Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff is the appellant in this second appeal. The suit is for streedhanam including the price of gold ornaments and bronze vessels. Plaintiff is the sister of defendants 1 and 2. The third defendant is their mother. Plaintiff was married in the year 1088 to one Devaseya Devaseya. It is alleged in the plaint that at the time of her marriage, her father, Cheriath, promised to give her 6000 Chakrams as streedhanam, gold ornaments for six sovereigns and bronze vessels of the weight of 450 Palams but that these were not given to her. The father died intestate in the year 1112. Plaint schedule properties belonged to him. According to the plaintiff, the streedhanam due to her including the value of the ornaments and bronze vessels is a charge on the plaint schedule properties and she is entitled to realise the same from the properties. Demand was made by the plaintiff on 2.1.1121 by means of a registered notice and the suit was filed on 29.1.1121. 2. The first defendant filed separate written statement in the case while defendants2 and 3 filed a joint written statement. The main contentions of the defendants were that the suit was not maintainable and that it was barred by limitation. It was admitted that there was an agreement at the time of the marriage of the plaintiff to give her 6000 Chakrams as streedhanam; but it was contended that the amount was paid to the plaintiff's father-in-law even before the date of the marriage. The alleged agreement to give ornaments and bronze vessels was denied; but it was contended that the plaintiff was in fact given some ornaments at the time of her marriage and that some ornaments were given for her first-born child. It was also contended that the plaintiff was given some bronze vessels both by her father and, after the death of the father, by the defendants. In the written statement filed by defendants 2 and 3 it was contended that, after the death of the plaintiff's father, his properties were partitioned between the defendants in the year 1116, that it was provided in the partition deed that first defendant should pay Rs. In the written statement filed by defendants 2 and 3 it was contended that, after the death of the plaintiff's father, his properties were partitioned between the defendants in the year 1116, that it was provided in the partition deed that first defendant should pay Rs. 50/- to the plaintiff over and above the streedhanam paid to her and that, in any case, defendants 2 and 3 and their share of the plaint schedule properties were not liable for any portion of the plaint claim. The plaintiff filed a replication traversing the contentions raised by the defendants and re-affirming the allegations in the plaint. It was also alleged that the partition deed mentioned in the written statement of defendants 2 and 3 was not binding on the plaintiff and that it was executed without her knowledge and consent. 3. Of the nine issues raised in case issues Nos.1, 2 and 6 were tried as preliminary issues by the trial court. Issue No.1 relates to the question whether the suit is maintainable. Issue No.2 is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The 6th issue relates to the question whether the amount claimed in the plaint is a charge on the plaint schedule properties. 4. The first court held that the Christian Succession Act, II of 1092 (Travancore), did not apply to the case since the plaintiff's marriage took place before the date of that Act. it was, therefore, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the benefit of S.28 of the Act which provides that streedhanam promised but not paid by the intestate will be a charge on his properties. It was also held that the suit, filed more than three years after the date of the promise to pay streedhanam, was barred by limitation. The suit was accordingly dismissed with costs. 5. In appeal filed by the plaintiff the District Court disagreed with the view of the trial court that the Christian Succession Act did not apply to the case. That court held that since the plaintiff's father died after 12.5.1092, the date on which the Christian Succession Act came into force, that Act applied to the case although the plaintiff's marriage took place before the date of the Act. That court held that since the plaintiff's father died after 12.5.1092, the date on which the Christian Succession Act came into force, that Act applied to the case although the plaintiff's marriage took place before the date of the Act. But it was held that since the right to enforce the promise by the plaintiff's father to pay streedhanam to her had become barred by limitation at the time of his death the benefit of S.28 of the Act was not available to the plaintiff. It was accordingly held that the suit was barred by limitation and the appeal was dismissed with costs. 6. The only question for decision in this second appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. If the suit is taken to be one for compensation for breach of an oral contract it is clearly barred by limitation since the contract was made in the year 1088 and the suit was brought only in the year 1121. But, according to the plaintiff, the suit is really for enforcement of her right under S. 28 of the Christian Succession Act (Travancore). Under that section any streedhanam promised, but not paid by the intestate, shall be a charge upon his property. The question for consideration is whether in a case in which there was an oral promise by the father to pay streedhanam to the daughter, more than three years before the date of the death of the father, the daughter is entitled, under S.28 of the Act, to a charge on the properties of the father who dies intestate. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the Christian Succession Act would not apply to a case in which the marriage of the daughter took place before the date of that Act even though the father died only after the date of the Act. We are unable to accept this contention. There is nothing in the Act to show that the provisions of the Act will not apply to a daughter who was married on the date of the Act. The Act applies to all cases in which succession opened after the date of the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the only material date is the date of the death of the father. The Act applies to all cases in which succession opened after the date of the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the only material date is the date of the death of the father. Since the father died only the year 1112 long after the Act come into force, succession to his property must be regulated by the provisions of this Act. There is therefore no force in the contention that the Act will not apply to the claim for streedhanam by a daughter who has been married before the date of the Act. 8. Under S.25 of the Act, daughters also are included among the heirs of a Christian who dies intestate. That section reads: "When a person dies intestate, his next of kin in the order set forth below shall be entitled to succeed to the residue, if any, of his property that may be left after deducting the widow's share. If he has left a widow, and also the mothers share, if he has left a mother, under circumstances which will, according to Ss. 21 to 23, entitle her to any share. The next of kin mentioned in the first group shall always be preferred to those standing second, the second to the third, and so on, in succession." Group I consists of sons and daughters and the lineal descendants of such sons or daughters as shall have predeceased the intestate. S. 28 is the next relevant section. It reads as follows: "Without prejudice to the provisions of S. 16, the male heirs mentioned in Group I of S. 25 shall be entitled to have the whole of the intestate's property divided equally among themselves, subject to the claims of the daughter for streedhanam. The streedhanam due to a daughter shall be fixed at one-fourth the value of the share of a son, or Rs. 5,000/-, whichever is less. Provided that any female heir of an intestate, to whom streedhanam was paid or promised by the intestate, or in the intestate's life-time, either by such intestate's wife or husband, or after the death of such wife or husband by her or his heirs, shall not be entitled to have any further claim on the property of the intestate when any of her brothers (whether of the full-blood or of the half-blood by the same father) or the lineal descendants of any such deceased brother shall survive the intestate. Any streedhanam promised, but not paid by the intestate, shall be a charge upon his property". Streedhanam is defined thus in S. 5: "'Streedhanam' means and includes any money or ornaments, or, in lieu of money or ornaments, any property, movable or immovable, given or promised to be given to a female or, on her behalf, to her husband or to his parent or guardian by her father or mother, or, after the death of either or both of them, by anyone who claims under such father or mother, in satisfaction of her claim against the estate of the father or mother". It will thus be seen that although under S. 25 sons and daughters are together entitled to succeed to the estate of the intestate under S. 28 the sons are allowed to have the whole of the estate divided equally among themselves subject to the claim of the daughter for streedhanam. The daughter is thus given only a right to streedhanam and not a share in the property when there are sons. This right is limited to one- fourth the value of the share of a son or Rs. 5000 whichever is less. It is further provided in the section that if streedhanam has been paid or promised to the daughter she will not be entitled to have any further claim in the property of the intestate when there are sons or lineal descendants of any deceased son. It is also provided that in a case in which streedhanam has only been promised but not paid it will be a charge in the property of the intestate. The effect of the section is this: When there are sons the daughter will not be entitled to a share in the property of the intestate but will be entitled only to streedhanam as defined in S.5. If streedhanam has already been paid she will not be entitled to any further claim in the property of the intestate. In cases in which streedhanam has only been promised but not paid the streedhanam so promised will be a charge upon the property of the intestate. 9. There is nothing in S. 28 to show that the charge conferred by the Section is limited to cases in which the promise to pay streedhanam can be enforced as a promise apart from the right acquired under the provisions of the Act. 9. There is nothing in S. 28 to show that the charge conferred by the Section is limited to cases in which the promise to pay streedhanam can be enforced as a promise apart from the right acquired under the provisions of the Act. The right conferred by the Section is a right enforcible against the estate of the intestate. It is distinct from the right to enforce the personal contract. According to the definition of streedhanam in S. 5, any money, ornaments or, in lieu of money or ornaments, any property promised to be given to the daughter or on her behalf to her husband or his parent or guardian either by the father or the mother in satisfaction of her claim against the estate of the father or mother, as the case may be, would constitute streedhanam. Thus, even in a case in which the mother has promised to give the daughter money, ornaments or property in satisfaction of the daughter's claim against the estate of the father or the mother, whether the promise was made to the daughter herself or to her husband or to the husband's parent or guardian, it will be streedhanam within the meaning of the Section and under S. 28 such a promise by the mother will deprive the daughter of the right to make any claim in the property of the father. It is not clear whether streedhanam promised by the mother will be a charge on the property of the father who dies intestate. In any case, there is no reason to think that the charge conferred by the Section will be available to the daughter only if the cause of auction based on the personal contract has not become barred by limitation at the time when succession opens. We are of opinion that the right conferred by the Section is independent of the right under the personal contract. The section declares the rights of a daughter in the property of her father or mother who dies intestate and it says that in cases in which there has been a promise to give her streedhanam either by the father or by the mother her right in the property of the intestate will be limited to a charge on the property to the extent of the amount covered by the promise. As stated already there is nothing in the Section to show that in cases in which the right to enforce the promise as such is barred by limitation the right to claim a charge on the property of the intestate in respect of the amount covered by the promise will also be lost. The only effect of the proviso to the section is that, in a case in which there has been a promise to pay streedhanam the daughter cannot claim out of the estate of the intestate anything more than the amount covered by the promise. The words used are "shall not be entitled to have any further claim in the property of the intestate". That does not necessarily mean that the right to enforce the personal promise should itself be subsisting on the date when succession opens for entitling the daughter to claim the charge conferred by the latter part of the section. 10. According to the respondents the words 'any streedhanam promised, apply only to a case in which the promise itself is enforcible in law on the date when succession opens. The literal meaning of the words does not warrant such an interpretation. There is also nothing in the Act to justify such an interpretation. Reference may be made in this connection to the following observations of Krishnaswamy Iyer, C.J. in the Full Bench decision of the Travancore High Court in Eleessa v. Aeliya (1947 TLR 285): "The last paragraph of S. 28 is only an affirmation of the subsistence of the charge even though a simple promise of payment of streedhanam had been accepted. In fact, it is a provision by which the charge upon the estate for streedhanam is preserved until the promise is performed". 11. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on the decision in Augusthy v. Mariam (18 TLJ 518). That was a case in which the daughter filed a suit against the father for streedhanam promised by him. It was held in that case that the suit should be regarded as one for recovery of amount due under an oral contract and that the period of limitation was only three years from the date of the breach of the contract. But, this is not a suit against the father for breach of a contract made by him. It was held in that case that the suit should be regarded as one for recovery of amount due under an oral contract and that the period of limitation was only three years from the date of the breach of the contract. But, this is not a suit against the father for breach of a contract made by him. This is a suit for enforcing the plaintiff's claim under S. 28 of the Christian Succession Act against the estate of her deceased father. The question whether S. 28 would apply to a case in which the suit was instituted against the father himself was considered by the learned judges in that case and they said: "It is doubtful whether S. 28 of the Christian Succession Regulation would be enforcible during the life-time of the promisor himself before the succession opens out". We do not think that there is any scope for doubt on the point S. 28 can apply only to a case in which claim is made against the estate of the intestate. The Section deals with rights in respect of the property of an intestate person and the words used in the section are 'any streedhanam promised, but not paid by the intestate shall be a charge upon his property'. It is, therefore clear that the section can have no application to a suit instituted by the daughter against the father himself for enforcement of his contract to pay streedhanam. The decision relied on by learned counsel for the respondents is, thus, of no assistance to him. 12. As stated already, this suit is for enforcement of the plaintiff's claim under S.28 of the Christian Succession Act against the estate of her deceased father. The reference in the plaint to the promise by the father at the time of the marriage of the plaintiff to give her streedhanam etc. is made only for the purpose of limiting the claim to the amount covered by the promise. If S. 28 applies the plaintiff has got a period of twelve years from the date of the death of the father for enforcing the charge against his properties. The suit having been filed within that period is not barred by limitation. is made only for the purpose of limiting the claim to the amount covered by the promise. If S. 28 applies the plaintiff has got a period of twelve years from the date of the death of the father for enforcing the charge against his properties. The suit having been filed within that period is not barred by limitation. We, therefore, set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below and send back the case to the trial court for disposal after trying the remaining issues in the case. The defendants will pay the costs of the plaintiff in this Court and in the lower appellate Court. Costs in the trial court will abide the final result of the suit. Allowed.