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1955 DIGILAW 7 (GAU)

Konsam Amujao Singh v. Paejathang Haokip

1955-01-31

BRIJ NARAIN

body1955
JUDGMENT Konsam Amujao Singh of village Tronglaobi, Police Station Bishenpur, has brought this petition for obtaining a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ against the opposite parties, i.e., the State of Manipur, the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, and the remaining 2 opposite parties forbearing from acting upon in any manner or giving effect to the orders of the opposite party No.2 dated 18-11-1952 on petition No.3116-D.C. dated 17-11-1952; dated 9th May 1953 passed in the settlement of Tronglaobi Memo. No.1044/B.T. dated 19-1-1953 and dated 19-10-1953 passed in Hill Civil Suit No.13 of 1953, which has been confirmed by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur, in Chief Commissioners Revenue Appeal Case No.36 of 1953 on D/-13-11-1953 (Manipur) (A), and further prohibiting the opposite parties Nos.2 and 3 from proceeding with the settlement of the land in question with the other opposite parties Nos.1 and 4. 2. According to the petitioner 50 Manipuri families had left Manipur with the Maharaja of Manipur in 1890 A.D. for Cachar and between 1938 and 1940 A.D. the petitioner along with the remaining 49 families of Cachar Manipuries came from Ichapur within the Cachar district and settled at the village Tronglaobi within the limits of Bishenpur Police Station, and within the valley of Manipur under the orders of late Sir Churachand Singh, the then Maharaja of Manipur State. The then Government of Manipur passed necessary orders for settlement of the land specified below with these families on the recommendation of the then Chief Minister Shri Priyobrata Singh: On the north - village Emon. On the south - the river Laiga. On the east - Khongnang Makha. On the west - Thangjing hill. The petitioner and the remaining 49 families thus claimed to have become entitled to the aforesaid land and they actually occupied it vide paras.1 and 3 of the affidavit. In 1949 the opposite party No.1 along with some other villagers of Mongyang trespassed upon the said land and so an application was made to the then Manipur State Council for taking action. The Tehsildar of Bishenpur Tehsil in accordance with the instruction then issued by the Government of Manipur issued a public notice to the effect that the said land had been granted to the petitioner and the 49 families mentioned above, and anybody who would enter the aforesaid area without the permission of the authorities would be liable to punishment. The Tehsildar of Bishenpur Tehsil in accordance with the instruction then issued by the Government of Manipur issued a public notice to the effect that the said land had been granted to the petitioner and the 49 families mentioned above, and anybody who would enter the aforesaid area without the permission of the authorities would be liable to punishment. The petitioner and the said 49 families remained in peaceful possession for some years over this land and later on the opposite party No.1 and some villagers of Mongyang, fomented trouble with the result that there was. a serious breach of peace in the said village. The present petitioner then brought a case No. 83 of 1951 under S.145, Criminal P.C., in the Court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Thoubal, and the Sub-divisional Officer ordered on 17-9-1951 that the petitioner and the other families referred to above migrated from Cachar district were entitled to the land in question. The opposite parties Nos.1 and 4 filed an appeal No.25 of 1951 (although no appeal is legally provided against the final decision in proceeding under S.145, Criminal P.C.) and the opposite party No.2 the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, reversed the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, Thoubal, illegally and without jurisdiction according to the petitioner. The petitioner then brought a declaratory suit No.155 of 1951 under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., in the Court of the Sub-judge, Manipur, against the opposite party Nos.1 and 20 others of Mongyang village and this suit was contested by the opposite party No.1 on the ground that the Sub-judge had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. Ultimately the opposite party No.1 did not appear on the subsequent dates of hearing with the result that the suit was decreed ex parte by means of judgment dated 28-4-1952. The opposite party No. 1 filed no appeal nor revision nor any restoration application against the decree dated 28-4-1954 and so this decision became final. The petitioner then applied to the opposite party No.2: for issue of a patta in his favour, but the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, refused to comply thus ignoring the decree passed by the Sub-judge, Manipur, in declaratory suit No.155 of 1951. The opposite party No.2 went a step further and by means of the order dated 9-5-1953 and Memo. No.1044/BT dated 19-1-1953 proceeded to settle the land in question with the opposite parties Nos.1 and 4 and other persons. 3. The opposite party No.2 went a step further and by means of the order dated 9-5-1953 and Memo. No.1044/BT dated 19-1-1953 proceeded to settle the land in question with the opposite parties Nos.1 and 4 and other persons. 3. Sometime after the opposite party No.4 on behalf of himself and 20 others of the village Molphei Tampak (in which the opposite party No.1 was included) brought a suit against the petitioner and 49 others mentioned above and this Hill Civil suit No.13 of 1953 was for a declaration that the judgment and decree of the Sub-Judge, Manipur, in Title Suit No.155 of 1951 was a nullity being without jurisdiction and the same was not binding on the opposite party Nos.4 and 20 others of Molphei Tampak village and the opposite party No.2 purporting to exercise the powers and jurisdiction of the defunct Hill Bench which was constituted under the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-judge, Manipur, dated 19-10-1953 on the ground that the learned Sub-judge had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and that the then Chief Ministers order in respect of the settlement of the land in question with the petitioner and other 49 families referred to above, was without authority and vague. The opposite party No.2 acted purporting to exercise this jurisdiction under the Chief Commissioners Notification No.J/12/51/23 dated 23-5-1251 published in the Manipur Gazette dated 13-10-1951 by which the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, was invested with the powers and jurisdiction of the defunct Hill Bench. According to the petitioner this Notification was illegal, void and ultra vires and so the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, had legally no option but to abide by the valid and binding judgment passed in Title Suit No.155 of 1951 which had become final between the parties. According to the petitioner the order of the opposite party No. 2 dated 19-10-1953 is void as the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, had no jurisdiction to try the Hill Civil Suit No.13 of 1933 and even if it be assumed that he had jurisdiction his order is not legally binding as he acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The orders dated 18-11-1952 and 9-5-1953 are also alleged to be void and illegal and as they were passed contrary to the orders of the competent civil Court in Title Suit No.155 of 1951 which had become final. The land in question is situated in the valley area within the Bishenpur Tehsil, and so it is contended that a title suit with regard to this land was maintainable only in the Court of the Sub-judge, Manipur, and in no other Court or the Hill Bench. The opposite parties have not filed any affidavit to rebut the allegations mentioned above by the petitioner in his petition as well as in his affidavit and it has been contended by the learned Government Advocate at the time of arguments that the order passed by the opposite party No.2 in Hill Civil Suit No. 13 of 1953 which has been confirmed by the Chief Commissioner, is binding on the parties as the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, opposite party No.2 acted under Notification No.J/12/51/23 dated 23-5-1951 issued by the Chief Commissioner and published in the Manipur Gazette dated 13-10-1951. According to his contention this Notification was published under Ss.3 and 4, Manipur Administration Order, 1949, which came into force on 15-10-1949, and the Manipur State Administration Order, 1949, was promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the powers of Ss.3 and 4, Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (Act XLVII of 1947) and of all other powers enabling it in this behalf. 4. As the opposite parties have not challenged the affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is to be held on facts that 50 Manipuri families migrated from Cachar to Tronglaobi Basti, Police Station Bishenpur in the year 1938 and they were given the lands in question within the specified boundaries by the then Government of Manipur on the recommendation of the then Chief Minister Shri Priyabrata Singh, and these people continued to remain in peaceful possession till 15-10-1949 when the Union Government took over the administration of Manipur in their hands, but later on the opposite parties Nos.1 and 4 along with others interfered with their possession and so litigation in various Courts ensued. The learned Sub-judge, Manipur, held in declaratory suit No.155 of 1951 under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., that the petitioner and other 49 Metei families (Manipuri families) were entitled to declaration of their title to the property described in schedule shown at the end of the plaint and confirmation of their possession. The opposite parties Nos.1 and 4 and others were ordered to deliver up the paddy given to them by the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, during the pendency of the suit. The opposite parties were further restrained permanently from entering upon the disputed lands with a view to disturb the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. The opposite parties filed no appeal nor revision nor any restoration application against this decree, but they tried to obtain pattas regarding the portion of the land in question and the Deputy Commissioner by means of the orders dated 19-1-1953 and dated 9-5-1953 proceeded to settle the land in question ignoring the decree passed by the learned Sub-judge presumably on the ground that the Civil Courts of the valley area had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The question which arises for determination is whether the learned Sub-judge had jurisdiction to try the suit No.155 of 1951 and whether the decision in that case is binding on the parties. The learned Government Advocate has urged that the jurisdiction of the valley Courts was expressly taken away by S.59 of Chap. IV-D, Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947, which runs as follows: "59 (a) All Civil suits and Criminal Proceedings to which both Hill men and Manipuris of the Valley are a party shall be tried by the Hill Bench as a Court of Original Jurisdiction. (b) In all cases where the parties reside in different Circles, the case shall be tried by the Circle Bench under whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises." The interpretation put on sub-s. (a) on behalf of the opposite parties is that if any hill man is a party to any civil or criminal case, the case must be tried by the Hill Bench alone and the valley Courts will have no jurisdiction over such a proceeding. To my mind this interpretation is based on a misreading of the sub-section for if this were the meaning the Legislature would have used some such words "All civil suits and criminal proceeding to which any hill man is a party shall be tried by the Hill Bench"......and the words "To which both Hill man and Manipuris of the valley are a party" would never have been used. The language used in this sub-section clearly implies that even if a Manipuri is joined with hill man in any suit relating to hill area, the suit would not be tried by the valley Courts simply because the valley men have been joined together with hill men as a party. Sub-section (b) of S.59 merely lays down that where the parties (hill men) reside in different circles the jurisdiction would be determined by the place where the cause of action arises. This sub-section also nowhere lays down that if a hill man encroaches upon the lands of valley men in the valley area, the case would be tried by the Hill Bench. 5. Section 39, Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947, clearly lays down that civil justice shall be administered by the Chief Court (now the Judicial Commissioners Court), the Hill Bench, Circle Bench and the village authorities. This section makes it absolutely clear that this Court will have jurisdiction to try civil cases of the hill area. In fact the entire scheme of Chapters IV-B and C, Manipur Hill Peoples Regulation referred to procedure of the Hill Courts in criminal proceedings, and to civil courts and proceedings in the hill area. The entire scheme of the above Regulation is that cases of hill area may not be tried by the Valley Courts; but to argue that S.59(a) gives power to a hill man to encroach on the private land of a valley man and to force the valley man to go and institute a case in hill area, would be stretching language of this section too far and this interpretation is totally inconsistent with provisions of Chapters IV C and D and S.57 of the Regulation. Section 33, Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, as amended by the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order 1950 also makes it clear that for the exercise of the functions vested in it by the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation 1947, the Chief Court (now the judicial Commissioners Court) shall in all cases sit with 2 assessors who shall be nominated for each particular case by the Member of the Executive Council responsible for hill administration. It is thus established that the disputes relating to hill area as between hill men and also in cases in which a valley man joins a hill man as a party should be tried by the Hill Bench etc. Even if S.59(a) is deemed to be inconsistent with the provisions of S.33, Manipur State Courts Act, and S.59, Hill Peoples Regulation, is irreconcilable, this provision would not be enforceable and the provisions of the Manipur State Courts Act contained in S.33 will prevail. 6. It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that as the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, was in force on 15-10-1949 when Manipur State was integrated with the Indian Union and as the Manipur State Courts Act was considered by the Central Government when the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950, was passed, no change could be made in the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950, and the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur since these enactments were promulgated as binding by the Parliament or by the President under Art.372 of the Constitution, which runs as follows: "372. (1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in Art.395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." 7. The ruling reported in - Babu v. Parsram, AIR 1954 Madh B 78 at p.80 (B), lays down that in the event of State succession, the civil law of the former territorial sovereign continues in operation until new laws have been enacted. The ruling reported in - Babu v. Parsram, AIR 1954 Madh B 78 at p.80 (B), lays down that in the event of State succession, the civil law of the former territorial sovereign continues in operation until new laws have been enacted. In the absence of such legislation, it is not to be presumed that the new sovereign has intended automatically to apply its whole system of private law as distinct from public law to the newly acquired territory. In view of this ruling also the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947 as amended in 1950 will continue to operate so long as it is not amended, repealed or altered by any adaptation or modification by the Parliament or competent authority; vide also Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 1953 Edition, page 146, where it has been observed: "5 and 6 Will. 4, c.63 (repealed and re-enacted by the Weights and Measures Act, 1878 (c.49), Ss.15 and 86), which prohibited the sale of liquids otherwise than by imperial measure, would not be considered as affecting a contract between British subjects for the sale of palm oil to be measured and delivered on the coast of Africa. A different construction would have involved the absurd supposition that the legislature intended that English subjects should carry English measures abroad." Article 239 of the Constitution provides as follows: "239. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a State specified in Part C of the First Schedule shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant-Governor to be appointed by him or through the Government of a neighbouring State:…." This article does not confer any power on the Chief Commissioner to legislate and in any case the Chief Commissioner cannot be deemed to amend or alter any laws duly framed by the Central Government. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes (1953 Edition) at page 300 has made the following observations: "Instruments and by-laws made under statutory powers enforceable by penalties are construed like other provisions encroaching on the ordinary rights of persons. They must, on pain of invalidity, be clear and definite and free from ambiguity, and should not make unlawful things that are otherwise innocent. They must not be in excess of the statutory power authorising them, nor repugnant to that statute or to the general principles of law. They must, on pain of invalidity, be clear and definite and free from ambiguity, and should not make unlawful things that are otherwise innocent. They must not be in excess of the statutory power authorising them, nor repugnant to that statute or to the general principles of law. If the subject is deprived of his right to resort to the Courts of law of his country, it must be by express enactment and not by by-law." 8. In view of what has been said by me above, I think if S.59(a), Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, meant to lay down that in any case in which a hill man was a party, the case was to be tried before the Hill Bench alone, the provision would be nugatory as it would be inconsistent with the other provisions of the Hill Peoples Regulation as well as the Manipur State Courts Act to which reference has already been made. Vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (1953 Edition), page 51, where it has been observed that if reconciliation is impossible, the subordinate provision must give way. In my opinion S.59(a) does not lay down any such provision and it merely provides for a case to which both hill men and Manipuris of the valley are a party. This conclusion further finds support from S.2 (a), Manipur Hill Peoples Regulation, which provides that the Chief Court (now the Judicial Commissioners Court) means the Chief Court of the Manipur State as constituted under the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, for the trial of cases or suits to which hill men are a party. This clearly shows that the valley Courts were also given jurisdiction to hear cases or appeals relating to hill area in certain cases. 9. The hill civil suit No.13 of 1953 which was decided by the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, as Hill Bench on 19-10-1953 in which it was held that the learned Sub-Judge, Manipur, had no jurisdiction to try the declaratory suit No.155 of 1951, was decided on the assumption that S.59(a). Hill Peoples Regulation, allowed that any suit to which a hill man was a party must be tried by the Hill Bench alone. Hill Peoples Regulation, allowed that any suit to which a hill man was a party must be tried by the Hill Bench alone. Apart from the fact that S.59(a), Hill Regulation, did not make any such provision the mandatory provisions of the Manipur State Peoples Hill Regulation were not complied with in deciding the hill suit No.13 of 1953 as the Deputy Commissioner alone decided that suit. Section 26 of the Hill Regulation provides as follows: "26. The Hill Bench at Imphal shall exercise the powers of a Sessions Court under the Criminal Procedure Code and shall comprise of a Bench of which a Judge of the Chief Court shall be chairman sitting with two Hill men as Judges." The Chief Commissioner, Manipur, has been granted power to nominate for each particular case two assessors under S.33, Manipur State Courts Act, in certain cases, but beyond that the Act does not provide that the Deputy Commissioner alone can constitute the Hill Bench. The decision of the Deputy Commissioner in the hill civil suit No.13 of 1953 cannot, therefore, be deemed to be in conformity with the provisions of the Manipur State Courts Act 1947, as amended by the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 and the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947. 10. The learned Government Advocate has argued that the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur alone can constitute the Hill Bench in view of the Chief Commissioners Notification No.J/12/51/23, dated 23-5-1951 which was sent to the Court along with Memo No.J/12/51/23-A, dated 24-5-1951. It is necessary to quote this Notification in extenso: "Government of Manipur. Orders by the Chief Commissioner. Imphal, the 23rd May, 1951." "No.J/12/51/23. It is necessary to quote this Notification in extenso: "Government of Manipur. Orders by the Chief Commissioner. Imphal, the 23rd May, 1951." "No.J/12/51/23. Whereas in the new set-up of the Administration of Manipur, the Chief Court constituted under the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, having been substituted by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner with a single Judge, a difficulty had arisen regarding the continuance of the Hill Bench as constituted by S.26, Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947 and also regarding the exercise of the functions which the Chief Court had exercised in accordance with the provisions of S.33, Manipur State Courts Act, 1947;" "And whereas in consequences thereof, the Hill Bench has been abolished and S.33 of the said Courts Act has become inoperative;" "AND WHEREAS doubts and confusions have arisen as to the authority for the exercise of the functions which the said Hill Bench and the Chief Court had exercised under the said Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947;" "AND WHEREAS in consequence of the conditions arising out of the aforesaid circumstances, it is deemed expedient for this Administrations notification No.J/12/51/10, dated 15-5-1951 to resolve these doubts and confusions and expressly to make provisions for the exercise of the powers which the said Hill Bench and the Chief Court had exercised under the said Regulation;" "NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by paras.4 and 5 of the Manipur (Administration) Order, 1949 and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Chief Commissioner is pleased to direct that all powers exercised by the Hill Bench and the Chief Court under the provisions of the said Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947, shall be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner respectively and in exercise of the powers by the Chief Commissioner, the provisions of S.33, Manipur State Courts Act, 1947 so far as they relate to Assessors shall be deemed to be repealed." 11. A perusal of this notification shows that by this notification the Chief Commissioner purported to amend, modify as well as repeal certain provisions of the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 which had been promulgated by the Central Government which was the sole authority competent to promulgate it under Art.372(1) of the Constitution. It is, therefore, to be examined whether the notification in question could duly be promulgated under paras.3 and 4 of the Manipur (Administration) Order 1949. 12. It is, therefore, to be examined whether the notification in question could duly be promulgated under paras.3 and 4 of the Manipur (Administration) Order 1949. 12. The Manipur Administration Order, 1949 was made by the Central Government by means of the notification dated 15-10-1949 and it was passed in exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by Ss.3 and 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (47 of 1947) and this order came into force on 15-10-1949. Section 3, Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, lays down that (1) it shall be lawful for the Central Government to exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction in such manner as it thinks fit. (2) The Central Government may delegate any such jurisdiction as aforesaid to any officer or authority in such manner and to such extent as it thinks fit. Under S.4(2) it has been laid down that without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s.(1), (for making such orders as it may seem, to the Central Government, expedient for the effective exercise of any extra-provincial jurisdiction) any order made under that subsection may provide- (a) for determining the law and procedure to be observed, whether by applying with or without modifications all or any of the provisions of any enactment in force in any Province or otherwise; (b) for determining the persons who are to exercise jurisdiction, either generally or in particular cases or classes of cases, and the powers to be exercised by them; (c) for determining the Courts, Judges, Magistrates and Authorities by whom and for regulating the manner in which, any jurisdiction auxiliary or incidental to or consequential on the jurisdiction exercised under this Act is to be exercised within any Province and; (d) for regulating the amount, collection and application of fees. 13. Section 6 of this Act is also material which lays down: "6. (1) If in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in a Court established in the provinces or by the authority of the Central Government outside the Provinces, any question arises as to the existence or extent of any extra-provincial jurisdiction of the Central Government, the Secretary to the Government of India in the appropriate department shall, on the application of the Court, send to the Court the decision of the Central Government on the question, and that decision shall for the purposes of the proceeding be final. (2) The Court shall send to the said Secretary in a document under the seal of the Court or signed by a Judge of the Court, questions framed so as properly to raise the question, and sufficient answers to those questions shall be returned to the Court by the Secretary and those answers shall on production thereof be conclusive evidence of the matters therein contained." 14. In the present proceedings it has not been alleged by the opposite parties that the Deputy Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner ever referred any matter to the Secretary of the appropriate department pointing out the difficulty that in spite of the Manipur Administration Order, 1949 the Central Government issued the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 by which various provisions of the Manipur State Courts Act and the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation 1947 were kept intact even though the Deputy Commissioner had been appointed to constitute the Hill Bench under the Manipur Administration Order, 1949. 15. It has further been contended on behalf of the opposite parties that delegation of powers under S.3(2), Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, can be inferred from paras.3 and 4 of the Manipur Administration Order, 1949. These paragraphs provide as under: "Para.3. Appointment of Chief Commissioner: There shall be a Chief Commissioner appointed by the Central Government at the head of the Administration of Manipur." "Para.4. Appointment of functionaries- (1) Subject to the control of the Central Government, the Chief Commissioner may appoint such Judges, Magistrates and other Officers as may be necessary for the administration of Manipur and may, by general or special order, determine their jurisdiction, powers, duties and functions." (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-para. (1), all Judges, Magistrates and other Officers who immediately before the commencement of this Order, were exercising lawful functions in Manipur or any part thereof shall, until other provision is made by the Chief Commissioner, continue to exercise their respective functions in the same manner and to the same extent as they were doing before the commencement of this Order." 16. So far as the provisions of para.3 are concerned there is no dispute but regarding provisions in para.4 it has been contended that some powers were delegated to the Chief Commissioner, but he was and could not legally be given powers to legislate, vide Art.239 of the Constitution, also vide - Satya Dev v. Padam Dev, AIR 1954 SC 587 (C), in which it has been held that the President occupies in regard to Part C States a position analogus to that of Governor in Part A State and of a Raj Pramukha in Part B State. It thus becomes clear that the Central Government never intended to delegate the functions of legislating on any subject on the Chief Commissioner as this para. Clearly provides that the powers conferred in cl.(1) would always remain subject to the control of the Central Government and if any doubt would arise the matter would be clarified by the Central Government under S.6, Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. The fact that the Central Government passed the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order in 1950 and kept most of the provisions of the old Act (of 1947) intact regarding constitution and jurisdiction of Courts also goes to show that it was not intended that the laws would be framed locally regarding the nature of cases to be tried by different Courts and also regarding jurisdiction of Courts except within the limits prescribed by the Manipur State Courts Act (Amendment) Order, 1950. No document has been filed in this case which might show that the Manipur Government was ever specifically empowered to oust the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioners Court in the hill area by the Central Government; on the other hand the provisions of the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 clearly show that these provisions were maintained in 1950 even though the Manipur Administration Order, 1949 had come in force on 15-10-1949. As such it becomes clear that the Notification No.J/12/51/23 dated 23-5-1951 issued by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur which purports to legislate on certain very vital and important matters, could not legally be issued by him. 17. As such it becomes clear that the Notification No.J/12/51/23 dated 23-5-1951 issued by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur which purports to legislate on certain very vital and important matters, could not legally be issued by him. 17. The Constitution of India came into force on 26-1-1950 and as has already been shown by me above, it clearly provides that the Chief Commissioner will have no powers to legislate and all the laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered, repealed or amended by competent Legislature or other competent authority. The Constitution is the fundamental of basic law to which all other laws must conform. It is superior to the will of the Legislature, the validity of whose Acts is to be determined by its provisions and it is the sole charter by which the rights of the Union as well as the State Governments are to be determined. It antedated all other laws and all of them must, whether by adaptation or modification be brought into line with and be placed on a footing as if the laws were made under the Constitution; vide - Prahalad Jena v. State, AIR 1950 Orissa 157 (FB)(D), which also lays down that local hardships and inconveniences do not count in interpreting a Constitution which is based upon the national will as against that of a Legislature. This ruling goes to snow that the provisions of the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 which was issued by the competent authority could not be repealed locally on the ground of local hardships and inconveniences. 18. The present Notification in question issued by the Chief Commissioner referred to above creates a number of glaring anomalies including the following: (1) The Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 provided that cases of hill area, should be decided judicially by officers having sufficient experience and legal training e.g., Judge of the Chief Court, including all big civil suits and serious criminal cases (murder etc.), but under the Notification in question trial of such cases have been entrusted to Magistrates. Under the Administration Order of 1949 the Chief Commissioner was not authorised to curtail the jurisdiction of the Chief Court and its Judges. Under the Administration Order of 1949 the Chief Commissioner was not authorised to curtail the jurisdiction of the Chief Court and its Judges. It has not been disputed before me that the present District Judge Shri L. Ibungohal Singh who was formerly a Judge of the Chief Court used to work on the Hill Bench and he worked in this capacity for a number of years but instead of the District Judge being appointed to work on the Hill Bench, the District Magistrate, has been under the Notification in question for reasons not given, ordered to constitute the Hill Bench, vide In re, Laxminarayan Timmanna Karki, AIR 1928 Bom 390 (E) and referred to in Ratan Lals Code of Criminal Procedure, 1952 Edn., p.27. (2) The Chief Court was given jurisdiction under S.2(a) of the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947 for the hill area cases and in the valley area also serious cases were to be tried by the Chief Court (now the Judicial Commissioners Court). By the Notification in question very serious criminal cases are to be tried by Magistrates and the appeals from them go to the Chief Commissioner while in similar cases (murder, etc.) decided by the Judicial Commissoner, the appeal goes to the Honble Supreme Court. (3) In hill area, appeals against acquittals and also cases for enhancing of sentences are filed after obtaining the sanction of the Chief Commissioner who is supposed to go through the papers in order to express a definite opinion whether such proceedings should be started or not and then the appeals and applications for enhancement of sentences are also to be heard by him judicially later on. This to my mind is a negation of justice. (4) The Notification in question seeks to create another High Court in this small State of Manipur where the Parliament by means of Act XV of 1950 (Judicial Commissioners Courts Declaration as High Courts) has intended that the Judicial Commissioners Court at Manipur should be the High Court for the entire State. The Notification in question thus infringes Art.215(1) of the Constitution also. 19. In - Sridhar Mahadeo v. Mannalal Chabilchand, AIR 1951 Madh-B 39 (F) it has been laid down that construction avoiding inconsistency and making any provision nugatory and absurd must be avoided in the interpretation of a Statute. The Notification in question thus infringes Art.215(1) of the Constitution also. 19. In - Sridhar Mahadeo v. Mannalal Chabilchand, AIR 1951 Madh-B 39 (F) it has been laid down that construction avoiding inconsistency and making any provision nugatory and absurd must be avoided in the interpretation of a Statute. If para.4 of the Manipur Administration Order is interpreted to mean conferring powers of legislation on the Chief Commissioner, it would give rise to the serious anomalies mentioned above and it would also offend the articles of the Constitution already mentioned above, so it seems to me that the proper interpretation of Para.4 is that the Chief Commissioner can exercise the powers mentioned in that para within the ambit of the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 and the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation. The wholesale repeal and change in the constitution of Courts and their jurisdiction and also the types of cases which are to be tried by different Courts, by the Chief Commissioner could not have been contemplated, as such a contingency offends against the provisions of the Constitution and accepted principles of interpretation of Statutes. 20. In - Radha Kishan v. Ramnagar Cooperative Society, AIR 1951 All 341 (FB)(G). it has been laid down at page 352 that it is not a rule of absolute application that in all cases the general words ought to be interpreted in their whole import, as stated by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Edn.9). page 63 and this passage has been quoted: "It is in the interpretation of general words and phrases that the principle of strictly adapting the meaning to the particular subject-matter with reference to which the words are used finds its most frequent application. However wide in the abstract, they are more or less elastic, and admit of restriction or expansion to suit the subject-matter. While expressing truly enough all that Legislatures intended, they frequently express more, in their literal meaning and natural force; and it is necessary to give them the meaning which best suits the scope and object of statute without extending to ground foreign to the intention. It is, therefore, a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not express and precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter. It is, therefore, a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not express and precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter. They are to be construed as particular if the intention be particular; that is they must be understood as used with reference to the subject-matter in the mind of the Legislature, and limited to it." 21. If the Central Government intended that in the hill area the Chief Court and the other judicial officers should not decide civil suits and criminal cases at all it would have been clearly mentioned in the Amendment Order of 1950, but this was not done and so it must be inferred that the Notifications No.J/12/51/23 D/-23-5-1951 and No.J/12/51/69 dated 6-10-1951 do not and could not properly be issued by the Chief Commissioner and these Notifications cannot be deemed to be binding on the parties, vide - Gopalji v. Shreechand, (S) AIR 1955 All 28 (H) in which it has been laid down that where there is a special Act dealing with special subject (Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950 in this case) resort should be had to that act instead of to a general provision which is exercisable or which is available under extraordinary circumstances only; vide also - Brij Bhukan v. S.D.O. Siwan, (S) AIR 1955 Pat 1 (SB) (1) in which it has been laid down that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to toe considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. The whole scheme of the legislation has to be taken into account, and the reasonableness of the legislation has to be determined by applying some objective standard which is said to be the standard of an average prudent man. It was held by the Judicial Commissioner Kutch in - Pragji Karamshi v. State of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 42 (J) that under practically similar circumstances the Chief Commissioner had no power to issue a Notification by which the provisions of the Bombay Gambling Act were extended to the State of Kutch. 22. It was held by the Judicial Commissioner Kutch in - Pragji Karamshi v. State of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 42 (J) that under practically similar circumstances the Chief Commissioner had no power to issue a Notification by which the provisions of the Bombay Gambling Act were extended to the State of Kutch. 22. I have shown above that on a proper construction of para.4 of the Manipur Administration Order, 1949 it appears that the Chief Commissioner was empowered to make some changes in the machinery for the administration of justice within the ambits of the Manipur State Courts Act and the Manipur Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947 which were subsequently amended by the Central Government by the Amendment Order of 1950. It has been held in - Norottam Das Jethabhai V. Aloysious Pinto Phillips, AIR 1951 Bom 180 (K) that it is not open to the legislature, supreme or sovereign as it may be within its own province to delegate to any authority the power of legislation which has been entrusted to it under the Constitution. It is solely the privilege of the legislature to make laws, in exercising that privilege it may entrust subordinates and agents with the power to carry out its policy and to give effect to legislation, but the subordinates and agents must act within the policy laid down by the Legislature. It cannot create a parallel or alternative law making authority. This ruling also clearly shows that the Chief Commissioner Manipur could not and was not in fact entrusted with the law making power and so I hold that the Notification No.J/12/51/23 dated 23-5-1951 (Memo. No.J/12/51/23-A dated 24-5-1951) published in the Manipur State Gazette dated 30-5-1951 is void and ultra vires and the decree in Hill civil suit No.13 of 1953 dated 19-10-1953 was without jurisdiction and hence a nullity. Similar orders dated 18-11-1953 and 9-5-1953 by which the pattas were not issued in accordance with the orders of the Sub-Judge in civil suit No.155 of 1951 and the pattas were being issued to the opposite parties Nos.1 and 4 and others are also not binding on the present petitioner and others, as the decision in suit No.155 of 1951 was passed by competent court and it has become final. 23. The scope of a writ of certiorari is very wide. 23. The scope of a writ of certiorari is very wide. A writ of certiorari lies not merely when Tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction but also when the tribunal commits an error of law patent on the face of the record; in other words, the High Court is able by virtue of the Writ to see that the inferior Tribunals keep within their jurisdiction and also to see that the inferior Tribunals observe the law in the course of exercise of that jurisdiction, vide - Srimati Kusum Kumari Devi v. Custodian of Evacuees Property, Bihar AIR 1954 Pat 238 (L). In the present case the hill civil suit No.13 of 1953 was legally not maintainable and the Deputy Commissioner of Manipur decided it without having any jurisdiction to entertain it and so this decision as well as the orders dated 18-11-1952 and 9-5-1953 are held to be not binding on the present petitioner and this Writ Petition is allowed with costs as against the opposite parties. The opposite parties are forbidden from acting upon in any manner or giving effect to the orders dated 9-5-1953 and dated 18-11-1952 and dated 19-10-1953 (which has been confirmed on appeal on 13-11-1953) and the opposite parties 1 and 4 are restrained from interfering with the possession of the petitioner on the land in question. 24. Before parting with this case I think I should refer to the Chief Commissioners note dated 7-1-1952 in R.R. No.582 during the pendency of civil suit No.155 of 1951 to the effect: "The attached temporary injunction is without jurisdiction and no action can be taken on it by the officer to whom it is addressed, who is bound to comply with the orders already issued by the Deputy Commissioner. Please in future confine yourself within your own jurisdiction and do not interfere with the jurisdiction of other courts and officers" is rather unhappy as it could have the effect of prejudicing the mind of the Sub-Judge against a particular party and an impression could be created that the judiciary was not free to act as it should be in a civilised State. The Chief Commissioner was not hearing any appeal from any judgment or order of the Sub-Judge and under the circumstances mentioned above no blame could be placed on the latter when he proceeded with the trial and decreed the suit. Petition allowed.