an important one affecting the community in general the Division Bench though it desirable to have it decided by a Full Bench. It was under these circumstances that the appeal happened to be referred to a Full Bench. 5. It was not contended by the first defendant in his written statement that he was not bound to maintain his wife. His only contention was that the plaintiffs went away fro his house without any valid reason and that he was not liable to maintain them so long as they refused to live with him. This is what is stated in paragraph 12 of the written statement: Ground No. 6 in the memorandum of appeal relating to this point is to the following effect: "The lower court ought to have found that the personal law of the parties does not allow the wife to claim separate maintenance where she has refused to live with the husband". It would appear from this that even at the time of filing the appeal the first defendant had no case that he is not bound to maintain his wife in any event and that his only contention was that he was not liable to maintain her so long as she refused to live with him. It was only at the time of arguing the appeal that the appellant took up the position that according to the personal law of the parties the husband is not legally bound to maintain his wife. 6. There is no statute law in the State relating to the question. Of course, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a wife, to whichever community she may belong, can apply to the Magistrate for an order for maintenance against her husband who, having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain her. 6. There is no statute law in the State relating to the question. Of course, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a wife, to whichever community she may belong, can apply to the Magistrate for an order for maintenance against her husband who, having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain her. The provision in that Code compelling the husband to maintain his wife and children is intended to prevent vagrancy and it has nothing to do with the question whether under the personal law governing the parties the wife has a civil right to claim maintenance from her husband. The Travancore Christian Succession Act does not deal with the question. As to whether under the customary law governing the Christian community the husband is legally bound to maintain his wife was not considered by the court below. In the nature of the contention raised by the first defendant in the case there was no occasion for the court to go into that question. It is a matter of common knowledge that suits are filed in the courts of the State by Christian wives for maintenance against their husbands and decrees are given in such suits awarding maintenance. It does not appear that a contention has been raised in any suit till now that, according to the personal law of the Christians, the husband has no legal obligation to maintain his wife. The only reported case in which the question of a Christian husband's liability to maintain his wife was considered by the Travancore High Court is Thoma v. Rahel (24 T.L.J. 281). In that case also the contention of the husband was not that he was not in law bound to maintain his wife but that the wife was not entitled to separate maintenance so long as she refused to live with him without justifiable cause, and the only question that was considered in the case was whether the wife was entitled to claim separate maintenance if without valid reason she refused to live with her husband. This is clear from paragraph 3 of the judgment which is to the following effect: "The allegations on which the claim for separate maintenance is based are habitual ill-treatment by the defendant, his disreputable ways of life and the consequent necessity for the plaintiff to take shelter in her parent's house. This is clear from paragraph 3 of the judgment which is to the following effect: "The allegations on which the claim for separate maintenance is based are habitual ill-treatment by the defendant, his disreputable ways of life and the consequent necessity for the plaintiff to take shelter in her parent's house. The law as to the wife's claim to get separate maintenance from the husband is well defined and in this case the arguments on both sides proceeded on the understanding that the rules of the Hindu Law relating to maintenance to a wife, consonant as they are with the general principles of jurisprudence are applicable to the parties here though Christians and in my view there is no impropriety in such application, as the differences in religion and caste are immaterial in a matter of this kind. Among Hindus as well as Christians, marriage creates a special status from which springs the rights and duties of married people as such, one of which being the duty of the husband to maintain the wife provided she in her turn discharges her marital obligations. Under the Hindu Law, a wife is not entitled to separate maintenance from her husband unless she proves that by reason of his misconduct or by his refusal to maintain her in his own place of residence or other justifying cause, she is compelled to live apart from him: Ulakamma and others v. Ganapathi Achari and others (6 T.L.R. 37); but if she quits him of her own accord, either without cause or on account of such ordinary quarrels as are incidental to married life in general, she can set up no claim to a separate maintenance, Surampalli Rangaramma v. Surampalli Brambaze (I.L.R. 31 Mad. 338) and A. Seenyya Reddi v. A. Mangamma (A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1159). The English Law as to the liability of the husband to maintain the wife, and the cessation of her right if she leaves him without his consent in circumstances which do not justify her in living apart, is similar. Then again nothing will justify a Hindu wife in leaving her home except such violence as renders it unsafe for her to continue there or such ill-usage as would be termed cruelty in an English Matrimonial Court (Matangini Dasi v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick) (I.L.R.19 Cal. 84). Then again nothing will justify a Hindu wife in leaving her home except such violence as renders it unsafe for her to continue there or such ill-usage as would be termed cruelty in an English Matrimonial Court (Matangini Dasi v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick) (I.L.R.19 Cal. 84). On the question of what is legal cruelty between man and wife, there is not material difference as between the English Law and the Hindu and Muhammedan Law (Yamunabai and Narayan Jaganath Bhide v. Narayan Moreshvar Pendse) (I.L.R.1 Bom.164). It is not suggested that, in a case of this kind the customary law of the Syrian Christians is different. The plaintiff has to stand or fall according to the allegation of cruelty and misconduct she had put forward in the plaint. The burden is heavily upon her in the peculiar circumstances of this case". 7. The fact that the contention now raised on behalf of the appellant has not been raised in any suit instituted by a Christian wife for maintenance against her husband may not by itself prove that, according to the custom in the community, the husband is legally bound to maintain his wife. But it goes a long way to show what the consciousness of the community is. 8. Under the Canon Law also the husband is bound to maintain his wife (vide Commentary on Canon Law, by Augustine, Book III, Volume V, page 330). The learned author says; "The husband has the duty of providing his wife with the necessaries of life which the civil law further details". Although the Canon Law referred to above does not as such apply to Catholics belonging to Oriental Churches including Syrian Catholics the principles relating to marital obligations embodied in the Canon Law apply to all Catholics. 9. In matters not governed by statute or customary law it is the principles of 'justice, equity and good conscience' that should apply, and it is supposed that those principles are to be found in the Common Law of England. We shall, therefore, see what the position is under that law. It was contended for the appellant that, under the Common Law, the husband has no legal obligation to maintain his wife and that the obligation is only moral. Reference was made to Eversley on Domestic Relations 6th Edition, page 177). We shall, therefore, see what the position is under that law. It was contended for the appellant that, under the Common Law, the husband has no legal obligation to maintain his wife and that the obligation is only moral. Reference was made to Eversley on Domestic Relations 6th Edition, page 177). The learned author says: "The husband, as head of the house-hold, is under an obligation to support and maintain his wife and children, in which latter term are included the children of which he has been adjudged to be putative father. This obligation was always rather moral than legal. It was not until his wife became actually chargeable to a parish or union that a man was liable to be punished for refusing or neglecting to support her, and then only as a rogue and vagabond. The wife, in truth, had no claim on her husband, even when starving and deserted by him; the guardians or overseers of the union or parish, the charges of which had been increased by his wrong-doing, alone could bring the offender to justice under the Poor Law (Amendment) Act, 1868, and recover the cost of her maintenance, and the justices in making their order were not limited by the amount already allowed by the guardians, or obliged to wait till the sum was fixed It seems to us that what the learned author means when he says that the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife was 'rather moral than legal' is that the wife could not bring an action against the husband for her maintenance. This was on account of the peculiar position which the wife occupied in relation to her husband under the English Common Law. Under that law, the husband and wife are one in person and, therefore, the wife could not sue the husband. 10. This was on account of the peculiar position which the wife occupied in relation to her husband under the English Common Law. Under that law, the husband and wife are one in person and, therefore, the wife could not sue the husband. 10. The position of married women under the English Common Law is described thus by Blackstone: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-french a femecovert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage". It follows from this that no action could be brought by either husband or wife against the other. This does not, however, mean that the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife was only moral and not legal. The Common Law itself provided other legal means by which the obligation could be enforced. The wife could pledge the credit of the husband for purchasing things necessary for her maintenance and thereby compel the husband to maintain her. That was an indirect way of enforcing the legal obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. Reference may be made to Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England (19th Edition., Volume I, page 278). The learned author says: "In fact, the chief legal effect of marriage at the present time is to impose a burden on the husband. A husband is bound to maintain his wife according to his estate and condition; and so, if his wife manages the domestic side of his establishment, she has a right to pledge his credit for house-hold expenses, unless he has forbidden her to do so or has supplied her with ready money to enable her to defray them. A husband is bound to maintain his wife according to his estate and condition; and so, if his wife manages the domestic side of his establishment, she has a right to pledge his credit for house-hold expenses, unless he has forbidden her to do so or has supplied her with ready money to enable her to defray them. Moreover, if she is living apart from him, not through her own fault, she has an irrevocable right to pledge his credit for necessaries, unless he actually makes her an allowance. But if it is through her own fault that she is living apart from him, his liability to maintain her ceases, for the liability to maintain her is co-relative to her duty to cohabit with him". At page 290 the learned author compares the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife with that of the father to maintain his child. He says: "A father is said to be bound to maintain, to protect, and to educate his children. But this duty is never such that if he neglects it he can be liable to an action at the suit of his aggrieved child, though, as we shall see, he may be criminally liable for cruelty. English Law has maintained to a surprising degree the father's absolute government of his house-hold, It is just possible that a father may be liable to pay another for the support of his child, whom he has left in a destitute state; but it is clear that a child has no right comparable to that of a wife to pledge her husband's credit if deserted by him, and so a father cannot be compelled to pay for the necessaries supplied to his child". It is clear from this that so far as the husband's obligation to maintain his wife is concerned it was not a mere moral obligation, but was a legal obligation which could be enforced by indirect action. 11. The question is discussed by Montague Lush in his 'Law of Husband and Wife'. It is clear from this that so far as the husband's obligation to maintain his wife is concerned it was not a mere moral obligation, but was a legal obligation which could be enforced by indirect action. 11. The question is discussed by Montague Lush in his 'Law of Husband and Wife'. The learned author says: "One of the first duties which the husband undertakes towards his wife is to maintain and support her, so long as the marriage relation continues and so long as the wife remains faithful to him; though she may divest herself of her right to be maintained and supported by him if she leaves him without his consent. This duty of the husband is one which is, and always has been, directly enforced by the Ecclesiastical Courts by a decree of alimony accompanied by a decree, formerly of divorce a mensa et toro, and now of judicial separation, in case the husband refuses to supply his wife with the necessaries of life, which is a recognised form of cruelty entitling the wife to such a decree. As far as the Common Law is concerned, it recognised and approved this relief given by the Ecclesiastical Courts, but can hardly be said to have directly enforced the duty by its own procedure, though there is authority that a wife could obtain redress by means of a writ of supplicavit; but the same authority adds that "if the husband will not give necessaries to his wife she can make her complaint to the ordinary, and he may give her a remedy, and that this is the proper course and best adapted to every such complaint is manifest". Although this duty was not enforced directly by processes at Common Law, there are may statutes imposing definite obligations upon husbands towards their wives, which are based upon the existence of the duty. Although this duty was not enforced directly by processes at Common Law, there are may statutes imposing definite obligations upon husbands towards their wives, which are based upon the existence of the duty. If a husband is able to maintain himself or his family, by work or other means, and wilfully refuses or neglects "so to do, so that his family whom he is legally bound to maintain, comes upon the parish, he may be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one month, with hard labour, under S. 3 of the vagrancy Act, 1824 And under the same Act, if he runs away and leaves the wife and children chargeable to any parish he may be convicted as a rogue and vagabond and sentenced to three months' imprisonment with hard labour. Moreover, if the wife comes upon the parish for relief the husband may be compelled to contribute to her support. By the Poor Law (Amendment) Act, 1834, S. 56, it was enacted that all relief given to or on account of the wife, or to or on account of any child or children under the age of 16, not being blind or deaf or dumb, shall be considered as being given to the husband of such wife or to the father of such child or children as the case may be". (Vide 3rd edition, page 19) Under S. 33 of the Poor Law (Amendment) Act, 1868, the guardians of the union or parish or the overseers of the parish to which the wife became chargeable could apply to the justices in petty sessions assembled and they could make an order upon the husband to pay such sum towards the cost of the relief of the wife as might appear proper to them. An order could be made under this section against the husband even if the wife refused, on account of his ill-usage, to return to him after he requested her to do so, provided she had a reasonable apprehension of renewal of the ill-treatment. Similar provisions were enacted in the Matrimonial Causes act, 1878, and the Married Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act, 1886, which were replaced by the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895. Similar provisions were enacted in the Matrimonial Causes act, 1878, and the Married Women (Maintenance in Case of Desertion) Act, 1886, which were replaced by the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895. Under the latter Act a married woman whose husband wilfully neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for her or her infant children could apply for relief to the court of Summary Jurisdiction and the court could order the husband to pay the wife personally or for her use to any officer of the court or third person such sum as the court might consider reasonable having regard to the means of both the husband and the wife. With regard to the procedure adopted by the courts of Common Law for enforcing the duty of the husband to maintain his wife the learned author says: "The means whereby the courts of Common Law enforced the duty of a husband to support and maintain his wife are indirect but effective. If he with-holds from her support and maintenance or fails to supply her with necessaries, the law holds him liable to anybody who supplies her with them It will be seen that a wife is entitled to pledge her husband's credit for what is necessary to maintain her in health, if he deprives her of the necessities of life while they are living together; and if he deserts her she has a still more extensive authority. But she loses this right in either case if she is guilty of unchastity uncondoned by her husband". (Page 30-31) 12. This is what Blackstone says on the subject: "The husband is bound to provide his wife with necessaries by law, as much as himself; and if she contracts debts for them, he is obliged to pay them, unless he supplies her with necessaries himself". (Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume I, Page 418). 13. Reference may also be made to Halsbury's Laws of England, Page 608, where the learned author says: "It is the duty of a husband to maintain his wife according to his means of supporting her. If he fails to perform this duty, she has implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries suitable to his station in life and this authority is not affected by his unsoundness of mind. If he fails to perform this duty, she has implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries suitable to his station in life and this authority is not affected by his unsoundness of mind. If the husband deserts his wife or is guilty of misconduct justifying her in leaving him and living apart, and she is without means of support, her implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries becomes an authority of necessity, which cannot be revoked by the husband". In the foot-note the learned author refers to New Monckton Collieries Limited v. Keeling (1911 Appeal Cases 648) wherein it was held that 'there is no presumption of law that a wife is dependent upon her husband's earnings merely because of his legal obligation to maintain her'. 14. The right of the wife to pledge the credit of the husband for purchasing necessaries was discussed by the Court of Exchequer in Read v. Legard (155 English Reports 698). Pollock, C.B., expounded the law thus: "The true principle seems to be, that when a man marries he contracts an obligation to support his wife, and, in point of law, he gives her authority to pledge his credit for her support, if circumstances render it necessary, she herself not being in fault". Alderson, B, said: "By the marriage contract entered into when the defendant was sane, the parties contracted a relation which gave the wife certain rights which the law recgonises. It is only necessary for us to say that one of them is, that the wife is entitled to be supported, according to the estate and condition of her husband. If she is compelled by his misconduct to procure the necessary articles herself, as for instance if he drives her from his house, or brings improper persons into it, so that no respectable woman could live there, according to the decided cases, he gives her authority to pledge his credit for her necessary maintenance elsewhere; which means that the law gives that authority by force of the relation of husband and wife". Platt, B., also observed that the defendant had contracted a relation by his marriage which imposed on him the obligation to maintain his wife. Platt, B., also observed that the defendant had contracted a relation by his marriage which imposed on him the obligation to maintain his wife. Martin, B., adopted the reasoning of Alderson, B., and said that by contracting the relation of marriage the husband took on himself the duty of supplying his wife with necessaries and that if he did not perform that duty either through his own fault or in consequence of a misfortune like insanity the wife had by reason of that relation authority to procure them herself and the husband was responsible for what was so supplied to her. It will thus be seen that under the Common Law of England the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife is not a mere moral obligation but is a legal obligation which could be enforced in law although not by direct action by the wife. 15. For the reasons given above, we hold that, according to the personal law of the Christians in the State, the husband has a legal obligation to maintain his wife. We may also say that, in this respect, the law governing Christians is in no way different from that applicable to Hindus. Both under the Hindu Law and the Christian Law, marriage creates a status with certain obligations attached to it. One of such obligations is that of the husband to maintain his wife, so long as the wife is willing to discharge her own marital obligations. According to Catholics and most of the other Christian denominations, marriage is not a mere contract. In the words of Eversley "it is a status the conditions of which are regulated for, and not by, those who enter it. When the marriage is perfected, the semblance of a mere contract is at an end". 16. The further question for consideration is under what circumstances a wife is entitled to claim separate maintenance from her husband. It is not disputed that the wife is entitled to claim separate maintenance only if there is justifiable cause for her refusal to live with him. The husband's obligation to maintain his wife is conditional on the wife's willingness to discharge her marital obligations. If for no valid reason she lives away from the husband he is not bound to maintain her. The husband's obligation to maintain his wife is conditional on the wife's willingness to discharge her marital obligations. If for no valid reason she lives away from the husband he is not bound to maintain her. The question whether the wife has justifiable cause for refusing to live with the husband will depend upon the facts of each case. Desertion by the husband and habitual cruelty are recognised as justifiable causes for the wife's refusal to live with the husband. This is the position both under the English Common Law and the Hindu Law. 17. The first plaintiff's case is that she was driven away from the first defendant's house and that the latter assaulted and ill-treated her. It is also alleged that the house in which she was living with the first defendant was pulled down by him. The first defendant denied these allegations and contended that the plaintiffs went away from his without any valid reason and that he was willing to maintain them if they went and lived with him. The plaintiffs examined four witnesses including the first plaintiff to prove their case that the first defendant was in the habit of assaulting the first plaintiff after getting himself drunk and that after driving away the plaintiffs from his house he pulled it down. Pw.1 is the direct niece of the first defendant. She lives close to the house in which the plaintiffs were living with the first defendant. Her evidence shows that she is not in any way inclined to help the plaintiffs. But, she admits that the first plaintiff went away from the house on account of quarrel with the first defendant. She also admits that occasionally the first defendant used to get drunk and abuse the first plaintiff. She further swears that after the plaintiffs left the house the first defendant used to abuse the third defendant also and that consequently she too left the house. She also says that the house was pulled down by the first defendant. Pw. 2 is one who was employed in a toddy shop near plaint item No. 2 on the opposite side of the river. He also swears that the first defendant used to quarrel with the first plaintiff after getting himself drunk and that the first plaintiff was sent away from the house by the first defendant. Pw. 2 is one who was employed in a toddy shop near plaint item No. 2 on the opposite side of the river. He also swears that the first defendant used to quarrel with the first plaintiff after getting himself drunk and that the first plaintiff was sent away from the house by the first defendant. He further swears that about a month after the plaintiffs left the house the third defendant also went away from the house and that the first defendant pulled down the house. Pw. 3 is the cousin of the third defendant's husband. He swears that the first defendant was in the habit of drinking, that he used to assault his wife and that he drove away the plaintiffs from his house are dismantled it. Since this witness is interested in the third defendant, the court below did not act on his evidence. Pw. 4 is the first plaintiff herself. She swears that it was on account of the ill-treatment of the first defendant that she was forced to leave the house in plaint them No. 2, that the first defendant used to get himself drunk and assault her, that she was driven away from the house by him and that she was consequently forced to go and live in her brother's house. The learned District Judge believed the evidence of Pws.1, 2 and 4. We also find no reason why these witnesses should not be believed. Their evidence shows that the first defendant was guilty of habitual cruelty towards the first plaintiff and that the plaintiffs were driven away from the house by him. In the circumstances, the first plaintiff had justifiable cause for refusing to live with the first defendant. She is, therefore, entitled to get separate maintenance from him. 18. As for the rate of maintenance the court below has found that the first plaintiff is entitled to get Rs. 100/- a year and the second plaintiff Rs. 331/3 a year. The second plaintiff's claim for maintenance was not pressed before us in view of the decision of this Court in 1952 K.L.T. 595. We are, therefore, concerned with the claim of the first plaintiff only. According to the plaintiffs, the first defendant's income from his properties is over Rs. 1,000/- a year, while according to the first defendant it is only Rs. 200/-. In any case, we do not think that Rs. We are, therefore, concerned with the claim of the first plaintiff only. According to the plaintiffs, the first defendant's income from his properties is over Rs. 1,000/- a year, while according to the first defendant it is only Rs. 200/-. In any case, we do not think that Rs. 100/- a year awarded by the court below as maintenance to the first plaintiff is excessive. We, therefore, confirm that award. The first plaintiff will be entitled to arrears of maintenance from 15.10.1120 and future maintenance from the date of suit at that rate. Arrears of maintenance will carry interest at six per cent per annum. The first plaintiff will be entitled to get maintenance at this rate till her death or re-marriage. The first plaintiff and the first defendant are free to move the court below for varying the rate of future maintenance if on account of altered circumstances the rate of maintenance becomes either excessive or inadequate. The decree of the court below is reversed as regards the award of maintenance and costs to the second plaintiff. 19. In the memorandum of objection filed by the second defendant he has objected to the decree of the court below making him liable for the costs of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought to make the second defendant also liable for the plaint claim. That relief was disallowed by the court below. In the circumstances, we find no reason why the second defendant should be made liable for the costs of the plaintiffs. The decree of the court below is modified to that extent, and the memorandum of objection is allowed. 20. The judgment and decree of the court below are modified to the above extent and confirmed in other respects. The appeal is partly allowed as indicated above. The first respondent will get her costs in this Court from the appellant. The other parties will bear their respective costs in this Court.