Judgement WANCHOO, C. J.:- This is an appeal by Bhanwarlal in a case under the Indian Succession Act. It came up before a learned Single Judge for decision, and as the points involved were of great importance and complexity, he referred the case to a larger Bench. 2. The facts, which led to this appeal may be briefly narrated. One Kishanlal was a flourishing business man and died in Kuchaman on 8-1-1952. An application was made on 14-10-1952 by his widow Mst. Mangibai for grant of succession certificate with respect to certain monies due to Kishanlal which were lying in certain banks. A little later, on the 6-12-1952, the present appellant Bhanwarlal also made an application for grant of succession certificate claiming to be the adopted son of Kishanlal deceased. He also filed objections to the grant of succession certificate to Shrimati Mangibai on the ground that he being the adopted son had a preferential claim. The two applications were tried together by the Senior Civil Judge, Merta. There is no dispute that Shrimati Mangibai is the widow of Kishanlal. There was, however, serious dispute to the claim of Bhanwarlal to be the adopted son of Kishanlal deceased. Evidence, therefore, was led by both parties on the question of adoption. The trial Court, however, did not go into all the evidence, and addressed itself to the question whether there was a registered deed of adoption in favour of Bhanwarlal or not. In this connection, the appellant relied on a copy of a registered deed of adoption said to have been executed by Kishanlal, the original being not available, and being said to be in the possession of Shvimati Mangibai. The case of Shrimati Mangibai in reply was that the alleged registration was a forgery, and that no adoption deed was ever executed by Kishanlal and much less registered. The trial Court addressed itself in detail to this question, and came to the conclusion that the registration appearing in the books of the Registration Department did not prima facie appear to be genuine. It was therefore not prepared to accept the copy relied upon by Bhanwarlal as the copy of a prima facie genuinely registered document. The trial Court addressed itself in detail to this question, and came to the conclusion that the registration appearing in the books of the Registration Department did not prima facie appear to be genuine. It was therefore not prepared to accept the copy relied upon by Bhanwarlal as the copy of a prima facie genuinely registered document. Having come to this conclusion the trial Court followed the law as said to be prevalent in the former State of Marwar, and held that as prima facie there was no registered deed of adoption in favour of Bhanwarlal, it could not be held that he was the adopted son of Kishanlal. Consequently his claim for succession certificate was dismissed, and a succession certificate was granted to Shrimati Mangibai who was prima facie entitled to it in the absence of an adopted son. 3. The present appeal is against the order by which succession certificate has been granted to Shrimati Mangibai. No appeal seems to have been filed against the order refusing to grant succession certificate to the present appellant on his application. The contention of the appellant before us is, in the first place, that the trial Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the document appearing in the registration books was not genuinely registered, and that therefore there was no registered adoption deed in favour of Bhanwarlal at all. In the second place, it has been urged that even if it be accepted that there was no registered adoption deed in favour of Bhanwarlal, the matter having come up before the Courts in 1952 after the coming into force of the Constitution, the law of Marwar, which required that there must be a registered deed of adoption before the Courts could recognize adoption, was void in view of Arts.13 and 14 of the Constitution, and the trial Court, therefore, should have proceeded to consider the oral and other evidence in proof of adoption and decide on that evidence whether Bhanwarlal was. the adopted son of Kishanlal deceased. 4. So far as the first contention, namely that the trial Court was wrong in holding that the document which appeared in the registration books as having been registered by Kishanlal in 1943 was not genuine, and that there was therefore no prima facie proof that Kishanlal ever executed a registered adoption deed in favour of Bhanwarlal, may be shortly disposed of. We have seen the document in question in the registration books, and have heard all that learned counsel for the appellant had to say against the judgment of the trial Court on this question. We think it unnecessary to repeat what the trial Court has said in coming to the conclusion that that particular document in the Registration books was a forgery, and was introduced into the books by fraud, and was never genuinely registered by the proper registering authority. The trial Court has given cogent reasons for coming to this conclusion, and it is sufficient for us to say that we agree with these reasons, and have no hesitation in holding that the document appearing in the registration books of 1943 was introduced there by some kind of fraud, and was never really registered by the proper registering officer. 5. This brings us immediately to the second contention on behalf of the applicant. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that there was in fact no legislation or no order having the force of legislation in the former State of Marwar which laid down that an adoption could not be recognized in that Stale unless it was made by a duly registered deed. It was also urged that even if there was such legislation or order having the force of legislation, that order had lost all force and validity after the commencement of the Constitution as it offends against the provisions of Arts.13 and 14 of the Constitution. The Courts, therefore, in a case which arose after the death of Kishanlal in January, 1952, were not bound to give effect to that law, and had only to see whether the provisions of Hindu Law regarding adoption had been complied with by Kishanlal in making the alleged adoption of Bhanwarlal. 6. Let us therefore see whether there was any law in the former State of Marwar, which laid down that the Courts could not recognize adoption unless there was a registered deed of adoption available, and if so what is the effect of that law. We may in this connection refer to - Bhajan Das v. Nanu Ram, AIR 1954 Raj 17 (A) to which one of us was a party. The main question in that case was whether giving and taking was necessary to the validity of an adoption. We may in this connection refer to - Bhajan Das v. Nanu Ram, AIR 1954 Raj 17 (A) to which one of us was a party. The main question in that case was whether giving and taking was necessary to the validity of an adoption. During the consideration of that question it was also considered what the law of adoption was in the former State of Marwar, and the case law on the subject was reviewed as far as available from 1914 onwards. It was held in that case that over and above the ceremony of giving and taking, the Marwar law as it then was required a registered deed of adoption for adoption to be effective in Marwar. This view was based on a decision of the Council of the former State of Marwar, dated 11-4-1914, which was in the following terms, and was published in the Marwar Gazette: "(1) In Marwar the law of adoption is governed by broad principles of Hindu Law. A widow when making an adoption adopts not for herself but for her husband. (2) A valid adoption cannot be cancelled. (3) The Darbar enforced the principle that a valid adoption in order to be recognized by the Courts must be in writing and duly registered." It may be added that there was already a provision in the registration law as it was prevalent in Marwar then that a deed of adoption was compulsorily registrable vide S.7(4), Marwar Registration Act of 1899. It is true that in Bhajandass case (A) the question whether there was any law at all in force in the former State of Marwar which required a registered deed of adoption as necessary for adoption to be valid in Marwar was not specifically questioned; but the judgment of that case certainly shows that the Court was then of opinion that such a law did exist in Marwar, and that over and above a registered deed of adoption it was also necessary to prove that there was giving and taking. It was, of course, pointed out that no particular form of giving and taking was required. It was also said that where an adoption was evidenced by an adoption deed containing a recital that giving and taking had taken place, a mere denial by a party that giving and taking had not taken place was not enough. It was, of course, pointed out that no particular form of giving and taking was required. It was also said that where an adoption was evidenced by an adoption deed containing a recital that giving and taking had taken place, a mere denial by a party that giving and taking had not taken place was not enough. The burden in such a case was placed on the party denying that giving and taking had taken place. We need only add that so far as taking is concerned, the existence of a registered deed of adoption in itself would generally be sufficient proof of it, and the only matter which would really require consideration in appropriate cases would be whether there was consent by the giver of the boy to the adoption. 7. The question, that is now raised, is whether the Gazette notification of 1914 which we have set out above amounts to law or not. We are of opinion that that notification must be treated either as a legislative act or at the least a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court in Marwar then. It must therefore be held to lay down the law of adoption in Marwar certainly from the date of its publication in the Gazette. It was only faintly argued that this notification in the gazette was neither law nor a judicial precedent, but was merely an executive act. It is enough to say that we cannot accept this contention, and the notification in the gazette must be either a law or at the least a pronouncement of the highest judicial authority in Marwar, and therefore a binding judicial precedent in Marwar. A review of the authorities of the time of the former State of Marwar, which was made in Bhajan Dass case (A), shows that except in one case of Bhabut Singh of 1915, the law as laid down in the notification was always followed. In Bhabut Singhs case, Civil original Case No.10 of 1914-15-Jodhpur C.C. (B), it seems that Bhabut Singhs adoption was recognized though there was only an unregistered deed of adoption in his favour. That case was, however, treated as a special case of a jagir succession to which was at the pleasure of the Ruler, though even there the Vice President of the Council dissented from that view. That case was, however, treated as a special case of a jagir succession to which was at the pleasure of the Ruler, though even there the Vice President of the Council dissented from that view. Later however the Ruler in - Ram Singh v. Baney Singh, Ijlas-i-Khas, Civil Appeal No.19 of 1927-28 (C), which was decided by the Ijlas-i-Khas in 1927-28 held that to make an adoption legal according to the local law, it should have been reduced into writing and also registered, and the exception made in Bhabut Singhs case (B), was not followed. There is no case after 1927-28 where the necessity of a registered deed of adoption to make adoption legal in the former State of Marwar was departed from. These cases were all based on the notification of 1914 which has already been set out above, and there is no doubt therefore that that notification must be held to be law whether it be treated as a legislative act or a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court in the State of Marwar. The contention of the applicant therefore that there was no law or order having the force of law which made it compulsory in Marwar that there should be a registered deed of adoption before the Courts could recognize adoption must be negatived. 8. The next point then is what is the meaning and scope of the notification of 1914. Special stress has been laid by learned counsel for the appellant on para. 3 of the notification which is in these words: "The Darbar enforced the principle that a valid adoption in order to be recognized by the Courts must be in writing and duly registered". Learned counsel urges that this paragraph only precludes the Courts from recognizing the adoption whenever a case is brought to Court, and does not lay down that no adoption in Marwar would be valid without a registered deed of adoption. Therefore it is urged that as this case has come before the Courts in 1952 when the notification of 1914, even if it is law, must be held to be void in view of Arts.13 and 14 of the Constitution, the Court can now decide for itself whether the adoption was valid according to Hindu Law as provided in para.1 of the order without worrying about the necessity of a registered deed of adoption. 9. 9. We may, therefore, here consider whether para.3 of this notification has become void after the coming into force of the Constitution. If it has, then the rest of the argument of learned counsel for the appellant will have to be considered, and it will have to be decided whether even after 26-1-1950, the Courts will require a registered deed of adoption in order to hold that a valid adoption had taken place in the former State of Marwar before 26-1-1950. The argument in this connection is that para.3 of the notification clearly denies equality before law or equal protection of the laws to the residents of what was the former State of Marwar, for there is no law in other parts of the present State of Rajasthan, which requires a registered deed of adoption in order that the Courts might recognize an adoption. In other parts of Rajasthan, it is enough that there should be an adoption according to Hindu law, and no registered deed of adoption is necessary to make the adoption valid and recognizable by the Courts. There is no doubt that there is this inequality between the residents of what was the former State of Marwar and the residents of other parts of the present State of Rajasthan. Learned counsel in this connection relies on - Manohar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1953 Raj 22 (D). That case has been approved by the Supreme Court in - State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Singhji, AIR 1954 SC 297 (E). We are of opinion that that case applies on all fours to the circumstances of the present case, and there is no reason why there should be a discrimination between the residents of what was the former State of Marwar and the rest of Rajasthan in this matter of the law of adoption. We cannot accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that registration itself is progressive and therefore we should not strike down a piece of progressive legislation which applied to the former State of Marwar simply because similar legislation does not exist in other parts of Rajasthan. It is enough to point out that it is not merely other parts of Rajasthan which do not require a registered deed of adoption as necessary to make an adoption valid and recognizable by Courts. It is enough to point out that it is not merely other parts of Rajasthan which do not require a registered deed of adoption as necessary to make an adoption valid and recognizable by Courts. In no part of India so far as we know, and certainly not in what was former British India, is there any such legislation laying down that a registered deed of adoption was necessary for the validity of an adoption. As such it will be too much to say that only the former State of Marwar was progressive enough to have this legislation while the rest of India was not. Nor, in our opinion, can it be said that there is anything peculiar in the former State of Marwar, which requires us to uphold this discriminatory law when it does not prevail in other parts of Rajasthan. We can find no reasonable basis for classification which would permit such an inequality in what was formerly Marwar. The principle enunciated in - Frank, J., Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis, (1880) 101 US 22 (F), also does not apply, for it can hardly be said that registration of a deed of adoption is essential for the welfare of all classes within this particular territory. We must therefore hold that para. 3 of the notification of 1914 has become void after the coming into force of the Constitution of India in view of Arts.13 and 14 thereof. 10. It is, however, well settled that the Constitution has no retrospective operation, and it strikes down laws from the date it came into force. Therefore it is only from 26-1-1950, that a registered adoption deed would not be required to make an adoption valid and recognizable by Courts in what was formerly Marwar. We, therefore, come back to a consideration of the nature of the law contained in para.3 in order to decide whether this case having come before the Courts in 1952 the Courts could overlook para.3 of the notification even though the alleged adoption in this case is of 1943. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that para.3 of the notification merely amounted to a procedural or adjective law, and that, in any case, it only forbade the Courts from recognizing an adoption if a case came before them, and it did not declare the adoption itself illegal without a registered adoption deed. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that para.3 of the notification merely amounted to a procedural or adjective law, and that, in any case, it only forbade the Courts from recognizing an adoption if a case came before them, and it did not declare the adoption itself illegal without a registered adoption deed. Therefore, if the provisions of Hindu Law are all complied with the Court need not hold in 1952 that the adoption was invalid when para 3 of the notification is no longer good law from 26-1-1950. We are, however, of opinion that para 3 cannot be called procedural or adjective law. It is, in our opinion, substantive law in the same manner, as, for example, para 2 of S.54, T.P. Act, which makes sale of tangible immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards possible only by a registered instrument. It is true that the words used in para 3 are different from those used in S.54, T.P. Act, and are certainly inartistic. But it would, in our opinion, be wrong to hold that by these words the law only made recognition of adoptions by Courts impossible without a registered deed of adoption, but the actual adoptions, even when made without a registered deed of adoption, were valid. It is difficult to conceive how actual adoptions by simply giving and taking can be held to be valid when such adoptions were forbidden to be recognized by the Courts. Further, this paragraph has been in existence since 1914, and has been a subject of a number of decisions by the Courts of the former State of Marwar. Those Courts have always, except in that one case of Bhabut Singh (B), interpreted this paragraph to mean that in Marwar mere giving and taking was not enough to constitute a valid adoption, and that a registered deed of adoption way also necessary in order to constitute a valid adoption. The available cases were all reviewed in Bhajan Dass case (A), and we may briefly refer to them here. 11. In Pusaram v. Shankerlal, decided by Chief Court, Jodhpur, on 11-1-1921 (G) it was held that "By laws of Marwar, it is required for an adoption in order to be considered valid that there should over and above other proofs be an adoption deed duly registered." 12. 11. In Pusaram v. Shankerlal, decided by Chief Court, Jodhpur, on 11-1-1921 (G) it was held that "By laws of Marwar, it is required for an adoption in order to be considered valid that there should over and above other proofs be an adoption deed duly registered." 12. There was a deviation in another case of - Amkanwar v. Ganpat, Civil Appeal No.351 of 1924-25 (Jodhpur C.C.) (H); but as pointed out in Bhajan Dass case (A) this trend was arrested by the decision of the Maharaja in Ramsinghs case (C) in 1928 where it was observed that "to make the adoption legal according to local law, it should have been reduced to writing and also registered." 13. Later in - Nagji v. Kesha, 1931-32 MLR 56 (Civil) (I), all the three Judges of the Chief Court were inclined to re-open the decision in - Mst. Hastus case, Marwar Gazette of 16-5-1914 which resulted in the notification of 1914; but eventually followed the decision in Ramsinghs case (C) though with reluctance. 14. In - Jaswant Dan v. Mst. Agran, Civil Appeal No.33 of 1931-32 (Jodhpur C.C.) (J) decided by the Chief Court of the former State of Marwar on 6-10-1932, it was observed that in that State a registered deed was considered necessary for an adoption, and other ceremonies were not so much insisted upon. 15. In - Baktawarlal v. Godawari, 1939 MLR 30 (Civil) (K) the Chief Court went to the length of saying that "according to the law now prevailing in Marwar, the ceremony of giving and taking is not at all necessary and all that is required is a registered deed of adoption." 16. Then in - Fojmal v. Mst. Singari, 1939 MLR 60 (Civil) (L) it was held that the law in Marwar relating to adoptions was different from the law in British India. "In British India there can be a valid adoption even in the absence of an adoption deed. Hero in Marwar however, a law has been passed whereby the Courts are precluded from recognising an adoption unless the same is evidenced by a writing duly registered." 17. "In British India there can be a valid adoption even in the absence of an adoption deed. Hero in Marwar however, a law has been passed whereby the Courts are precluded from recognising an adoption unless the same is evidenced by a writing duly registered." 17. In - Kesrimal v. Amritlal, 1940 MLR 245 (Civil) (M) the Chief Court went to the length of saying that the notification of 1914 did not introduce any new law but enforced the law relating to adoption already in force, and consequently an adoption made prior to 1914 would be invalid if not evidenced by a registered deed. 18. In - Dharamchand v. Jatna, 1944 MLR 1 (Civil) (N) it was held that in Marwar there could be no valid adoption unless the same was evidenced by a writing duly registered. 19. In - Lal Chand v. Thikana Banta, 1944 MLR 100 (Civil) (O) it was held that in Marwar; if a registered deed was not forthcoming, no considerations could be allowed to prevail and the adoption could not be sustained. 20. Whatever therefore are the terms of para 3 of the notification of 1914, there is no doubt that the Marwar Courts have been consistently holding since the decision in Ramsinghs case (C) in 1927-28 that no valid adoption can be made without a registered deed of adoption in writing. It seems to us that in this state of the authorities of the former State of Marwar it would be wrong on our part to give another meaning to the words appearing in para 3 of the notification. Nor can it be said that the meaning that has been given by the Marwar Courts to these words is necessarily wrong. After all what does para 3 say? It says that in order that a valid adoption be recognised by the Courts in Marwar it must be in writing and registered. Emphasis may here be laid on the word valid. The language is certainly inartistic; but it seems to us that the intention of those who framed para 3 was clear, and that intention was that there can be no adoption in Marwar without a duly registered deed in writing. Emphasis may here be laid on the word valid. The language is certainly inartistic; but it seems to us that the intention of those who framed para 3 was clear, and that intention was that there can be no adoption in Marwar without a duly registered deed in writing. The intention could not have been that only when the case came to Court there should be a search for a registered deed, but that otherwise an adoption would be valid if only the provisions of Hindu law were complied with and there was no registered deed of adoption. As we have already pointed out, there was already a law in force in Marwar by which, if there was an adoption deed in writing, it required registration. By para 3 the intention must have been to provide for something more, and that something more could only be that there could be no valid adoption without a registered deed in writing. The form in which this intention was put was in the nature of a prohibition to Courts. But if a thing is not to be recognized by the Courts at all without a certain formality, it can hardly be said that that thing without that formality would still be valid. There is, therefore, no difficulty in interpreting the words of para.3 as providing that in Marwar no adoption can take place without a registered deed in writing. This Court has certainly held in Bhajan Dass case (A) that a mere registered deed in writing was not enough and there must also be proof of giving and taking; but that does not mean that an adoption would be valid and effective if only giving and taking has taken place and no registered adoption deed is forthcoming. The two essentials, namely giving and taking and a registered adoption deed, cannot, in our opinion, be separated, though in actual fact there would always be a time-lag between the giving and taking and the registration of the deed. After all, registration can only take place after the giving and taking is over. The same can be said by a sale which is also invalid in view of S.54, T.P. Act without a registered deed in writing, if it is about tangible immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards. After all, registration can only take place after the giving and taking is over. The same can be said by a sale which is also invalid in view of S.54, T.P. Act without a registered deed in writing, if it is about tangible immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards. There also the parties come to an agreement before the sale deed is actually registered; but the agreement of the parties and the registration of the sale deed cannot be separated, and a sale cannot be effected merely because of an agreement subject, of course, to other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act like S.53-A. Similarly in a case of adoption giving and taking and registration of the deed are both essential, and both must take place if the adoption is to be valid, and therefore to be recognised by the Courts. We are therefore of opinion that para.3 lays down substantive law, and not merely procedural or adjective law, and the interpretation that has been given, (namely that no adoption is possible without a registered deed in writing) by the Marwar Courts is correct, and must, in any case, be followed by us considering that it was consistently followed by the Marwar Courts after the decision in Ramsinghs case (C) in 1928. 21. Another argument that was raised on behalf of the appellant was that the Marwar Registration Act of 1934 repealed the notification of 1914, and therefore, in any case, the notification was not in existence when this adoption took place in 1943. This argument is based on S.49, Marwar Registration Act of 1934 which says that no document required by S.17 to be registered shall constitute any valid adoption unless it has been registered. This provision, however, merely hits the document and does not hit the transaction itself. It is similar to the provision in S.49, Indian Registration Act with respect to a document conferring power to adopt. The notification of 1914, on the other hand, as we have just held, hits the transaction itself, and is substantive law. The provision therefore of S.49, Marwar Registration Act, which merely hits the document and is procedural in nature, cannot repeal the earlier notification which is substantive law and hits the transaction itself. The notification of 1914, on the other hand, as we have just held, hits the transaction itself, and is substantive law. The provision therefore of S.49, Marwar Registration Act, which merely hits the document and is procedural in nature, cannot repeal the earlier notification which is substantive law and hits the transaction itself. This argument must therefore be rejected, and it must be held that the notification of 1914 was in force when this adoption took place. 22. Another argument on behalf of the appellant was that the widow was estopped from challenging the adoption in view of what her husband had done, she being only the representative-in-interest of her husband. Reliance was in this connection placed on - Rani Dharam Kunwar v. Balwant Singh 39 Ind App 142 (P.C.) (P). The facts of that case however were quite different, and have no application to the present case. The law is well settled that there can be no estoppel against statute, and the notification of 1914 must be deemed to be a statute, and on that ground alone this argument must be rejected. Besides in 39 Ind App 142 (PC) (P), estoppel was raised against Rani Dharam Kunwar because of certain statements she had made on an earlier occasion and her conduct. There was no question in that case of raising any estoppel against a statute. If the law laid down that adoption could only be made in Marwar in a particular manner, any amount of conduct by a party would be of no avail if the provisions of the law were not complied with. This argument also must be rejected. 23. For the same reason another argument raised on behalf of the appellant must be rejected. It was urged that adoption was a matter of religious nature, and if the religious ceremonies were performed, the adoption was complete. This argument, however, overlooks the statute law as prevalent in Marwar by virtue of the notification of 1914. There was nothing to prevent the State of Marwar, while recognising adoption as permitted by Hindu law, to add a further condition to its validity namely that there should be a registered deed of adoption. Once that condition was added, as we have held that it was, the mere performance of ceremonies would not constitute a valid adoption. 24. There was nothing to prevent the State of Marwar, while recognising adoption as permitted by Hindu law, to add a further condition to its validity namely that there should be a registered deed of adoption. Once that condition was added, as we have held that it was, the mere performance of ceremonies would not constitute a valid adoption. 24. Lastly, it was urged that even if it was necessary in the former State of Marwar that there must be a registered deed of adoption before adoption could be valid, such a deed would always be executed sometime after the giving and taking had taken place. Kishanlal could register the deed of adoption even some months after the giving and taking had taken place. Even if Kishanlal did not execute any deed of adoption and register it before 26-1-1950, a new situation arose after the Constitution came into force. That was that on 26-1-1950 by virtue of Arts.13 and 14 of the Constitution the notification of 1914 became void. Thereafter, no registered deed of adoption was necessary in order that a valid adoption might take place. Consequently it is urged that giving and taking, which had taken place in 1943, would be sufficient to constitute a valid adoption after 26-1-1950, and Kishanlal might not have thought it necessary to execute a registered deed of adoption after the coming into force of the Constitution. The argument looks attractive prima facie, but when examined closely it cannot be accepted. It is true that, under the Marwar law, it was possible for the deed of adoption to be registered sometime after the giving and taking had taken place. But, as we have pointed out, giving and taking as well as registration of the deed were both essential to the coming into existence of a valid adoption. If no registered deed was executed before 26-1-1950, the mere giving and taking would not give rise to a valid adoption, and thus even though giving and taking had taken place, there would be no adoption at all on account of that alone. If, therefore, there was no adoption according to law in 1943, the change in law in 1950 would not make what was no adoption in 1943 into a valid adoption in 1950. If, therefore, there was no adoption according to law in 1943, the change in law in 1950 would not make what was no adoption in 1943 into a valid adoption in 1950. As we have already pointed out, the Constitution does not make the law void retrospectively, and the notification of 1914 must be held to be in full force up to the time that the Constitution came into force. Adoption is a matter of status, and status is conferred at the moment of adoption. If it was not conferred at that moment, it cannot arise later because of some change in the law. We may in this connection refer to - Vasudeo Vishnu v. Ramchandra Vinayak, 22 Bom 551 (FB) (Q). In that case the adoption required the assent of two daughters, one of whom was a minor, and it was alleged that they had consented to the adoption. It was held that the adoption was invalid as the minor daughter could not give consent. It was also held that subsequent assent to an adoption cannot give it validity if it was invalid when made. Farran, C.J., observed as follows at p. 555 in this connection: "...........; but the adoption must, in my opinion, have been either valid or invalid at the time when it took place, and its validity cannot depend upon the subsequent action of Godi....." This view was followed by the Madras High Court in - K. Sattiraju v. P. Venkataswami, AIR 1918 Mad 1072 (R), and the effect of the Bombay case was summarised in these words: "The adoption in question must have been either valid or invalid at the time it took place and its validity could not depend on the subsequent action of one of the persons, in whom the estate had vested and who was alleged to have consented later." This principle, in our opinion, applies with full force to the present case with only this difference that here the validation is said to have arisen because the notification of 1914 came to an end on the coming into force of the Constitution. However, as the alleged giving and taking never constituted a valid adoption without a registered deed of adoption in this case, there could be no adoption after 26-1-50 and the appellant must be held to remain in the family in which he was born. However, as the alleged giving and taking never constituted a valid adoption without a registered deed of adoption in this case, there could be no adoption after 26-1-50 and the appellant must be held to remain in the family in which he was born. There is ample authority for this view also which we shall consider just now. 25. In - Bawani Sankara v. Ambabay Ammal, 1 Mad HCR 363 (S) it was held by the Madras High Court that the natural rights of a person adopted remained unaffected when the adoption was invalid. The same view was followed in - Vaithilinga Mudali v. Munigan, AIR 1914 Mad 460 (T), where it has been held by the same Court that an invalid adoption does not per se destroy the adoptees rights in his natural family. The same view was taken in - Dalpatsinghji Naharsinghji v. Raisinghji Naharsinghji, AIR 1915 Bom 93 (U), where the following observations of Sir Michael Westropp, C.J., in - Lakshmappa v. Ramava, 12 Bom HCR 364 at p. 397 (V) were quoted with approval: "An invalid adoption works nothing. It leaves the alleged adoptee precisely in the same position which he occupied before the ceremony, no matter how formally it may have been celebrated." Similarly in - Haridas Chatterjee v. Manmatha Nath, AIR 1938 Cal 1 (W), the following observations appear at p.11: "In point of fact the authorities support the opposite view, namely that if the adoption is no adoption, the ceremonies performed in the new family are of no effect." 26. These authorities clearly lead to the conclusion that if for any reason the adoption is invalid the fact that some ceremonies were performed would make no difference at all, and the adoptee would remain in his original family. If, therefore, the adoptee remained in his old family because of adoption being invalid for any reason, he cannot become the adopted son after 26-1-1950, because the law was changed on the coming into force of the Constitution. The status of an adopted son could only be acquired if the essentials of the law as it was prevalent in Marwar before 26-1-1950 were complied with. The status of an adopted son could only be acquired if the essentials of the law as it was prevalent in Marwar before 26-1-1950 were complied with. As those essentials were never fully complied with in this case, the fact that certain ceremonies took place in 1943 (assuming that to be so) would not itself give rise to a valid adoption, and the change in law in 1950, by which the notification of 1914 became invalid, would not result in the status being conferred in 1950 on the basis of what had taken place in 1943. As has been pointed out in Raghavachariars Hindu Law, Edn.3, p.155, the doctrine of factum valet applies only to a limited extent to cases of defective adoption. Learned author observes as follows at page 155: "The proper application of the doctrine of factum valet to cases of adoption must be limited to cases in which there is neither want of authority to give nor to accept nor imperative interdiction of adoption. In cases in which the Sastras are merely directory and not mandatory or only indicate particular persons as more eligible for adoption than others, the maxim may be usefully and properly applied, if the moral precept or recommended preference be disregarded. Adoption under the Hindu Law being in the nature of gift, three main matters constitute its elements apart from questions of form. The capacity to give, the capacity to take and the capacity to be the subject of adoption, seem to be matters essential to the validity of the transaction, and, as such, beyond the province of the doctrine of factum valet." This view is in conformity with the observations of Mahmood, J., in - Ganga Sahai v. Lekhraj Singh, 9 All 253 (X). 27. In Marwar the necessity of a registered deed of adoption is equally essential, and the absence of such a deed would make the adoption no adoption at all even if ceremonies were performed, and the change of law in 1950 would, in lour opinion, make no difference. The argument, therefore, that the notification of 1914 having become invalid after the coming into force of the Constitution, there is now no necessity for a registered deed of adoption even in Marwar, and as Kishanlal died in 1952, the adoption of 1943 would become valid, must therefore be rejected. 28. The argument, therefore, that the notification of 1914 having become invalid after the coming into force of the Constitution, there is now no necessity for a registered deed of adoption even in Marwar, and as Kishanlal died in 1952, the adoption of 1943 would become valid, must therefore be rejected. 28. Lastly it was urged that the amounts not being in the name of Kishanlal in the banks but in that of the firm the respondent is not entitled to the money. There is, however, no force in this contention, for the appellant also treated the money in the banks as belonging to Kishanlal personally and had himself applied for a succession certificate with respect to it. In these circumstances, the respondent is certainly entitled to a succession certificate as the heir of Kishanlal, once the adoption fails. 29. There is, therefore, no force in this appeal, and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.