DEKA J.: This Rule was issued at the instance of Jyoti Nath Ganguly, for a writ in the nature of Manda­mus and/or Certiorari and/or such other appro­priate writ or writs as this Court might think fit. (2) The case of the petitioner is that he was an employee of the Commercial Carrying Company Limited for a span of about 20 years, and when that Company was relieved and the State Govern­ment took up the Transport Service in the Gauhati-Shillong route to the exclusion of others, the Gov­ernment started a department of its own, known as the State Transport Department, and the peti­tioner was absorbed as one of the Drivers in that route sometime in 1948, and he was regularly dis­charging his duties since then till 20-1-1952. On 20-1-1952, when the vehicle, of which the peti­tioner was the driver, was taken to the Gauhati Station yard, the Petrol Khalashi, contrary to the instruction of the petitioner, was pouring petrol into the tank inside the vehicle, and it all of a sudden caught fire due to some match stick being inadvertently thrown by some one of the passengers who had already boarded the bus, but the petitioner was held responsible for the negligent act, as a result of which the accident, as aforesaid, took place and few passengers were severely burnt and one of them, subsequently died in the hospital. The State Transport Authority at once took action and the Station Superintendent of Gauhati, by his order No. ST/GHY/42/2962, dated 20-1-1952, suspended the petitioner and called upon him to explain as to why he should not be removed from State Transport service on the ground of negligence in the discharge of his duties. The notice (Annexure A to the petition) served on the petitioner is of material importance and it runs thus: "Office of the Station Superintendent, State Trans­port, Gauhati. Ref: No. ST/GHY/42/2962, dated, Gauhati, the 20th January, 1952. Memorandum To Shri J. N. Ganguly, Driver of Bus No. E-20, State Transport, Gauhati. Subject:- Suspension. You are hereby placed under suspension, with immediate effect, and called upon to explain as to why you will not be removed from State Transport services on the following grounds: (1) That due to your negligence of duty, you did not take petrol in your vehicle this morning before it was placed in the yard, for the up passengers. You are hereby placed under suspension, with immediate effect, and called upon to explain as to why you will not be removed from State Transport services on the following grounds: (1) That due to your negligence of duty, you did not take petrol in your vehicle this morning before it was placed in the yard, for the up passengers. (2) That you violated the Petroleum Rules by trying to put in petrol in the tank from an open can, when the Bus was full of passengers. (3) That due to above careless actions of yours, the Bus caught fire and the passengers sustained injuries and three of whom have to be put in as indoor patients in the Civil Hospital. (4) Your explanation should reach this office within three days from the date of receipt of this. During the period of your suspension, you will be given 1/4th of your pay as subsistence allow­ance. Sd/Illegible, Station Superintendent, State Transport, Gauhati." (3) Thereupon proceedings were drawn up against the petitioner and an enquiry was started, and on completion of the enquiry, an order, dated 12-3-52, was served on the petitioner by Sri H. P. Rajkhowa, for Secretary, Board of Control, State Transport, Assam. This order (Annexure C to the petition) intimated that Sree J. N. Ganguly, Driver, State Transport, who was under suspension, was removed from service with effect from 5-3-1952. On receipt of the order, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Board of Control, State Transport, Assam, which however, was dismissed on 6-11-1952, and the same was communicated to the petitioner by Mr. H. G. Cocksedge, Secretary, Board of Control, State Transport, Assam, under Memo No. EST/ST/10/402, dated 6-11-1952. On a representation being made to the Minister-in-Charge of Transport, he refused to interfere in the matter, and thereafter an appeal was preferred to the Chief Minister, Assam, on 22-3-1954, which, however, was not disposed of. (4) The Rule was obtained from this Court on 2S-6-1954 on the representation that the order of removal from service was illegal, mainly on two grounds- (i) that the order was in violation of cl. (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution, and (ii) that there was no substantial compliance with rule 4 of the Disciplinary Rules for State Transport pub­lished in the Assam Gazette on 26-4-1950. (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution, and (ii) that there was no substantial compliance with rule 4 of the Disciplinary Rules for State Transport pub­lished in the Assam Gazette on 26-4-1950. There was a further contention that the notice of suspen­sion was not proper since it came from the Station Superintendent of Gauhati, and not from the Secre­tary to the State Transport Department, who was the appointing authority. (5) It is not denied that the accident took place while the petitioner was in charge of the vehicle which caught fire when petrol was being filled, and that petrol was being filled at a time for­bidden by the rules. The petitioner, though ad­mitting the circumstances, ascribes the accident to the negligence of other persons besides himself, which however, the authorities did not accept. (6) Regarding the objection that there has been no proper notice served under cl. (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution, let me quote below the mate­rial portion of the Article which runs as follows: "(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State, shall be dis­missed or removed by an authority subordi­nate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dis­missed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him........" What is required under cl. (2) of Art. 311 is that no member of the civil service or a person who holds a civil post, shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a rea­sonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Here, the notice, Annexure A, clearly asks the petitioner to show cause against the charges set out therein, and he has been further asked to explain why he should not be removed from the State Transport service. The petitioner did show cause (per Annexure B) and there was also an enquiry, though the result of the enquiry is not before us. But it may be safely assumed that the final notice of dismissal was as a result of that enquiry. The petitioner did show cause (per Annexure B) and there was also an enquiry, though the result of the enquiry is not before us. But it may be safely assumed that the final notice of dismissal was as a result of that enquiry. The only question is- whether there should have been two notices, one asking him to show cause in answer to the charges framed against him, and the second, asking for a fresh explanation as to why he should not be removed from service, if the Government so decided. Mr. Ahmed for the petitioner has strenuously contended that there was only one notice at the time of suspension and that only invited him to show cause against the charges framed against him, and there was no second notice asking him to show cause against the proposed punishment which was essential. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that the self same notice asks the petitioner to show cause, if any, against his removal from the State Transport service, apart from explaining the allegation of negligence. Clause (2) of Art. 311 does not speak of two notices, but it speaks of the offending officer being given a reasonable oppor­tunity of showing cause against the action propos­ed to be taken, in regard to him. Here obviously the action proposed to be taken against the peti­tioner was his removal from service and he had sufficient notice about it. Mr. Ahmed relied on the decision of this Court reported in - 'Bhuiram Hazzarika v. Superintendent of Police, Sibsagar', AIR 1954 Assam 18 (A). There obviously the facts were different, and the Police Sub-Inspector, be­fore his actual removal, had really no notice about the proposed intention of the authorities for his removal from service, nor was he asked to show cause against it. Here, that is not the case. (7) Mr. Medhi appearing for the State, has con­tended that Art. 311, cl. (2) nowhere lays down that there should be two distinct notices, but what is required under the provisions of that Article is that there should be a clear notice as to the action proposed to be taken in regard to the particular officer. (7) Mr. Medhi appearing for the State, has con­tended that Art. 311, cl. (2) nowhere lays down that there should be two distinct notices, but what is required under the provisions of that Article is that there should be a clear notice as to the action proposed to be taken in regard to the particular officer. He relies on the observations of Deep Narayan Sinha, J., in the case of - 'Jatindra Nath Biswas v. R. Gupta', AIR 1954 Cal 383 (B), where the learned Judge observed thus: "Under these provisions of law, the procedure followed should be as follows: A civil servant must be told about the charges against him and the punishment or punishments which are propos­ed to be inflicted in case the charges are proved. Where there is an enquiry, not only must he have an opportunity of contesting his case be­fore the enquiry but, before the punishment is imposed upon him, he must be told about the result of the enquiry and the exact punishment which is proposed to be inflicted for a parti­cular charge which has been proved. This, however, is not a procedure which is immutable. There may be such a case where the facts are such and the punishment proposed is such that it would be unnecessary to give the civil servant two chances, instead of one. For example, if there was a single charge and the proposed punishment was a single punishment and the civil servant had the amplest opportunity at the enquiry stage to meet the whole case, a second opportunity may not be necessary. That this is so, has been expressly recognised by both the Federal Court and the Judicial Committee in - 'High Commr. for India and Pakistan v. I. M. Lall', AIR 1948 PC 121 (C)." In our view, this is the correct approach to the facts of this case. Here, the facts are exceedingly simple. The petitioner was found to be negligent in the discharge of his duties, and, as a result, an unfortunate accident happened, and the peti­tioner, though trying to shift the responsibility to the Petrol Khalashi, did not succeed in so doing because he was a direct participant in the breach of rules which resulted in the accident. The autho­rities at the very inception intended to remove this civil servant from the job and gave a notice ac­cordingly. Mr. The autho­rities at the very inception intended to remove this civil servant from the job and gave a notice ac­cordingly. Mr. Ahmad contended that this notice of discharge could be given only after the enquiry was completed. We do not find anything catego­rical in the statute to support this contention but whether a second chance should be given would depend on the circumstances. The accident evidently took place during the day and in the presence of several persons when the Station yard was full of passengers, officers and others and, there­fore, the authorities could have easily formed an opinion about the gravity of the offence of the peti­tioner and they could have at that stage thought of removing him from service, and a notice was accordingly given for showing cause. This action, therefore, of removing the officer without a second notice, cannot be said to be illegal or ultra vires. (8) The second contention of Mr. Ahmed is that there was violation of the provisions of Rule 4 of the Disciplinary Rules for State Transport, as men­tioned above. Rule 4 says that "no punishment shall be inflicted on any employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action as well as the nature and severity of the punish­ment contemplated and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. He shall be required to put in a written statement of defence within a reasonable time. He shall be heard in person, if he so desires, but it shall be at the discretion of the punishing authority to call any witness or not. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof." There is a proviso attached to this rule, to which we need not go as no violation of that proviso is alleged. Mr. Ahmed's contention is that the petitioner was not given a hearing in person. But we have no materials to find whether he expressed any such intention because the rule says that the officer shall be heard in person if he so desires. It is not denied that the officer had shown cause and that he was given notice in writing of the grounds on which it was proposed to take action and the nature of the punishment contemplated was also intimated. It is not denied that the officer had shown cause and that he was given notice in writing of the grounds on which it was proposed to take action and the nature of the punishment contemplated was also intimated. There was, therefore, substan­tial compliance with Rule 4 of the Disciplinary Rules, and we cannot say that the order of re­moval was in violation of the principles or pro­cedure inculcated in this rule. (9) The third and the final point taken by Mr. Ahmed on behalf of the petitioner was that the notice of suspension given on 20-1-52, not being a notice from the Secretary of the State Transport Department, was not a proper notice, as contempla­ted under Cl. (2) of Art. 311. In support of his contention, Mr. Ahmed relied on a decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in - Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin', AIR 1953 Trav-C. 130 (D). There the learned Judges had taken pains to show that in the absence of any authority except the President, the Governor or Raj Pramukh and the authority who had ap­pointed the civil servant, no other authority could be brought in for the purpose of Cl. (2) for giving a notice. With great respect to the learned Judges, we do not think that we can accept that interpre­tation in the face of the clear wording of Cl. (2) of Art. 311, which seems to say that the notice should be from a competent authority and working in conjunction with the authority who could re­move the particular officer. Mr. Ahmed conten­ded that the accident having taken place on the 20th of January and the notice in question being also served on the same day, it could not be conceived that the Station Superintendent obtained the con­sent of the Secretary of the State Transport Depart­ment and he might have acted independently of the proper authority. We do not find adequate facts to support this contention, whereas it is easy to imagine that the officer might have been con­tacted that very day and the notice might have bfen in pursuance of his wishes. We do not find adequate facts to support this contention, whereas it is easy to imagine that the officer might have been con­tacted that very day and the notice might have bfen in pursuance of his wishes. Unless the statute says that such a notice is bad, we cannot assume that an official act was done in violation of the official rules, and we will only assume that the notice was according to the wishes of the autho­rity who appointed the petitioner and it was a valid notice, in the absence of anything to the con­trary on the record. (10) The result, therefore, is that there is no sub­stantial ground for interference by this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution and we accordingly direct that the Rule be discharged, but since the petitioner seems to be an officer of a lower rank, we pass no orders as to costs. SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: (11) I agree. My learned brother has dealt with the other aspects of the case, but I like to say a few words in regard to the im­portant question raised in this application. The question, as already pointed out, is that the peti­tioner should have been given another notice, as required by Art. 311, Cl. (2) of the Constitution. Article 311, Cl. (2) does not necessarily contem­plate the issue of two different notices to the person concerned. There' may be cases where a general enquiry about the allegations made may be necessary, and after the general enquiry, the authority concerned may propose to take some definite action against the party complained against. In that case, under Art. 311, Cl. (2), a fresh notice has to be given to the party about the action proposed to be taken against him in order to enable him to show cause for that pur­pose; but where, as in this case, the facts are quite simple and undisputed, a general enquiry of a preliminary character or a proceeding to show cause before the authority decided to take action for dismissal or removal from service of the peti­tioner was unnecessary. The order of suspension in which the petitioner was directed to show cause, itself indicates that the action proposed was to remove him from service. The order of suspension in which the petitioner was directed to show cause, itself indicates that the action proposed was to remove him from service. The petitioner showed cause against it and after that the appropriate authority, who was admittedly competent to dis­miss him, passed the order in question. This is sufficient compliance with Art. 311(2) of the Con­stitution. We are not concerned here, in an ap­plication under Art. 226 of the Constitution, with the merits of the order. We have to see whether the authority concerned had jurisdiction to pass the order- in question and has acted, in so doing, in accordance with the principles of law and natural justice. (12) So far as the issue of the notice is con­cerned, the fact that it was not made by the Secretary himself who was competent to dismiss the petitioner, will not invalidate the order of removal. There can be no doubt, and it is not questioned, that before passing the order of re­moval from service, the Secretary must have and had taken into consideration the cause shown by the petitioner in response to the notice in question. The whole object of the notice is to provide an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to be taken and to participate in the proceedings, and if a notice has been served upon him, and an opportunity given for that pur­pose, the fact that the notice was not served in the name of the authority who subsequently dismissed him, is not very material. It may be somewhat irregular but it does not constitute any such illega­lity as to vitiate the final order passed by a com­petent authority after consideration of the cause shown. I think, in the circumstances, the 'pro­visions of Art. 311, Cl. (2) of the Constitution have not been infringed. Rule discharged.