JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. This is an application under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision in- 'Murlidhar v. Firm Ganeshdas Kishnaji'. The appeal arose out of a suit in which the plaintiff Murlidhar alleged that the defendant-firm was accountable to him upon several forward transactions in gold and silver and prayed for a decree for the rendition of accounts and for payment of such sum as may be found due to him, and in the alternative if the account had been rendered to him, for the reopening of the account. The trial Judge gave to the plaintiff a preliminary decree permitting him to surcharge and falsify the accounts kept by the defendant. The plaintiff then appealed to this Court. We allowed the appeal and substituted the decree of the trial Court by a preliminary decree directing the defendant to render accounts to the plaintiff. The defendant now seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 2. The valuation of the subject-matter of the dispute in the original Court, as well as in the appeal before us was Rs. 21,000/-; the decree sought to be appealed from, is not one of affirmance of the decree passed by the trial Court. The petitioner is, therefore clearly entitled, as of right, to a certificate or leave to appeal. Mr. Sanghi learned counsel for the non-applicant, however, on the authority of- 'Kuppuswami Rao v. The King', AIR 1949 PC 1 (A) and- 'Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. v. Dominion of India', AIR 1950 FC 77 (B), contends that under Art. 133 no appeal is provided for against a preliminary decree. I am unable to accede to the contention. The word "decree' which occurs in Art. 133 of the Constitution and in S. 109 Civil P.C. is not qualified by the words "preliminary" or "final". Under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 595, Civil P.C., 1882, an appeal lay to the Privy Council from "any final decree" and under clause (c) of that section an appeal lay from "any decree when, the case is certified to be a fit one for appeal". Under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 595, Civil P.C., 1882, an appeal lay to the Privy Council from "any final decree" and under clause (c) of that section an appeal lay from "any decree when, the case is certified to be a fit one for appeal". The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, removed the distinction between a final decree and a preliminary decree observed by the Code of 1882 with regard to appeals to the Privy Council and made any decree which satisfied the conditions laid down in S. 109, C.P.C., 1908, appealable to the Privy Council. Article 133 of the Constitution does not in any way change the position so far as the appealability of a decree is concerned. It makes no distinction between a preliminary decree and a final decree. Under that article a preliminary decree as well as a final decree is appealable. The argument of Mr. Sanghi learned counsel appearing on behalf of the non-applicant that as no appeal lies against an interlocutory judgment or order, therefore, a preliminary decree is not open to appeal to the Supreme Court is fallacious. The fallacy lies in assuming that a preliminary decree does not partake of the nature of finality attributed to a final decree or a final order or a final judgment. The term 'decree' has been defined in S. 2(2) of the Code It means "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final". The explanation to this sub-section says that a decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. This definition of preliminary decree clearly satisfies the test of finality laid down by the Privy Council in- 'Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons', AIR 1933 P.C. 58 (C), add applied by the Federal Court in AIR 1949 F. C. 1 (A)', and 'AIR 1950 F.C. 77 (B). It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. This definition of preliminary decree clearly satisfies the test of finality laid down by the Privy Council in- 'Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons', AIR 1933 P.C. 58 (C), add applied by the Federal Court in AIR 1949 F. C. 1 (A)', and 'AIR 1950 F.C. 77 (B). The test laid down in the above cases for determining the finality of an order is whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties and that "the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If after the order the suit is still alive in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it :" It must be noted that the test is not whether further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of; it is whether the rights of the parties have been finally determined by the judgment or order and whether the suit is a live suit not for the purpose of working out the details in accordance with the judgment or order but for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties. Now in a suit for rendition of accounts and for payment of such money as may be found due after the taking of accounts, the real question for determination is the liability to account and when that has been determined by a preliminary decree against the defendant, the determination of the amount due to a party after the taking of accounts is merely a matter of working out the details in accordance with the preliminary decree. In such a case after the passing of the preliminary decree further proceedings in the suit are not proceedings in which the rights of the parties have to be determined. A Preliminary decree is, therefore, even on applying the test laid down in the cases cited by the learned counsel for the non-applicant, appealable under Art. 133. This conclusion is reinforced by the provisions of S. 97, C.P.C. which prescribes that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This conclusion is reinforced by the provisions of S. 97, C.P.C. which prescribes that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. The anomaly and absurdity that would result if a preliminary decree is not appealable to the Supreme Court is thus too obvious. No doubt if Art. 133 had expressly made only final decrees to the exclusion of preliminary decrees, appealable to the Supreme Court, then a party could not have by merely relying on S. 97, C.P.C. claimed a right to appeal to the Supreme Court from a preliminary decree. But the anomaly and absurdity resulting from S. 97 would still remain. It cannot be ignored in construing the meaning of the word 'decree' in Art. 133. 3. I must refer to two decisions of the Privy Council where it has been held that under. S. 109 C. P. Code 1908 an appeal lies from a preliminary decree.. In- 'Sanyasi Charan Mandal v. Krishnadhan Banerji', AIR 1922 P.C. 237 (D), an appeal was filed before the Privy Council against a decree passed by the Calcutta High Court against the defendant directing him to render accounts to the plaintiff. A preliminary objection was taken before the Privy Council that the appeal did not lie as the order was not final. The Privy Council overruled the objection and made the observation that a preliminary objection was taken that the appeals did not lie because the order was not final. But their Lordships did not give effect to it and the appeals have been heard". In- Rahimbhoy Haribhoy v. C. A. Turner', 18 Ind App. 6 (PC) (E), an appeal was preferred to the Privy Council from a decree of the Bombay High Court directing the defendant to account to the plaintiff. The question arose whether the decree was a final one within the meaning of S. 595 of the Civil P.C. 1882. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the decree was a final one. The question arose whether the decree was a final one within the meaning of S. 595 of the Civil P.C. 1882. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the decree was a final one. They said : "It is true that the decree that was made does not declare in terms the liability of the defendants but it directs accounts to be taken which he was contending ought not to be taken at all; and it must be held that the decree contains within itself an assertion that, if a balance is found against the defendant on those accounts, the defendant is bound to pay it. Therefore, the form of the decree is exactly as if it affirmed the liability of the defendant to pay something on each one of these claims, if only the arithmetical result of the account should be worked out against him. Now that question of liability was the sole question in dispute at the hearing of the cause, and it is the cardinal point of suit. The arithmetical result is only a consequence of the liability. The real question in issue was the liability, and that has been determined by this decree against the defendant in such a way that in this suit it is final. The Court can never go back again upon this decree so as to say that, though the result of the account may be against the defendant, still the defendant is not liable to pay anything. That is finally determined against him, and therefore, in their Lordships view the decree is a final one within the meaning of S. 595 of the Code." 4. It will be noted that an order in Rahimbhoy's case was one which' under the present Code would be a preliminary decree. This case was referred to in- ' AIR 1933 P.C. 58 (C)', where the test for the determination of the finality of an order was laid down. The Privy Council distinguished it by saying that the order therein decided the cardinal point and said that in that case, i.e. in Rahimbhoy's case an appeal to His Majesty in Council would have lain as of right under the provisions of the present Code, i.e. the C. P. Code of 1908. The Privy Council distinguished it by saying that the order therein decided the cardinal point and said that in that case, i.e. in Rahimbhoy's case an appeal to His Majesty in Council would have lain as of right under the provisions of the present Code, i.e. the C. P. Code of 1908. In my view on the principles laid down in the above two cases, an appeal would lie to the Supreme Court from a preliminary decree, e.g., a decree declaring the liability of a party and directing accounts to be taken. 5. For these reasons I would grant the petitioner leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment and decree dated 20-8-1954 in Civil First Appeal No. 8 of 1951. Costs of this application will be costs in the appeal. 6. CHATURVEDI, J. :- I agree. Leave granted.