Judgment Misra, J. 1. This is an application under Sec. 491, Criminal P. C., and Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was taken into custody on 28-7-1955, and was served with a copy of the order of detention, under Sec.3 Sub-section (2) and Sec. 4, Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950), passed by the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur. The order of detention was served on him on 29-7-1955. The order was passed upon him on the allegation that he was a member of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh cum R, S. S. S. and his activities as a member of these two organisations, particularly in connection with the campaign for banning of cowslaughter, were prejudicial to public order, and as such his detention was necessary in the interest of, public tranquillity. 2. In pursuance of Section 7, Preventive Detention Act, the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur also served upon the petitioner a copy of the grounds when the petitioner was confined in the Central Jail at Bhagalpur. The statement of the grounds bears date 30-7-1955, which was duly forwarded to the Superitendent, Central Jail, Bhagalpur, for service and return. The petitioner has moved this Court, accordingly, for ordering his release from detention as, according to him, the detention order is bad in law, mala fide and meant for suppression of freedom of speech. He has also attacked the grounds of detention as being vague which would not enable him to make an effective representation against his detention. He has also stated in the petition that he never indulged in any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and security of the State. 3. The petitioner has admitted in the application that he is the Provincial Joint Secretary of the organization known as Gohatya Nirodh Samity, which is an all-India body brought into existence with the object of seeming the prevention of cow-slaughter by legislation. He has also stated that he was the organiser of Bhagalpur District Gohatya Nirodh Samity and also a member of the Bihar Provincial Executive of the said Samity; but he denies that beyond carrying on peaceful agitation for prevention of cow-slaughter in the country by legislation and beyond winning public support for the movement, he indulged in any activity of a prejudicial character against the maintenance of public order. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that, in the circumstances, the act of the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur in passing an order of detention against the petitioner amounts to suppression of freedom of speech. We have been taken through the grounds which were served, upon the petitioner. These are eight in number. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has taken us through each one of the grounds seriatim and contended that none of these grounds in fact can be said to be of a character which can be connected in any way with the prejudicial activity of the petitioner against the maintenance of public order. The grounds set out are as follows : "1. He is a very important and active worker of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh cum R. S. S. Sangh. He associated himself actively with anti-cow-slaughter campaign since 1953 and Was made the Provincial Joint Secretary of Gohatya Nirodh Samiti. Thereafter till the date of his detention he was the organiser of Bhagalpur District Gohatya Nirodh Samity and also a member of the Bihar Provincial Executive of the said Samiti. , 2. He actively associated with the fast undertaken by Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer at Bhagalpur in July, 1952, held meetings at several places, organised public opinions, obtained their signatures sent telegrams to the Prime Minister, etc., criticised vehemently the Congress Government and accused the Indian Prime Minister in his speeches saying that he was solely responsible for the partition of India and cow-slaughter. He incites the public against cow-slaughter and threatened the Government with bad consequences if Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer expired. 3. He issued numerous leaflets which were inflammatory in character at several places. On 6-5-55 he was found writing on the walls in Bhagalpur town the following ; "GOPAL RAM KI BHUMI meN GOHATYA NAHI CHALEGI. 14 MAY SE 21 MAY TAK GOHATYA NIRODH SAPTAH MANYE, JAN SANGH. SWATANTRA BHARAT MEN GOHATYA BHARAT, BHARATIYA TATHA BHARAT-BASI KE SATH BISWASGHAT HAI. YADI GOHATYA JARI RAHI TO DESH ME BAGAWAT HO JAYAGI." He was inciting people against cow-slaughter and was found enrolling members for staging a Satyagraha, before the Assembly House at Patna when the session reopens in August, 1955. 4. His communal activities became apparent when he moved about in different places of the Province with his Desh Darshan Pradarshani in 1954-55 and tried to incite people. 5. 4. His communal activities became apparent when he moved about in different places of the Province with his Desh Darshan Pradarshani in 1954-55 and tried to incite people. 5. On 23-11-52 he criticised the secular policy of Indian Government and accused the Prime Minister of India as a most communal man. In another meeting he called the Indian Prime Minister as a traitor to the country. 6. In a meeting held at Colgong on 17-1-55, he criticised the Government for not banning cow-slaughter and called them as Anti-Hindu and that it was the Government, which were allowing continuance of cow-slaughter in the country. He further said that if it was necessary to continue cow-slaughter for economic gain, then Pandit Nehru should get the graveyard of Muslims and Christians demolished to get lacs of acres of land for Cultivation purposes. 7. Taking advantage of the ensuing Bakr-Id festival, he carried on the agitation for ban on cow-slaughter with more vigour and was actively inciting the Hindus against the Muslims. 8. He was also detained as a security prisoner in Bhagalpur Jail during 1948-49 for his prejudicial activities." 4. Dealing with ground No. 1, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that there can be nothing objectionable in the petitioner being a member of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh cum R.S.S.S. inasmuch as these two organisations are not illegal nor is the Gohatya Nirodh Samity as ah all India body at all, of an objectionable character. The mere fact, therefore, that the petitioner was a member of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh cum R.S.S.S. or was an office-bearer in the organisation known as Gohatya Nirodh Samity cannot be held to be objectionable by any stretch of the meaning of the expression "maintenance of public order". In my opinion, the contention is well-founded and since these organisations are not illegal organisations, mere membership of Bharatiya Jan Sangh or R.S.S.S. or Gohatya Nirodh Samity cannot bring the petitioner within the mischief of the Preventive Detention Act. 5. Ground No. 2, is that he associated himself with the fast undertaken by Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer and that the petitioner criticised the Congress Government and accused the Indian Prime Minister in bis speeches saying that he was solely responsible for the partition of India and cow slaughter. 5. Ground No. 2, is that he associated himself with the fast undertaken by Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer and that the petitioner criticised the Congress Government and accused the Indian Prime Minister in bis speeches saying that he was solely responsible for the partition of India and cow slaughter. In my opinion, this part in itself, however indiscreet might be the act of the petitioner, cannot be characterised as an act likely to endanger the maintenance of public order. It might be the individual opinion of the petitioner, with which, many people, even among his audience, might not agree that the Prime Minister of India was responsible for cow-slaughter. The statement might indicate only the personal approach to these problems of the petitioner but that statement in itself cannot be taken in any way to have any connection with the maintenance of public order, inasmuch as these statements cannot have any rational probative force to serve as a ground for the detention of the petitioner under the Preventive Detention Act. There is, however, another passage in ground No. 2 to the effect, "He incites the public against cow slaughter and threatened the Government with bad consequences if Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer expired. Learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the State, urged that the word incites used in this ground is sufficient to show that the petitioner asked the public to carry on a violent campaign in favour of cow slaughter and threatened the Government with bad cunsequences, which would also have an implication of some violent activity on the part of the petitioner. In my opinion, however, the word incites even according to the dictionary meaning, does not lead one further than an attempt on the part of the petitioner to urge the people actively to agitate for the prevention of cow slaughter. Since, however, the entire phrase "incites the public against cow slaughter" is for consideration before us, it is obvious that the expression can only mean that he urged the public to agitate against, cow slaughter and nothing more. The further expression "(he) threatened the Government with bad consequences if Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer expired" also likewise cannot have the implication that the petitioner threatened a violent upheaval resulting from the death of Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer as a result of the fast undertaken by him for the prevention of cow slaughter. The further expression "(he) threatened the Government with bad consequences if Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer expired" also likewise cannot have the implication that the petitioner threatened a violent upheaval resulting from the death of Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer as a result of the fast undertaken by him for the prevention of cow slaughter. In any case, it appears that both the expressions "incites the public against cow-slaughter" and "threatened the Government with bad consequences" are so vague as not to lead to the conclusion that any kind of violence was to be practised by the people in case Sri Ramchandra Sharma Veer expired. 6. Coming to the third ground, the expression mainly stressed by learned Standing Counsel as being prejudicial against the maintenance of public order was "Yadi Gohatya Jari Rahi to Desh Me Bagawat Ho Jayegi". It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that this is a quotation from a statement made by Sri Vinoba Bhave and when read in the context it is nothing more than the fact that the country would be alienated from, the present Government if the Government would not take any measures for the prevention of cow-slaughter as well. It appears to me that, relying as the petitioner did upon the statement of Sri Vinoba Bhave in the context, it is only an appeal to Indias cultural past in regard to the respect for cow and the word "Bagavat" can only amount to la threat of alienation of the people from the Government and not in the nature of a violent rebellion. Apart from that, the expression does not mean that the petitioner himself asked anyone to rise in rebellion against the Government if cow- slaughter is permitted to continue in the country, but, at the highest, it can be said that he was afraid that there might be something untoward against the Government. It does not show that he asked the people to rise in rebellion if cow-slaughter is not stopped. . It was further stated in this ground that he was inciting people against cow-slaughter and was found enrolling members for staging a Satyagrah before the Assembly House at Patna. It does not show that he asked the people to rise in rebellion if cow-slaughter is not stopped. . It was further stated in this ground that he was inciting people against cow-slaughter and was found enrolling members for staging a Satyagrah before the Assembly House at Patna. For all, one can see, this Satyagrah, as the term indicates would be a peaceful Satyagrah and there is nothing in the nature of incitement to violence even, if the petitioner, in fact, were enrolling members for staging a Satyagrah beiore the Assembly House. It would at the highest only indicate that the organisers of the movement for prevention of cow-slaughter were out to persuade the legislators, to pass some measures for prevention oi cow-slaughter. 7. The fourth ground, relates to something called "Desh Darshan Pradarshani" winch is vague inasmuch as the ground gives no indication as to what it was. If it is in the nature of something to be exhibited, as the word "Pradarshani" indicates, it is difficult to say how merely showing something in the nature of picture of the country can be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Learned counsel for the petitioner informed us that this is nothing more than a man of India containing the names of the sacred places of the Hindus and the places where the great heroes of Hindu History, like Ram and Krishna, were born and where their places of birth actually stand on the map of India. If that is so, I am still less able to see how it can have any tendency, beyond educating the public, towards creating public disorder, 8. Ground No. 5, in substance, is that the petitioner criticised the secular policy of the Indian Government and accused the Prime Minister of India as the most communal man. In my opinion, this may be the personal approach, again, of the petitioner to the way in which the Constitution of the country has been framed, and although the Prime. Minister of India is characterised as a communal man, this is nothing more than his personal opinion and cannot be connected with anything likely to prejudice the maintenance of public order, 9. Minister of India is characterised as a communal man, this is nothing more than his personal opinion and cannot be connected with anything likely to prejudice the maintenance of public order, 9. Ground No, 6, in substance, is in the same manner vague as the other grounds mentioned, before for criticising the Government as being anti-Hindu, because it did not pass the necessary legislation for the banning of cow-slaughter in the country. This criticism is of no greater value than what he has advanced before and cannot be put on a higher footing, and cannot be of any effect so far as maintenance of public order is concerned. The reference in this ground that if cow-slaughter is continued for economic reasons there is no valid justification why the same economic reasons should not impel the Government to set free the lands for cultivation removing the graveyards of Muslims and Christians, is also an academic argument which the petitioner advanced according to his own conception of meeting the economic objection and cannot have any tendency to prejudice the maintenance of public order beyond its dialectical value for the petitioner himself. 10. Ground No. 7, in my opinion, is a little more specific inasmuch as it is stated therein that the petitioner carried on agitation for ban on cow-slaughter with more vigour and was actually inciting the Hindus against the Muslims. Learned counsel for the State contended that the expression "actively inciting the Hindus against the Muslims" means that the petitioner was going about asking the people to rise against the Muslims. In my opinion, however, although the expression is "inciting the Hindus against the Muslims." it does not necessarily lead to the inference that he asked the Hindus to go against the Muslims and to practise violence against them. It might well be that some Muslims are supposed to indulge in cow-slaughter along with other non-Hindus, and the campaign for prevention of cow-slaughter might look like an act on the part of the petitioner in, inciting the Hindus to go against the Muslims, but the word incites, as I have considered before, is equally vague here. It might well be that some Muslims are supposed to indulge in cow-slaughter along with other non-Hindus, and the campaign for prevention of cow-slaughter might look like an act on the part of the petitioner in, inciting the Hindus to go against the Muslims, but the word incites, as I have considered before, is equally vague here. Since the entire campaign is for prevention, of cow-slaughter by means of legislation, as the grounds taken as a whole indicate, I am unable to see how inciting the Hindus against the Muslims in the present context can be taken as an attempt on the part of the petitioner to ask the Hindus to stop the Muslims from cow-slaughter by any means open to them. The campaign might be one against the Government only indirectly, and "even indirectly St might look like asking the Hindus or those who are in favour of prevention of cow-slaughter, to stop those who may be for cow-slaughter from indulging in it, but it cannot be taken as anything more than merely to create public, opinion for getting the necessary legislation passed for the Purpose which would be equally binding upon the citizens of India, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and others. In my opinion, the fact mentioned herein also is to say the least, vague in so far as the actual effect of Jeopardising public order is concerned. Besides, no details are given as to the place, date and nature of utterance leading to this ground. 11. Ground No. 8 is apparently irrelevant inasmuch as if the petitioner was ever detained as" security prisoner before, it can have no relevant bearing upon his present activities which must be judged on merits apart from the petitioners past, no reference being made to the nature of his past activities. 12. I have considered the grounds in the light of the proposition of law raised before us by learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Thakur Prasad, for the petitioner, relied in the main on the decision in the case of -- Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj V/s. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 318 (A), wherein it was held that the grounds to be served upon a detenu must be sufficiently particularised to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj V/s. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 318 (A), wherein it was held that the grounds to be served upon a detenu must be sufficiently particularised to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him. Their Lordships in that connection considered the case -- State of Bombay V/s. Atmaram Shridhar Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157 (B), and held that the same principle was laid clown in that decision as well, because to hold otherwise would amount to an infringement of the safeguard provided in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. -Their Lordships considered in that connection also various paragraphs in the statement of grounds and held, on an examination of the grounds, that at least one of them was extremely vague. In any case, since their Lordships were satisfied that the grounds served upon the petitioner Dr. Bhardwaj vyere vague, the vagueness of the grounds supplied to the detenu so as to make it difficult for him, to make an adequate representation did make the detention void in that case. Learned counsel for the State, however, drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of -- Ujagar Singh V/s. The, State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 350 (C), for the contention that mere vagueness of grounds will not justify the Court in scrutinising the grounds for ordering the release of the detenu. In my opinion, however, even it AIR 1952 SC 350 (C), the detenu was released on the ground of vagueness and their Lordships of the Supreme Court have re-affirmed the position in the above case of AIR 1953 SC 318 (A), that the grounds served on the detenu must be sufficiently particularised to enable him to make an adequate representation. In the result, the three decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above are authority for the proposition that the Court can scrutinise the grounds to see whether they are sufficiently explicit to enable the detenu to make a representation or not. If the grounds do not fulfil that condition, it would amount to the violation of the safe-guard under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, and as such the authority passing the order of detention must take care to make the grounds specific so that the detenu can be in a position to make an effective representation. If the grounds do not fulfil that condition, it would amount to the violation of the safe-guard under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, and as such the authority passing the order of detention must take care to make the grounds specific so that the detenu can be in a position to make an effective representation. Learned counsel for the State, however, brought to our notice a decision of this Court in! the case of -- Samalia Bhuian V/s. State, AIR 1952 Pat 374 (D), in support of the contention that the vagueness of the grounds served would not by itself be a ground for this Court to order the release of the petitioner. In that case, however, it appears that, the grounds in fact were not vague and Ahmad, J., who delivered the judgment, said that the grounds could have been more definitely specified, but in fact an examination of the facts would show that his Lordship was satisfied that the grounds in question were not vague, and as such the case referred to above cannot be relied upon by learned counsel for the State for the purpose of this case. Learned counsel for the State also drew our attention to Cri. Misc, Nos. 363 to 368 of 1953 disposed of by Sinha and Choudhary, JJ. on 17-12-1953 (Pat) (E). It was contended that their Lordships reiterated in the above, cases the principle that vagueness is no -ground as the detenu is entitled to ask for more particulars. But, it appears that, their Lordships followed the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1953 SC 318 (A), and held that vagueness in fact is a ground and ordered the release of one of the detenus, Ranen Roy, on that ground. In the present case, however, all the grounds which I have scrutinised above are so vague as to make the detention order void from the date of service of the statement of the grounds, and in fact most of the grounds have no rational probative value being wholly irrelevant to the maintenance of public order or security of the State. That is the effect of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case. 13. In the result, it must be held that the detention of the petitioner on the grounds served on him cannot be held to be legal. That is the effect of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case. 13. In the result, it must be held that the detention of the petitioner on the grounds served on him cannot be held to be legal. The application must be allowed and the petitioner must be released from detention forthwith unless he is required for detention in connection with some other proceeding. Sahai, J. 14 I agree.