Judgment 1. THIS petition under Art. 226 of the constitution of India is directed against the order of assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Respondent No. 1) on February 7, 1962 against the petitioner firm under the West Bengal Taxes on entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act'); and the order of May 24, 1962 made by Respondent No. 2, Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, dismissing the petitioner's appeal against the said order of Respondent No, 1, and the certificate proceedings in Certificate case no. 47 S. T. /62-63, instituted by the respondents to recover the tax 'assessed by the impugned order. 2. THE petitioner's case is that the same persons entered into partnership agreements to carry on two supplementary business under the name of two firms, namely, the petitioner Air Carrying corporation-carrying on the business of a common carrier of goods by Air, and Respondent no. 3, the Indian Roadways, carrying on business of a carrier of goods by road. It is stated in the petition that when the petitioner firm is in need of backload for the purpose of properly flying the aeroplanes chartered by it, it takes over the quantity required from the Respondent No. 3 of goods which have been consigned to the latter for carriage by road. In February and March, 1959, respondent No. 3 received certain consignments of tea to be carried from siliguri to Calcutta by road, the consignee being the Central Bank of India ltd. After the Respondent No. 3 had advised the Central Bank of India Ltd. that the goods would be carried by road, the petitioner requested the Respondent No. 3 to supply some backload for its chartered flights, and in pursuance of such request the Respondent no. 3 supplied some of the goods consigned with them by two Manifests dated 25th Feb. and the 8th March, 1959, respectively (Ann. 'b'. 3 supplied some of the goods consigned with them by two Manifests dated 25th Feb. and the 8th March, 1959, respectively (Ann. 'b'. By two letters of the 2nd and 9th March, 1959, the Respondent No. 3 informed the Central bank of India that though the said goods were consigned to be carried by road by respondent No. 3, they were, in fact, being carried by air and requested the bank to amend the Bill of Entry for the purpose of payment of the Entry tax under the provisions of the Act, and the Bank by its letter of the 13th and 14th March, 1959, written to Respondent No, 3, acknowledged a note of this fact on the 17th March and the 7th April. The Taxes payable under the provisions of the Act in respect of these consignments were accordingly paid by the Central Bank of India but such payment was made by the Bank on the basis that the said goods had been transported by road, owing to their inadvertence. On the 3rd August', 1959, a notice under section 10 of the Act was served upon the petitioner calling upon the petitioner to pay tax in respect of the same consignments for which the tax had already been paid by the Central Bank. 3. NOTWITHSTANDING the petitioner's protest, the Respondent No. 1, by his impugned order assessed a tax of Rs. 2,270. 25 paise in respect of the disputed goods and his appeal was rejected by the Respondent No. 2. The petitioner challenges these orders on two grounds in the petition, namely,- (a) that the petitioner was not a ''dealer' within the meaning of the said Act and that accordingly the respondent had no jurisdiction to tax the petitioner ; (b) that since the tax for the disputed goods had already been paid by the Central Bank, the respondent had no jurisdiction to tax the petitioner again for the self same goods and that the impugned orders axe accordingly vitiated by absence of jurisdiction as well as an error of law apparent on the face of the record and that the petitioner's fundamental right under article 19 (i) (g) has been affected by such illegal assessment. The petitioner accordingly seeks writs in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned order of assessment as well as the certificate proceedings together with a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents not to give effect to the certificate in any manner whatsoever. 4. THE first ground has not been pressed at the hearing so that the only point for determination is whether the disputed goods are identical which those in respect of which the Central Bank had paid the tax already, and, if so, whether the impugned orders are liable to be quashed on that ground. In the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent No. 1 (Asstt. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes), it is stated that the central Bank of India has paid the tax payable under the Act in respect of certain consignments of tea, bearing consignment Note Nos. 468, 473, 476, 486 and 488, but they were shown in the Bills of Entry submitted by the bank as having been carried by road but that the consignments which were carried by air by the petitioner are not identical with the consignments in respect of which the Bank has paid the tax and that except the consignment note numbers, there was nothing else in common between the two lots of goods. The identity of the goods not having been established, and the Petitioner not having submitted a Bill of entry in respect of the disputed goods as required by the Act, the Respondent was obliged to make a 'best of judgment assessment' under section 10 of the act. The counter-affidavit filed by the Certificate Officer (Respondent No. 4) shows that the certificate proceedings are stayed under orders of this court. 5. IT is true that there is no provision in the Act for double taxation and that the Petitioner may succeed if it can establish that the disputed goods are the same goods in respect of which the Central Bank of India has already paid the tax on the footing that they had been carried by road. 5. IT is true that there is no provision in the Act for double taxation and that the Petitioner may succeed if it can establish that the disputed goods are the same goods in respect of which the Central Bank of India has already paid the tax on the footing that they had been carried by road. But the onus of establishing this identity is upon the Petitioner and that onus is enhanced by the fact that the impugned assessment has been made according to the 'best of judgment' under section 10 (1)of the Act because of the failure of the petitioner to submit a Bill of Entry prior to the actual entry of the goods, as required by section 5 (1) of the Act. The scheme of the Act, and the stringent consequences provided for by the act for failure to submit a Bill of Entry, have been explained by me in the case of (1) Daga Shipping Agents v. Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, C. R. 562 (W) of 1961 and the observations made therein need not be reiterated. In brief, it may be said, that the object of demanding a Bill of Entry before the goods actually enter into the local area to which the Act applies is to prevent evasion and fraud. However bona fide the excuses may be, no person who imports goods into the area in question is exempted from submitting the Bill of Entry. Even where he thinks that the goods are not liable to be assessed under the Act, he must submit a nil entry, stating that the goods are not liable to be taxed, because if it eventually turns out that the goods are taxable, he runs the risk of being assessed under the drastic provisions of section 10 (1. 6. IN this case, the Petitioner did not submit a Bill of Entry on the assumption that it was not a 'dealer'. This contention has been given up. Hence, section 10 (1) has been rightly applied. 6. IN this case, the Petitioner did not submit a Bill of Entry on the assumption that it was not a 'dealer'. This contention has been given up. Hence, section 10 (1) has been rightly applied. AS has been held by me, in (2) Essards v. State of West Bengal, c. R. 271 (W) of 1961, following the Supreme Court decision in (3) Raghubar v. State of Bihar, 1958 S. C. A. 852, an assessment under section 10 (1) can be assailed only on the ground that it violates the principles of natural justice, for instance, where it is founded on pure guess, and no materials whatever. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner, of course, urged that the impugned order of the Appellate Authority in Anx. 'k' is based on no materials that, however, is not correct. The point for determination was whether the goods which were booked with the Indian Roadways to be transported by road for delivery to the Central Bank of India was actually carried by air by the Petitioner, The Asstt. Commissioner in his order in Anx. 'I' had held that the Petitioner had failed to prove this identity. The Commissioner, on appeal, has affirmed that finding. Of course, the Commissioner has not given elaborate reasoning for his affirmance, but these statutory tribunals are not required to act as Courts, and write out judgments in the manner laid down in the C. P. Code, and their decisions must be read in that light. It is clear from the Commissioner's order that he accepts the finding of the Assistant commissioner that the Petitioner has failed to establish the identity as correct. The real point for determination, there fore, is whether there were any materails to support the finding of the asstt. Commissioner. 7. IN the instant case, the question of identity of the disputed goods with the goods which have been already taxed is undoubtedly one of the fact find the finding of the inferior tribunals cannot be challenged in the instant case merely on the ground that it is erroneous or oven on the ground that this Court, independently, might come to a different finding on the materials on the record. The Petitioner can succeed only on showing that the instant case comes within the purview of the decisions such as Raghubar's case (ibid) or the case of (7) Dhakeswari Cotton Mills, (1955) S. C. A. 90. The Petitioner can succeed only on showing that the instant case comes within the purview of the decisions such as Raghubar's case (ibid) or the case of (7) Dhakeswari Cotton Mills, (1955) S. C. A. 90. It does not, however, appear that the order of the Assistant commissioner, which has been affirmed by the Commissioner, is based on no materials whatever. 8. 11. THE Assistant Commissioner has proceeded on the assumption that the Air Carrying Corporation and the Indian Roadways are sister concerns but has held that the Petitioner has failed to prove to his satisfaction that the very goods which had been consigned with the Roadways were the disputed goods, On this point, he relies primarily on the fact that the Registers of the two concerns being separate, it was for the Petitioner to show from the Registers that the goods consigned with the Roadways were transferred to the Petitioner but that the Petitioner could not show this from the relevant Registers. Of course, the petitioner produced some invoices or correspondence as between the two concerns to show this, but these were unilateral documents and the primary documents, no doubt, were the Registers. No explanation was offered even before me why the Registers of the two companies would not contain the necessary entries to show the identity. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the Assistant Commissioner's finding was capricious and not based on any material whatever. In the absence of the necessary entries in the Registers, the Assistant commissioner refused to act on the solitary fact that the disputed goods bore the same consignment numbers as appeared in the Bill of Entry submitted by the Central Bank or the papers of the Roadways. On behalf of the petitioner, reference was made to certain garden marks and invoice nos. in the bill of Entry filed by the Central Bank. But the Asstt. Commissioner did not accept those things as relevant on the ground that those marks did not appear in the manifest at the time of arrival of the goods at Dum, Dum, by air. Here, again, the finding cannot be held to be capricious, having regard to the fact that the Petitioner had not complied with its statutory duty to submit a Bill of Entry before arrival of the disputed goods at Dum Dum. Here, again, the finding cannot be held to be capricious, having regard to the fact that the Petitioner had not complied with its statutory duty to submit a Bill of Entry before arrival of the disputed goods at Dum Dum. In the present proceeding, the Petitioner can have no advantage of the indolence of its own staff in the matter of keeping proper books or of adducing proper evidence before the assessing authority. 9. THE strongest argument, on behalf of the Petitioner is cf course, is the fact that the Central Bank is an independent party and that, in the absence of any allegation of fraud, there is no reason why the statements of the central Bank, in support of the Petitioner's case, in Anx. 'f' should not be accepted. But this statement was made long after the disputed entry of the goods and was made after repeated requests made by the Petitioner and its sister concern. On the other hand, in the Bills of Entry submitted by the central Bank, about a month after the purported dates of arrival of the goods by road and also subsequent to the intimation by the Petitioner and its sister concern, by letters dated 19-3-59 and 21-3-59 that the goods were being carried through air, the Central Bank had stated that the goods had already arived by road. It may be that this anomaly has, again, taken place owing to the indolence of the staff of the central Bank. But the Central Bank is not a party in this proceeding and has furnished no affidavit herein. It does not appear that the Central bank took delivery of the disputed goods from the airport itself, so that an independent knowledge of the actual carriage of the disputed goods by air cannot be imputed to the bank. In this state of affairs, the refusal of the Assistant Commissioner to act on the subsequent statement of the central Bank cannot be said to be capricious, even though in fairness to the petitioner it must be said that it had an otherwise debatable case. 10. In this state of affairs, the refusal of the Assistant Commissioner to act on the subsequent statement of the central Bank cannot be said to be capricious, even though in fairness to the petitioner it must be said that it had an otherwise debatable case. 10. HAVING regard to the intitial fact that Petitioner has brought upon itself all the trouble by not submitting a Bill of Entry under section 5 (1), and having regard to the fact that the impugned findings cannot be condemned as founded on no materials whatever, i cannot interfere with the impugned orders in the instant proceeding. The Rule is, accordingly, discharged, but without any order as to costs.