Judgment Misra, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against the order of a first class Magistrate at Purulia, convicting the petitioners under Sec.126 (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. They were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each. The petitioners preferred an appeal against the conviction and sentence before the Sessions Judge of Manbhum-Singhbhum but the conviction was upheld, although the sentence -was reduced to a fine of Rs. 30.00 each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 13 days. 2. The petitioners were proceeded against on the allegation that on the 4th of January, 1952, a public meeting was held at 8 p. m., in front Of the house of petitioner Rameshwar Mahton, in his Kuli, which was attended by about 100 persons. Petitioner No. 2, Baul Chandra Mahton, addressed the meeting and exhorted the people to cast their votes in the Engine Box, the engine being the symbol of the candidate of the Lok Sewak Sangh party. It was at village Bara Urma. The Chowkidar, Tikaram Manjhi (P .W. 3), objected to the meeting as illegal as it would be ft contravention of Clause (1) of Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act. The meeting, however, continued in epite of his protest. Kalipada Mahton (P. W. 1), also attended the meeting on the Invitation of petitioner Rameshwar Mahton It appears that he belonged to the Congress party and he sent a report of the meeting to the president of the Thana Congress Committee. He went to the Sub-Inspector of Police, also, on the 5th January, 1952, with the report and the Sub-Inspector, after investigation, recommended prosecution of the petitioners under Clause (2) of Sec.126. It may be stated that the elections for the State Legislature as well as Parliament were going on in the constituency in which Bara Urma lies and, in fact, there was polling booth in that village. If, therefore, it could be established that there was a public meeting at Bara Urma on the 4th of January, 1952, the persons convening, holding and attending the public meeting would be liable to the penalty provided in Clause (2) of that section. It is also admitted that polling did take place at the Bara Urma polling booth on the 4th January, 1952, from 10 A.M. to 4. It is also admitted that polling did take place at the Bara Urma polling booth on the 4th January, 1952, from 10 A.M. to 4. P. M. and that it was due also to take place on the 5th January, 1952. 3. The petitioner denied that there was any meeting. It was pleaded on their behalf that some people residing in the Kuli in front of the house of petitioner No. 1 Rameshwar Mahton gathered in the evening of the 4th January, 1952, for their evening chat and no speech was delivered by anyone in connection with the elections. The whole story of the prosecution was concocted by Kalipada Mahton as the petitioners were working for the candidates set up by the Lok Sewak Sangh, whereas Kalipada Mahton and his father were working for the Congress candidates. They were hostile to Rameshwar Mahton and accordingly made a false report to the President of the Thana Congress Committee and the police with regard to the public meeting having been held at the instance of Rameshwar Mahton, petitioner No. 1. The Courts below, however, on a consideration of the evidence, negatived the plea of the defence and accepted the prosecution story as well-founded. 4. Mr. B. C. Ghosh appearing for the petitioners in this Court contended that it should be held that there was no public meeting at the house of Rameshwar Mahton, as alleged by the prosecution. The gathering at the house of Rameshwar Mahton, in fact, was only that of his friends and people who were residing in the Kuli, in front of Rameshwars house. The meeting was not even held at a, public place and as such the gathering cannot come within the mischief of Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act. It seems to me, however, that this argument is one of fact pure and simple and the Courts below have gone into the question and held that, in fact, it was a gathering to which members of the public in general were invited, including the opponents of Rameshwar Mahton, and a speech was delivered by petitioner Baul Chandra Mahton exhorting the people assembled to cast their votes in the Engine Box, Chowkidar Tikaram Manjhi has stated that he was present at the meeting and objected to its continuance as being illegal. In the result, it must be held that there is no substance in this contention that there was no public meeting, although it was held in front of the house of Rameshwar Mahton in the evening. 5. The next point raised by learned counsel was that we should hold that Section 126 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is ultra vires the Parliament of India, as it had no jurisdiction to make provision to that effect barring public meeting in general during the time of elections. Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act reads as follows: "126 (1). No person shall convene, hold or at, tend any public meeting within any constituency on the date or dates on which a poll Is taken for an election in that constituency. (2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be punishable with fine which may expend to two hundred and fifty rupees." Learned counsel referred in this connection to Articles 13 and 19 of the Constitution of India, Article 13, Clause (2) provides, "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void." Both Articles 13 and 19 fall in the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. Article 19 (1) (b), so far as it is relevant, is all citizens shall have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms". It was contended that the right of peaceable assembly having been conferred in specific terms on all citizens in Article 19 (1) (b), Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act passed by the Parliament shall be void, because it takes away the right conferred under this clause to hold public meetings. This follows from Clause (2) of Article 13. Learned counsel urged that Clause (3) of Article 19 provides in clear terms that "nothing in Sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order ................. reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause." The law relating to regulation of public meetings is a law passed in the interests of public order. reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause." The law relating to regulation of public meetings is a law passed in the interests of public order. It has been held by this Court as well as the Supreme Court of India that a law regulating the holding of public meetings must be deemed to be one in the interests of public order. The expression "public order", however, falls in 7th Schedule, List II, Item No. 1 which is "Public order (but not including the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed fources of the Union in aid of civil power)." Item No. 72 of List I of the 7th Schedule, which enumerates the subjects which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union Legislature, provides "Elections to Parliament, to the Legislatures of States and to the offices of President and Vice-president; the Election Commission." The Indian Parliament purported to legislate in regard to the elections in the shape of the Representation of the People Act in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under item No. 72 of List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Sec.126 however, of the Act which prohibits the convening, holding or attending of public meetings within a constituency on the date or dates on which a poll is taken for election in that constituency must be held to be a provision in the interests of public order. If that is so, it comes within item No. 1 of List II and not Item No. 72 of List I. Public order thus being a subject within the, exclusive jurisdiction of the State, it is only the State Legislature which should legislate on that subject, and not the Parliament of India. It must, therefore, be held that this section is beyond the competence of the Parliament. Learned counsel conceded that there is no decision on this point of any High Court in India or their Lordships of the Supreme Court, but he contended that the position is clear in view of the two Articles 13 and 19 and the two relevant entries in the two Lists mentioned above. Learned Standing Counsel, who appeared to oppose the application, drew our attention to a single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Negendra. Learned Standing Counsel, who appeared to oppose the application, drew our attention to a single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Negendra. Mahto V/s. The State7 AIR 1954 Patna 356 (A), In that case Sections 131 (1) (b) and 136 (1) (f) or the Representation of the People Act were challenged as ultra vires of the Constitution, as the subject-matter covered under those sections related to item No. 1 of the State List, namely, Public order, and the Parliament had no legislative competence in the matter. His Lordship; considered the matter with reference to Article 327 of the Constitution and items 72 and 93 of the Union List (List I) and held that the subject-matter of Sections 131 (1) (b) and 136 (1) (f) of the Representation of the People Act falls within Article 327 and Item 72 of List I and also under Item 93 of List I of the Constitution, and the Union Parliament had full competence to legislate in respect of election offences provided for under those sections. It was contended on the footing of this judgment that it was decided that ail election offences could be provided for by the Parliament by proper legislation and this would cover the subject-matter of Sec.126 as well. Mr. B.C. Ghosh, however, urged in reply that this decision is no authority for the contention that the subject-matter of Sec.126 also is covered by the decision of Ramaswami J., because it was confined only to specific offences under Section 136 (1) (b) and 136 (1) (f), and not Sec.126 which covers offences of a different character. It is true, no doubt, that it is so and also that Sections 126 to 138 deal with electoral offences and fall in Chapter III, Part VII, of the Act. It may be open to the petitioners to distinguish that case on the ground that the various offences provided for under that Chapter must be considered "independently of one another in so far as the question of competence of the Parliament to legislate is concerned. Mr. Ghosh raised in that case also the identical question that the provisions of Sections 131 (1) (b) and 136 (1) (f) relate public order and hence Parliament could not legislate thereon. Mr. Ghosh raised in that case also the identical question that the provisions of Sections 131 (1) (b) and 136 (1) (f) relate public order and hence Parliament could not legislate thereon. That contention no doubt, was negatived, but the present argument is that the subject-matter of Sec.131 (1) (b) refers to a person acting in a disorderly manner at any polling station and Sec.136 (1) (f) refers to destroying, taking, opening or otherwise interfering with any ballot-box, and both these have been made punishable under the above two sections, and the subject-matter of Sec.126 although relating to an electoral offence is different from the matter covered in the decision of the above case. But the fact remains that the question of public order was involved in that case also and it was contended that the above provisions also were in the interests of public order which was the subject covered in item 1 of List II of the 7th Schedule, and as such beyond the competence of the Parliament. The same argument is being urged in the present case as well in relation to the offences provided for in Sec.126. 6. In the case of Debi Soren V/s. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (B), a Division Bench of this Court held that Sections 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code could not be held to be an infringement of the fundamental right of freedom of speech guaranteed to a citizen in Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The restrictions contemplated under Sections 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code were of a reasonable character. Mr. Ghosh, however, developed the point in this case in a slightly different manner. He stressed that an offence like the one provided for under Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act can be construed as having been made penal either in the interests of public order or in the interests of elections. If it is the former, it is bad on account of Parliament having encroached upon the field of the State Legislature,, and if it is the latter, it is bad because Clause (3) of Article 19 warrants reasonable restrictions on the right of peaceable assembly of the citizens of India only if the restrictions are placed in the interests of public order or morality. If, therefore, the provision was made in the interests of elections, Clause (3) itself would not) warrant the imposition of a restriction on the right of peaceable assembly -and as such it will be void on that ground. Learned counsel urged that the pith and substance theory as explained in the judgment of the Federal Court, and which is now regarded as a necessary canon in the interpretation of the constitutional statutes, cannot save the provisions of Sec.126. The pith and substance theory or what is called incidental encroachment by the State Legislature on the jurisdiction of, the Parliament, or encroachment by the latter upon the jurisdiction of the State Legislature, can be of no avail in upholding the validity of Sec.128, because incidental encroachment should be confined to matters other than those which are provided for in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. 7. This contention of learned counsel, however, can be met with in this manner. Since it has been held by this Court that regulation of public meetings appertains to public order and is covered under that expression, and if the prohibition of convening, holding or attending a public meeting is a matter of public order, it must be held that such restrictions were imposed by the State in the interests of public order, In that view the requirement of Clause (3) of Article 19 of the Constitution are fulfilled inasmuch as that clause provides for enjoyment of the right guaranteed to a citizen under Article 19 (1) (b) subject to reasonable restrictions being imposed by the State in the interests of public order or morality. "The State" has been defined in Article 12 as including the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. The term "State" used in Clause (3) of Article 19 evidently refers to any of the authorities mentioned in Article 12, and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was enacted by the Parliament of India and as such it comes within the meaning of the term "State" put in the above clause. There is no violation, therefore, of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (b) in terms of Clause (3). There is no violation, therefore, of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (b) in terms of Clause (3). As a matter of fact, the guarantee relates to the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and the restrictions could be placed upon that right by the State which can enact the necessary legislation or the Government either of the Union or one of its units, the constituent States. No citizen can make a grievance that his fundamental right guaranteed in Article 19 (I) (b) has been Infringed if, in fact, reasonable restrictions have been placed by any of the units mentioned therein Mr. Ghosh, however, contended that the legislature must be a competent legislature for, if an, apparently reasonable restriction regulating public order is passed by the Legislature of a State in regard to the citizens of another State, it will evidently be bad law. But the crucial question is, whether there is any violation of the fundamental rights in terms of Clause (3) of Article 19 of the Constitution if, in fact, the terms of the clause have been fulfilled. Mr. Ghosh, however, asked us to read Clause (3) together with the entries in the Lists in the 7th Schedule. I find it difficult to accede to this contention. The Lists in the 7th Schedule, no doubt, define the limits of the Union and the State Legislatures respectively and if, therefore, there is encroachment by the Parliament on a subject which is exclusively within the powers of the. State Legislature to legislate upon, the law will be bad not because there is any violation of the fundamental rights, of a citizen but because it involves a question of competence of such Legislature as set out in Article 245 and the lists of the 7th Schedule. Mr. Ghosh, however, invites us to read the schedules as part of the fundamental rights so that the term "State" in Clause (3) of Article 19 should be read along with Lists I, II and III. I find my self unable to accept this contention which would make the working of the Act impossible in many respects and the pith and substance theory of the interpretation of constitutional statutes would also fall to the ground. I find my self unable to accept this contention which would make the working of the Act impossible in many respects and the pith and substance theory of the interpretation of constitutional statutes would also fall to the ground. The correct interpretation, therefore, as is now well-settled, is that whenever there is incidental encroachment by a State Legislature on the legislative field of the Parliament and by the latter on the legislative field of State Legislature, its validity must be judged in the light "of the pith and substance theory and the doctrine of incidental encroachment. In my opinion, if the Parliament in the present case provided necessary safeguard for peaceful elections incorporating it in Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act, and if, in doing so, it touched upon tht field of public order which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature, it must be taken only as incidental encroachment, and as such the provisions of Sec.126 must be upheld as being within the competence of the Parliament. In the result, this contention fails and it must be held that Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was validly enacted by the Parliament for peacefully conducting the elections. 8. Mr. Ghosh urged further that assuming that the Parliament could incidentally encroach upon the field of the State Legislature so far as public order in the conduct of elections is concerned, still this provision must be held to be ultra vires because the restrictions are unreasonable and this Court is competent to pronounce upon the reasonableness or otherwise of the restrictions imposed upon the fundamental rights of" a citizen guaranteed in Article 19. There is no doubt that the proper Court can scrutinize the restrictions imposed in a statute to see whether they are reasonable, but, in my opinion, there is nothing unreasonable herein. Mr. There is no doubt that the proper Court can scrutinize the restrictions imposed in a statute to see whether they are reasonable, but, in my opinion, there is nothing unreasonable herein. Mr. Ghosh contended that the restriction in Section 126" might be reasonable if it extended to the limit of prohibiting public meetings during the actual election hours which were 10 a. m. to 4 p. m., or in the neighbourhood of the polling booths; but under Sec.126 public meetings are prohibited in the entire constituency, which in the present case Includes the whole of South Manbhum and Dalthum, as also for all the days that the polling would go on, and public meetings of all kinds including religious and educational would, come within, the ambit of this section. This Court should hold that restriction imposed in such wide terms must be unreasonable and in no way connected with the peaceful conduct of elections. The argument is without substance, because if the Legislature had allowed meetings in general to be held excepting those relating to elections, it might be difficult to distinguish meeting of one kind from another. In the garb of holding an educational or religious meeting, propaganda might be carried on in the interests of one candidate or another on the days that the polling is afoot in a constituency. It might likewise be difficult to confine the area of "prohibition to the polling booth and its neighbourhood, because meetings outside might be held to intimidate or cajole the voters on the day or days of the elections. Nor is there anything unreasonable in public meetings being prohibited on the day or days of the elections instead of confining the prohibition to the actual polling hours, because on the eve of election undue pressure might be brought, on the voters to vote for one candidate or another. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, I am satisfied that the restrictions imposed on public meetings under Sec.126 of the Representation of the People Act are reasonable and do not contravene the provisions of Clause (3) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The contentions thus raised having failed, the application must be dismissed. Sahai, J. 9 I agree.