SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : A preliminary objection has been raised to this appeal on the ground that it is barred by limita­tion. It appears to me that in view of the decision in - 'Gabriel Christian v. Chandra Mohan', AIR 1936 Pat 45 (A) the appeal is not barred by limi­tation and that the time between the date of pro­nouncement of judgment and the date of signing of the decree. had to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. But my attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court reported in - 'Governor-General in Council v. Jesraj Tilakchand Labhchand', AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B) which takes a contrary view of the matter. I am inclined to accept the view held in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court. In a matter of procedure like this, it should be held that the appeal is not barred by limitation but on account of the contrary view expressed by this Court, the matter has to be referred to a Full Bench for decision. (2) On the merits, I was of opinion that the I material issue which should have been decided in the case has not been decided. The dispute is as to title to lands between two rival purchasers at revenue sales, the plaintiff being a subsequent purchaser of a separate account. Therefore the main question was whether the lands appertained to plaintiff's separate account No. 8 or to the parent estate as contended by the appellants. This issue should have been specifically framed and decided after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on the point, the onus to prove title to the lands being primarily on the plaintiff who had sued for declaration of title and recovery of posses­sion. Unfortunately, this was not done by the two Courts below who appear to have clouded the real • issue in the case. In the circumstances, I was in­clined to frame this issue and direct the Courts below to submit a finding to this Court after taking evidence on the point but in view of the question of limitation involved, I think the best course is to refer the appeal to a Special Bench for decision consisting of myself and my other two colleagues. JUDGMENT OF THE SPECIAL BENCH SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : (2a) A preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The relevant dates are as follows: The judgment under appeal in this case was pronounced on 26-6-52 but the decree was prepared and signed on 21-8-52. The appellant applied for copies on 16-9-52, stamps having been notified on 23-10-52 and the copy was ready for delivery on 14-11-52. The appeal was then filed along with the copy of the judgment and decree on 2-12-1952. The learned counsel for the respon­dents contends that the appeal is evidently time-barred from the date of the judgment which, with­in the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, is also the date of the decree. He urges that the time occupied between the date of pronouncement -of the judgment and the signing of the decree could not be taken into consideration in computing the period of limitation. In support of his contention, he refers to two decisions of this Court in - 'Katimal Brahma v. Mohan Nath', AIR 1949 Assam 23 (C) and AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B). The learned counsel for the appellants submits that these deci­sions require consideration in view of the fact that they place a narrower construction upon the lan­guage of S. 12(2), Limitation Act, and departed from an age-long practice established by the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in - 'Bani Madhab v. Matungini Dassi', 13 Cal 104 (D) which has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of the Privy Council and some other Courts in India. It is also pointed out that the territories un­der the jurisdiction of this Court were at one time within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and as such on a matter of procedure, the cursus curie adopted by the Calcutta High Court should not have been departed from. In view of the im­portance of the point of limitation in the case, I thought it proper to have the question decided by a Special Bench. (2b) The point, therefore, which really arises for consideration is whether the appellants are entitled in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal to a deduction of time taken between the date of pronouncement of the judgment, that is, 26-6-52 and the date of the signing of the decree which is 21-8-52. (2b) The point, therefore, which really arises for consideration is whether the appellants are entitled in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal to a deduction of time taken between the date of pronouncement of the judgment, that is, 26-6-52 and the date of the signing of the decree which is 21-8-52. If the appellants are entitled to the exclusion of this period, then admittedly, the appeal would be within time. The question there­fore depends upon the interpretation of S. 12(2), Limitation Act. Under Art. 156, Limitation Act, the period required for filing an appeal to this Court under the Code of Civil Procedure is 90 days from the date of the decree appealed from and it is also well-known that under O. 20, R. 7, Civil P. C., the date of the decree is the date of the judgment. The appellants, however, claim that under S. 12(2), Limitation Act, they are entitled to a deduction of -the period between 26-6-52, the date of the judg­ment and 21-8-52, the date on which the decree was ready. (3) Section 12 runs as follows: "(1) In computing the period of limitation pre­scribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation pre­scribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judg­ment, the day on which the judgment complain­ed of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation pre­scribed for an application to set aside an award the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." It is obvious that in order to prefer an appeal, the party intending to do so has got to obtain copies of the judgment and decree by which he is aggrieved and for that purpose, he has to file an application and proceed according to normal chan­nels in securing these copies. If, therefore, it is held that the meaning of the expression 'time re­quisite' for obtaining a copy must be limited to the period between the date of the application for copies and the date on which he obtains them, then, of course, the party would not be entitled to any period prior to the date of his application, even if the decree for a copy of which he applied may have come into existence later. According to 'his view, the time to be excluded under S. 12(2) has to be strictly confined to the period running from the date on which application for copy is made and the date on which the copies are obtain­ed, no matter whether the decree, copy of which is sought, is or is not in existence. This interpre­tation therefore lays emphasis on the step actually taken by the party for obtaining a copy and pur­ports to ignore the delay caused by the office in preparing the decree to which the application for copy relates. Support for this view is also sought on the ground that according to the terms of the Code of Civil Procedure, the date of the decree is the date of the judgment; and no matter, whatsoever the delay in preparing and signing the decree may be, the appellant is not entitled to any advantage of the same. because the period of limitation under the Limitation Act read along with the Code of Civil Procedure runs from the date of the judg­ment. This line of interpretation appears to have found favour in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in -- 'Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan', 12 All 461 (E). There Mahmood J. held that "the words 'requisite' and 'obtaining' as they oc­cur in the context seem to me to assume that some definite step ancillary to the obtaining, that is, acquisition, is not only intended to be taken but has already been taken. There Mahmood J. held that "the words 'requisite' and 'obtaining' as they oc­cur in the context seem to me to assume that some definite step ancillary to the obtaining, that is, acquisition, is not only intended to be taken but has already been taken. The first step for 'obtaining' must be to take some step to­wards the obtainment and the act of "obtaining" cannot be said to have even commenced before such step .....In this sense, I interpret the word 'obtaining' as it occurs in para 2 of S. 12, Limi­tation Act, and hold that "the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree" cannot refer to any period antecedent to the appellant's asking for a copy by the usual mode of applying there­fore, or to any period subsequent to its being ready for delivery." It is obvious that the distinguished Judge em­phasised in particular on the use of the word 'ob­taining' as it occurs in S. 12(2), Limitation Act, and he was of opinion that when, no application to ob­tain a copy of the decree is made and the decree remains unsigned the appellant cannot claim the benefit of a matter which did not in any manner frustrate or retard his endeavour to obtain a copy, the endeavour itself not having been made. There is undoubtedly a good deal of reason and logic be­hind this interpretation of the. law. There is, how­ever, ample and overwhelming authority for the other and more liberal line of interpretation which holds that the preparation of the decree does not generally depend upon any act or conduct of the party, except in cases on the original side of the High Court or in special class of suits like suits for partition, mesne profits etc. In such cases, where the party has nothing to do with the matter, so long as the original itself is not in existence, no copy thereof can be delivered to him. The fact, therefore, that he makes an application for copy is hardly material, because unless the decree itself is prepared and signed, he cannot obtain a copy merely by filing an application. The fact, therefore, that he makes an application for copy is hardly material, because unless the decree itself is prepared and signed, he cannot obtain a copy merely by filing an application. It is therefore ob­served that the party not being responsible for any delay in the preparation of the decree, such time which is occupied between the date of the judg­ment and the date of the decree being prepared and signed should be excluded in computing the period of limitation given to him. It is held that the word 'requisite' is a very strong word and it connotes time indispensably occupied in obtaining a copy of the decree. This indispensable period ac­cording to the above view would cover the period between the date of the judgment and the date of the decree and there is no reason why an allow­ance for this period should not be conceded to the party where he is not at all to blame in the mat­ter. The answer to the question does not depend upon the fact that the period of limitation runs From the date of the decree which is the date of ;he judgment but purely and entirely upon the interpretation of S. 12(2) itself and if a wider interpretation can be given to the language of the sec­tion, there is no reason why a narrower interpre­tation should be adopted which defeats the remedy available to a party instead of advancing it. The leading case on this line of interpretation is the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 13 Cal 104 (D). The date of the judg­ment in that case was 17-7-1883 and the date on which the decree was signed was 23-7-1883. The application for copy of the decree was made on 3-8-1883 and it was ready for delivery on 11-8-1883, the appeal itself having been filed on 30-8-1883. Article 152, Limitation Act, limited the time for preferring an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code to the District Judge to 30 days from the date of the decree appealed against, and under S. 205, Civil P. C. as it then was (now cor­responding to O. 20, R. 7), the date of the decree was the date of the judgment. Article 152, Limitation Act, limited the time for preferring an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code to the District Judge to 30 days from the date of the decree appealed against, and under S. 205, Civil P. C. as it then was (now cor­responding to O. 20, R. 7), the date of the decree was the date of the judgment. Petheram C. J. there pointed out that it would be unfair to compute the period of limitation, in all cases, from the date on which the judgment was delivered because it is obvious that things may in­tervene so as to prevent the decree being signed until after the expiration of the whole period of 30 days allowed for preferring the appeal and so the appeal may be rendered impossible without any fault of the parties. His Lordship therefore held that with a view to avoid this contingency, S. 12, Limitation Act, is there. He held that the fact that the decree was not in existence, that is signed by the particular Judge, and could not therefore be copied until the 23rd July, that is, six days after it was pronounced, entitles the appel­lant to deduct those six days. If that deduction were allowed under S. 12, the appeal had been presented within the prescribed period. This view was pronounced as early as 1886 and it appears that since then, except for some stray discordant notes, the decision has all along been followed in the High Court of Calcutta and the territories within the jurisdiction of that Court. This rule clearly emphasises upon the fact that where the decree itself is not ready and the party had nothing to do in the matter of having the de­cree prepared there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the exclusion of that period in computing limitation. So long as the decree itself was not ready, no copy of it could be obtained. In other words, according to this view, the time so occupied was "time requisite" within the meaning of S. 12(2), Limitation Act, the delay not having been occasioned by any default of the party concerned. So long as the decree itself was not ready, no copy of it could be obtained. In other words, according to this view, the time so occupied was "time requisite" within the meaning of S. 12(2), Limitation Act, the delay not having been occasioned by any default of the party concerned. (4) The above rule of interpretation was, in my opinion, more in consonance with justice and good conscience, but unfortunately, the Allahabad High Court in 12 All 461 (E) did not accept the view expressed in the above case of 'Bani Madhub Mitter (D)'. Commenting on that decision, Mah-mood J. observed that the rule as stated in the judgment of Petheram C. J. went to the length of laying down that even in cases where the decree remained unsigned for a period beyond that allow­ed for appealing from that decree, the appellant, by a subsequent application for obtaining a copy and procuring it might prefer an appeal by ex­cluding the whole period during which the decree had remained unsigned although during that period he had made no application for copy at all. The learned Judge thought that the effect of the rule was that time would run not from the date of the judgment but from the date of the decree which according to him was obviously opposed to the pro­visions of O. 20, R. 7, Civil P. C. These appre­hensions of Mahmood J. were somewhat unfound­ed, if I may be permitted to hazard that opinion. What the learned Chief Justice actually held in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' was that on the inter­pretation of S. 12(2), the party is entitled to a de­duction of the period between the date when the judgment was pronounced and the date when the decree was signed, in a case where the party him­self had nothing to do in order to expedite the preparation thereof. The period was indispensably taken in the preparation of the decree and to the same extent in the preparation of the copy thereof and as such was the time requisite for obtaining the copy. The period was indispensably taken in the preparation of the decree and to the same extent in the preparation of the copy thereof and as such was the time requisite for obtaining the copy. (S) It is true that the Courts in India held diver­gent views on the point and the preponderance of authority was in favour of the Allahabad view, un­til in 1922, there came the decision of the Judi­cial Committee in - 'Pramatha Nath v. William Arthur Lee', AIR 1922 PC 352 (F) which had an important bearing on the interpretation of S. 12(2), Limitation Act. It was there laid down that no period could be regarded as requisite under the Act which need not have elapsed, if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain the decree or order, and that there was no warrant for the proposition that the time actually consumed in obtaining the decree must be deducted. In that case, the appellant was a defendant in a suit which was decreed on 14-2-1918. An appli­cation made to the learned Judge of the original side of the Calcutta High Court- to set aside the decree was refused on 26-7-1918. The appellant preferred an appeal on the 30th of August with a copy of the order. The notice of appeal was out of time as the period of appeal was 20 days from the date of the decree or order which it sought to impeach and that period expired on the 15th August. The appellant, however, relied on S. 12(2), Limitation Act, and contended that in the circum­stances, the time requisite within the meaning of sub-s. (2) was the time which is actually occupied in obtaining a copy of the decree or order and that so regarded, the appeal would be within time. It appears that after the order had been made on the 26th July, no steps were taken by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up but after the lapse of four days under the original side rules, it was com­petent to the defendant to apply for that purpose. These four days also lapsed but nothing was done. On the 6th August, application was made by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up and on the 7th August, the draft of the order was sent to the appellant. These four days also lapsed but nothing was done. On the 6th August, application was made by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up and on the 7th August, the draft of the order was sent to the appellant. The Privy Council pointed out that the order was simplicity itself yet the appellant only returned the draft on the 16th August. On the 28th August, it was signed and on the 3rd Sept- ; ember, it was filed by the plaintiff. In those circumstances, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held as stated above. In that case, the appellant took no steps and the periods between the 30th July and the 6th August and again between the 7th August and the 16th August were well within the appellant's control. It could not, there­fore, be held that the time which elapsed must have elapsed inevitably even if he had acted with reasonable promptitude. The appellant, in support of his case further sought to rely upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid 'Bani Madhub's case (D), but their Lordships distinguished the case on the ground that the appellant there was not res­ponsible for any delay at all and that all that that case decided was that the two periods of time, "one of which was prompt and effective and the other of which the appellant might not have been able to control, ought to be deducted from the length of time between the decree and the lodging of the memorandum." These observations clearly show that the Privy Council justified the decision in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' and held that the real test was whether the party was responsible for the delay or that the delay was unavoidable, and due to circumstances beyond the control of the party. It is also difficult to conceive that in giving their decision, their Lordships could not have been aware of the opposite view taken in the Allahabad Full Bench decision in 'Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan (EX which was also favoured at the time by some of the other High Courts in India. It is also difficult to conceive that in giving their decision, their Lordships could not have been aware of the opposite view taken in the Allahabad Full Bench decision in 'Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan (EX which was also favoured at the time by some of the other High Courts in India. If the Privy Council thought that 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' did not lay down a sound proposition of law, they would have dismissed it with the observation that the time taken between the date of pronounce­ment of judgment and the date of preparation of decree could not be in any event excluded, in computing the period of limitation. This decision, therefore, if it does not actually overrule the Allahabad view, does, in my opinion, very much strengthen the view taken by the Cal­cutta decision. What is really important is to re­member the principle which it inculcates about the interpretation of S. 12(2) of the Act; and that principle is, that the conduct of the appellant has to be taken into consideration in determining the time requisite in obtaining copy. The benefit of any period on which the appellant had no control had to be given to him in computing the period of limitation for obtaining the copy but any such period which lapsed on account of his own default should not be so considered. The Privy Council laid emphasis upon the meaning of the term 'time requisite.' (6) This view was reiterated by the Judicial Com­mittee in - 'Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar Firm', AIR 1928 PC 103 (G). There the position was further clarified. It was held there that in reckoning the time for presenting an appeal, the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree and judgment had to be excluded even though by the rules of the Court, it was not necessary to ob­tain those copies. It was further held that the word 'requisite' was a strong word and meant something more than the word 'required.' It meant "properly required" and implied that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period was due to the ap­pellant's default. Their Lordships also pointed out that for the time which was taken up by the oppo­nent in drawing up the decree or by the officials of the Court .in issuing the documents, the appel­lant was not responsible. Their Lordships also pointed out that for the time which was taken up by the oppo­nent in drawing up the decree or by the officials of the Court .in issuing the documents, the appel­lant was not responsible. In other words, he should have the benefit of the period. On the authority of this decision, it is obvious that where the ap­pellant has no hand in the preparation of the de­cree and has nothing to do in the matter, the de­cree having been drawn up by the officials of the Court, there is no reason why that period which is taken in the preparation of the decree should not be excluded in computing the period of limi­tation for the filing of the appeal. Interpreting S. 12(2) Lord Philimore said: "Their Lordships have now to return to the gram­matical construction of the Act and they find plain words directing that the time requisite for obtaining the two documents is to be excluded from computation. Section 12 makes no refer­ence to the Code of Civil Procedure or to any other Act. It does not say why the time is to be excluded, but simply enacts it as a positive direc­tion." The above dictum, in my opinion, meets the criticism of Mahmood J. that the interpretation of S. 12(2) by Petheram C. J. in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' militates against the provisions of O. 20, R. 7, Civil P. C. (7) After these views repeatedly expressed by the Judicial Committee, there was hardly any doubt left as to the true interpretation of S. 12(2), Limi­tation Act, and the meaning of the term "time re­quisite for obtaining copy of the decree or order." It is true that these decisions relate to cases which arose on the original side of the High Court but the real point to note is that these decisions have a bearing directly upon the interpretation of S. 12 (2), Limitation Act, and cannot be, therefore, brushed aside on the supposition that they were given in a different context, which of course would be always so, no two cases being exactly parallel. In my opinion, therefore, it has been rightly con­tended that the effect of these two decisions of the Privy Council was to reinforce the Calcutta view. In my opinion, therefore, it has been rightly con­tended that the effect of these two decisions of the Privy Council was to reinforce the Calcutta view. (8) We find that the principle of 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' always extended to cover cases arising both on the appellate and original side of the High Court. I refer to a decision in - 'Secretary of State v. Sm. Parijat Devi', AIR 1932 Cal 331 (FB) (H) which is also a Full Bench decision. The order appealed from in that case was passed on 17-3-1931 and the memorandum of appeal was presented on the 9th June. A requisition for drawing up of the order was made on the 18th of March and on the 30th of April, the appellant's solicitor wrote to the Registrar asking for a direction for expedition. On the 6th May, the appellant's attorney received the draft order for approval and returned it approved on the 8th. The draft of the order was finally settled on the 12th but not signed until the 20th and was not filed until the 1st of June. Mean­while, on 18th May, the appellant's attorney lodged a requisition for a copy of the order and on 8th June, the copy was ready for delivery. As I have already said, the memorandum of appeal was pre­sented on the 9th June. The Registrar refused to entertain it because it had been presented after the expiry of 20 days from the date of the order which was the period allowable by Art. 151, Limitation Act. For the respondent, it was contended that un­der S. 12(2) no time could be excluded prior to the time when the appellant filed his requisition for a copy and the fact that the order had not been signed until 20th May or filed until 1st June did not make any difference; any period prior to the date of the application could not be allowed to him. The appellant took his stand on the ground that the order could not be copied until it was complete. Therefore, the time prior to the date of the application should also be held to be time re­quisite for obtaining the copy of the order. The appellant took his stand on the ground that the order could not be copied until it was complete. Therefore, the time prior to the date of the application should also be held to be time re­quisite for obtaining the copy of the order. In view of the divergent opinion expressed by the Courts in India as to the interpretation of S. 12(2) especially in its relation to cases on the original side of the High Court, Rankin C. J. referred the case to a Full Bench. In making the reference, the learned-Chief Justice expressed the view that 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' which was followed daily on the appellate side of the Court was applicable to appeals from decrees and orders made on the ori­ginal side. Said he: "If the fact that the decree is not in existence is not imputable to the negligence on the part of the appellant, then the rule may be applied in the same way in which it is applied to decrees of the subordinate Courts without condition. The fact that the decree was not in existence and could not therefore be copied, entitles the ap­pellant to deduction of the time which elapsed before the decree was completed. His right to the deduction does not depend upon his filing an application for a copy at a time when there is no possibility of copying it. 'Pramatha Nath Roy's case (F)' lays down a qualification of the rule in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)'. That qualifi­cation is that the appellant must be diligent in taking steps to have the decree or order drawn up. But there is no rule which disentitles an ap­pellant to exclude the time which elapses be­tween the making and the drawing up of an order by reason merely of the fact that his ap­plication for a copy was not filed prior to the drawing up." The verdict of the Full Bench was in support of the view taken by Rankin C. J. The learned Judges observed that the appellant is as of right, entitled to the ex­clusion of such time as is properly required for the drawing up of the decree or order, assum­ing that no part of the delay, if any, is due to his default. In other words, if the delay in ob­taining a copy is due to the laches of the appel­lant, he cannot claim the benefit of this provi­sion for exclusion of the time required for ob­taining a copy of the decree or order." It was further observed that the decision of the Full Bench in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)', which ac­cording to the learned Judges was referred to with approval by their Lordships of the Judicial Com­mittee in the case of 'Pramatha v. Lee (F)', was still the law so far as appeals from the original side were concerned, subject of course to what has been stated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the above Privy Council case. I need not refer to the other Calcutta cases because the law as laid down in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' has been almost consistently followed there. (9) In other Courts also, it appears that the Privy Council decisions in the cases of 'Pramatha Nath v. W. A. Lee (F), & ']. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar Firm (G)' changed the current of authority. I may refer to the Full Bench decision of seven Judges of the Patna High Court in AIR 1936 Pat 45 (A) where that Court decided that the period between the date of the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree which was not under the control of the appellant should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. It may be stated that in adopt­ing that interpretation of S. 12(2), Limitation Act, their Lordships reverted to the earlier decision of three Judges of the Patna High Court which followed the Calcutta view in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' but had been subsequently reversed by an­other Full Bench decision of the same Court con­sisting of five Judges. The judgment of the trial Court in 'Gabriel Christian's case (A)' was dated 6-12-1930 but the decree was not signed until 13th December. The appellant applied for copy of the judgment and decree on the 10th December and the copy was not ready for delivery until the 15th of the month. The appeal was filed on the 13th of January. Un­der Art. 152, Limitation Act, the period allowed for lodging the appeal was 30 days from the date of the judgment. The appellant applied for copy of the judgment and decree on the 10th December and the copy was not ready for delivery until the 15th of the month. The appeal was filed on the 13th of January. Un­der Art. 152, Limitation Act, the period allowed for lodging the appeal was 30 days from the date of the judgment. It was contended that the appel­lant was not entitled to the period between the judgment and his application for copy thereof and as such his appeal was out of time. The learned Judges thought that difference of opinion existed on the construction of the words in S. 12, sub-ss. (2) and (3) of the Act and "the choice lay be­tween the two alternative constructions depending upon whether (a) the proper emphasis is upon the word 'requisite' or (b) whether it was upon the word "obtaining". They held that the proper em­phasis should be on the word 'requisite' and the first alternative should be adopted with the result that no period which might be under the control of the appellant between the date upon which judgment was pronounced (which is the date of the decree under the Civil Procedure Code) and the date on which the appeal was filed could be considered as the time requisite within the mean­ing of S. 12(2) of the Act. They pointed out that in most cases, the decree of the trial Court follows upon the judgment with­out the parties being required to do anything in the interval and in such cases the appellant would be entitled to the exclusion of the time between the judgment and the decree; but in exceptional cases, for instance as cases of partition and mesne profits, the drawing up of the decree might depend upon the filing of the necessary stamp papers or court-fees; in such cases, the exclusion of time in favour of the party who is to file the court-fees would depend upon the circumstances but other parties to whom no responsibility attaches for the delay would be entitled to the exclusion of time. In other words, they followed the principle that the real test was whether the appellant was res­ponsible for any delay in obtaining the copy. If he was not and the preparation of the decree was delayed merely on account of official acts, there is no reason why he should not get that exclusion of time. In other words, they followed the principle that the real test was whether the appellant was res­ponsible for any delay in obtaining the copy. If he was not and the preparation of the decree was delayed merely on account of official acts, there is no reason why he should not get that exclusion of time. In Patna, after the above Full Bench decision in 'Gabriel Christian's case (A)', it appears to be a settled practice that although for purposes of limi­tation, time runs from the date of the decree, for purposes of computing the exclusion of time under S. 12(2), Limitation Act, the time occupied in the preparation of the decree has to be excluded, save in exceptional cases where the delay is occasioned by the default of the party himself. The time requi­site for obtaining a copy includes the time during which the decree had remained unsigned; the effect in such cases is that for all practical purposes the period of limitation has to be calculated from the date the decree is signed: Vide, - 'Manoo Rai v. Keshwar Rai', AIR 1948 Pat 260 (I)'. (10) A recent Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in - 'Jayashankar Mulshankar v. Mayabhai Lalbhai', AIR 1952 Bom 122 (J), supports also the same interpretation of S. 12(2), Limitation Act and lends its approval to the view expressed in the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1932 Cal 331 (H), and by the other Full Bench of Patna in 'Gabriel Christain's case (A)', which follow­ed the old Full Bench decision in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)'. Chagla C. J. pointed out in the recent Bombay case that although equal emphasis should be placed on both the expressions "requisite" and "obtaining" in sub-s. (2) of S. 12, yet 'it was diffi­cult to understand why the action on the part of the appellant in applying for a copy of the decree should be a decisive factor in the interpretation of that sub-section and why the appellant should apply for a copy which is non-existent. The learned Chief Justice thought that it was futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact the original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original could be given. I respectfully en­dorse this view. The learned Chief Justice thought that it was futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact the original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original could be given. I respectfully en­dorse this view. The Bombay Full Bench also ob­served that the Privy Council in 'Pramatha Nath v. Lee (F)': "considered the various steps taken by the appel­lant in getting the decree signed and it is rather significant that their Lordships did not consider the question of the application for a copy of the order at all. That was not the test that they applied. What they considered was whether the time taken up between the making of the order and the signing of it was properly taken up or whether part of it was due to the default of the applicant. That case clearly shows that their Lordships did not consider the application for a certified copy as the conclusive test. The case rather assumes that the period between the making of the order and the signing of it should be ordinarily excluded and that is why their Lordships were at pains to consider whether the whole of that period was properly required or whether part of it was taken up by reason of default on the part of the applicant." The decision also scuttled as futile the suggestion that the adoption of the principle of allowing time in the preparation of the decree in cases where the appellant is not at fault would lead to dilatoriness. This was on the ground that there was no connec­tion between an application for a certified copy of a decree and the preparation and signing of the •same and they emphatically stated that "however long the result might be, however un­reasonable it may be, if the appellants were not responsible for the delay and if the Court was responsible for the delay, we fail to see why the appellants should be penalised for the period that expired between the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree." The above decision is the most recent decision on the point. It is true that it has not considered the decisions of this Court, but it considered and dis­sented from another Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in - 'Keshar Sugar Works, Bombay v. R. C. Sharma', AIR 1951 All 122 (K), which by a majority followed the earlier decision in 'Bechi's case (E)'. (11) It is only right that I should say a few words in regard to this Allahabad case supporting as it does the earlier view in spite of the Privy Council decisions which I have already discussed. Malik C. J. who delivered the leading judgment of the Court observed that the precise question before them, namely : whether the time occupied between the pronouncement of the judgment and when the decree was signed should be excluded did not fall to be considered by the Privy Council and there­fore, those decisions did not affect the correctness of the earlier decision of that Court in 'Bechi's case (E)'. I am afraid, I cannot induce myself to accept that interpretation of the Privy Council judg­ments. They have a direct bearing on the inter­pretation of S. 12(2) and cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that they were pronounced in a different context. With reference to the Privy Council judgment in 'Pramatha Nath v. Lee (F/, Agarwala J., who delivered the dissentient judg­ment in the above Full Bench, rightly pointed out that "if the Allahabad view were correct, a short answer to this contention was that no time, before an application for obtaining a copy of the decree was made, could be excluded. With reference to the Privy Council judgment in 'Pramatha Nath v. Lee (F/, Agarwala J., who delivered the dissentient judg­ment in the above Full Bench, rightly pointed out that "if the Allahabad view were correct, a short answer to this contention was that no time, before an application for obtaining a copy of the decree was made, could be excluded. But this was not the answer given by the Calcutta High Court or by the Judicial Committee." In assigning his own reasons for adhering to the earlier view, Malik C. J. also observed thus : "If there is no rule or law which prevents an appellant from making an application for copy of a decree on the ground that the decree is not ready, there seems to be no good reason why the appellant should wait and not file his application for the issue of a copy till the decree is ready and is signed by the presiding officer." I should have on the contrary thought that the learned Chief Justice had approached the question from the view-point whether there was any rule or law to compel the party to make such an appli­cation before the preparation of the decree. If there was, then surely, he cannot have the advan­tage of his own default; but if there was none, he could not be compelled to apply for a copy of the decree which did not exist and suffer for not doing so on account of delay on the part of others on whom he had no control. My respectful answer to the argument suggested in the above quotation is in the same terms as that given by Chagla C. J. when he said that howsoever long and unreason­able the delay in preparation of the decree, if the appellant was not at fault, he could not be penalised for something which the officers of the Court had to do; and in all fairness was entitled to the exclusion of time taken in such preparation which must be regarded as the time "requisite" for ob­taining a copy. Seth J. in his separate judgment appears to postulate two essential conditions for the application of sub-s. (2) of S. 12 : (i) that the time should be occupied in obtaining a copy of the decree and (ii) that it should be requisite for that purpose. Seth J. in his separate judgment appears to postulate two essential conditions for the application of sub-s. (2) of S. 12 : (i) that the time should be occupied in obtaining a copy of the decree and (ii) that it should be requisite for that purpose. So far there can be no exception taken to the postulates. But the learned Judge goes on further to suggest that in the decisions of the Privy Council referred to above, their Lordships did not advert to or were not called upon to apply their mind to the requirements of the first condition. This is more than I would venture to accept and it seems to take an uncharitable view of the Privy Council judgments. In the first place, the words "the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree" follow in a natural sequence and the con­text is so simple that it is impossible to miss the import of any of the expressions used. In the second place, their Lordships were called upon to interpret the sub-section as a whole and must have been conscious of the point of difference in the in­terpretation thereof in the Courts in India. Agarwala J., in my opinion, was justified in holding that the two decisions of the Privy Council strongly Indicated "that nothing turns upon the mere fact whether an application for copy of the order or decree has been made......but that one has to see in every case whether the time taken in drawing up of the decree was beyond the control of the appellant or not." (12) I have avoided so far discussing the deci­sions of this Court, because the decisions depend upon the Allahabad rule of construction and on a rejection of the Calcutta view. The first decision in AIR 1949 Assam 23 (C), need not detain us long. Although, the point directly rose for consi­deration in that case, the learned Judges did not try to consider at all the application of S. 12(2), Limitation Act. They merely interpreted Art. 152, Limitation Act, and held that the period of limi­tation for filing an appeal runs from the date of the judgment and not from the date of the decree, inasmuch as according to the Code of Civil Pro­cedure, the date of the decree is the same as that of the judgment. They merely interpreted Art. 152, Limitation Act, and held that the period of limi­tation for filing an appeal runs from the date of the judgment and not from the date of the decree, inasmuch as according to the Code of Civil Pro­cedure, the date of the decree is the same as that of the judgment. The learned Judges therefore distinguished 'Bani Madhab's case (D)', on that ground alone. In the case in question, it may be pointed out that the judgment under appeal was delivered on 30-5-1946 but the decree was not signed by the trial Judge until 1-7-1946 though an application for copies of the judgment and decree was filed by the appellant on 15-6-1946. Copies of the judgment and decree were made over to the appellant on 7-7-1946 and the appeal was filed on the 14th of August. Unfortunately, the contention on behalf of the appellant was ad­vanced in a bald form that time for filing the application ran from the date of the signing of the decree and the learned Judges negatived the contention merely on the interpretation of Art. 152, Limitation Act, without paying any regard, if I may say so, to the language of S. 12 (2) of the Act which was essential. This decision, therefore, suffers from that obvious weakness and cannot stand in our way. (13) The other decision in AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B), purports to interpret S. 12(2), Limitation Act, but it prefers to follow the decision in 'Bechi's case (E)', of Allahabad High Court in preference to the cursus curiae of the Calcutta High Court as laid down by 'Bani Madhab's case (D). It is to be remembered that the appeal in that case was filed before the Calcutta High Court and on the constitution of this Court, it was transferred for disposal here. The learned Judges were evidently impressed with the consideration that it would have-been unjust to dismiss the appeal when the proce­dure of the Calcutta High Court was in his favour. The learned Judges were evidently impressed with the consideration that it would have-been unjust to dismiss the appeal when the proce­dure of the Calcutta High Court was in his favour. They, therefore, without any application for the purpose, extended time under S. 5, Limitation Act, and over-ruled the preliminary objection observing that "the appellant was undoubtedly misled by the judgments and practice of that Court into believ­ing that appeals filed under such circumstances as the present are within time." If the learned Judges had been pleased to accept the Calcutta view then the necessity of extending time under S. 5, Limi­tation Act, would not have arisen at all. The danger of interfering with a well-established cursus curiae in a matter of procedure is, as I understand, that in a number of cases under similar circum­stances, this Court has had to extend time under S. 5, Limitation Act. I have perused the judg­ment of this Court very carefully and I do not find that the attention of the learned Judges was drawn to the Privy Council decisions at all. The judg­ment also purports to rely upon the previous deci­sion of this Court in AIR 1949 Assam 23 (C), which has been already discussed by me. (14) I am, therefore, unable to accept the above decisions of this Court as laying down the correct proposition of law. I hold in agreement with 13 Cal 104 (D), reinforced as it is by subsequent deci­sions of the Privy Council that the time occupied between the date of the judgment and the prepara­tion of the decree should be regarded as "time requisite" for obtaining a copy of the decree and should be excluded as such in computing the period of limitation, where, as in this case, the appellant was not responsible for the delay. That being so, I would reject the preliminary objection and ac­cept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the appeal is within time. (15) The appeal being a second appeal, I did not formulate any questions of law and referred the appeal for decision by the Special Bench. On merits, I adhere to the view which I expressed in the order of reference dated 23-11-54 and would direct that the case should be remitted to the Court of Appeal below for submission of its finding. The order of reference will form a part of this judgment. On merits, I adhere to the view which I expressed in the order of reference dated 23-11-54 and would direct that the case should be remitted to the Court of Appeal below for submission of its finding. The order of reference will form a part of this judgment. (16) DEKA J. : I agree. RAM LABHAYA, J.: (17) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. It is the preliminary objection raised in the case that neces­sitated its reference to a Full Bench. This objec­tion is that the appeal is barred by limitation. If the view which prevailed in AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B), is adhered to, the appeal would admittedly be barred by time. My Lord the Chief Justice felt inclined to adopt the view expressed in AIR 1936 Pat 45 (FB) (A), and therefore thought that recon­sideration of the decision reported in AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B), was necessary. (18) The facts bearing on the question of limita­tion may be briefly referred to. The judgment, the correctness of which has been assailed by this appeal, was delivered on 26-6-1952. The decree was signed on 21-8-1952. The appellant applied for copies on 16-9-1952. The requisites were put in on 23-10-1952. The copy was ready for deli­very on 14-11-1952. The appeal was filed on 2-12-1952. If the period that elapsed between 26th June, the date of the judgment, and 21st August, the date of the signing of the decree is treated as time requisite for obtaining copies, the appeal would be within time. This period the appellants are not entitled to deduct according to AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B). (19) The question that arises for consideration as formulated by my Lord the Chief Justice is whether the appellants are entitled in computing the period of limitation for appeal to a deduction of time between the date of the pronouncement of the judgment viz. 26-6-1952 and the date of the signing of the decree viz. 21-8-1952. (20) Under Art. 156, Limitation Act, the period required for filing an appeal to this court under the Civil Procedure Code is 90 days from the date of the decree appealed from. 26-6-1952 and the date of the signing of the decree viz. 21-8-1952. (20) Under Art. 156, Limitation Act, the period required for filing an appeal to this court under the Civil Procedure Code is 90 days from the date of the decree appealed from. For finding out the date of the decree we have to go to the Civil Pro­cedure Code, O. 20 R. 7 of which provides that the date of the decree is in all cases the date of judgment. No matter when the decree is actually signed, it has to bear the date of the judgment. It may also show, as it happens sometimes in actual practice, the date of the signing of the decree. But the date of the decree is the date of the judg­ment. The combined effect of the two provisions which have to be read together is that the date of the decree is the date of the judg­ment and that date is the starting point for limitation provided for appeals to this Court. There thus cannot be any manner of doubt that the period of 90 days provided for appeal from a decree under Art. 156 commences from the date of the decree which is also the date of the judgment. There is no dispute about this proposition and on this point there is also no divergence of judicial opinion. 13 Cal 104 (D), also concedes this propo­sition. We therefore start with the proposition that the time does commence to run from the date the judgment is delivered, that being the date of the decree. It is not possible to say that the time commences from the date of the signing of the decree. This would be contrary to law as laid down in Art. 156. The running of time for appeal cannot thus be postponed to the signing of the decree. We have then to see whether time that elapses upto the signing of the decree can be ex­cluded from computation under S. 12(3), Limita­tion Act, as time requisite for obtaining a copy. (21) It may be noticed at this stage that though under the law time runs from the date of the decree which is no other than the date of the judgment, actually no decree comes into existence simultaneously with the judgment. It takes time to prepare the decree sheet. (21) It may be noticed at this stage that though under the law time runs from the date of the decree which is no other than the date of the judgment, actually no decree comes into existence simultaneously with the judgment. It takes time to prepare the decree sheet. Where parties have to do nothing about it, as in the case before us, the ministerial staff of the Court has to take some time to put up the decree sheet for the signatures of the Judge. There is always some interval be­tween the date of the judgment and the signing of the decree. In some cases parties have to be informed about the contents of the decree. Their objections are heard. Where this practice or pro­cedure is followed, the preparation of the decree takes more time. Notwithstanding this Art. 156-requires that the prescribed period for an appeal shall be computed from the date of the decree. Therefore time starts running in all cases before the decree sheet has actually come into existence. It commences to run therefore virtually and for all-practical purposes from the date of the judgment. This is so, as in legal contemplation the decree comes into existence on the day the judgment is. delivered even though it is signed much later. Not only it is deemed to come into existence that day,, it also takes effect from that day in regard to the rights of the parties under the adjudication. This, is the effect of O. 20 R. 7. The effect of Art. 156 is that limitation for appeal, also starts from the date when the decree comes, into existence in legal contemplation not actually. The decree-sheet does not come into existence on. the day of the judgment, yet the period of limi­tation commences to run from that date as though, the decree was in existence. A non-existent decree, which is to be prepared and signed in future, takes-effect not only for purposes of limitation but for all other purposes also as between the parties. Alb their rights are determined on the basis as though, the decree came into existence at the time that the judgment was delivered. It is conceivable that the decree may take some months to get ready. This can happen in cases where one of the parties-is required to put in deficient court-fees. Alb their rights are determined on the basis as though, the decree came into existence at the time that the judgment was delivered. It is conceivable that the decree may take some months to get ready. This can happen in cases where one of the parties-is required to put in deficient court-fees. A long; period of time may elapse between the judgment and the signing of the decree. But the rights of the successful party under the decree take effect as though the decree had existed all the time from.' the date of the judgment. It could not have been otherwise. When an adjudication on rights is given, there is no justification for delaying the ope­ration of the adjudication and in view of the practi­cal difficulties attending the simultaneous signing: of the decree sheet, it was necessary to provide that the decree shall bear the date of the judgment., so that it should show on the face of it that it takes effect from that date. (22) The Court must be deemed to have express­ed what the decree is, on the date of the judgment. In - 'Giribala Dassi v. Biswambhar Haldar', AIR 1924 Cal 1064 (L), an application for certification of payment under O. 21 R. 2 was held maintain­able even though the decree had not been drawn up. The decree though drawn up afterwards, relates back to and operates from the date of the judgment. In - 'Harbans Singh v. Ram Chandra',. AIR 1942 Oudh 139 (M), the limitation for exe­cution under Arts. 181 and 182 was held to run. from the date of the judgment. (23) Not only decrees, even documents relating •to transfers when they are compulsorily registrable, take effect under the law from the date of execu­tion and not from the date of registration. With-Jut registration the document does not create any 'title. It does not affect the property. The tran­saction embodied in the document is completed on registration which should normally occur within .four months. If there is a dispute about execu­tion, it may be delayed considerably. Yet when the document is finally registered, it takes effect .from the date of execution. The change in the rights of the parties takes place from that date, even though the transaction is not completed till .registration is effected. If there is a dispute about execu­tion, it may be delayed considerably. Yet when the document is finally registered, it takes effect .from the date of execution. The change in the rights of the parties takes place from that date, even though the transaction is not completed till .registration is effected. More or less in the same way law gives effect to a non-existent decree from the date of the judgment regardless of the date on which it is signed. If therefore the decree is not treated as existing from the date of judgment, R. 7 .of O. 20 is contravened and if it is not treated as •existing for purposes of Art. 156, there would be a contravention of that Article. (24) The Code of Civil Procedure and the Limi­tation Act were both enforced on the same day (1st of January 1909). The Code was passed a little earlier. They were both enacted by the same legis­lature. The legislature was aware when the start­ing point of limitation for appeals and applications for leave to appeal under the Code was fixed in Arts. 152, 156 and 179 that the decree which pro­vides the starting point has to bear that date on which judgment is pronounced, though it would come into existence later. This shows that the in­dention was that the period should start running from the date of the judgment on the assumption that the decree exists even though the decree-sheet would in almost all cases come into existence later. !f the intention had been that the time should run from the date of the signing of the decree, there was nothing to prevent the legislature from pro­viding that the date on which the decree is signed should be the date from which limitation should start running for purposes of appeals or applica­tions. It follows therefore that a decree has to •be deemed to have come into existence on the date •of the judgment for purposes of limitation also even though it is signed later. In - 'Narayan v. Ramdulari', AIR 1922 Nag 113 (1) (N), it was held that Art. 152 of Schedule to "the Limitation Act gives the date of the decree .appealed from as the time from which the period begins to run in the case of an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code to the Court of a District Judge. In - 'Narayan v. Ramdulari', AIR 1922 Nag 113 (1) (N), it was held that Art. 152 of Schedule to "the Limitation Act gives the date of the decree .appealed from as the time from which the period begins to run in the case of an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code to the Court of a District Judge. The decree must be deemed to have come into existence on the day the judgment is pronounced. For, the decree is a decree before it is signed according to Rr. 7 and 8. Rearing this in mind we have to consider the effect of cl. 2 of S. 12, Limitation Act, which allows exclusion of requisite for obtaining copies of certain docu­ments in computing the period of limitation. The •clause provides as follows : "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was ;pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining .a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded." (25) An appellant would be entitled under this provision to exclude all the time requisite for ob­taining a copy of the decree he is appealing from in computing the period allowed to him for an ap­peal. The words required to be interpreted are 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree'. The words are simple and ordinary. Rut they have been the source of an endless conflict. They have evidently caused great concern to lawyers and judges alike. (26) It would be noticed that the time requisite should be for obtaining a copy of the decree as distinguished from the original. Clause 2 of S. 12 also has to be read with Art. 156 and also O. 20. R. 7. It takes no notice of the time that elapses in preparing the decree whether parties have to do anything or not in getting it signed. Since the decree exists in law it provides for the exclusion of time for obtaining the copy. It necessarily treats the original as existing. Time also starts running before the decree sheet comes into existence, that is, from the day of the judgment. Since the decree exists in law it provides for the exclusion of time for obtaining the copy. It necessarily treats the original as existing. Time also starts running before the decree sheet comes into existence, that is, from the day of the judgment. The law there­fore entitles an intending appellant to apply for, a copy which he would need for purposes of ap­peal and it does so on the assumption that the ori­ginal has to come into existence. The provision therefore is in line with O. 20 R. 7 which gives effect to the decree as though it were existing even though it has not been signed. It allows only that time to be excluded from computation which is requisite for obtaining a copy. It does not at all concern itself with the original. Its language ap­plies to the process of obtaining copies as distin­guished from any process for the preparation of. the original. The legal fiction created by O. 20 R. 7 is recognized even in this provision. The decree is taken as existing. In terms therefore the section has got no application to any time that may be spent for the preparation of the original. (27) Section 12 occurs in the body of the Limi­tation Act. The Schedule contains articles which provide that limitation would start from the date of the decree or order sought to be appealed from. Time starts running from the date of the decree, even though non-existent. If time could run, a copy could also be applied for as we have not to forget that the decree exists in law. Section 12(2) provides for the exclusion of time spent in obtain­ing a copy. An application for a copy could be made at any time after the delivery of the judg­ment. But the period within which the copy of the decree may be asked or applied for is not un­limited. It is fixed by Art. 156. It is a fixed period for appeal for if the period of appeal is allowed to expire without any application, the right is lost. In no other way can effect be given to Art. 156. If an application can be made after expiry of the period prescribed for appeal Art. 156 is completely nullified. It is fixed by Art. 156. It is a fixed period for appeal for if the period of appeal is allowed to expire without any application, the right is lost. In no other way can effect be given to Art. 156. If an application can be made after expiry of the period prescribed for appeal Art. 156 is completely nullified. The effect of the two provisions of tie Limita­tion Act read together is that the appellant has no impediment in the way of his applying for a copy immediately after the delivery of the judgment. He is also under an obligation to apply within the period of limitation, for otherwise he would be too late. Both the right and the obligation rest on the hypothesis, which the law recognizes, that the decree exists from the date of the judgment. By applying within time, the applicant becomes en­titled to the exclusion of all the time that may be taken in preparing the decree-sheet if his negli­gence or default has not added to its duration. Such an application if made, cannot be rejected on the ground that the decree has not been signed. That would be contrary to the provisions of the law which give effect to the decree from the date of the judgment even though the decree-sheet is not there. The application therefore has to be enter­tained as the law deems the decree to be in exist­ence from the very date of the judgment. It is for this reason that there is no provision in the law which permits the copying department to re­ject or file or return an application for a copy of the decree on the ground that the decree has not been signed, vide - 'Tarabati Koer v. Jagdeo Narain', 10 Ind Gas 542 (Cal) (O). The appli­cation has to remain pending. This, it was stated in the course of the argument, is the practice in Assam. It is therefore riot open to a person who wants to appeal from the decree to say that he could not apply for a decree till the time the ori­ginal came into existence. If that had been the intention of the legislature, there should have been an obligation on the court to intimate to the parties the date of the signing of the decree. If that had been the intention of the legislature, there should have been an obligation on the court to intimate to the parties the date of the signing of the decree. It should then have been provided that the decree sheet should be signed in the presence of the parties or after intimation to them of the date fixed for the purpose. (28) It may now be considered as to what is signified by the words "for obtaining" a copy of the decree. According to all recognized canons of interpretation, words of the statute have to be given their ordinary meaning. The context in this case does not indicate that the legislature intended any particular meaning to be given to any word used in cl. 2 of S. 12. We have then to ascertain what is signified by the term 'obtaining' as it occurs in the section. Now 'obtaining a copy' is a process and it must have its beginning and also its end. The dictionary meaning of the word 'obtaining' (Webster's dictionary) is to get hold of by effort, to get possession of or to acquire. There is a consi­derable body of case-law bearing on the interpre­tation of the words contained in section 12(2) and though the word 'obtaining' was interpreted in its dictionary sense as early as the year 1890 in 12 All 461 (E), in no case has it been suggested that the expression can have a different connotation. Agarwala J. who dissented from the majority view in AIR 1951 All 122 (K), took into consideration the language of S. 12(2) and observed as follows : "No doubt it is possible to take a strict view of the meaning of these words. 'Obtaining a copy' implies 'applying for the copy and then acquir­ing it. 'But he added that "it is also possible to take a more lenient view of the words. 'Obtain­ing' refers to the final act of acquiring. It no doubt, implies applying for the copy at some stage. But the emphasis is not on applying, which word is not at all used in the section. 'But he added that "it is also possible to take a more lenient view of the words. 'Obtain­ing' refers to the final act of acquiring. It no doubt, implies applying for the copy at some stage. But the emphasis is not on applying, which word is not at all used in the section. The emphasis is upon the final act of acquiring and the query is "what is that time which must be deemed necessary for completing the final act of acquiring the copy." With great respect to the learned Judge I find it difficult to subscribe to the view that he has taken of the expression 'obtaining'. He concedes that even if a more lenient meaning is given to the word 'obtaining' an application for the copy at some stage would be necessary. There could, even according to him, be no obtaining without an appli­cation for a copy. He however decides to place emphasis on the result of the process rather than on the entire process commencing with the appli­cation. But emphasis on any part of the pro­cess may not be placed without some valid reason. There is 110 indication in the section that emphasis was meant to be placed on the result. The con­trary indication is afforded by the necessary impli­cation of the word 'obtaining'. The act of applying is implied in it. The application for a copy there­fore would commence the process. There does not therefore appear to me to be any justification for the view that 'obtaining' means the acquisition re­garded as a result and therefore everything that has to be done before acquisition is included in it. Even if emphasis could be placed on acquisi­tion, time spent in preparing a copy and not the original can be excluded. If 'obtaining' implies the need of an application for a copy, there would be no justification for any leniency. The final act of acquisition is merely the result of the process and therefore both obtaining and acquisition neces­sarily imply some effort for the purpose. It is therefore implicit in the expression 'obtain­ing' that some effort has to be made for obtain­ing the copy before the time requisite for obtain­ing it may be said to commence. An application for the copy which has inevitably to be made is that action by which time may be excluded under cl. 2 of S. 12. It is therefore implicit in the expression 'obtain­ing' that some effort has to be made for obtain­ing the copy before the time requisite for obtain­ing it may be said to commence. An application for the copy which has inevitably to be made is that action by which time may be excluded under cl. 2 of S. 12. Reading Art. 156 and S. 12(2) in the light of O. 20 R. 7, the conclusion that I reach is that if no application for a copy of the decree is made before the period prescribed for an appeal has run out, the appeal would be barred. An appli­cation after the period of limitation has expired, would serve no useful purpose as the period ac­tually occupied in obtaining the copy iii those circumstances even if added to the period of limi­tation would not bring the appeal within time. The interval between the expiry of the period of limitation and the date of application could not be excluded. In other words where the process of obtaining a copy of the decree by an application does not commence till after the expiry of the period of limitation, the appeal becomes time barred. The only way to interrupt the running of time under Art. 156 is by an application for a copy, which entitles the applicant to add to the prescrib­ed period all the time by which he is actually delayed by the acts or omission of the officers of the court. Section 12(2) seen in this light would be in complete harmony with the provisions con­tained in O. 20 R. 7. (29) In 13 Cal 104 (D), it was observed that "the fact that the decree was not in existence, that is signed by the particular Judge, and could not therefore be copied until 23rd July, that is, six days after the date that it bears, entitles the appellant to ask us to deduct those six days in addition. .. (29) In 13 Cal 104 (D), it was observed that "the fact that the decree was not in existence, that is signed by the particular Judge, and could not therefore be copied until 23rd July, that is, six days after the date that it bears, entitles the appellant to ask us to deduct those six days in addition. .. ." Chief Justice Chagla in AIR 1952 Bom 122 (J), ob­served that "it seems to us that it is rather futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact the original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original could be given to him." Other learned Judges who have followed the view enunciated in 13 Cal 104 (D), have also, it ap­pears, been influenced, whether they have said so or not, by the fact that there is no point in any one applying for a copy of the decree when the original has not come into existence. But this view does not take notice of the requirement of the law which gives effect to the decree on the assump­tion that the decree exists. It cannot be disputed that an application for a copy can be made even though the decree has not come into existence. I have also come to the conclusion that an obli­gation to apply for a copy of the decree is impli­cit in the language of S. 12(2) when read with Art. 156 and O. 20 R. 7. The result is that there is an obligation on the part of the copying depart­ment to receive an application for the copy and to keep it pending till the decree remains unsigned. The applicant who wants a copy of the decree in­curs the obligation to apply within time by the state of the law which makes his appeal barred by time if he does not apply within the period of limitation. Basing any argument on the non-exist­ence of the decree sheet involves overlooking the provisions contained in O. 20 R. 7 which gives effect to the decree from the time the judgment is pronounced, regardless of the fact when the decree sheet which merely reproduced the directions con­tained in the judgment (apart from the calculation of costs) is actually prepared and signed. But quite apart from the effect of the provisions contained in O. 20 R. 7, it would not be wholly futile to apply for a copy without knowing whether the decree sheet has actually been prepared or not, for, it is conceivable that it may hasten the signing of the decree to a certain extent however small or at least in some cases. (30) In AIR 1951 All 122 (K), Malik, C. J. dealt with the argument, commonly advanced that 'why should the courts insist on an application being filed for the copy of a decree when the copy cannot be issued as the decree is not ready and has not been signed?' His view was that when the applicant can apply for a copy and there is no rule or law preventing him from doing so, there is no reason why it should not be insisted on that he should apply for a copy, if he wants that period to be excluded. I do not consider it necessary to re­produce his reasons which he gave in support of his view. With great respect I feel, as observed by my Lord the Chief Justice, that what has to be seen is not whether there is any rule of law pre­venting him from applying but 'whether on the contrary there was any rule of law to compel a party desiring to appeal, to make an application before the decree had been signed'. I have come to the conclusion that the relevant provisions of the law if given effect to make it obligatory on him to apply within a prescribed time for a copy of the decree, for, if he does not do so, he loses his right of appeal. The obligation to apply within the period of law is implicit in Art. 156 and other similar articles. The penalty for not apply­ing within time is that the prescribed period runs out, if no deduction is earned. In - 'Ramey v. Broughton', 10 Cal 652 (P), the decree had remained unsigned for the prescribed' period of limitation and the appellant subsequently applied for and obtained a copy of the decree. The penalty for not apply­ing within time is that the prescribed period runs out, if no deduction is earned. In - 'Ramey v. Broughton', 10 Cal 652 (P), the decree had remained unsigned for the prescribed' period of limitation and the appellant subsequently applied for and obtained a copy of the decree. It was contended that "where the decree was not drawn up and signed until after 20 days had ex­pired from the delivery of the judgment, the 20 days ought to count from the time when the decree was made." Garth, C. J. disposed of this conten­tion in the following terms : "But this is directly contrary to the express lan­guage of the law. By Art. 151 of the schedule to the Limitation Act the 20 days are to be re­ckoned from the date of the decree; and by S. 205, Civil P. C. (now O. 20 R. 7) the decree is to bear date the day on which the judgment is pronounced, so that the appeal must clearly be filed within 20 days from the day on which the judgment is pronounced." In the course of the arguments the learned judge observes that "if the appellant had applied for a copy while the 20 days were running, he would not be barred." The only way to give effect to the period of limitation provided in Art. 156 and other similar articles is to insist on an application for a copy before the period has run out. Other­wise if litigants are permitted to apply for copies after the period of limitation has expired on the ground that the decree has not been signed, the mandate of the law contained in Art. 156 read with O. 20 R. 7 would be contravened. The period provided would be enlarged by the time that is taken in signing the decree. That date would vary from case to case. The period provided would be enlarged by the time that is taken in signing the decree. That date would vary from case to case. (31) In 13 Cal 104 (D), it was held that "where a suitor is unable to obtain a copy of a decree from which he- desires to appeal, by rea­son of the decree being unsigned, he is entitled under S. 12, Limitation Act, to deduct the time between the delivery of the judgment and that of the signing of the decree in computing the time taken in presenting his appeal." This case was considered in 12 All 461 (E), a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. It was held in that case that the time requisite for obtaining a copy does not begin until an appli­cation for a copy has been made. An earlier case reported in - 'Parbati v. Bhola', 12 All 79 (Q), was followed. In that case, the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court dissented from the view which prevailed in 13 Cal 104 (D). Mahmooc! J. when dealing with the Calcutta case quoted the following paragraph from the judgment of the earlier case in which the learned Chief Justice had observed : "In my opinion applying S. 12 of the Limitation Act to such a case, allowance should be made for the time between the date when the decree was signed, if the delay in signing the decree delayed the applicant in obtaining a copy of the decree, and not otherwise. In such a case as that, it would clearly be, within the meaning of S. 12, time which was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, because a copy of the decree could not be obtained until the decree was signed by the Judge. But that is not the case here. Here no application was made until the 15th April; so that in no sense was the appli­cant delayed in obtaining a copy of the decree by the fact that the decree was not signed by the Judge on the date the judgment was pro­nounced, but was signed on the 1st April. But that is not the case here. Here no application was made until the 15th April; so that in no sense was the appli­cant delayed in obtaining a copy of the decree by the fact that the decree was not signed by the Judge on the date the judgment was pro­nounced, but was signed on the 1st April. Con­sequently the period between the 29th March and the 1st April cannot in my opinion be allowed." The learned judge could not agree with the view of Petheram, C. J. in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)', on the ground that if given effect to, the period of limitation would commence to run not from the date on which the judgment was pronounced which the date of the decree, but the date on which "it would be actually signed, which would be con­trary to law". When dealing with this aspect of the matter he observed as follows : "Indeed, the rule as stated in the judgment of Petheram, C. J. goes the length of laying down that even in cases where the decree remains unsigned for a period beyond that allowed for appealing from that decree, the appellant, by a .subsequent application for obtaining a copy and procuring it, might prefer an appeal by exclud­ing the whole period during which the decree had remained unsigned and during which he had made no application for a copy at all. That this rule, in the unqualified form in which it has been expressed, taken with the facts and dates of the case before the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, has the effect of holding that the starting period of limitation for appeal is not the date of the decree, which under S. 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure must "bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced", but the day on which it is signed, cannot be doubted." (32) The effect of the view enunciated in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)', was stated in clear terms in a Division Bench case of the Patna High Court reported in AIR 1948 Pat 260 (I). Sinha, J. as he then was, observed that "by reading article 156, Limitation Act with O. 20, R. 7, Civil P. C., the time between the pro­nouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree has to be excluded from computing the period of limitation under Art. 156 for filing an appeal. That is to say for all practical pur­poses the period of limitation has to be calcu­lated from the date the decree is signed". If the view has that effect as it obviously has, it is clearly contrary to what is laid down in Art. 156 and other similar articles that precede it. The question therefore is whether the law could be so altered by this process of interpretation. Assuming for a moment that the Calcutta view expressed in Bani Madhub's case (D), is more convenient, it may not be read into law as ft now exists. The law may be altered. It will be a ground for altering the law, and I may state with profound respect and in all humility that it would be more correct to say that it should be the law rather than that it is. (33) In Bechi's case (E), Pandit Ajudhia Nath, learned counsel for the respondents, was relying on the Calcutta view. He placed before the court an extreme case by way of illustration, in order to show that it would cause hardship and injustice if the making of an application was considered essen­tial for giving a start to the time requisite for ob­taining a copy of the decree. He asked the court to imagine a case in which the court closed on the very date on which the judgment was pronounced, thereby excluding the possibility of an application for a copy on that day. According to the illus­tration, the court remained closed for a period longer than the period of limitation provided for appeal. If the application was made on the day the court reopened and if all the time taken in preparing the copy was excluded, it may not help the applicant to save limitation, unless the appeal was filed on the very day the copy was delivered. The learned counsel argued that this would practi­cally amount to a denial of the right of appeal at least in some cases. This indeed is a very extreme case. Such extreme cases are rare in actual life. The learned counsel argued that this would practi­cally amount to a denial of the right of appeal at least in some cases. This indeed is a very extreme case. Such extreme cases are rare in actual life. Since 1890 when Bechi's case (E), was decided this difficulty has not been experienced in actual practice in any single case as far as I am aware. Justice Mahmood regarded the illustration as an extremely unusual one and his answer was that any hardship in extreme cases could be relieved by condonation of delay under S. 5, Limitation Act. This is one answer to the contention. But I think any possible hardship that could result from the case need not be attributed to the rule which requires an application for a copy before time could be regarded as requisite for obtaining a copy. It arises from a very unusual combination of circumstances which is extremely unlikely to occur in actual life. The same difficulty can arise even under the Calcutta view. Let us assume that the judgment is passed and the decree is also signed that day. The court closes that day and there is no time for applying for a copy. When the court reopens the period of limitation has expired. An application for a copy could be made that day and the appeal according to' the illustration will have to be filed on the day the copy is delivered. The difficulty would be the same even under the Calcutta view. Cases of hardship can be imagined whatever view is taken of S. 12(2). But where a litigant has not been guilty of any laches, or negli­gence or default and the period of limitation has expired under circumstances over which he had no control, reasonable delay can be condoned under S. 5. (34) The only reason given in Bani Madhub's case (D), for treating the entire period that elapses between the date of the judgment and the date of the decree was, that the requirement of the Civil Procedure was that the Memo of Appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree. (34) The only reason given in Bani Madhub's case (D), for treating the entire period that elapses between the date of the judgment and the date of the decree was, that the requirement of the Civil Procedure was that the Memo of Appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree. It was regarded as unfair to compute the period of limi­tation in all cases from the date on which the judg­ment was delivered, for in their Lordships' view it was obvious that things may intervene so as to prevent the decree being signed until after the ex­piry of the whole period of 30 days allowed for preferring the appeal and so the appeal may be rendered impossible without any fault of the parties. With great respect, I feel that considera­tion of hardship should not influence the interpretation of the statute. If the law as it stood, causes or results in hardship in its working, the remedy lies in its amendment. The unfairness which in­fluenced their Lordships to hold that the period that elapsed before the signing of the decree could be excluded under clause 2, was 01: the assumption that there is no obligation to apply for a copy within the period of limitation. If that obligation is recognized, there can be no conceivable hardship. An application has to be made, within the period of limitation regardless of the fact whether the decree has been signed or not. When an applica­tion for a copy is made all the time that the court and its officers take in preparing the original, can be excluded. (35) In 'Harish Chandra v. Chandpur Co. Ltd.', 39 Cal 766 (R), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court did not follow Bani Madhub's case (D), when the question was whether an appli­cation for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was within time. The rule laid down in Bechi's case (E), was relied on. This decision was followed by another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court reported in - - 'Nibaran Chandra v. Martin & Co.', AIR 1920 Cal 304 (S). In - 'Sarat Chandra v. Upendra Nath', AIR 1927 Cal 623 (T), the appeal arose from an order passed on the Original Side of the High Court's jurisdiction. This decision was followed by another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court reported in - - 'Nibaran Chandra v. Martin & Co.', AIR 1920 Cal 304 (S). In - 'Sarat Chandra v. Upendra Nath', AIR 1927 Cal 623 (T), the appeal arose from an order passed on the Original Side of the High Court's jurisdiction. Ac­cording to this decision, where an appellant is re­quired to do certain things before delivery of copies to him, default on his part in doing those things will disentitle him from claiming the exclu­sion of the whole time under S. 12(2). Rankin, C. J. observed after referring to certain decisions including the decision in Pramatha's case (F), that "these decisions show that (1) a copy of the order must be applied for within twenty days of its being pronounced and (2) that it will be of no avail to apply for such copy unless within the twenty days a requisition to draw up the order has been given either by the appellant or by some other party to the cause. Even if these conditions are complied with the time to be exclu­ded will not necessarily be the whole of the time which in fact elapsed between the date of the application for a copy and the date on which the copy was furnished. Under the Original Side rules, there are certain points at which the time to be occupied by the process of obtaining a copy of the order is in the control of the appel­lant to some extent". He stated his conclusion in the following terms: "In my opinion, the decisions show that the proper way for ascertaining whether the appel­lant is in time is to look first at the date on which he applied for a copy. By that date, so many days out of the twenty given to him by Art. 151 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act had been exhausted, and he had so many left. The time requisite for obtaining the copy begins to run in his favour from that date. By that date, so many days out of the twenty given to him by Art. 151 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act had been exhausted, and he had so many left. The time requisite for obtaining the copy begins to run in his favour from that date. But if he could and should have applied to have the order drawn up before any such application was in fact made whether by himself or any other party or, if unnecessary delay was occasioned by his conduct at any of the other points at which time was within his control, he can get no credit for the time wasted." This conclusion gives effect to the Allahabad view even in cases arising from the Original side of the Calcutta High Court. Other decisions of the Calcutta High Court above referred to are also in conformity with that view. In Allahabad the view enunciated in 12 All 461 (E) has been adher­ed to since 1890. (36) A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in - 'Ram Asray Singh v. Sheonandan Singh', AIR 1916 Pat 267 (U) followed 'Bani Madhub's case (D)'. But that decision was overruled by a Full Bench decision reported in - - 'Jyotindra Nath v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd.', AIR 1921 Pat 175 (V). As a result of this decision, the Allahabad view was being followed even in Bihar upto 1936, when another Full Bench decided to revert to the view which had prevailed in AIR 1916 Pat 267 (U). (37) The Bombay High Court also followed the Allahabad view in - • 'Yainaji v. Antaji', 23 Bom 442 (W) and also in - 'New Piece Goods Bazaar Co. Ltd. v. Givabhai Vadilal', 15 Bom LR 681 (X), In -. 'Narayanaswamy Tevan v. Krishnaswami Pillai', AIR 1915 Mad 308 (1) (Y) it was held that the date of the decree for purposes of calculating time for appeal was the date when the judgment was pronounced. Order 20, R. 7 read with Art. 152 was regarded as conclusive on the point. (38) 'Cases from other High Courts in which the-Allahabad view prevailed are - To Kyaw Maung v. Ma Lay', AIR 1929 Rang 116 (Z) (in which a previous Full Bench decision -- 'Maung Kin v. Maung Sa', 3 Low Bur Rul 62 (FB) (Zl) was. Order 20, R. 7 read with Art. 152 was regarded as conclusive on the point. (38) 'Cases from other High Courts in which the-Allahabad view prevailed are - To Kyaw Maung v. Ma Lay', AIR 1929 Rang 116 (Z) (in which a previous Full Bench decision -- 'Maung Kin v. Maung Sa', 3 Low Bur Rul 62 (FB) (Zl) was. followed) -'B. B. Saran, In the matter of, AIR 1917 Sind 35 (Z2) - 'R. B. Harjimal & Sons v. Dhanpat Mai Dewan Chand', AIR 1921 Sind 42 (Z3-4) and - 'Narain v. Ram Dulare', AIR 1922 Nag 113 (1) (N). (39) From the above resume it appears that be­fore 1922 there was more or less a unanimity of the view that time requisite under S. 12(2) does, not commence without an application for copies. The contrary view taken in 13 Cal 104 (D) was-losing force even in the Calcutta High Court. Its-authority was shaken by subsequent decisions. After 1922, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1932 Cal 331 (H), a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in AIR 1936 Pat 45 (A) and a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1952 Bom 122 (J) preferred to follow the view taken in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' as modified by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Coun­cil in AIR 1922 PC 352 (F). These decisions have been influenced in varying degrees by the view that the pronouncements of their Lordships of the-Privy Council in AIR 1922 PC 352 (F) and AIR 1928 PC 103 (G) lend support to the view which-prevailed in 13 Cal 104 (D). (40) Apart from the Privy Council decisions from which some support has been derived, very little has been added to the reasons given in 13 Cal 104 (D) iii support of the view enunciated. It may now be seen to what extent these decisions support the-principle of 'Bani Madhub's case (D)'. I would prefer to consider AIR 1928 PC 103 (G) first. This case went up to their Lordships from Rangoon. It arose out of a suit heard on the Original Side of the High Court of Rangoon. The suit was dismissed on 8-1-1925. On 28th, the plaintiff presented to the appellate side of the court a memo of ap­peal against the decree. The appeal was admitted subject to just exceptions. This case went up to their Lordships from Rangoon. It arose out of a suit heard on the Original Side of the High Court of Rangoon. The suit was dismissed on 8-1-1925. On 28th, the plaintiff presented to the appellate side of the court a memo of ap­peal against the decree. The appeal was admitted subject to just exceptions. The appellant put in an affidavit explaining delay and also applied for its condonation. The court dismissed the appeal hold­ing that there was no sufficient cause for condona­tion of delay. He applied for a review of the ap­pellate decree. In the review for the first time it was argued that the time during which he was procuring a copy of the decree and a copy of the judgment, was not to be reckoned as part of the period of 20 days which was prescribed by Art. 151 for such appeals. The answer to this contention was that as under the rules of the Rangoon High Court which had modified the Code of Civil Procedure on the point, the appeal from an order passed on the original side could be filed without any copy of the decree or the judgment and therefore the period could not be excluded under S. 12. The court affirmed its previous order that the appeal was out of time. It would be seen that the question was whether time spent in obtaining copies could be allowed at all considering that it was not necessary to file them with the memo of appeal. Their Lordships observed that if the only reason for excluding time had been that these documents must necessarily accompany the appeal, it might be said that the provisions of S. 12 could not have meant to apply to such a case. But they observed that even so, there would be a difficulty in dealing with the grammatical construction of words. Turning to the grammatical construction of the Act, their Lord­ships observed (p. 105) as follows : "Their Lordships have now to return to the grammatical construction of the Act, and they find plain words directing that the time requi­site for obtaining the two documents is to be excluded from computation. Section 12 makes no reference to the Code of Civil Procedure or to any other Act. Section 12 makes no reference to the Code of Civil Procedure or to any other Act. It does not say why the time is to be excluded, but simply enacts it as a posi­tive direction." The provisions of the Act referred to by their Lordships is S. 12(2) and it provides that the date on which the judgment complained of is pronounc­ed and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded. The re­quirement of the rule is explicit. The day on which the judgment complained of is pronounced is to be excluded from consideration and similarly the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the de­cree. The rule has no qualification. It docs not re­quire that this time shall be excluded from com­putation, if a copy of the decree or the judgment has to accompany the memorandum of appeal. This requirement therefore could not be read into cl. 2. The time has to be excluded whether under the rules of a particular High Court copies of the judgment and the decree have to accompany the memorandum of appeal or not. This is all what their Lordships held. This was their answer to the contention raised before them that as copies of judgment and decree were not necessary to be ' filed, time spent in obtaining them could not be excluded in computation of the period for appeal. This was the only question that arose in the case and their Lordships disposed it of in terms re­produced above. The question when time requisite for obtaining a copy commences, did not at all. arise. It was not argued. It could not have been decided. The observations of their Lordships that S. 12 makes no reference to the Code of Civil' Procedure, refers to the provisions of O. 41, R. 1, which requires that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree. The Rangoon High Court had modified it. Their Lord­ships remarked emphatically that the operation off S. 12 did not depend on any provisions in the Code requiring a copy of the decree to be filed with the memorandum of appeal. Time has to be excluded for computation, regardless of that requirement. This is the demand of S. 12(2). The Rangoon High Court had modified it. Their Lord­ships remarked emphatically that the operation off S. 12 did not depend on any provisions in the Code requiring a copy of the decree to be filed with the memorandum of appeal. Time has to be excluded for computation, regardless of that requirement. This is the demand of S. 12(2). Their Lordships were not referring to the provision contained in O. 20, R. 7. No argument was based on it and it-had not come into the picture at all. (41) Apart from this construction, their Lord­ships agreed to examine the practice in the matter in spite of the very explicit language of S. 12(2; and before they gave their interpretation of cl. 2 in regard to the question before them, they exa­mined all the cases which were placed before them and which had a bearing on the practice. They commenced the examination with the observation, that "their Lordships, if they had found a consistent-course of practice, would have been disposed to accept the construction put upon then by the High Court of Rangoon. When, however, the-matter comes to be examined, it is found that there have been divergences of opinion in the several High Courts, and that the more preva­lent opinion is not that which has been taken by the High Court of Rangoon." Cases bearing on this practice which were consi­dered include the case of AIR 1922 PC 352 (F). and it is interesting to observe what their Lord­ships had to say about this case. Their Lordships referring to this case observed as follows : "To these authorities it should perhaps be added that in the case of AIR 1922 PC 352 (F), it seems to have been assumed that the time pro­perly required for obtaining copies of the two documents was to be excluded, the "discussion, turning upon the question whether the steps, taken by the appellant were sufficiently prompt to entitle him to the benefit of this provision." As I have stated above the decision was referred; to while the question of practice about exclusion of time for obtaining copies not required to be filed with the memo of appeal was being examin­ed. It was utilised as an instance in which it was assumed that time properly required for obtaining-copies of two documents was to be excluded. It was utilised as an instance in which it was assumed that time properly required for obtaining-copies of two documents was to be excluded. The' decision was referred to for this limited purpose, though incidentally their Lordships' view of what was decided in that case was also stated. This case gives no indication that their Lordships approved the Calcutta view either on the language of S. 12 (2) or upon any other ground. My reading of the judgment receives support from a very important fact brought out in AIR 1951 All 122 (K) by Malik,. C. J. on p. 125. He discovered from the statement of facts of the case given by the Reporter that an application for copies of both the judgment and •the decree had been filed by the appellant on the same day that the judgment was delivered viz., on 8-1-1925. On 25th March, copy of the judgment was ready for delivery but the copy of the decree was not ready until 27-4-1925, when it was obtain­ed on payment of urgent fee. The time taken in taking a copy of the decree was not given credit as the rules of the original side of the High Court made it unnecessary to file a copy of the decree and it was therefore urged that the time occupied in obtaining it could not be regarded as time re­quisite within the meaning of S. 12(2). The time that was sought to be excluded was that which was spent in obtaining copies after the application. The only question was whether in the circumstances of that case time spent in obtaining, the copy of the •decree on application could be treated as time re­quisite. All observations in the case ought to be inter­preted and seen in the light of the facts. The ques­tion that was being examined was whether even after the application for a copy of the decree, the whole of the time spent in obtaining it could be regarded as time requisite for purposes of cl. 12. Their Lordships also gave their interpretation of the term 'requisite'. It was said that it is a strong word. The ques­tion that was being examined was whether even after the application for a copy of the decree, the whole of the time spent in obtaining it could be regarded as time requisite for purposes of cl. 12. Their Lordships also gave their interpretation of the term 'requisite'. It was said that it is a strong word. 'It may be regarded as meaning something -more than the word 'required', it means 'properly required' and it throws upon the pleader or coun­sel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default', but for the time which is taken in drawing up the decree by officials of the .court in preparing and issuing two documents, he is not responsible. What is meant is that by mere­ly filing an application, the appellant would not be entitled to all the time that may be obtained in actually getting the copy. It is merely time which is properly required, that would be time requisite. Therefore, even after application if an applicant is guilty of default or delay in putting in folios or making necessary deposit which the rules require, lie may not get all the time. The entire period after 'the application is not allowed as a matter of course. It is allowed when the applicant has not 'been responsible for lengthening unnecessarily the process of obtaining copies. Their Lordships add­ed that if delay is occasioned by the opponent or by the officers of the court, the applicant could not be responsible. These observations have to be read in the light of the fact that there was an applica­tion in the case and their Lordships were there­fore not deciding as to what the situation would "be if no application for a copy was made. That point was not before them at all. This decision therefore does not support in any way the view that time requisite for obtaining a copy can com­mence before any application for a copy is made. (42) The change in the trend of Indian decisions after 1922 is due mainly to the decision in AIR 1922 PC 352 (F). In that case the defendant ap­pealed to their Lordships. On 14-2-1918 a decree for Rs. 27,443 was passed against him. An application to set aside the decree was rejected on .26-7-1918. (42) The change in the trend of Indian decisions after 1922 is due mainly to the decision in AIR 1922 PC 352 (F). In that case the defendant ap­pealed to their Lordships. On 14-2-1918 a decree for Rs. 27,443 was passed against him. An application to set aside the decree was rejected on .26-7-1918. The appellant desired to appeal from this order and presented his memorandum of ap­peal before the court on 30th August on the eve of the court rising for the vacation. (43) The appellant did not comply with Rule 3 of Chapter 32 of the Rules of the Calcutta High Court which requires that the Memo of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree or order appealed from. The memo of appeal was admitted subject to just exceptions. On the hearing, it was decided that the appeal was time barred. The appeal to the Privy Council was from this order. (44) The period prescribed for appeal to the High Court was 20 days. It admittedly expired on the 10th August. The memo of appeal was presented on the 30th August. (45) On behalf of the appellant, it was conten­ded before their lordships of the Privy Council that the time requisite within the meaning of sub-s. 2 of S. 12 is the time which in the circumstances of the case is "actually occupied in" obtaining the decree and that so regarded the time that ought to be deducted was more than sufficient to rectify ' the delay. (46) Rule 27 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side rules of the Calcutta High Court provides that no decree or order shall be drawn up until applied for by a party. The application has to be made by the party in whose favour it is made within four days, and failing him by any party within one month thereafter. Plaintiff did not take any steps for having the order drawn up within the first four days viz., till 30th July. It was open to the defendant to apply for it. He also did not do it. On 6th August the plaintiff applied to have the order drawn up. On 7th August the draft was sent to the defendant. He did not return it till the 16th August. The order was signed on 28th and filed on 3rd September. It was open to the defendant to apply for it. He also did not do it. On 6th August the plaintiff applied to have the order drawn up. On 7th August the draft was sent to the defendant. He did not return it till the 16th August. The order was signed on 28th and filed on 3rd September. Their Lordships found that the two periods (1) bet­ween 30th July and 6th August and (2) between 7th August and 16th August were within appel­lant's control and were sufficiently great to prevent the appellant from saying that the time that did elapse must have elapsed even if he had acted with reasonable promptitude". On his behalf the whole of the period from 26th July to 28th August was claimed as time requisite, as all this was occupied in signing the order. In their Lordships' opinion, no period could be regarded as requisite under the Act which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain the order. This was their answer to the contention on an interpre­tation of S. 12(2). (47) It was also urged in support of the conten­tion that on the basis of the decision in 13 Cal 104 (D), in 1886 a practice had grown up in the Calcutta court according to which all the time that actually elapsed in 'obtaining the order', was excluded from computation. It was argued that the practice was being undeviatingly followed in J the courts at Calcutta. Their Lordships found that F the decision in Bani Madhub's case (D), did not I lend any support to the practice which permitted I the exclusion of all the time actually spent in 1 getting the order signed. In that case the judge merit was pronounced on 17th July and the decree ' was signed on 23rd July. This period of six days was allowed to be deducted. Their lordships ob­served that it was impossible for any one to suggest that this was unreasonable time. Their I conclusion was that this case lent no support to the contention raised before them, as it allowed only I reasonable time for the signing of the decree. (48) It is argued before us that the decision in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council, though with a little modification. Their I conclusion was that this case lent no support to the contention raised before them, as it allowed only I reasonable time for the signing of the decree. (48) It is argued before us that the decision in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council, though with a little modification. The view in 'Bani Madhub'j case (D)' militates against the view of the Allahabad High Court and that should be regarded as obso­lete. (49) From the facts of the case before their Lordships, it is clear that the two periods of time which were being claimed as time requisite were periods before any application for a copy was made. Even so, it is not possible to hold that their Lordships decided that the period of time that elapses before any application for a copy is made, even if properly spent, is time requisite in all cases and is deductible under S. 12(2). The question whether any period that elapses before applying for a copy is deductible or not, was not before their Lordships. This was not the point in controversy. The entire period that elapsed before the signing of the order was claimed as time re­quisite. The respondent's answer to the conten­tion is not explicitly stated but it can be easily gathered from the judgment. The controversy I centred round the point whether the whole of this period could be regarded as time requisite consi­dering that appellant himself had failed to take reasonable and proper steps to obtain the order. It was open to the respondent to urge that no en­quiry into the conduct of the appellant was neces­sary as no period that elapsed before the appli­cation could be regarded as time requisite under S. 12(2). It is clear from the judgments of their Lordships that this contention was not put for­ward. There is nothing in the judgment to suggest even remotely that this stand was taken up from the side of the respondent. (50) The judgment gives an inkling as to why it was not urged on behalf of the respondent that the time that elapsed before the application for the copy could not be regarded as time requisite. There is nothing in the judgment to suggest even remotely that this stand was taken up from the side of the respondent. (50) The judgment gives an inkling as to why it was not urged on behalf of the respondent that the time that elapsed before the application for the copy could not be regarded as time requisite. (51) It was asserted in the course of the argu­ment that practice in the Calcutta High Court since 1886 was that time actually taken in the signing of the decree or order was being excluded. It ap­pears that the prevailing practice permitted the time elapsing before the signing of the decree to be excluded, for there was no dispute about it. It was therefore assumed in the absence of any dis­pute on the point that time spent in getting the decree or order could be excluded on the basis of the practice. But their Lordships did not find any justification for the view either from the language of the law or from 'Bani Madhnb's case (D)' or even from practice that the whole of the period elapsing before the signing of the decree or order could be excluded as a matter of course. Some book on practice was also relied on. Their Lordships observed that even there 'the practice laid down was not in terms so plain and unhesitating that their Lordships could say that it was so estab­lished as to be equivalent to a Rule of Court'. The judgment indicates clearly that the case was argued and decided on the assumption that time before the signing of the decree or order could be excluded according to the prevailing practice. The dispute was limited to the point whether the whole of the time was to be excluded or only such time as was properly spent. It is the prevailing practice that influenced the attitude of the respondent's counsel. He refrained from urging that the time before the application for a copy could not be ex­cluded under any circumstances. The decision in this case therefore proceeds on the obvious assump­tion that the time taken in getting a decree or an order signed before an application for a copy is made, can be excluded from computation under-S. 12(2) in the circumstances of the case. The re­quirement that the applicant should not be respon­sible for any delay was added by their Lordships. The re­quirement that the applicant should not be respon­sible for any delay was added by their Lordships. The assumption on which the judgment proceeds, became necessary in view of the absence of con­flict between the parties on the point. (52) Chagla C. J. thought that it was rather significant that their Lordships did not consider the question of the application for a copy of the order at all. He inferred from this that their Lordships did not consider the application for a certified copy as a conclusive test. With profound respect I think considering the circumstances in which their Lord­ships were, the inference drawn does not seem to be justified. Their Lordships of the Privy Council themselves observed (in AIR 1928 PC 103 at p. 104 (G)) that "in the case of 'Pramatha Nath Roy v. Lee (F)' it seems to have been assumed that the time pro­perly required for obtaining copies of the two documents was to be excluded, the discussion turning upon the question whether the steps taken by the appellant were sufficiently prompt to entitle him to the benefit of this provision." These observations help to interpret the decision. I have stated above what more was assumed. The reason for the assumption was that in the circum­stances of that case there was no dispute about it and the attitude of the parties was influenced by the existing practice, which itself was limited in its application to the cases arising from the origi­nal side of the Calcutta High Court. It was ob­served by Agarwala J. when dealing with 'Pramatha's case (F)' that if the Allahabad view were correct, a short answer to this contention was that no time before an application for obtaining a copy of the decree was made, could be excluded. Malik C. J. was of the view that as 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' was distinguishable, it was not necessary for their Lordships to examine the correctness or other­wise of this decision. The validity, propriety or correctness of a decision, which does not support a contention and is distinguishable, is generally not examined. It is usually avoided. Their Lordships therefore may well have avoided entering into a consideration of the question which was not raised. The validity, propriety or correctness of a decision, which does not support a contention and is distinguishable, is generally not examined. It is usually avoided. Their Lordships therefore may well have avoided entering into a consideration of the question which was not raised. This however may not be the only reason for the omission on the part of their Lordships to con­sider the question whether the process of obtaining a copy can commence before an application for obtaining a copy is made. The real reason is afforded by the attitude of the parties to which I have already referred. According to Original Side prac­tice which was undisputed, time taken in signing decrees or orders was being excluded as time re­quisite even though no application for copies was made. The limited question on which their Lord­ships were invited to give a decision was whether the whole of the time actually occupied for pre­paring the original without reference to the con­duct of the appellant could be excluded, or it was only that part of the time which was properly spent without any negligence or delay on his part that was deductible. Their Lordships did not very appropriately travel beyond the limits of the con­troversy. (53) Agarwala J. could not believe that their Lordships were not aware of the view of the Allahabad High Court which had been followed in most other High Courts in India except the Cal­cutta High Court. I take it that they were. Let us presume that their Lordships were fully aware of the state of the law in the rest of India. If they did not even refer to it, they probably did not want to disturb the view prevailing in all the other High Courts. This would be a more appropriate inference from their deliberate avoidance of any reference to that view. I have very little doubt however that the Allahabad view was not placed before them on behalf of the respondent; if it had been done, their Lordships would have dealt with it and we would have had a clear and an articu­late expression of their views on a very vexed ques­tion on which controversy has continued since 1890. I have very little doubt however that the Allahabad view was not placed before them on behalf of the respondent; if it had been done, their Lordships would have dealt with it and we would have had a clear and an articu­late expression of their views on a very vexed ques­tion on which controversy has continued since 1890. In the situation in which they found them­selves, their Lordships could easily have preferred not to advert to the Allahabad view in order to avoid raising a controversial issue themselves and then deciding it for the whole of India. They de­cided this case on the assumption on which it was placed before them without even indicating their mind about the validity of that assumption. (54) In 37 Cal WN on page 47 of short notes of cases, there is a report of 'Parijat Devi v. Admini­strator General of Bengal (Z5). The question was whether the order of the appellate court admitting an appeal which was challenged as time barred, was a final order. The application for leave to ap­peal was rejected on the ground that the order ad­mitting the appeal was not a final order. The peti­tioner applied for a special leave. It was urged before their Lordships that 'the proper construc­tion of S. 12(2) of the Limitation Act was a matter of far-reaching importance constantly recurring in the Indian courts, and there has been a consider­able divergence of judicial opinion on the ques­tion.' It was stated that the High Courts of Allaha­bad. Bombay, Rangoon, Patna and Calcutta itself had taken the view favourable to the contention raised, whereas 13 Cal 104 (D) which had been followed in that case, stood alone on the other -side. Their Lordships rejected the petition on the ground that the order in question was not a final order leaving it open to the petitioners to raise the question of the construction of the Limitation Act on any ultimate appeal by the petitioners to the Board, without indicating that the question had decided by the Judicial Committee already. On the ultimate appeal on the merits this question was not raised again. It may therefore be regarded as a question which is still open. (55) For reasons given above I do not find it possible to say that the question now before us was raised or decided in AIR 1922 PC 352 (F). On the ultimate appeal on the merits this question was not raised again. It may therefore be regarded as a question which is still open. (55) For reasons given above I do not find it possible to say that the question now before us was raised or decided in AIR 1922 PC 352 (F). It is difficult to read into it any such decision. Any decision to the effect that 13 Cal 104 (FB) (D) embodies a correct interpretation of S. 12(2) and not 12 All 461 (E) or that time spent in signing the decree or order before a copy is applied for, must be excluded from computation if properly spent even in cases where the practice of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court is not followed as in Allahabad or in this province, cannot be read into it. Even the assumption on which 'Pramatha's case (F)' was argued or decided, is limited in its application to a case where the rules require the parties to move the court for preparing and sign­ing the original. It is not applicable to cases where parties have nothing to do to bring the decree or the order into existence, and where they get no-intimation from the court as to when the decree or order would be signed. The very language of the proposition laid down by their Lordships has no application to the state of affairs prevailing in provinces where the practice of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court is not followed. Their Lordships laid down that no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reason­able and proper steps 'to obtain an order.' Now where an applicant has not to obtain an order, this proposition cannot possibly apply. They were es­sentially dealing with a case where parties had to obtain orders and therefore what was assumed by them should not apply to cases where parties have to do nothing to obtain decrees or orders. They were es­sentially dealing with a case where parties had to obtain orders and therefore what was assumed by them should not apply to cases where parties have to do nothing to obtain decrees or orders. If they were prepared to continue established practices in Calcutta and Rangoon as is indicated by their pronouncements, they would have applied the same rule to the rest of India, particularly when the view prevailing in the rest of India was based on what according to distinguished Judges like Chief Justice Chagla and my Lord the Chief Justice rests on a logical interpretation of S. 12. More than sixty years have elapsed since the decision-in Bechi's case was given. No flaw, snag or hole in the reasoning on which it is founded has been pointed out in any subsequent decision. Their Lordships of the Privy Council maintained a dis­creet silence about it. The other view may be described as more leni­ent, broad and generous or liberal. There is 110 doubt that it gives a longer period of limitation even when it is not earned by any effort or the part of the applicant at least in cases where he had to do nothing to obtain the order. But for that reason alone, it would not necessarily be in accord­ance with the requirements of S. 12(2). Their Lord­ships cautiously avoided dealing with the question whether an application for a copy is necessary for giving a start to the time requisite under S. 12(2). But there is intrinsic evidence in the judgment: which accounts for the course they adopted. This does not in my humble opinion justify the infer­ence that their Lordships did not consider the ap­plication for a certified copy as a conclusive test in all conceivable, set of circumstances. Nor does it support the conclusion that nothing turns upon the mere fact whether an application for a copy of the order or the decision has been made. As said above, the proposition laid by their Lord­ships is limited hi terms to cases where the origi­nals have to be obtained by the parties. Their Lordships recognized the practice without saying that it was strictly in accordance with law. As said above, the proposition laid by their Lord­ships is limited hi terms to cases where the origi­nals have to be obtained by the parties. Their Lordships recognized the practice without saying that it was strictly in accordance with law. It may not be read into the decision that they were hold­ing that in all cases regardless of the fact whe­ther the parties had anything to do or not in the matter of obtaining the original, time taken in signing the decree or order has to be allowed as time requisite for obtaining copies. Rankin C. J. has rightly pointed out that this question was not really raised in either case before the Judicial Committee. Malik C. J. and Seth J. held the same opinion. They could not read into the Privy Coun­cil decision in 1922 a determination that even in cases where rules do not require the parties to move the court for preparing the decree or order, time till the signing of the decree has to be allow­ed to them in each case. I respectfully agree with this view. 'Pramatha's case (F)' does not therefore decide this point. It does not assist us in inter­preting S. 12(2) for the purposes of deciding the question before us. I have given my very anxious consideration to the question and I say in all humility and with profound respect to the distinguished Judges who have applied the view in 'Bani Madhub's case (D)' to cases where parties have not to move the court for the preparation of the decree or order, have extended the scope even of the assumption on which the decision of their Lordships was found­ed. If the rule is applied' to such cases, there would be no question of any default or negligence or lack of promptitude from the parties till the signing of the decree. They have to do nothing in the matter. They will be getting all the time till the decree is signed in each case and no question of the exa­mination of their conduct arises. The result will be that all the time before the signing of the decree would be allowed to them which is contrary to the requirements of the Limitation Act. Their Lord­ships themselves held in - 'Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Commr. The result will be that all the time before the signing of the decree would be allowed to them which is contrary to the requirements of the Limitation Act. Their Lord­ships themselves held in - 'Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Commr. of Income Tax, Lahore', AIR 1940 PC 230 (Z6) that the remarks made by them should be confined in their appli­cation to cases of a similar nature. (56) In AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B) there is no re­ference to any of the two Privy Council decisions, though there is a reference to Chitaley's Limita­tion Act, 2nd edition, 1944, Vol. 3 at page 2509, where the views of different High Courts were dis­cussed. The learned author was inclined to the Allahabad view. That view prevailed in the case. It appears however that the Privy Council cases were not put up for consideration. I subscribed to the view taken in that case. I have, therefore, given anxious thought to the whole question again. I have 1 carefully gone through the case law on the point and have tried to enter into the spirit of the Privy Council decisions. I discover no compulsion either in the language of S. 12(2) or in 'Pramatha's case 'FV for holding that the time between the date of 'he judgment and the signing of the decree should be excluded from computation under S. 12(2) in this province where there are no rules on the line of the rules of the Calcutta High Court for its original side requiring parties to move the court for obtaining decrees or orders. 1 adhere to the view that no time before an application for a copy is made can be regarded as time requisite for ob­taining a copy under S. 12(2) under the conditions which obtain in Assam. (57) In AIR 1949 Assam 23 (C) the question now before us was evidently not raised. The pro­position laid down in it is undoubtedly correct. But the decision is not helpful as it stops short at hold­ing that the time runs from the date of the judg­ment which is also the date of the decree. (57) In AIR 1949 Assam 23 (C) the question now before us was evidently not raised. The pro­position laid down in it is undoubtedly correct. But the decision is not helpful as it stops short at hold­ing that the time runs from the date of the judg­ment which is also the date of the decree. (58) It must be conceded that the practice alone as distinguished from the requirements of law was not relied on in either of the Assam cases in sup­port of the view that the time before the signing of the decree should be excluded as a matter of course even in the absence of an application for a copy. In AIR 1949 Assam 23 (C) the question of limitation arose in the District Court. The learned Judge dismissed the appeal as time barred. He did not allow the time that elapsed before the appli­cation for copies. Evidently he at least was not aware of the practice on which time till the sign­ing of the decree could be excluded. Nothing has been said about the practice in the District Courts-before 1948. In regard to the practice at the High Court level, this province was within the jurisdic­tion of the Calcutta High Court. Till 1932 there were conflicts of opinion in that High Court. The course of authority was not uniform. In that year the Full Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that 'Bani Madhub's case (D/ received support from the assumption on which the decision in 'Pramatha's case (F)' was founded. The rule laid down in that case has been the law in that Court since then for all territories within the limits of its jurisdiction including Assam. A separate High Court for this province was constituted in 1948. The High Court was called upon to interpret S. 12 (2) in AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B). It could follow one of the two prevailing views. It preferred the Allahabad view. It no doubt marked a departure from the view of the law prevailing in the Cal­cutta High Court. But the view there was not based only on practice at that stage. What happened in Assam occurred in Patna in 1921. The High Court there was constituted in 1916. For about five years, the Calcutta view was followed. The shift in the interpretation of S. 12 (2) came in 1921. But the view there was not based only on practice at that stage. What happened in Assam occurred in Patna in 1921. The High Court there was constituted in 1916. For about five years, the Calcutta view was followed. The shift in the interpretation of S. 12 (2) came in 1921. The principle of 'stare decisis' and the maxim 'cursus curiae est lex curiae' did not stand in the way. Jenkins C. J. in - - 'Kashiram v. Pandu', 27 Bom 1 (FB) (Z7) observed that out­side the realm of property law the rule of 'stare decisis' loses much of its importance. The rule that the practice of the court is the law of the court applies when the practice is on a point of proce­dure for which the law makes no provision. Where there is a provision in the statute, no practice con­trary to that provision can be binding. The law has to be given effect to. Where a statutory provi­sion has been wrongly interpreted and a wrong practice has been followed, it should be set right as soon as the mistake is discovered. This was the rule laid down in - 'Allah Kabul Almin v. Ganga Sahai', AIR 1947 All 211 (FB) (Z8). This rule ac­counts for the fact that not only in Patna but in Calcutta and Bombay also opinion on the import and significance of S. 12(2) has been in a state of flux for a long time. The controversy was set at rest in Calcutta in 1932, in Patna in 1936 and in Bombay in 1952, though it may not be said that even in these courts no revision of the existing view is possible in the future. In six other pro­vinces namely, Punjab - 'Tej Kishen v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.', AIR 1950 EP 195 (Z9); Allahabad, AIR 1951 All 122 (K); Nagpur, - - 'Mukunda v. Bisansa', AIR 1933 Nag 125 (Z10); Peshawar, - 'Shivan Ditta Banarsi Dass v. Radha Kishan Kapur', AIR 1941 Pesh 74 (Zll); Rangoon, - 'Mg Baw Byu v. Mg Yan Shin', 1939 Rang LR 686 (Z12) and Madras, - 'Tirumala Reddy v. Anavemareddf, AIR 1934 Mad 306 (FB) (Z13) the view enunciated in 'Bechi's case (E)' still prevails. The weight of authority is still in favour of the Allahabad view. The weight of authority is still in favour of the Allahabad view. In this state of the law, I think this court had ample justification to come to its own conclusion about the interpretation of S. 12(2) as it did. I realise that the effect of AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B) was to take out Assam from the eastern region in which the decision in 'Bant Madhub's case (D)' as modified by 'Pramatha's case (F)' was being followed. This view is indulgent to the suitor. It is also convenient to the Bar. The result of the view of S. 12(2) taken in AIR 1950 Assam 83 (B) has thus been the curtailment of a privilege which had been utilised for quite a long time. This result causes some embarrassment. But I am relieved to find that my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Deka J. have come to the conclusion that it is possible to allow in­tending appellants time till the signing of the de­cree without any application even here, though with profound respect to them I myself have not been able to adopt their view. (59) I entirely agree with my Lord the Chief Justice in the conclusion he has arrived at on the merits of the case, though in the view that I take of the matter this appeal should be dismissed as time barred. Case remanded.