Wanchoo, C.J.—This is an application by Firm Rasulji Buxji Kathawala against the Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi, and the Seventh Additional Income Tax Officer, Ajmer, holding his office at Udaipur, and also designated as Income Tax Officer, A Ward, Udaipur, under Art. 226 of the Consitution, for a writ in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order. 2. The case of the applicant is that it is a registered firm carrying on business of manufacturing and selling Kattha at Udaipur. The Income-Tax Officer, Ajmer, served a notice on the applicant on the 19th of March, 1954, under sec. 34 of the Income Tax Act calling upon him to make a return of his income for the assessment year 1945-46 on the ground that certain income had escaped assessment. The proceedings were later transferred to the Income-Tax Officer, A Ward, Udaipur, who was also designated as Seventh Additional Income Tax Officer. Ajmer. In pursuance of this notice, the applicant filed his return on the 10th March, 1955. At the same time, he took the objection that the Income Tax Officer Ajmer, who had issued the notice under sec. 34, had no jurisdiction to do so, and therefore, no proceedings could be taken against him, The Income tax Officer overruled this objection, and proceeded to assess the applicant, and actually passed assessment order on the 15th of March, 1955, by which the applicant was ordered to pay Rs. 94,098/- as income-tax. It may be mentioned that the applicant has filed an appeal against this order which is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. He has also come to this Court under Art. 226 at the same time, and prays that this Court should interfere on three main grounds, namely— (1) that the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer, who issued the notice, had no jurisdiction under sec. 64 of the Income-tax Act to issue such a notice to the applicant ; (2) that it was incumbent on the Income-tax Officer to refer the dispute as to the place of assessment under sec. 64 of the Income-tax Act to issue such a notice to the applicant ; (2) that it was incumbent on the Income-tax Officer to refer the dispute as to the place of assessment under sec. 64(3) of the Income tax Act, and as that was not done, the Income tax Officer could not proceed further ; and (3) that there was no income-tax in Mewar in 1945-46, and the Income-tax Act, 1922 did not apply to the State of Mewar, and consequently the applicant was not liable to pay income tax on the income accrued to him in the year 1945-46. 3. The application has been opposed on behalf of the opposite parties, and their main pleas with respect to these three points are that the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer, had jurisdiction to issue the notice and that, in any case, the objection as to jurisdiction had to be raised at the latest by the 1st of May, 1954, which was the date on which the applicant had to file his return according to the notice issued to him, and as that was not done, that objection could not be entertained in view of the second proviso to sec. 64(3) It is also urged that as the applicant did not raise his objection as to the jurisdiction of that particular Income-tax Officer within time, it was not incumbent upon him to refer the question of jurisdiction to the Income tax Commissioner under sec. 64(3). Further, it is urged that the question whether the applicant is chargeable with income-tax amounts to a denial of his liability to be assessed under the Act, and he could file an appeal under sec 30 of the Income-tax Act, and he has done so. This Court therefore should not at this stage exercise its extraordinary powers in favour of the applicant. 4. We shall first consider the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer, who issued notice under sec. 34. Sec. 64 provides for the place of assessment, and when the applicant is raising the question of jurisdiction, he is relying on the provisions of sec. 64. Sub sec. (1) of sec. 4. We shall first consider the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer, who issued notice under sec. 34. Sec. 64 provides for the place of assessment, and when the applicant is raising the question of jurisdiction, he is relying on the provisions of sec. 64. Sub sec. (1) of sec. 64 provides that where an assessee carries on a business, profession or vocation at any place, he shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which that place is situate, or, where the business, profession or vocation is carried on in more places than one, by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which the principal place of his business, profession or vocation is situate. Sub-sec. (2) provides that in all other cases an assessee shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which he resides. Sub-sec. (5) (b) provides that the provisions of sub sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) shall not apply where by any direction given or any distribution or allocation of work made by the Commissioner of Income-tax under sub-sec, (5) of sec. 5, of in consequence of any transfer made under sub-sec. (7-A) of sec. 5. a particular Income-tax Officer has been charged with the function of assessing that assessee. The case of the Income tax Department is that notice was issued to the applicant by the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer, by virtue of a notification under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 5. We do not think it necessary for present purposes to consider whether the Income-tax Officer Ajmer, could issue a notice to the applicant under sec. 34 by virtue of the notification which has been issued under sec. 5 (5). The reason for this is that the applicant is barred from raising the question of the place of assessment (this is what he means by saying that the Income tax Officer, Ajmer, had no jurisdiction to issue notice to him) by the second proviso to sec. 64 (3). It is therefore, necessary to set out sec. 5 (5). The reason for this is that the applicant is barred from raising the question of the place of assessment (this is what he means by saying that the Income tax Officer, Ajmer, had no jurisdiction to issue notice to him) by the second proviso to sec. 64 (3). It is therefore, necessary to set out sec. 64(3) which is as follows— "Where any question arises under this section as to the place of assessment, such question shall be determined by the Commissioner, or, where the question is between places in more States than one, by the Commissioners concerned, or, if they are not in agreement, by the Central Board of Revenue: Provided that, before any such question is determined, the assessee shall have had an opportunity of representing bis views: Provided further that the place of assessment shall not be called in question by an assessee if he has made a r turn in response to the notice under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 22 and has stated therein the principal place wherein he carries on his business, profession or occasion, or if he has not made such a return shall not be called in question after the expiry of the time allowed by the notice under sub-sec. (2) of set. 22 or under sec. 34 for the making of a return: Provided further that if the place of assessment is called in question by an assessee the Income-tax Officer shall, if not satisfied with the correctness of the claim, refer the matter for determination under this sub-section before assessment is made." 5. Shorn of the involved language in which this sub-section appears, the provisions which it makes are these— (1) If any dispute arises as to the place of assessment, such question shall be determined not by the Income-tax Officer, but by the Commissioner, or other higher authority. (2) The Income-tax Officer may accept the contention that the place of assessment is not within his circle. If he does not accept this contention, he has to refer the matter to the Commissioner or other higher authority. (3) The Commissioner or other higher authority must give a hearing to the assessee before deciding any matter referred to him about the place of assessment. (4) The objection as to the place of assessment cannot be made at all if the assessee, in response to a general notice under sec. (3) The Commissioner or other higher authority must give a hearing to the assessee before deciding any matter referred to him about the place of assessment. (4) The objection as to the place of assessment cannot be made at all if the assessee, in response to a general notice under sec. 22(1), has filed a return, and has stated therein the principal place wherein he carries on his business, profession or vocation. But where an assessee makes no return under sec. 22(1) in response to a general notice, but has received, what we may call a special notice under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 22, or under sec. 34, the place of assessment can only be called in question up to the time mentioned in the notice under sec. 22(2), or sec. 34 for making a return, and not thereafter. 6. In this case, the assessee did not file any return in response to the general notice under section 22(1), and therefore his case is governed by the second part of the second proviso, which lays down that where an assessee has received a notice under sec. 34, and wants to take an objection as to the place of assessment, he must do so before the period fixed in the notice for making a return expires. In this case, the assessee received a notice under sec. 34 and was allowed time up to the 1st of May, 1954 to make a return. He has, therefore, the right to object to the place of assessment up to the 1st of May, 1934. If he did not object to the place of assessment till then, the second part of the second proviso bars any such objection. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the applicant did not object to the place of assessment (or what he calls the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer) within the time allowed. He could not, therefore be heard to object to the place of assessment (or what he calls the jurisdiction of the Income tax Officer, Ajmer) after that date. His objection, therefore, as to the place of assessment in March, 1955, was barred by the second part of the second proviso. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, was not bound to refer the question to the Commissioner or higher authority under the third proviso. 7. His objection, therefore, as to the place of assessment in March, 1955, was barred by the second part of the second proviso. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, was not bound to refer the question to the Commissioner or higher authority under the third proviso. 7. It seems to us that the intention of the legislature in making these provisions was that the place of assessment should only be called in question in a limited class of cases and within a limited time, and if it was not called in question within that time, the objection as to the place of assessment could not be taken at all. This is based on the principle that it makes no difference, provided a man is assessable, whether he is assessed by Income-tax Officer at place A or Income-tax Officer at place B, and that if he wants to object to his assessment at a particular place he must do so within a very limited time. If he fails to do so within that limited time, he would not be heard to object to the place of assessment. 8. As the applicant did not object as to the place of assessment within the time allowed to him, he cannot be heard to raise the question of place of assessment at all in view of the second proviso to sec. 64(3). In this state of affairs, we do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the notification under sec. 5, sub-sec. (5), under which the Income-tax Officer, Ajmer, is said to have given notice to the applicant, does really confer power on the Income-tax Officer to assess the applicant. If the applicant had any objection that the Income tax Officer Aimers office was not the place of assessment for him, he should have taken that objection on or before the 1st of May, 1954, and as he did not do so, he is barred from raising that objection for ever, and cannot raise it as a ground in support of an application for a writ under Art. 226. We are, therefore, of opinion that in view of the second proviso to sec. 64(3), the applicant cannot raise any objection as to the place of assessment and his writ application based on the plea as to the place of assessment (which he calls the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer. Ajmer) must fail. 9. We are, therefore, of opinion that in view of the second proviso to sec. 64(3), the applicant cannot raise any objection as to the place of assessment and his writ application based on the plea as to the place of assessment (which he calls the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer. Ajmer) must fail. 9. We may in this connection refer to a number of cases in support of the view we have taken of the second proviso to sec. 64(3). 10. In Wallace Brothers & Co., Ltd., vs. Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay, Sind and Baluchistan (1), the Federal Court has held that the determination of the proper place of assessment is a matter more of administrative convenience than of jurisdiction, and in any event it is not one for adjudication by the Court; and the scheme of the Act does not contemplate an objection as to the place of assessment being raised on an appeal against the assessment after the assessment has bean made. 11. In Talchar Sabai Grass Trading Company Ltd., vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa(2), the Patna High Court has held that under sec. 64 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the question as to the place of assessment has to be determined before the assessment is made. An objection as to the place of assessment cannot be raised for the first time on appeal against the assessment after the assessment has been made. Where no objection to the place of assessment or to the assessing officer was raised by an assessee before the income-tax Officer, the appellate authorities would be entitled to overrule the attempt of the assessee to raise it after the assessment had been made. 12. In U.C. Rakhi vs. Income-tax Officer 1st "F" Ward, New Delhi(3), the Punjab High Court held that "the place of assessment of an assessee is a matter which under see 64 of the Indian Income-tax Act is to be decided by the Income-tax Commissioner, and not by the Courts". 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant relied on Dayaldas Kushiram vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Certral (4). It is enough to say that is not a case in which the second proviso to sec. 64(3) was applicable. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant relied on Dayaldas Kushiram vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Certral (4). It is enough to say that is not a case in which the second proviso to sec. 64(3) was applicable. We may say with respect that we have doubts about the correctness of that decision; but assuming it to be correct, that case has no application to the present case where the second proviso to sec. 64(3) applies with full force. 14. Learned counsel for the applicant also referred to The King vs. Commissioners for General Purposes of the Incomr-tax for Kensington (5), on the question of the jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer. It is enough to say that the law in England is apparently different and there is nothing analogous to the second proviso to sec. 64 (3) there. 15. A review of these authorities only confirms us in the decision at which we have arrived. It is enough to say that there is no difference in principle whether the objection as to the place of assessment is raised in appeal or before the Income-tax Officer, but after the time fixed in the second proviso to sec. 64 (3) has expired. In either case the objection is not entertain able, and the place of assessment cannot be questioned. 16. Then we come to the last point raised on behalf of the applicant, namely that he is not liable to income-tax under the Act. So far that is concerned, it is enough to say that the applicant has already been assessed. He has a remedy by way of appeal under sec. 30 of the Income-tax Act in so far as he denies his liability or raises other objections as to the amount of the tax assessed on him and so on. He has already filed an appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer, which is still pending. We are of opinion that, in such circumstances, we should not intervene at this stage. The Income-tax Act provides remedies against wrong assessment There is first an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under sec. 30. Then there is an appeal from the Assistant Appellate Commissioner to the Appellate Tribunal under sec. 33. We are of opinion that, in such circumstances, we should not intervene at this stage. The Income-tax Act provides remedies against wrong assessment There is first an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under sec. 30. Then there is an appeal from the Assistant Appellate Commissioner to the Appellate Tribunal under sec. 33. Thereafter, if an assessee is dissatisfied with the decision of the Appellate Tribunal on any question of law, he can apply to the Tribunal to refer the question of law to the High Court under sec. 66. The Appellate Tribunal can then state a case to the High Court. If the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state a case to the High Court, the assessee can apply to the High Court also under sec. 66 to direct the Appellate Tribunal to state a case. It seems to us highly improper that we should intervene at this stage when an assessment has been made by the Income-tax Officer and when so many remedies are open to the applicant, and he has not exhausted them. 17. It was contended on behalf of the applicant that as this case raises the question of jurisdiction, and a writ of prohibition will have to issue, we should not refuse to issue such a writ simply because there are other remedies open to the applicant. It is enough to sty that the applicant cannot in view of the provisions of sec. 64(3), second proviso, raise any objection as to the place of assessment which is the only question of jurisdiction that he has raised in this case. In these circumstances, there is. in our opinion, no reason for us to intervene at this stage when there are so many remedies still open to the applicant under the Income- tax Act. Nor does it seem desirable on general principle to intervene in the middle like this when other remedies are undoubtedly open to the applicant. 18. Learned counsel for the applicant drew our attention to Himmatlal Harilal Mehta vs. Stale of Madhya Pradesh (6), and relies on the following observations in that case at page 406 by their Lordships while referring to the State of Bombay Vs. The Untied Motors (India) Ltd. (7). 18. Learned counsel for the applicant drew our attention to Himmatlal Harilal Mehta vs. Stale of Madhya Pradesh (6), and relies on the following observations in that case at page 406 by their Lordships while referring to the State of Bombay Vs. The Untied Motors (India) Ltd. (7). "There it was held that the principle that a Court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available could not apply where a party came to the court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under Art. 226 Moreover the remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and burdensome character. Before the appellant can avid of it he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax. Such a provision can hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy." Learned counsel urges that in this case also he has to deposit the tax in case he pursues his remedy under the Income-tax Act, and therefore, that is not an adequate alternative remedy. It is also urged that he is being deprived of his money by being forced to pay this income tax, and therefore his fundamental right to hold his property is being jeopardized. 19. We are of opinion that these observations must be taken in conjunction with the facts in Himmatlal Harilal Mehtas case(6). In that case, it was held that a certain provision of the G. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act was ultra vires. In spite of that the Nagpur High Court refused to grant a writ on the ground that an alternative remedy was available under the Act itself. The Supreme Court did not agree with this in the circumstances that case. They were of the view that the right of the applicant to carry on a trade was affected by the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. They further held that the Act provided for deposit of the tax before appealing, and that was onerous. The Income-tax makes no such provision for deposit of the tax before an appeal could be filed. Further, it cannot be said that merely because the applicant has to pay a tax, and is being deprived of his money, and therefore his fundamental right is being affected. The Income-tax makes no such provision for deposit of the tax before an appeal could be filed. Further, it cannot be said that merely because the applicant has to pay a tax, and is being deprived of his money, and therefore his fundamental right is being affected. Further, in that case, the Nagpur High Court held that a certain provision of the law was ultra vires, and still refused to give relief which properly followed from such declaration. That in our opinion, is the important circumstance which distinguishes Himmatlal Harilal Mehtas case(6). The applicant has not contended before us that any part of the Income-tax Act is ultra vires, and in consequence he is entitled to any remedy. It would have been a different matter it we had held that any part of the Income-tax Act was ultra vires, for in that case we would give relief to the applicant as it is not possible for authorities constituted under the Income-tax Act to give him relief by holding any part of the Act ultra vires. But where as in this case no part of the Act is being attacked, there is, in our opinion, no justification tor us to intervene at this stage when other remedies which are not necessarily onerous are still open to the applicant under the Act. We, therefore, refuse to intervene at this stage in this case, and leave it to the applicant to pursue his remedies under the Income-tax Act so far as the question of his chargeability to income-tax under the Act, or other matters are concerned. 20. The application is hereby dismissed with one set of costs to the opposite parties.