Bapna, J.—This is an application under sec. 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Madho Singh was convicted under sec. 302 of the India Penal Code by the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District, on the 27th February, 1954, and sentenced to transportation for life. He presented an appeal through jail, and it was dismissed under sec. 421 Cr.P.C. on the 14th of May, 1954. Madho Singh has filed the present application on 7th June, 1954, through counsel urging that the appeal be re-heard. In support of the application it was argued by learned counsel for the applicant that the provision of sec. 421 Cr.P.C. was discriminatory and denied equality before the law. and being inconsistent with Art. 14 of the Constitution was void, as declared by Art 13 of the Constitution. 3. Sec. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows: — "(1) On receiving the petition and copy under sec. 419 or sec. 420, the Appellate Court shall peruse the same, and, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily; Provided that no appeal presented under sec. 419 shall be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same. (2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case, but shall not bo bound to do so. It was urged that there was discrimination in the procedure provided for appeals presented by the appellants who were in jail and those who were not in jail. The other discrimination was between appellants whose appeals were presented through pleaders and those who sent them direct through the jail to the Court. It was urged that power to dismiss an appeal summarily without affording a reasonable opportunity to appellant who was in jail, and who might not be able to employ a pleader had no reasonable basis for a classification. It was urged that the position was incongruous, if, for instance, an appeal was presented by an appellant in jail through a pleader, who subsequently withdrew, Such presenilation would be one under sec. 419 Cr.P.C., and the proviso to sec. 421(1) would make it incumbent on the court to give opportunity to the appellant of being heard before dismissal. It was urged that the position was incongruous, if, for instance, an appeal was presented by an appellant in jail through a pleader, who subsequently withdrew, Such presenilation would be one under sec. 419 Cr.P.C., and the proviso to sec. 421(1) would make it incumbent on the court to give opportunity to the appellant of being heard before dismissal. in which case the appellant would have a further opportunity of engaging a lawyer or appearing in person in was presented under sec. 420 Cr.P.C. and the appellant after presentation engaged a pleader, it would still be open to the Court to dismiss the appeal summarily without notice to the appellant or his pleader, because the presentation was not under sec. 419 It was argued that no harm could come to anybody, if notice of hearing of the appeal was, at any rate given to the appellant in jail even at the admission stage, and it would be for the appellant in jail to make arrangement for his representation through a pleader, if his personal attendance may not be considered to be a reasonable expenditure to be incurred by the State. 4. There is no doubt that a distinction has been made between appellants in jall and those outside it, and again as between appellants in jail represented by pleader and those in jail not so represented. The only point for consideration is whether this amounts to a discrimination hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution. The principle underlying sec, 421 Cr.P. is illustrated in Jalam Bharatsingh vs. Emperor (I), and the following observations are relevant. "The Legislature may will have thought that it would occasion serious inconvenience and expense to allow every convicted person who desires to appeal from jail the right to come to the Appellate Court to be heard.. and it would be a serious matter if all such appellants were entitled as of right to insist on being brought at the public expense, often from a jail in a distant part of the presidency......... It was further observed: — "The general rule that no person should be condemned unheard cannot apply to an appeal the righr to which is the creation of statute. It was further observed: — "The general rule that no person should be condemned unheard cannot apply to an appeal the righr to which is the creation of statute. Where a man has already been condemned and deprived of his liberty, it requires, some statutory provision to entitle him to insist upon leaving the place where he is confined and being brought to the place where his appeal is to be heard." 5. Various authorities of the Supreme Court were cited by learned counsel appearing for the parties, but a reference to all these authorities is found in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court to Budhan Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar (2). The principles settled are found in paragraph 5 of that judgment, and may be set out here:— "It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification amout be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to subjects, or occupation, the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Art 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure." 6. It is a obvious that if every person sentenced to jail is to be permitted to appear in court in support of his appeal, elaborate arrangements for safety in transportation and costs have to be made at the expense of the State. It is also obvious that except in rare cases appellant himself would be quite unable to say anything further than what may have been urged by him in his grounds of appeal, and what may be apparent from a perusal of the judgment. It is also obvious that except in rare cases appellant himself would be quite unable to say anything further than what may have been urged by him in his grounds of appeal, and what may be apparent from a perusal of the judgment. It would further involve great delays in the disposal of appeals, for, as observed in the Bombay case cited above, many of the appeals proceed on nothing more substantial than the hope which springs eternal in the human breast." What is, however, more importants is that that section does not fetter the discretion of the Court to send for the appellant and hear him in support of the appeal, in case there appears to be some point in his favour. The direction dismiss the appeal summarily is therefore, vested in the court, and it is a judicial discretion to be exercised. In that view the two illustrations given by learned counsel for the applicant do not create any anomaly, for if an appellant in jail, after filing his appeal though the jail, engages a lawyer, the case can easily be considered as one as if the appeal had been presented through a lawyer, and similarly, if a pleader who has presented an appeal, withdraws, an opportunity would no doubt be given to the appellant to engage another lawyer if he can do so, but if he cannot do so, it would be as good as an unrepresented appeal. The section, however, does not make it incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the appeal without hearing the appellant, and therein lies the key to the validity of the section. The dismissal, if made, would only be done in exercise of the judicial discretion, and would not be one which may be hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution. The observations of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are very relevant : "The judicial decisions must of necessity depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal application of the law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection of law unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional and purpose full discrimination." 7. The contention raised by learned counsel for the applicant has no force, and must be rejected. 8. The contention raised by learned counsel for the applicant has no force, and must be rejected. 8. The second prayer for re-hearing the appeal for the ends of justice may now be taken up. The applicant was sentenced by the learned Sessions Judge on 27th February, 1924, and his appeal was dismissed on 14th May, 1954. There was some difference of opinion among the High Courts as to whether an appeal dismissed under sec. 420 was a bar to the hearing of a regular appeal by counsel later on, but the point was thoroughly thousand out by the Pat. High Court in Pem Mahton vs. Emperor (3). It was held that the High Court had no power to entertain an appeal from a conviction and sentence passed on the appellant after the dismissal of the appeal, which he preferred from jail. With great respect we agree with the view expressed therein, which also finds support in Jodha vs. Emperor(4). As regards a rehearing, sec. 369 read with sec. 424 Cr.P.C. bars a re-hearing unless the previous hearing may have been done under circumstances which may invalidate such hearing. None such mistake has been pointed out. The judgment which was delivered by this Court is final and cannot be reviewed on the ground urged that the appellant was in jail and was not intimated of the date of hearing.