JUDGEMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. This is an appeal filed by the judgment-debtors against an order of the executing Court which held that the execution of the decree is within time. In order to understand and appreciate the points urged in this appeal it seems proper to refer to certain facts of the case. The respondents, the Indore Premier Co-operative Bank Ltd., Indore, are a co-operative society registered under the Indore Co-operative Societies Act (Act No. 5 of 1914), doing banking business. Defendant Gopalji Govindram was a member of this society and owed money to this society. As the manager of the joint Hindu family and as the manager of the family firm, he executed a certain document and on the basis of this document, the decree-holders put forth a claim against the appellants. To determine this dispute, Mr. D.P. Avadhoot a pleader, was invested with the powers of Registrar, Co-operative Societies under S. 3 Indore Cooperative Societies Act (Act No. 5 of 1914). Rule No. 19 of the rules made under S. 43, Indore Cooperative Societies Act read as follows : "A dispute in respect of the business of the society between any person who (a) is or has been a member of a society, or (b) claims through any one who is or has been a member, and such society or its committee or any of its officers shall be referred to the registrar for decision." 2. The case appeared to be a rather complicated one and as many as nine issues were struck. The Registrar came to the conclusion that the defendants were liable to pay Rs. 39,172-2-5 to the society, and after deducting various sums he held that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim from the defendants a sum of Rs. 28,053 as principal together with simple interest from 1-1-1936 till satisfaction of the plaintiffs, claim. He then passed the following order : "I accordingly order that the defendants shall pay to the plaintiffs the above mentioned amounts within six months from the date of this order, failing which it shall be recovered by the plaintiffs by the sale of the house mortgaged with the plaintiffs as described below. It is further ordered that if the sale-proceeds fall short of the total claim of the plaintiffs, the balance shall be recovered from other joint family property of the defendants and from the defendant Govindram personally." 3. It is further ordered that if the sale-proceeds fall short of the total claim of the plaintiffs, the balance shall be recovered from other joint family property of the defendants and from the defendant Govindram personally." 3. This is the operative portion of the order passed on 21-8-1942. 4. It was argued by Mr. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellants, that this order amounts to a final decree as nothing remains to be done. In my opinion this contention is not tenable as a period of six months was laid down for the payment of the amount due. It was obviously contemplated that the defendants would pay something within six months and then it will be seen whether the house mortgaged would be sold or not. Now it appears from an order of the Registrar dated 13-8-1946 that within six months the defendants paid to the society a sum of Rs. 3,972-4-0. Then for the remaining sum due a decree for sale of the mortgaged property was passed on 13-8-1946. It is this decree that gave rise to the present dispute. When on 11-8-1949 an application for execution of this decree was made the judgment-debtors raised the objection that it is not within time as time will run from 21-8-1942 when the first award was made by the registrar. The learned Additional District Judge over-ruled this objection holding that the decree passed on 13-8-1946 is the final decree and time would run from that date. On this basis he held that the execution was within time. The judgment-debtors have come in appeal against this order. 5. It is not disputed before us that a Registrar of Co-operative Societies acting under Rules framed under the Indore Co-operative Societies Act is a Court. So the decree passed on 13-8-1946 will be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court for the purposes of execution and it is well settled that an executing Court cannot refuse to execute a decree unless it is apparent on the face of the decree that it is one passed without jurisdiction. Infact it has been held in Ahmad Yar v. Co-operative Credit Society, AIR 1926 Lah 547 (1) (A) that any Court executing the award under the Co-operative Societies Act has no power to do anything except to execute the award as if it were a decree of the Court executing it. Infact it has been held in Ahmad Yar v. Co-operative Credit Society, AIR 1926 Lah 547 (1) (A) that any Court executing the award under the Co-operative Societies Act has no power to do anything except to execute the award as if it were a decree of the Court executing it. The sole question, therefore, in this appeal is, whether on its face, the award was one passed without jurisdiction. Mr. Sanghi contended that the Registrar in fact had passed the award on 21-8-1942 and thereafter he became functus officio and had no jurisdiction subsequently to rewrite the original award. He placed reliance on Chhati Lal v. Ram Chariter, AIR 1941 Pat 215 (B). He therefore urged that the second award on 13-8-1946 was illegal and time will run from the first award dated 21-8-1942. I have seen the two orders passed on 21-8-1942 and on 13-8-1946 and I have come to the conclusion that the two awards are not two separate awards, but the first clearly contemplated six months time to the judgment-debtors within which they should pay the money; failing which a proper order would be made as to how much amount was due and for how much amount the mortgaged property be sold. In my judgment it clearly contemplated passing of a final order. An arbitrator or Registrar of Co-operative Societies passing an award is in no way bound by the provisions of O. 34, R. 4 or by the form of a preliminary decree. We have to see the substance and not the form of the decree. If the order contemplates passing of a final order then the first order must be deemed to be a preliminary decree as something remains to be done. In this view of the matter, I am not prepared to state that it is a case merely of rewriting the award and that the Registrar had become functus officio. In my opinion, AIR 1941 Pat 215 (B) would not apply to the facts of this case. It appears from the record and from the judgment of the lower Court that within six months time the judgment-debtors did pay a sum of Rs. 3,972-4-0 and that the decree-holders then applied to the Registrar for preparing a final decree in the case. It appears from the record and from the judgment of the lower Court that within six months time the judgment-debtors did pay a sum of Rs. 3,972-4-0 and that the decree-holders then applied to the Registrar for preparing a final decree in the case. Notices were issued to the judgment-debtors and in their presence and after a proper inquiry, the decree in question was passed on 13-8-1946. This decree clearly stated that the first order was a preliminary award and that this was a final award. The judgment-debtors did not contest at the time of passing the final award that this award was without jurisdiction or that the Registrar had become functus officio and could not pass the final award. As the decree was passed after notice to the judgment-debtors and in their presence without any contest from them about the jurisdiction. I am of opinion that irrespective of the question, whether it was necessary or not to pass this decree, the decree must be held to be valid and binding so far as the parties to it are concerned as it was never set aside and is still subsisting. In my opinion it cannot be said that on the face of it the award of 13-8-1946 is without jurisdiction. It follows therefore that an executing Court cannot refuse to execute it and in this view of the matter the judgment of the Court below must be affirmed. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. 6. DIXIT, J. : I agree.