ORDER : 1. This is an application for the transfer of case No. 108 of 1955 Criminal Miscellaneous from the Court of Additional District Magistrate, Gwalior, under S. 526, Criminal P.C. The facts out of which this application arises may be shortly stated thus : 2. The accused were arrested by the police for an offence of abduction under S. 366, I.P.C. The police applied for a remand while the accused put in an application for bail. At the time of the hearing of the bail application, the counsel for the accused was not present in the Court and, so the Court asked the accused, who were present, as to what they had to say. The accused in their reply straightway stated that at the instance of the villagers they had abducted the woman in question. The Court examined the police record as well and dismissed the application for bail. It seems that after the accused had made the statement admitting their guilt, the counsel for the accused entered the Court. He objected that no question could be asked of the accused, and, that the statement made by them may have been induced by some fear. The Court observed that this objection would be given due weight at the stage of weighing the evidence. On these facts, this application for transfer has been moved. 3. The main contention of the learned counsel for the accused is that the Court was not justified in asking the accused what they had to say and that the Court cannot examine the accused in manner different from the one given in S. 342 or S. 253 Criminal P.C. 4. It is obvious that what the Court asked of the accused did not amount to their examination either under S. 253 or under S. 342, Criminal P.C. A mountain is being made out of a mole-hill. In the absence of the counsel, the Court was absolutely justified in asking the accused what they had to say about their application. And if in reply to this the accused made a statement injurious to themselves, I cannot blame the Court. Besides the purview of Ss. 253 and 342, Cr. P.C., I think that every Court has an inherent right to put any question which may refer to the case under consideration. And if in reply to this the accused made a statement injurious to themselves, I cannot blame the Court. Besides the purview of Ss. 253 and 342, Cr. P.C., I think that every Court has an inherent right to put any question which may refer to the case under consideration. Now to describe this simple thing as being tantamount to demanding the 'plea of guilty or not guilty is not fair. And what is there in it to cause fear to the accused that they would not have a fair trial ? No act of the Magistrate has induced their apprehension. The basis of transfer of a case is that the accused should have a reasonable apprehension that they would not have a fair trial. But no fanciful idea can be substituted for reasonable apprehension. And I fail to see any ground for having even a suspicion that the accused will be denied a fair trial. 5. The learned counsel for the accused contends that the lower Court possesses no inherent powers but I do not accept this position. No legislative enactment dealing with the procedural law can provide for all the cases that may arise and, it is an established proposition of law that a Court of Justice must possess inherent powers, apart from the express provision of law, which are necessary to its existence and the proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. If I assume for a moment that the Court possess no inherent powers at all, and, that every thing, the Court does must be according to the Criminal Procedure Code, then I would like to know whether a Magistrate can or cannot ask the accused what his name is, on the accused entering his Court. The learned counsel for accused says he can. Well, where is the provision for it in Criminal Procedure Code ? And would such a question amount to an examination of the accused under S. 253 or S. 342 of the Code ? An argument can always be stretched but it should not be stretched to the breaking point, because it is liable to be considered useless by the force of its own pressure. And would such a question amount to an examination of the accused under S. 253 or S. 342 of the Code ? An argument can always be stretched but it should not be stretched to the breaking point, because it is liable to be considered useless by the force of its own pressure. The Criminal Procedure Code or for the matter of that no procedural law is ever exhaustive and in cases, where circumstances require it, the Courts have acted on the assumption that they possess inherent powers (as of right) to do justice for which they really exist. At the same time it must be remembered that a Court has no inherent power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. In this view of the matter every Court whether civil or criminal, in the absence of any express! provision to the contrary, shall be deemed to possess, as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary in the course of the administration of justice. The rule of inherent powers has its source in a latia maxim "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa esse non potest" which means that "when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist." 6. In this connection I should like to refer briefly to S. 561A, Criminal P.C., which deals with inherent powers of the High Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in- 'Jairamdas v. Emperor', AIR 1945 PC 94 (A), have observed that S. 561A, Criminal P.C., confers no powers. It merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court. This section, saves the inherent powers of the High Court but it is silent with regard to any such powers possessed by subordinate Courts. This omission, however, does not mean that subordinate Courts cannot, when necessary, exercise inherent powers. (See Criminal Procedure Code by Chitaley, Note No. 8 of Section 561-A on page 3107). 7. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that the learned Magistrate was not justified in adjourning the case after the submission of the application for transfer on costs and he has cited In re, Venkatarama Chetti, AIR 1942 Mad 178 (B). Even if the ruling is to be followed, the case was not transferred on that ground. 7. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that the learned Magistrate was not justified in adjourning the case after the submission of the application for transfer on costs and he has cited In re, Venkatarama Chetti, AIR 1942 Mad 178 (B). Even if the ruling is to be followed, the case was not transferred on that ground. A mistake of law made bona fide is no ground for the transfer of a case. See- 'Ashirbad Muchi v. Muju Muchini, 8 Cal WN 833 (C). 8. For reasons stated above, I would reject the application for transfer. Application rejected.