JUDGEMENT : NEVASKAR, J. This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondents for recovery of Rs. 10,500 from the appellants. This suit was decreed by the District Judge Dhar to the extent of Rs. 9,080-14-0. 2. Appellants, who were the defendants in the suit, assail the decision of the District Judge on the question of limitation. 3. Plaintiffs case as stated in the plaint is that plaintiff No. 1 Lala Pyarelal who died during the pendency of the suit was the Diwan in the former Jhabua State in the year 1921-22 and the defendants were and are the members of a joint Hindu family banking concern operating in the name of Manmohanlal Champalal and having its branches at Indore and Rajgarh. Lala Pyarelal began depositing money with the defendants concern from 19-1-1952. On that day he realised Rs. 15,664-11-6 from the shop of Pannalal Ganeshdas of Ujjain and deposited the same with the defendants. Later on 6-2-1922 he deposited a further sum of Rs. 335-4-6 in cash. 4. On the latter date the firm of Madhaolal Champalal issued a deposit receipt of Rs. 16,000 covered by the earlier two deposits mentioned above. 5. In March 1922 Lala Pyarelal realised Rs. 10,000 from the firm of Tilokchand Pannalal of Indore. This sum together with a cash deposit of Rs. 2,000 were deposited with the defendant firm. For this sum of Rs. 12,000 a deposit receipt dated 30-3-1922 was issued by the firm in his favour. 6. There were subsequent deposits and withdrawals. All these were entered in a small book by the defendant firm and the same was handed over to plaintiff No. 1 as a pass-book. Twice the accounts between the parties were settled. On 20-12-1922 there was the second settlement and Rs. 23,168-9-6 were found in favour of the plaintiff No. 1. 7. There are subsequent withdrawals from time to time. Interest was debited as per agreement. Rs. 2,000 were withdrawn on 19-2-1929 and Rs. 2,500 were collected through Imperial Bank of India from 4-4-1929 to 6-5-1930. 8. On 19-2-1929 balance was drawn in the Pass-book in the possession of the plaintiffs under the signature of one Mangilal of defendants shop. 9. Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to Rs. 11,200-7-0 on the basis of this account. They however confined their claim to Rs. 10,500. 10. 8. On 19-2-1929 balance was drawn in the Pass-book in the possession of the plaintiffs under the signature of one Mangilal of defendants shop. 9. Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to Rs. 11,200-7-0 on the basis of this account. They however confined their claim to Rs. 10,500. 10. On 29-2-1932 plaintiffs by notice demanded the return of their dues which were in deposit with the defendants and on their refusal to take notice the present suit was filed. 11. It was also alleged that defendants Nos. 1 and 3 acted as the manager of the firm. The cause of action was stated to have arisen on 19-2-1929 when the account was acknowledged. The suit was filed on 11-2-1935. 12. The defendants contended that banking was not their family business. It was also denied that defendant No. 3 Ratanlal acted as the Karta. The principal defence was that the defendants never acted as bankers and the money received by them from plaintiff No. 1 was not by way of deposit but was in pursuance of transaction of loan. They denied that any balance was drawn on behalf of the defendants firm on 19-2-1929. The cause of action according to them did not arise on 29-2-1932. The notice alleged by the plaintiffs was denied. The claim was alleged to be barred by time. 13. On these pleadings the case was tried and decreed in the Court below. 14. The only point raised in this appeal is one relating to limitation. This will involve consideration whether the relationship between the parties was that of depositors and depositees or creditors and debtors. 15. The trial Court considered this question while dealing with the issue of limitation. According to its view the relation between the parties was of depositors and depositees. 16. The question whether certain transaction or a series of transactions between the parties to litigation represent a loan or a deposit has been considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in two decisions reported in Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh, AIR 1936 PC 171 (A) and Suleman Haji v. Haji Abdulla, AIR 1940 PC 132 (B). In the former case their Lordships appear to have considered the question whether the depositee is a banker or not to be material. In the former case their Lordships appear to have considered the question whether the depositee is a banker or not to be material. But even in the absence of definite evidence to that effect the test laid down by their Lordships in the words of Atkins who delivered the judgment of the Board is as follows. "Was this then a loan or was it a deposit payable on demand. It should be remembered that the two terms are not mutually exclusive. A deposit of money is not confined to a bailment of specific currency to be returned in specie. As in the case of a deposit with a banker it does not necessarily involve the creation of a trust, but may involve only the creation of the relation of debtor and creditor, a loan under conditions. The distinction which is perhaps the most obvious is that the deposit not for a fixed term does not seem to impose an immediate obligation on the depositee to seek out the depositor and repay him. He is to keep the money till asked for it. A demand by the depositor would therefore seem to be a normal condition of the obligation of the depositee to repay". 17. It is therefore relevant to consider whether the defendants carried on the business of banking at the material time and place and also whether it was implicit in these transactions that the defendants need not have sought for the plaintiff No. 1 and paid him or whether it is only when plaintiff No. 1 made a demand that money was to be paid. 18. In their written statement defendants flatly denied that they carried on banking business. But defendant Champalal has admitted chithis sent by him to plaintiff No. 1, Exs. P/5 and P/6 on printed form which clearly indicate that the firm carried on business of bankers also. Ratanlal defendant No. 3 admitted that the firm of defendants carried on the business of banking. 19. Besides this if the nature of initial deposit of Rs. 16,000 is examined it will appear that plainitff No. 1 was entitled to recover Rs. 15,664-11-6 from Pannalal Ganesh of Ujjain. These were collected by the defendants firm on the instructions of plaintiff No. 1. In addition to this plaintiff No. 1 paid Rs. 335-4-6 making a round sum of Rs. 16,000. 16,000 is examined it will appear that plainitff No. 1 was entitled to recover Rs. 15,664-11-6 from Pannalal Ganesh of Ujjain. These were collected by the defendants firm on the instructions of plaintiff No. 1. In addition to this plaintiff No. 1 paid Rs. 335-4-6 making a round sum of Rs. 16,000. The defendant passed a receipt to plaintiff No. 1 on 6-2-1922 for this sum informing him that Rs. 16,000 stand credited to his account in his firm on interest at 7½ per cent. per annum. Similarly Rs. 10,000 were recovered from Tilokchand Kalyanmal on the basis of a note of plaintiff No. 1 and Rs. 2,000 were paid by plaintiff No. 1 in cash, thus making a round sum of Rs. 12,000 for which a receipt was passed by the defendant firm informing plaintiff No. 1 about the fact of recovery and of the fact that Rs. 12,000 stood in his account to the credit of the plaintiff on interest at the same rate. 20. If we take into account the fact that the defendants then carried on business of banking and the fact of collection of these sums above indicated from third parties and issue of merely receipts indicating the fact of credit or deposit of these sums in the defendants shop on interest there will clearly arise an inference that the amount was not a loan but a deposit. The nature of the correspondence exchanged between the parties, as is plain from letters Ex. P/6 to Ex. P/10, also indicates that the defendants were not to seek the creditor and pay but that it was the plaintiff who had to make a demand if he wanted payment. 21. Defendant Ratanlal moreover admits that when the initial transaction was made plaintiff had asked the defendants to allow the amount to remain with them and that he would charge therefor interest at 70½ per cent. per annum. This further supports the theory of Ratanlal who admitted that they had deposists and there was never an occasion to take loan from the plaintiff. 22. If to this is added the further circumstance that even the salary of the plaintiff used to be deposited with the defendants for some time and the defendants even invested money on behalf of the plaintiff under his instructions. 22. If to this is added the further circumstance that even the salary of the plaintiff used to be deposited with the defendants for some time and the defendants even invested money on behalf of the plaintiff under his instructions. All this clearly go to establish the fact that the transactions between the parties were in the nature of deposit and not a loan. 23. The initial transactions in suit were evidenced by deposit receipts dated 6-1-1922 and 30-3-1922 and unless it were shown that the plaintiff had demanded the whole of his dues deposited and in balance on a particular date the period of limitation would not begin to run against him. According to the plaintiff he made a demand for payment of the entire dues standing in deposit with the defendant firm on 29-2-1932. If this is accepted then inasmuch as the suit was filed on 11-2-1925 it is clearly within time. 24. But Mr. Waghmare for the appellants contended that the letters relied upon by the plaintiffs viz., Ex. P/7 dated 11-1-1924 and Ex. P/8 dated 29-11-1924 clearly indicate that the plaintiff had decided to withdraw entire amount from the defendant firm. If that be so the plaintiffs claim, in the absence of anything else would be barred by time. 25. On examining Ex. P/7 it appears that plaintiff No. 1 had demanded money to which the defendant Champalal had replied stating that he would have sent money according to the order of the plaintiff had it not been that the defendant had then granted loans to others and also had invested in cotton. He informed the plaintiff that he had already deposited Rs. 7,000 in the Bank to his account and the rest he would pay after the (Cotton) season was over. 26. It is not clear what was plaintiffs order, whether the plaintiff No. 1 had demanded the whole of the deposit or only a portion of it. 27. Ex. P/8 indicates that the plaintiff had sent a telegram. The defendant gave two hundis worth Rs. 2,500 and asked the plaintiff to collect the sum and have it credited in his account and as for the rest he agreed to send within a short time. 27. Ex. P/8 indicates that the plaintiff had sent a telegram. The defendant gave two hundis worth Rs. 2,500 and asked the plaintiff to collect the sum and have it credited in his account and as for the rest he agreed to send within a short time. He however brought to the notice that he wanted to keep the plaintiffs money in deposit as he thought the same to be auspicious owing to the fact that the defendant had prospered since these transactions began. It was stated that in case plaintiff wanted money the same would be sent otherwise it would remain with the defendant as safely as in a box. This too is not clear. It nowhere says that the plaintiff had demanded whole of his dues. 28. Both these letters no doubt contain a clear acknowledgment of money due and payable by the defendant. 29. On behalf of the defendant a letter dated 2-3-1926, Ex. D. K. is produced as having been received from plaintiff No. 1. This no doubt shows that the plaintiff had made a demand in respect of the whole of their dues. 30. But we have this further fact that the plaintiffs had stated in Para 15 of the plaint that they had received payments of various sums of money from 4-4-1929 to 6-3-1930 from the defendant through Imperial Bank of India. This fact is admitted by the defendants in their written statement. The deposits in the Bank by the defendants to plaintiffs account must of necessity be accompanied by deposit forms signed by the person making the payment. These payments therefore are enough to bring the case within S. 20 of the Limitation Act corresponding to S. 20 of the Gwalior Act which applied to this case. 31. Thus we have payments made before the expiry of period of limitation from the date of acknowledgments dated 11-1-1924 and 29-11-1924, which was six years in Gwalior State, even if it be assumed that the letters containing these acknowledgments indicated an immediate prior demand for full payment. 32. If they do not make out a demand for the whole amount due then the letter Ex. D. K., dated 2-3-1926 is the only one which contains such a demand. 32. If they do not make out a demand for the whole amount due then the letter Ex. D. K., dated 2-3-1926 is the only one which contains such a demand. Even if the period of limitation began to run on that day each of the payments ranging from 4-4-1929 onwards upto 6-5-1930 gives a fresh start of limitation. 33. The suit therefore filed on 11-2-1935 is clearly within time. 34. There is therefore no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. 35. SAMVATSAR, J. :- I agree.