Judgment Jamuar, J. 1. This is a reference from the 1st Additional Sessions Judge of Saran recommending that an order passed by a Magistrate of the first class of Siwan, dated 10th January, 1955 directing the payment of costs under Sec.148(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure be set aside. 2. There was a proceeding before Mr. R, K. P. Sinha, Magistrate, 1st Class, at Chapra under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to a pucca house lying in Holding No. 545 of the Chapra Municipality in Mahalla Dhaiawan of Chapra town. The learned Magistrate disposed of that proceeding by an order which he passed on 16-10-1954. By virtue of a notification, dated 14-10-1954, the learned Magistrate was transferred from the headquarters station of the district of Saran and was posted in the sub-division of Siwan of the same district. In pursuance of that notification, the Magistrate made over charge at Chapra on 16-10-1954, and joined his post at Siwan. While at Siwan two applications were filed before him one on 19-10-1954, and the other on 20-10-1954 with a prayer that he may be pleased to order the payment of costs under Sec.148(3), Criminal P. C., in respect of the proceeding which he had tried at Chapra under Sec.145, Criminal P. C., as, in the final order passed by him. under Sec.145, he had passed no order in respect of costs. The learned Magistrate entertained the applications, and, by his order dated 10-1-1955, he awarded cost of Rs. 500 in favour of Maulavi Farhat Hussain, one of the parties to the proceeding, and he directed : that half of the amount be paid by what he called the first group of the first party, being Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and the fifth party, and the other half by party No. 4 of the first party. 3. Thereupon two applications in revision were made to the Sessions Court as against the order of the Magistrate, dated 10-1-1955, for making a reference to this Court to set aside that order. The learned Sessions Judge, accordingly, has made this reference recommending that that order be set aside on two grounds, which I shall now proceed to consider. 4. The first ground is that Mr. The learned Sessions Judge, accordingly, has made this reference recommending that that order be set aside on two grounds, which I shall now proceed to consider. 4. The first ground is that Mr. R. K. P. Sinha, after having made over charge at Chapra on transfer to Siwan, had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter of awarding costs in the case, and thus his order passed at Siwan directing the payment of coats is illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned Judge has stated that, while at Siwan, the learned Magistrate was not in charge of the case, and, therefore, he could not be competent to pass any order under Section 148, Criminal P. C. 5. It appears from the order passed by the learned Magistrate that he went into the question whether he had jurisdiction to pass the order which he did at Siwan but that all the parties conceded before him that he had such jurisdiction, and thereafter the learned Magistrate proceeded to examine the question whether it was a proper case for passing such an order. 6. Sub-section (3) of Sec.148, Criminal P. C., provides that, when any costs have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under the Code, it is the Magistrate passing a decision under Sec.145, Sec.146 or Sec.147 who may direct by whom such costs shall be paid. Accordingly, it is the Magistrate Who passes the final order under Sec.145. Criminal P. C., who has been empowered to pass an order in respect of costs as well. It was Mr. R. K. P. Sinha, the Magistrate at Chapra, who had made the order under Sec.145 and it would be he alone who would toe entitled to make an order regarding costs. Since this Magistrate had been posted to Siwan later, applications were filed before him to pass orders in respect of costs, and the question now arises whether, while at Siwan, the Magistrate could have jurisdiction to deal with those applications. 7. Since this Magistrate had been posted to Siwan later, applications were filed before him to pass orders in respect of costs, and the question now arises whether, while at Siwan, the Magistrate could have jurisdiction to deal with those applications. 7. Reference may now be made to Sec.12 of the Criminal P. C. By Sub-section (1) of that section, the State Government is empowered to appoint as many persons as it thinks, besides the District Magistrate, to be Magistrates of the first, second or third class in any district outside the presidency towns; and the State Government or the District Magistrate, subject to the control of the State Government may from time to time, define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code. Sub-section (2) of that section provides as follows : "Except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of such persons shall extend throughout such district". In other words, a Magistrate appointed under Sub-section (1) of Sec.12 shall have jurisdiction as well as powers which shall extend throughout the district unless it is otherwise provided by defining the local areas within which such a person may exercise his jurisdiction and his powers. Prom the notification transferring Mr. R. K. Sinha from the headquarters station at Chapra to Siwan, it does not appear that his jurisdiction or his powers had been defined within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Sec.12 of the Code. In the absence of such a definition, therefore, it seems to be clear enough that Mr. B. K. P. Sinha had jurisdiction which would extend throughout the district of Saran. It would then follow that he had powers to entertain the applications which had been filed before him in respect of the awarding of costs under Sec.148(3) of the Code. 8. Mr. Murtaza Pazl Ali, who has appeared against the reference, has cited some decisions in support of his contention that the order of the Magistrate under consideration is a perfectly good order. I may first refer to a case of this Court, Rameshwar Dusadh V/s. King-Emperor, reported in 1 Pat LT 632 : AIR 1920 Pat 25 (A). The facts of this case were shortly these. A proceeding under Sections 110 & 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been drawn up against certain persons. I may first refer to a case of this Court, Rameshwar Dusadh V/s. King-Emperor, reported in 1 Pat LT 632 : AIR 1920 Pat 25 (A). The facts of this case were shortly these. A proceeding under Sections 110 & 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been drawn up against certain persons. This proceeding was directed by the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur to be made over to a first class Magistrate in charge of the Sadar Sub-division. It was, subsequently, withdrawn from the file of this officer by the District Magistrate to his own file under Sec. 528, Criminal P. C., and thereafter transferred under Sec.192 of the Code to the file of the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Madhipura who disposed of the case. The first point raised be ore the High Court was that the Sub-divisional Officer of Madhipura had no jurisdiction in the case, Inasmuch as the petitioners did not reside within the local limits of his sub-division, and it was also contended that the District Magistrate had no power to withdraw the police report from the Subdivisional Officer at the Sadar Sub-division and transfer it to the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Ma. dhipura. Their Lordships who dealt with that case did not think it necessary to consider the latter point. With regard to the first point, they observed as follows: Now this depends upon the Government notification appointing the Magistrate. We have ourselves seen the notification in question and find that the Local Government directed that the Magistrate should have charge of the Madhipura Subdivision, without making any order restricting his general jurisdiction over the whole district of Bhagalpur. Sec.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it competent for the Local Government to define the local limits of the jurisdiction of a particular officer posed to a district, but subject to the limitation so placed the jurisdiction of that officer is not affected over the whole district. Here, although the Magistrate was placed in charge of the Madhipura Sub-division, there is nothing to show what his jurisdiction over the area outside his jurisdiction as a Magistrate of the first class was curtailed. Therefore, no matter how the police report came before the Sub-divisional Magistrate to Madhipura, that Magistrate as a Magistrate of the first class had jurisdiction to take proceedings under Sec.110 of the Code. Therefore, no matter how the police report came before the Sub-divisional Magistrate to Madhipura, that Magistrate as a Magistrate of the first class had jurisdiction to take proceedings under Sec.110 of the Code. Their Lordships said that they were fortified in their views by the decision in Sarat Chunder Roy V/s. Bepin Chandra Roy ILR 29 Cal 389 (B). In this latter case, a Sub-divisional Magistrate had instituted proceedings under Sec.107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and objection was taken to his trying the case, and, in consequence of it, under the orders of the District Magistrate, the case was transferred to a Magistrate not in the sub-division but holding his Court at the headquarters of the district. In the course of the judgment, it was pointed out that Sec.12 Of the Criminal Procedure Code empowered the Local Government to appoint certain persons to be Magistrates of certain classes in the district, and it enabled such Government to define the local limits within which such Magistrates may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may be invested. It was further pointed out that Sub-section (1) of the section empowered the Government to limit the jurisdiction. Consequently, unless the powers of a Magistrate had been restricted to a certain local area, he had jurisdiction over the entire district. 9. In another case, Mt. Chhoti V/s. Khacheru ILR 42 All 649 : AIR 1920 All 177 (2) (C), it was held that, in a case of the kind which I have before me it is not the case of an officer transferred from one district to another district, and that a Magistrate who has been relieved of one sub-division and placed in charge of another sub-division may exercise jurisdiction over the whole district unless his powers and jurisdiction are curtailed by Sub-section (1) of Sec.12 of the criminal P. C. 10. Mr. Ghose, who has appeared in support of the reference, cited some cases in support of his argument that Mr. R. K. P. Sinha, having been transferred from Chapra to Siwan, could not exercise jurisdiction over cases arising within the territorial jurisdiction of a Chapra Magistrate. Those cases do not appear to have considered the effect of Sec.12 of the Criminal P.C. One of the cases cited by Mr. R. K. P. Sinha, having been transferred from Chapra to Siwan, could not exercise jurisdiction over cases arising within the territorial jurisdiction of a Chapra Magistrate. Those cases do not appear to have considered the effect of Sec.12 of the Criminal P.C. One of the cases cited by Mr. Ghose is that of Mahangu Lal V/s. Emperor AIR 1935 Pat 131 (1) (D), where it was held that a Sub-divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sec.107, Criminal P. C., against a person residing outside his jurisdiction. Mr. Murtaza Fazl Ali made reference to another case reported in the same volume at page 436 Rameshwar Pathak V/s. Baijnath Rai AIR 1935 Pat 436 (E), where a similar point arose. In this case, a District Magistrate had transferred a proceeding under Sec.145, Criminal P. C., from one Magistrate to another Magistrate in another sub-division, and some of the subject-matter of the proceeding were outside the sub-division of the latter Magistrate. In that case, in support of the argument that the latter Magistrate could not deal with the proceeding, a case reported in Chelapathi Naidu V/s. Subba Naidu ILR 52 Mad 241 : AIR 1928 Mad 1230 (P) was cited, and this Madras case was also cited before me by Mr. Ghose who, as I have said, appeared in support of the reference. His Lordship who decided the case reported in AIR 1935 Pat 436 (E) preferred to rely upon the case of 1 Pat LT 632 : AIR 1920 Pat 25 (A), just referred to by me. I feel, therefore, that I am bound to follow the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1935 Pat 436 (E), and hold that Mr. R. K. P. Sinha, while at Siwan, had jurisdiction to deal with the application filed before him under Sec.148(3) of the Criminal P. C. 11. Mr. Murtaza Pazl Ali then contended that, in any view of the matter, even if Mr. R. K. P. Sinha, while at Siwan, had jurisdiction to deal with the application filed before him under Sec.148(3) of the Criminal P. C. 11. Mr. Murtaza Pazl Ali then contended that, in any view of the matter, even if Mr. R. K. P. Sinha was wrong in exercising his jurisdiction in dealing with this matter, by reason of the provisions of Sec. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no interference is called for by this Court, Sec. 531 is as follows: No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local areas, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. This section along with some other sections, was considered in the case of Acharja Singh V/s. King-Emperor ILR 15 Pat 418 : AIR 1936 Pat 410 (G) in which a case reported in Ganapathy Chetty V/s. Rex ILR 42 Mad 791 : AIR 1920 Mad 824 (H) was followed. In that case, it was pointed out that the policy of the Criminal Procedure Code as shown by Sections 531 to 538 was "to uphold in most cases the orders passed by the Criminal Court which lacked local jurisdiction or which had committed illegalities or irregularities (?) unless failure of justice." The case reported in ILR 15 Pat 418 : AIR 1936 Pat 410 (G) was a case where an offence under Sec. 420, Indian Penal Code, which was said to have been triable in Ranchi was tried at Monghyr, and their Lordships observed: In our opinion. Sec. 531 is thus a complete answer to the contention that the convictions of the petitioners ought to be set aside because the charges under Sec. 420 may possibly have been triable in Monghyr and not in Ranchi. In the present case before me, no material was placed to show that there had been a failure of justice or that there was likely to be a failure of justice. And the parties had conceded before the Magistrate his jurisdiction. Accordingly, on the decisions placed before me, I am of the view that, even if Mr. In the present case before me, no material was placed to show that there had been a failure of justice or that there was likely to be a failure of justice. And the parties had conceded before the Magistrate his jurisdiction. Accordingly, on the decisions placed before me, I am of the view that, even if Mr. R.K.P. Sinha could not deal with this matter at Siwan, no interference with the order passed by him under Sec.148(3), Criminal P. C., is called for. 12. The only other point upon which this reference was made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was that the order passed under Sec.148(3) was bad, because the learned Magistrate had made no enquiry as to what were the costs incurred in the proceedings and the learned Judge relied upon a ease reported in Hira Mahton V/s. Rajkumar Mahtoa AIR 1922 Pat 564 (I). This case followed the case of Jhaman Mahton V/s. Thakuri Mahton 1 Pat LT 363 : AIR, 1920 Pat 219 (J). Jhaman Mahtons case (J) is the decision of a single Judge, and that was the subject-matter Of consideration in a Division Bench case of this Court Langar Mahton V/s. Radha Mahton AIR 1954 Pat 135 (K) of winch I was a member. It was pointed out that Jhaman Mahtons case (J) could not be considered to be good law under the amended Code of Criminal Procedure. On that reasoning, the case of AIR 1922 Pat 564 (I), on the basis of which this reference has been made, cannot be accepted as a correct decision, in the Division Bench case of this Court AIR 1954 Pat 135 (K), it was pointed out that Sub-section (3) of Sec.148 gives a very wide discretion to the Magistrate for the assessment of amount of costs, and the only restriction which this sub-section appears to place upon the Magistrates discretion is that the costs must be reasonable. It was further pointed out that, on the wordings of Sub-section (3) of Sec.148 of the present Criminal Procedure Code, it cannot be said that an enquiry is necessary for the purpose of finding out as to what were the actual costs incurred for assessing the amount of costs. This ground, therefore, taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also untenable. 13. For the reasons stated above, I find myself unable to accept this reference. This ground, therefore, taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also untenable. 13. For the reasons stated above, I find myself unable to accept this reference. The reference is, accordingly, discharged.