Judgment.-This petition raises a simple point of limitation for determination, which obviously has been wrongly decided by the learned Small Cause Judge The Advocate-Guardian, appointed by the District Court for two minors in O.P. No.15 of 1945, obtained a pronote for Rs. 297-4-0 on 25th August, 1946, from two debtors of the minors’ estate. The guardian filed the suit, on 1st August, 1951, without doing anything to save limitation during the usual period of three years. The District Munsif dismissed the suit as time-barred, holding that the pronote was to the guardian solely though described in it as guardian of the minors and that, therefore, the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act could not be claimed by the minors. He appears to have been misguided by a ruling in Ramanuja Ayyangar, v. Sadagopa Ayyangar1, the facts of which he thought were more or less on fours with the present case. That was a case of a minor, who sued by his next friend in August, 1903, to recover an amount on a promissory note, executed in September, 1897, in favour of his mother and alleged to have been made and delivered on account of his estate. The District Munsif held that as the minor’s money had been lent on the pronote, the suit was not barred by limitation. The learned Bench held that the mother’s name alone appeared on the pronote as the holder and payee, and that therefore, under the Negotiable Instruments Act, she was the person who was entitled to sue. This decision was followed in Vishnu Narayan Deo v. Keshan Gajanan Potbhare2, in which it was held that section 6 of the Limitation Act had no application to a suit on a promissory note taken by a guardian on behalf of a minor, which ought to be instituted within three years of its date. That decision was. considered by another Bench of the Bombay High Court in Manikshet v. Ajamkha Wallad Sardarkha3 . That was a case, in which, after attaining majority, a minor, on behalf of himself and his younger brother, were permitted to sue on a bond executed to their mother as guardian. It would appear that Vishnu Narayana Deo v. Keshav Gajanan1, proceeded on the assumption that the pronote considered there was similar to the pronote in Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Sadagopa Ayyangar2. It would appear that Vishnu Narayana Deo v. Keshav Gajanan1, proceeded on the assumption that the pronote considered there was similar to the pronote in Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Sadagopa Ayyangar2. There can be no doubt that the pronote in the present case was in the name of the minors who are entitled to sue on it after attaining majority, and to obtain the full benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act. Mitra in his Law of Limitation and Prescription, 7th edition, at page 78, cites a wealth of case law in support of the following propositions: “The benefit of section 6 is not limited to the period after the cessation of the disability but applies also to the period during which disability exists. Persons under disability are not forbidden to sue or apply (by their next friends) before the cessation of disability ; their next friends may sue or apply at any time during the continuance of the disability, whether the ordinary period of limitation has already expired or not.” One of the more recent decisions in support of the above view is Ramesh Chandra v. Firm Kashi Ram Bhajan Lal3. It would be most anomalous to hold that it would be open to a minor to sue after attaining majority, in which case he would be fully entitled to full time allowed by section 6, and to deny the guardian’s right to sue on his behalf before he attains majority and more than three years from the date of a pronote. In this case although the Advocate-Guardian, is strictly entitled in law to file a suit at any time before the minors attain majority, one would have expected him to file the suit within the ordinary period of three years from the date of the pronote. There may be, of course, some reasons which led him to file the suit after 5 years from the date of the pronote. The suit cannot be held to be time-barred. The plaintiffs ask for interest at contract rate on the pronote, namely, 6¼; per cent. from the date of the pronote, that is, for 5 years prior to the institution of the suit. I see no grounds for allowing interest for more than three years prior to the suit, which is the normal period and within which the Court guardian should I think have instituted the suit. from the date of the pronote, that is, for 5 years prior to the institution of the suit. I see no grounds for allowing interest for more than three years prior to the suit, which is the normal period and within which the Court guardian should I think have instituted the suit. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for Rs.297-4-0 with interest for three years at 6¼ per cent. upto the date of the suit and at 6 per cent. thereafter. Mr. Ramaswami Iyengar for respondents says that a plea, that they were agriculturists, was taken in their written statement. But it is obvious from the lower Court’s order that this plea was abandoned, and the only point for determination when the suit came The petition is allowed with costs. K.S. ----- Petition allowed.