( 1 ) THIS is a second appeal preferred by the appellants defendants 1 and 2 against the judgment and decree of the learned subordinate Judge, Mandya, in Begular Appeal No. 41 of 1949-50 confirming those of the learned Munsiff, Srirangapatna, in original Suit No. 97 of 1948-49. ( 2 ) THE facts that have given rise to this appeal are briefly as follows: the respondent was the plaintiff and the appellants were defendants 1 and 2 in the lower Court. Plaintiff's suit was for a declaration of his title to the schedule property, for possession and for the recovery of mesne profits. Admittedly the schedule land is the joint family property of one Javarappa who is said to have died during the early part of 1935. He left two widows by name Boramma (who is the 2nd appellant in this case) and another Lakahmidevamma, a son (defendant 1,) and a daughter Kempamma, both born of the 2nd defendant, and a widowed mother who was also known as Boramma. Javarappa's mother Boramma and his daughter Kempamma are also stated to be dead. It is alleged that Javarappa's mother Boramma had a sister also by name Boramma, The latter Boramma is said to have died leaving a son by name Venkatappa who is examined as P. W. 8 and a daughter whose husband is stated to be thimmiah the present plaintiff. It is further alleged that venkatappa had a son by name Srinivasiah whose wife is said to be one Gowramma. The said Srinivasiah is said to have died in the year 1947 leaving his widow the above mentioned gowramma. ( 3 ) THE case for the plaintiff is that after the death of javarappa, an agreement was arrived at among his two widows, of whom the 2nd defendant is one, his mother Boramma and his son the first defendant, and that the said agreement resulted in a family arrangement evidenced by a registered deed of settlement, of date 12-8-1935, which is marked as Exhibit A in the case. ( 4 ) IT is stated that the schedule property was given to Javarappa's mother Boramma who is said to have been put in possession of the said property in pursuance of the deed of settlement. It is also stated that Javarappa's mother Boramma gifted the schedule property under Ext. ( 4 ) IT is stated that the schedule property was given to Javarappa's mother Boramma who is said to have been put in possession of the said property in pursuance of the deed of settlement. It is also stated that Javarappa's mother Boramma gifted the schedule property under Ext. B. on 4-10-1935 in favour of Srinivasiab, son of Venkatappa; Srinivasiah is said to have died subsequently leaving his widow Gowramma. The contention of the plaintiff is that the property after the death of Srinivasiah passed on to his widow Gowramma, that the said Gowramma subsequently underwent a second marriage on 14-12-1947, as a result of which she became divested of the schedule property by virtue of section 6 of the Mysore Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1938, that thereafter the schedule property reverted to Venkatappa, the sole heir of Srinivasiah, that the plaintiff purchased the schedule property from Venkatappa under the sale deed Ext. D, that he was further put in possession, that he was subsequently dispossessed by the defendants and that he was entitled to a declaration that he was the owner of the schedule property entitled to possession. ( 5 ) THE defendants' contention was that they were not aware of the deed of settlement, that the same was nominal and fraudulent which was brought about to defraud the 1st defendant who was a minor at that time, that the deed of settlement is not for the benefit of the minor, that the same was not binding on him, that the defendants have been in possession of the property in their own right and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. ( 6 ) THAT the schedule land once belonged to the defendants family is admitted by the plaintiff but his case is, as mentioned above, that in a family settlement evidenced by Ext. A this property was given to Javarappa's mother Boramma, that she gifted the same to Shnivasiah, after whose death he (plaintiff) purchased the same from his father Venkatappa who had acquired good title to the suit property as a result of his daughter-in-law, i. e. , Sreenivasiah's wife, having re-married. A this property was given to Javarappa's mother Boramma, that she gifted the same to Shnivasiah, after whose death he (plaintiff) purchased the same from his father Venkatappa who had acquired good title to the suit property as a result of his daughter-in-law, i. e. , Sreenivasiah's wife, having re-married. As against this, the contention urged on the side of the defendants is that the family settlement is not binding on the 1st defendant who was then a minor, that the 1st defendant continued to be the owner of the suit property even after the alleged deed of settlement and that the plaintiff has acquired no title to the property under the sale deed executed by Venkatappa. ( 7 ) SO far as the contention of the defendants that Ext. A, the deed of settlement, is not binding on them is concerned, I am of opinion that there is no substance in it. Both the Courts below have found on facts that the deed of settlement is true, that it was for the benefit of tbe 1st defendant and that 'the same is binding on him. From a perusal of the judgment and the evidence on record, I am convinced that the Courts below have well appreciated the evidence. There are concurrent findings against the defendants in this behalf and I find no grounds to disturb them. ( 8 ) MOREOVER the evidence fully justifies the findings of the Courts below. P. W. 1 is the writer of Ext. A and P. W. 2 its attestor ; p. W. 3 is a witness who has identified the executant before the sub-Registrar. These have sworn to the genuineness of Ext. A. Even the second defendant who is a party to Ext. A has admitted execution of the same though she does not support the plaintiff's case in other respects. The contention urged on the side of the defendants that Ext. A was brought about by fraud is negatived by the evidence of D. W. 5 inasmuch as she does not give the details of fraud. It is also seen from her evidence that after this arrangement was arrived at, Boramma herself was taking the crop of the schedule land. Therefore it is clear that Ext. A was given effect to and that the parties acted on it. It is also seen from her evidence that after this arrangement was arrived at, Boramma herself was taking the crop of the schedule land. Therefore it is clear that Ext. A was given effect to and that the parties acted on it. None of the witnesses examined on the side of the defendants is an attestor of Ext. A. D. W. 4 is no other than the 1st defendant and he knows nothing about the transaction, he having been a minor on the date of Ext. A. D. W. 5 is the 2nd defendant. I have already referred to her evidence. ( 9 ) IT appears to me that, as between the evidence adduced on plaintiff's' side and the defendants' the former has to be preferred to the latter. Both the lower Courts have found on facts against the defendants and I agree with their findings in this behalf. ( 10 ) THE genuineness of Ext. B, the gift deed, and Ext D, the sale deed, is not seriously disputed. P. Ws. 1 and 8 nave sworn to the genuineness of Ext. B and Ext. D the sale deed has also been proved. It is not the case for the defendants that these documents are not real but their contention is that they are not aware of these transactions. In view of this defence, I think that the evidence on record in support of the genuineness of these documents is sufficient to conclude that the same are genuine and supported by consideration. ( 11 ) THE point that arises for consideration is as to the nature of the title Gowramma got in her husband's estate after his death i. e. , whether she acquired a limited or life estate or an absolute one. Whatever might have been the position previously, the law as at present is not uniform on the question whether a widow takes only a life estate or an absolute one in her husband's property. At any rate, in this State the law on this point is different from that in force in some of the other States in the indian Union. At any rate, in this State the law on this point is different from that in force in some of the other States in the indian Union. It is, no doubt, true, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, that a widow takes only a limited estate known as a widow's estate in her husband's property as enunciated under the pure Hindu Law, but some inroads appear to have been made by subsequent legislative enactments having regard to the changed needs and conditions. Such a change in hindu Law has been effected in this State by enacting Act X of 1933. ( 12 ) SECTION 10 of the said Act defines what Stridhana is. Section 10 (g) provides that'what a female inherits in her deceased husband's estate is her Stridhana in the absence of a daughter or a daughter's son of the propositus. According to this section, after the death of her husband, a female gets an absolute right in her husband's property when he dies without leaving a daughter or a daughter's son. In this case, it is admitted that Gowramma's husband Srinivasiah died during the early part of 1917 without leaving any issues and that he is survived only by his widow Gowramma. Act X of 1933 came into force in the year 1934. So, Gowramma, widow of Srinivasiah became entitled to the benefit of this Act. Therefore it is clear that Gowramma got an absolute estate in her husband's property after her husband's death. ( 13 ) THE contention urged on the side of the respondent-plaintiff is that Ggwramma has subsequently married another person, that under section 6 of the Mysore Hindu Widows Re-marriage act, she became divested of her deceased husband's estate that vested in her after his death, that the property passed to Venkatappa, the next heir of Gowramma's deceased husband, and that the sale effected by Venkatappa under Ext. D must be held quite valid. As against this contention, it was urged on the side of the appellants that the property of her deceased husband became vested in her as her ' Stridhana ' property and that the property once vested could not be divested. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on two decisions of the Madras High Court bangam Reddi v. Mangammal, (1946) 2 M. L. J. 377 and Lakshmi Ammal v. Thangavel Asari, AIR, 1953 Mad. 977. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on two decisions of the Madras High Court bangam Reddi v. Mangammal, (1946) 2 M. L. J. 377 and Lakshmi Ammal v. Thangavel Asari, AIR, 1953 Mad. 977. It is no doubt, true that in those cases section 2 of Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act as in force in the Indian union, which corresponds to section 6 of the Mysore Act, has been interpreted. In the first case, it is held that section 2 of the central Act has no effect on property belonging to a widow absolutely on the date of re-marriage. The same view has been adopted in the subsequent case, and it has been held that the interest contemplated by section 2 of the Hindu Widows Be-marriage Act (as in force in Madras) is confined or limited to the life time of the widow and that it does not apply to an absolute interest legally acquired by the widow. I am of opinion that these decisions cannot be of any avail to the appellant. ( 14 ) SECTION 6 of the Mysore Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act provides thus : all rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to re-marry, only a limited interest in such property with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her re-marriage cease and determine as if she had then died ; and the nest heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same. ( 15 ) THERE is no warrant for the proposition that the interest or the right that a widow acquires in her husband's property by inheritance is only a limited one. The word ' inheritance ' has been used without any qualification in the section. Therefore a limited construction cannot be placed on that word. Hence the right or the interest that a widow acquires in her husband's property may be either limited or absolute. This should depend upon other considerations. The word ' inheritance ' has been used without any qualification in the section. Therefore a limited construction cannot be placed on that word. Hence the right or the interest that a widow acquires in her husband's property may be either limited or absolute. This should depend upon other considerations. If the law governing the parties confers an absolute estate in such property, the interest or right created would be an absolute one : if, on the other hand, the law creates only a limited interest in the widow then such interest or right will be a limited or life estate. In this case, as mentioned before, gowramma the widow of Srinivasiah, got an absolute estate in her husband's property by virtue of section 10 of the Hindu Law women's Bights Act. ( 16 ) THE principle enunciated in the two Madras cases to which a reference has been made cannot be applied to the facts of the present case inasmuch as there was no Act corresponding to mysore Act X of 1933 in Madras at the time when these cases were decided. Sub-section 3 of section 3 of the Hindu Women's rights to Property Act provides that any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of that Act shall be a limited interest known as "hindu Woman's estate". Therefore, their lordships of the Madras High Court in propounding the principle in the two cases referred to above could not but hold that the interest created in favour of a widow in her husband's property was only a limited one and that section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage act contemplated only a limited interest and not an absolute one. They did not visualise an instance where a widow got an absolute estate in her husband's property by inheritance. ( 17 ) FURTHER, in the two cases of the Madras High Court their lordships were not dealing with any interest or right created by inheritance. In the first cape, the widow's claim for maintenance was satisfied by settling on her by her husband's brother certain property absolutely with powers of alienation and his Lordship mr. Justice Rajamannar (as he then was) hold that the estate which was conferred on the widow was an absolute one not liable to forfeiture on her re-marriage. In the second case, his Lordship mr. Justice Rajamannar (as he then was) hold that the estate which was conferred on the widow was an absolute one not liable to forfeiture on her re-marriage. In the second case, his Lordship mr. Justice Subba Rao (as he then was) was dealing with a right or interest created in favour of a widow under a compromise decree. ( 18 ) A distinction should be made between the nature of the interest created in a widow in pursuance of an agreement between herself and others, whoever it may be, and the nature of an interest created by operation of law because, in the former case, the agreement or settlement between the widow and others may itself be a foundation of a new root of title and the interest created will be an absolute interest ; and in the latter case, it may be either limited or absolute according to the law governing the parties. ( 19 ) THEREFORE the only other question that remains for consideration is whetlier an absolute interest created in a widow in her husband's property divests itself as a result of re-marriage. So the point that arises for consideration in this case is whether the interest created in favour of Gowramma after her husband's death became divested as a result of her re-marriage. It is conceded on both sides that Gowramma has undergone a second marriage after her former husband's death (vide the testimony of P. W. 7 her 2nd husband ). The contention urged on the side of the appellants was that the property of her deceased husband became vested in Gowramma as soon as he died, that under Act X of 1933 the said property became the " stridhana " of Gowramma, that Section 6 of Hindu Widows Ee-marriage Act has not the effect of divesting an absolute estate already vested, that Gowramma continues to be the owner of the property and that Venkatappa had no right to alienate the property under exhibit D. Therefore the point that arises for decision is whether Section 6 of Hindu Widows Ee-marriage Act has the effect of divesting property which is absolutely vested in a widow. There can be 110 doubt that Gowramma became entitled to the property left by her husband immediately after his death because inheritance can never be kept in abeyance. There can be 110 doubt that Gowramma became entitled to the property left by her husband immediately after his death because inheritance can never be kept in abeyance. It is also true that under the pure Hindu Law an estate once vested in a person cannot be divested except either by the birth of a preferable heir, such as a son or a daughter who was conceived at the time of his death or by adoption m certain cases of a son to the deceased. Section 6 of the Hindu Widows Ee-marriage Act must be taken as au additional exception to this general rule of hindu Law. To accept the proposition that the property inherited by a widow from her husband cannot be divested even after heare-rnarriage would lead to certain anomalies which are highly repugnant to the principles of Hindu Law. ( 20 ) IT is well settled that a Hindu widow forfeits her right to her deceased husband's property by re-marriage. Except the allahabad High Court, the rest of the High Courts in the Indian union have fallen in line in laying down the above principle. The Courts have gone to the extent of holding that the forfeiture enacted in Section 2 of the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act (Central Act) applies even to cases where a re-marriage takes place in pursuance of a custom prevailing in the community to which the parties belong. It is so held in Ganapathi Naid v. Jeevammal, A. I. R. 1929 MAD. 765. This is also the view taken by the Nagpur, bombay, Patna and Calcutta High Courts in their decisions in manabai v. Mt. Chandanbai, A. I. R. 1954 Nag. 284, patna Appa Patil v. Sakhu Daitu Gharal, A. I. R. 1954 Bom. 315 Suraj Jote Euer v. Attar Kumari, I. L. R. 1922 PAT. 378, and matungini Gupta v. Bam Button Boy, I. L. R. 19 Cal. 289. (F. B) respectively. Even this Court has taken the same view in Setty Gowda v. Maka, 13 Mys. C. C. R. 70. ( 21 ) THUS it is seen that the weight of judicial authority is in favour of the view that by re-marriage a widow forfeits her right to her deceased husband's property both under the pure Hindu Law and also under Section 6 of the Mysore Hindu Widows Remarriage act corresponding to Section 2 of the Centra] Act. ( 21 ) THUS it is seen that the weight of judicial authority is in favour of the view that by re-marriage a widow forfeits her right to her deceased husband's property both under the pure Hindu Law and also under Section 6 of the Mysore Hindu Widows Remarriage act corresponding to Section 2 of the Centra] Act. I am of opinion that even an absolute interest created in her husband's property in favour of a widow should get itself divested on re-marriage. In appreciating this proposition, we have to understand the principle underlying the widow's right to succession to her husband's property. ( 22 ) APART from the Act, a widow's right to succession is under the Hindu Law based on the ground that she is half of the body of her deceased husband and that she is capable of conferring spiritual benefit on him. When she re-marries she ceases to be half body of her deceased husband and to be able to confer spiritual benefit on him inasmuch as she becomes the wife and half body of her new husband. In other words, a widow's right to succession is recognised under the Hindu Law not because of the past relationship existing between the widow and her deceased husband, not even because that she was once the wife of the deceased, but because of the continuance of the relationship. ( 23 ) THUS it is seen that a widow's right to inheritance of her husbands property is founded on the view that she is the surviving half of her husband. In this connection, I may refer to Vitta thayaramma v. Chatakondu Sivaiyya, I. L. E. 41 Mad. 1078 (F. B ). Matungini Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy, I. L. R. 19 Cal. 289 (F. B ). and Rama Appa Patil v. Sakhv Dattu Gharal, A. I. R. 1954 Bom. 315. These decisions have enunciated the proposition just adverted to. Keeping this principle in mind, we will proceed to consider whether there is any justification for holding that a widow on re-marriage does not incur forfeiture of her absolute interest in her deceased husband's estate. I am of the view that there is absolutely no justification to uphold this proposition. 315. These decisions have enunciated the proposition just adverted to. Keeping this principle in mind, we will proceed to consider whether there is any justification for holding that a widow on re-marriage does not incur forfeiture of her absolute interest in her deceased husband's estate. I am of the view that there is absolutely no justification to uphold this proposition. When as a result of re-marriage a widow ceases to be the wife of her former husband and when she also ceases to be able to confer spiritual benefit on him and when she becomes the wife of another man, it is against all principles of hindu Law that she should be allowed to retain her interest, whatever it may be, in her first husband's property. In this connection, I would like to refer to the view taken by the author of the " Hindu Law in Bharat. " At page 56 the learned author opines that in Mysore even the full estate that a widow inherits from her husband or his lenial successors becomes extinguished and passes on to the next heir of the last male holder on her re-marriage. I think this view is quite in consonance with section 6 of the Hindu Widows Ee-marriage Act and the general principles of the Hindu Law. Therefore the law, so far as this state is concerned, may be laid down to be that a widow on re-marriage forfeits all interest, either limited or absolute, both in movable and immovable properties, inherited from her husband. ( 24 ) FOR these various reasons, I am of opinion that the absolute interest created in favour of Gowramma in her husband's property after his death, became extinguished or forfeited as a result of her re-marriage. I think that the appellants cannot succeed. ( 25 ) IN the result, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate judge are confirmed and this appeal stands dismissed. As the decision in this case rested on the interpretation of certain legal provisions, I direct the parties to bear their own costs in this court. --- *** --- .