Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing an order of the State Government and the proceedings pursuant thereto and other allied reliefs. The petitioners are Sister Mary Aloysious D.M., Superior of the Convent of the Daughters of Mary, at Adoor in Kunnathur Taluk, and Sister Mary Fancesca D.M., Superior of the Convent of the Daughters of Mary, at Anchel in Pathanapuram Taluk. 2. For arrears of tax due to the Government, 32 acres of land comprised in S. No. 1398/14A-16/1 of Kaliyil Pakuthy, Vilavancode Taluk, was sold in auction under the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, I of 1068, by the Tahsildar of Vilavancode on 24.4.1109 M.E. (9.12.1933 A.D.) and one Sivaswamy Nadar purchased the same at the revenue auction. In 1112 Sivaswamy Nadar sold the said land to Rev. Fr. Joseph Kuzhignalil, hereinafter referred to as Fr. Joseph, who is the founder of the two Convents of which the petitioners are the Superiors. According to the Petitioners after purchasing the property from Sivaswamy Nadar, Fr. Joseph effected improvements in it and the total value of the improvements effected by him would be Rs. 16,000 at present. More than thirteen years after the revenue auction sale counter-petitioner 1, Madhavan Pillai Kumara Pillai, who is a son of the original pattadar, filed a petition, referred to here-in-after as the first revision petition, on 17.6.1122 M.E. (30.1.1947 A.D.) before the Dewan of Travancore under S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act for setting aside the said sale. After the integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin and the constitution of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue the revision petition was heard by the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue under S.6 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance II of 1950, and was dismissed by the Board on 17.2.1950 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Ext. A is a copy of the order of the Board. Shortly after this order Fr. Joseph executed a deed of settlement on 24.3.1950 conveying the property to the petitioners, to be held by them for and on behalf of their respective Convents. On 7.9.1950 counter-petitioner 1 filed another revision petition, referred to hereinafter as the second revision petition, before the State Government against the order, Ext. A, of the Board of Revenue dated 17.2.1950. Joseph executed a deed of settlement on 24.3.1950 conveying the property to the petitioners, to be held by them for and on behalf of their respective Convents. On 7.9.1950 counter-petitioner 1 filed another revision petition, referred to hereinafter as the second revision petition, before the State Government against the order, Ext. A, of the Board of Revenue dated 17.2.1950. Although the petitioners had obtained the property long before the second revision petition was filed, and neither Sivaswamy Nadar nor Fr. Joseph had any interest in it on the date of that revision petition the petitioners were not impleaded therein and only Sivaswamy Nadar and Fr. Joseph were made counter-petitioners in it. The prayer in the second revision petition was that "the order R. Dis. 6886/49 dated 17.2.1950 of the Board of Revenue rejecting the revision petition (i.e., the first revision petition) on a technical ground of delay may be set aside and the petition may be ordered to be heard on its merits". Subsequently on 16.2.1951 the revision petitioner's counsel filed another petition before the Government praying that the second revision petition might be amended so as to include a prayer for setting aside the auction sale itself. Without issuing notice about the amendment petition to Sivaswamy Nadar and Fr. Joseph, and also without issuing notice about the revision petition and the amendment petition to the petitioners who had obtained the property from Fr. Joseph even so early as 24.3.1950 and without hearing them, the Government passed an order on the second revision petition on 23.10.1952 allowing the same and setting aside not only the order, Ext. A, of the Board of Revenue, but also the revenue auction sale. Ext. B is the copy of the order of the Government dated 23.10.1952. In that order Government held that the delay in filing the first revision petition had been condoned by Government itself before that revision petition was transferred to the Board of Revenue, that the Board was therefore wrong in dismissing the revision petition as barred by limitation, and that the revenue sale also was void ab initio. After obtaining this order counter-petitioner 1 moved for redelivery of the property to him and the District Collector of Trivandrum ordered the property to be delivered to him on 10.2.1953. After obtaining this order counter-petitioner 1 moved for redelivery of the property to him and the District Collector of Trivandrum ordered the property to be delivered to him on 10.2.1953. According to counter petitioner 1 and the State, which is counter-petitioner 3, the property was also delivered over to counter-petitioner 1 on 27.2.1953 in pursuance of the Collector's order dated 10.2.1953, and Ext. C is the copy of the delivery record. According to the petitioners, the property has not been actually delivered over from them, they are even now in possession of it, and there was no real delivery on the spot as stated in Ext. C. In the present petition, CMP No. 43 of 1954, the petitioners seek to quash the order of the Government dated 23.10.1952, i.e., the original of Ext. B, and the subsequent proceedings taken by the revenue authorities in pursuance of that order culminating with the alleged delivery, Ext. C, dated 27.2.1953. They also seek for an order prohibiting interference with their possession of the property and also other appropriate orders and directions which this Court may deem fit to issue in the matter. They contend that the Government's order of 23.10.1952, Ext. B, was passed without jurisdiction and is contrary to the express provisions of law as well as the principles of natural justice and that therefore the said order and the proceedings pursuant to it are illegal and liable to be set aside. C.M.P. No. 43 of 1954 was originally filed under Art.227 of the Constitution, but the petitioners have subsequently applied to treat the petition as one filed under Art.226 also and that has been allowed. 3. The petition is opposed by counter-petitioners 1 and 3. According to them, the Government order is not liable to be set aside and the property has also been delivered over to counter-petitioner 1 as stated in Ext. C and is in his possession. 4. Ext. B, the order of the Government dated 23.10.1952, shows that it was in exercise of its revisional powers under the Revenue Recovery Act that the Government passed that the order allowing the second revision petition filed by counter petitioner 1 on 7.9.1950 and setting aside the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.2.1950 (Ext. A) as well as the revenue auction sale of 24.4.1109. A) as well as the revenue auction sale of 24.4.1109. The order does not however specify whether it was in exercise of the revisional powers under the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, or it was in exercise of the revisional powers under the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act that the Government passed that order. All that it says is "Government Proceedings. Revenue Department. Revision under R.R. Act". S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act conferred powers on the Devan "to revise any orders passed, or proceedings taken by a Division Peishkar, Tahsildar or Proverthiakar", under the provisions of the said Act. There was also a proviso to that section which read: "Provided that no order shall be passed under this section without previous notice to the party to be affected by such order". It was under this section that counter petitioner 1 filed before the Government the first revision petition dated 17.6.1122 (30.1.1947) for setting aside the revenue auction sale. After the integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin this general power of revision was transferred from the Government to the Board of Revenue which was then newly constituted. S.6 of the United States of Travancore and Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance, XII of 1124, provided: "The Board shall exercise all appellate or revisional powers exercisable by the Government or a Minister under the enactments mentioned in the First Schedule or the rules passed thereunder and for this purpose all references in the said enactments or rules to the Government or the Minister shall be construed as references to the Board." Revisional powers under S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act was the second item in the first schedule of the said Ordinance. When the Constitution of India came into force this Ordinance was replaced by the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance, II of 1950. S.6 and the first schedule of this Ordinance also were in the same terms as S.6 and the first schedule of the United State of Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance. It was on account of this transfer of revisional powers to the Board of Revenue that the first revision petition was transferred from the Government to the Board of Revenue, and it was while the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance, II of 1950 was in force that the Board heard that revision petition and dismissed it as barred by limitation on 17.2.1950. The revisional powers under S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act having been thus exercised by the Board of Revenue in this case there was no scope for a further exercise of the same revisional powers on a subsequent occasion by the Government. The Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, VII of 1951, which replaced the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, I of 1068, after the Constitution came into force, does not contain any provision conferring general powers of revision on the Government. All the powers which had been conferred on the Government by S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act were conferred by S.55 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act on the Board of Revenue and not on the Government. Therefore the assumption of jurisdiction in this case by the Government under the Revenue Recovery Act was clearly contrary to law and the order of the Government dated 23.10.1952, Ext. B, on the second revision petition filed by counter-petitioner 1 on 7.9.1950 which purports to have been passed in exercise of the revisional powers under the Revenue Recovery Act has to be held as one passed without jurisdiction. 5. The learned Government Pleader also very rightly conceded that Government had no jurisdiction to pass the order of 23.10.1952 under the Revenue Recovery Act. But he as well as the learned Counsel for counter-petitioner 1 contended that the said order was passed by Government under S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Act, XI of 1950 which has replaced the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance, II of 1950. S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Act is in the same terms as S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Ordinance, and reads as follows: "Government may at any time call for and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by the Board and may pass such order in reference thereto as Government think fit: Provided that no order shall be passed under this section without notice to the party who may be affected by the order." Ext. B. however, expressly purports to be an order passed under the Revenue Recovery Act. Neither in the second revision petition nor in the amendment petition of 16.2.1951 counter petitioner 1 had mentioned the provision of law under which he had filed the petition, and it is clear from Ext. B. however, expressly purports to be an order passed under the Revenue Recovery Act. Neither in the second revision petition nor in the amendment petition of 16.2.1951 counter petitioner 1 had mentioned the provision of law under which he had filed the petition, and it is clear from Ext. B that Government had treated the second revision petition as one filed under the Revenue Act, and not as one filed under the Board of Revenue and has assumed jurisdiction only under the Revenue Recovery Act and not under the Board of Revenue Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Paikeday, S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act does not apply at all to cases in which the Board has disposed of revision petitions filed under S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act by virtue of the powers conferred on them by S.6 of the two Board of Revenue Ordinances and S.6 of the Board of Revenue Act, and S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act would apply only to orders passed by the Board other than those passed under S.6. Since Government itself has not treated the second revision petition as one passed under S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act nor passed the order, Ext. B, under that section, it is not proper for us to express any opinion on this controversy at the present stage. In view of counter petitioner 1's contention that, although he had not mentioned in the second revision petition the provision of law under which he had filed it, he had really filed that petition under S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act, and in view of the fact that Government had treated the said revision petition as only one filed under the Revenue Recovery Act, the proper course for us would be to leave it to Government to consider whether it can entertain the second revision petition under S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act, leaving it free to the petitioners also to raise the contention before Government that S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act would not apply to this case. 6. There are also other illegalities and irregularities which vitiate the order, Ext. 6. There are also other illegalities and irregularities which vitiate the order, Ext. B. After the enactment of the Board of Revenue Ordinances and the Board of Revenue Act the Board of Revenue was the authority competent to revise the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act and since the Board had dismissed the first revision petition only on the preliminary ground that it was barred by limitation and without going into its merits, even if the second revision petition had been treated as an application under S.9 of the Board of Revenue Ordinance or Board of Revenue Act and the order of the Board dismissing the first revision petition on the ground of limitation was found to be wrong, in normal circumstances, Government would have only quashed the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.2.1950 (Ext. A) and remanded the first revision petition to the Board for a fresh disposal. In the second revision petition also the original prayer was only for cancellation of the Board's order rejecting the first revision petition on the technical ground of delay and for remanding that revision petition to the Board for re-hearing on its merits. The prayer for setting aside the revenue auction sale itself was brought in only by means of the amendment petition filed on 16.12.1951. In the petition of 16.12.1951 it was expressly prayed that notice of the amendment should also be given to the counter petitioners in the second revision petition. The relevant portion of that petition reads: "It is also prayed that due notice be given to those concerned for the amendment made in the prayer in the original revision petition dated 7.9.1950." No notice, however, was given about the amendment petition even to the persons who were impleaded as counter petitioners in the second revision petition. From the notice in the file produced before us it appears that the counter petitioners in the revision petition were given notice only about the revision petition and not about the amendment petition. Therefore, even the counter petitioners in the revision petition had no notice of the fact that Government would be considering the question whether the sale itself was liable to be set aside or not and had no opportunity to show that the sale was not liable to be set aside. Therefore, even the counter petitioners in the revision petition had no notice of the fact that Government would be considering the question whether the sale itself was liable to be set aside or not and had no opportunity to show that the sale was not liable to be set aside. Both S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act and S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Act provide that no order shall be passed under those sections without notice to the party who may be affected by that order. As the property was settled upon the petitioners on 24.3.1950 and the second revision petition was filed only on 7.9.1950 and the impugned order was passed thereon on 23.10.1952 there can be no doubt of the fact that the petitioners are the parties who will be affected by that order. It is admitted that they were not made parties to the second revision petition. Counter-petitioner 1's explanation for the omission to implead them in the second revision petition is that Fr. Joseph had not disclosed that he had executed the settlement deed in their favour and that the said settlement deed is a sham document. There is absolutely no proof in support of the contention that it is a sham document. At the time the first revision petition was filed and disposed of Fr. Joseph was the owner and he had contested that revision petition. Between the dismissal of that revision petition on 17.2.1950 and the filing of the second revision petition on 7.9.1950 there was no proceedings pending nor any contact between Fr. Joseph and counter-petitioner 1. Long before 7.9.1950 the petitioners obtained the property by a registered deed, and the revision petition was allowed and the revenue sale set aside only more than 21/2 years after the deed taken by them. Proviso to S.50 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act as well as the proviso to S.55 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act direct that no order shall be passed under the said sections without previous notice to the party to be affected by such order. The proviso to S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Act directs that no order shall be passed under that section without notice to the party who may be affected by the order. Therefore, whether Ext. The proviso to S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue Act directs that no order shall be passed under that section without notice to the party who may be affected by the order. Therefore, whether Ext. B is treated as an order under the Revenue Recovery Act or under the Board of Revenue Act, it is imperative that notice should have been given to the petitioners before that order was passed. The contention that since counter-petitioner 1 had no actual knowledge of the petitioners' rights there was no obligation to give notice about the second revision petition to them cannot be accepted. Having regard to the imperative language of the provisos referred to above, the persons who obtain orders cancelling revenue sales without making proper enquiries and ascertaining who would be the persons that would be affected by the order, would be doing so at their peril and the orders cancelling the revenue sales would themselves be liable to be set aside as passed in contravention of these proviso if impugned by the affected persons to whom notice had not been given. As the deed of settlement under which the petitioners claim was registered long before the second revision petition was filed and as copies of such documents are sent by the Sub-Registrar to the revenue authorities for effecting mutation of names in the Government registers, we are not also inclined to believe counter-petitioner 1's contention that he had no knowledge of the petitioners' rights when he filed the second revision petition. Further, in proceedings involving cancellation of revenue sales Government also is vitally interested, and it is not merely the original thandaper holder or his heirs and assignees and the auction purchaser and his heirs and assignees who are interested in such proceedings. The rights and liabilities of the Government vis-a-vis the auction purchaser and his heirs and assignees as well as the Government's rights and duties in the matter of recovering arrears of tax will also be affected by an order cancelling the sale. Government also has, therefore, a duty to see that the notice required under S.50 of the Revenue Recovery Act and S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act is given to the persons mentioned in those sections before a revenue sale is set aside. Government also has, therefore, a duty to see that the notice required under S.50 of the Revenue Recovery Act and S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act is given to the persons mentioned in those sections before a revenue sale is set aside. The usual practice in the case of revision petitions affecting revenue sales is to dispose of them after calling for reports from the subordinate revenue authorities, and it is seen from the file produced before us that as a matter of fact the second revision petition was disposed of after calling for reports from the subordinate revenue authorities. We are not therefore impressed by the argument that neither the Government nor counter petitioner 1 could have known about the petitioner's rights when the second revision petition was heard and disposed of, even if they had acted with due diligence and care. It is significant that neither in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State nor in the affidavit filed by counter petitioner 1 there is any express statement that the Government and counter petitioner 1 had no knowledge about the petitioners having obtained the property on 24.3.1950 and being the persons who would be affected by the order on the revision petition. On the other hand in the affidavit filed by counter petitioner 1 the complaint is that Fr. Joseph had not disclosed the execution of the document in favour of the petitioners and there is a careful avoidence of any statement to the effect that he (counter petitioner 1) had no actual knowledge about that document. It is further stated in that affidavit that the petitioners had also actual knowledge about the revision petition. But beyond the interested statement in the affidavit there is nothing to show that the petitioners had actual knowledge about the revision petition or about the date on which it was posted for hearing. Even if the impugned order is treated as one passed under S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act it has to be held, in these circumstances, that the said order was passed contrary to law and is liable to be set aside in as much as it was passed in contravention of the proviso to S.9 of the Act. 7. It follows from the above findings that all the subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance of Ext. 7. It follows from the above findings that all the subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance of Ext. B, the order of Government dated 23.10.1952, including the alleged re-delivery of the property to counter petitioner 1 on 10.2.1953, are illegal and of no effect and have to be set aside. There is a dispute between the parties whether after the date of Ext. B the property has been actually delivered to counter petitioner 1 and whether it is now in the possession of counter petitioner 1 or in the possession of the petitioners. According to counter petitioners 1 and 3, after the date of Ext. B the property was delivered over to counter-petitioner 1 in pursuance of an order of the District Collector of Trivandrum, which itself was passed on the application of counter-petitioner 1 and the report of the Tahsildar of Vilavancode, pursuant to the order, Ext. B. Ext. C is the record of the alleged delivery and it shows that the property was delivered to counter petitioner 1 from Rev. Fr. Joseph on 27.2.1953. According to the petitioners, this is a sham record and no delivery was actually effected on the spot on 27.2.1953 and the property was not also in Fr. Joseph's possession on that date. Admittedly no notice was given to the petitioners when the District Collector's order was passed or about the date of the proposed delivery. Fr. Joseph had executed the settlement deed in favour of the petitioner even so early as 24.3.1950 and he had therefore no right or interest in the property on the date of the delivery. As has been stated already the petitioners had no notice about the second revision petition also, and were not parties to that revision petition. In the circumstances the alleged delivery of 27.2.1953 evidenced by Ext. C is not binding on the petitioners and their case that there was no actual delivery on that date and that Ext. C is only a sham record cannot but be true. There is yet another circumstance also which throws considerable suspicion on Ext. C. Soon after Ext. B was passed, Fr. Joseph, who was the founder of the petitioners' Convents filed a Writ Petition under the Constitution, O.P. No. 22 of 1953, for quashing that order and notice of the said petition was served on the Government Pleader on 21.2.1953. There is yet another circumstance also which throws considerable suspicion on Ext. C. Soon after Ext. B was passed, Fr. Joseph, who was the founder of the petitioners' Convents filed a Writ Petition under the Constitution, O.P. No. 22 of 1953, for quashing that order and notice of the said petition was served on the Government Pleader on 21.2.1953. The alleged delivery is said to have been effected six days after the service of that notice. According to the State, the subordinate revenue authorities effected the delivery in ignorance of the filing of the petition. O.P. No. 22 of 1953 was ultimately dismissed on 12.1.1954 on the ground that as Fr. Joseph had executed the settlement deed in favour of the petitioners he had no right to the property and could not therefore maintain any petition in respect of it. The hurry with which the proceedings were pushed through in spite of the service of notice of the filing of the petition on the Government Pleader would show that counter petitioner 1 and the subordinate revenue authorities were intent upon bringing into existence some record to show that possession had passed over to counter petitioner 1 even before O.P. No. 22 of 1953 could be heard. As Fr. Joseph had no right or interest in the property on the date of the alleged delivery and as Ext. C only mentions of a delivery of possession from him we have no doubt that Ext. C is a sham document and that there has been no real delivery at all to counter petitioner 1 and possession of the property is still with the petitioners and is not with counter petitioner 1. 8. On behalf of the petitioners it was also contended that the revenue authorities have no power under the Revenue Recovery Act to deliver the properties from the auction purchaser or his heirs and assignees to the original thandaper holder or his heirs and assignees on the cancellation of a revenue sale. In view of the fact that we have found that the cancellation of the revenue sale itself is invalid and the alleged subsequent delivery also is invalid and of no effect we do not think it necessary to consider this contention in this case. 9. The petitioners' counsel also contended that the order of the Board of Revenue, Ext. In view of the fact that we have found that the cancellation of the revenue sale itself is invalid and the alleged subsequent delivery also is invalid and of no effect we do not think it necessary to consider this contention in this case. 9. The petitioners' counsel also contended that the order of the Board of Revenue, Ext. A, dismissing the first revision petition on the ground of limitation is right and that we should therefore not only quash the Government order of 23.10.1952 and the subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance of it but also declare that the second revision petition filed by counter petitioner 1 on 7.9.1950 is incompetent and not maintainable. According to him, the statement in Ext. B that the delay in filing the first revision petition was condoned by Government before that revision petition was transferred to the Board of Revenue is incorrect. In view of S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act and the fact that the order of 23.2.1952 was passed by the Government without notice to the petitioners and without hearing them we think it will be premature on our part to express any opinion on this matter before the Government itself hears the petitioners and considers their objections in regard to it. The proper course for us would be to vacate the Government order dated 23.10.1952 and all the subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance of it including the delivery, Ext. C, and direct that the second revision petition filed by counter petitioner 1 before the Government on 7.9.1950 be reheard and disposed of by the Government after making the petitioners also counter petitioners in that revision petition and issuing notice to them also. 10. In the result, the order of Government dated 23.10.1952 and the subsequent proceedings taken in pursuance of it, including the alleged delivery on 27.2.1953 evidenced by Ext. C, are set aside, and it is hereby declared that the petitioners are in possession of the property in dispute in this case, namely, 32 acres of land comprised in S. No. 1398/14A-16/1 of Kaliyil Pakuthy, Vilavancode Taluk, by virtue of the revenue auction sale of 24.4.109 and the subsequent sale executed by the auction purchaser of his rights in favour of Rev. Fr. Joseph Kuzhignalil and the deed executed by Rev. Fr. Joseph Kuzhignalil in favour of the petitioners on 24.3.1950. Fr. Joseph Kuzhignalil and the deed executed by Rev. Fr. Joseph Kuzhignalil in favour of the petitioners on 24.3.1950. We direct the revision petition filed by counter petitioner 1 before the Government on 7.9.1950 against the order of Board of Revenue dated 17.2.1950 be re-heard and disposed of again after making the petitioners also counter petitioners in that revision petition and issuing notice to them also. We also prohibit the counter petitioners from interfering on the strength of Exts. B and C, with the petitioners' possession of the property, 32 acres of land comprised in S. No. 1398/14A-16/1 of Kaliyil Pakuthy, Vilavancode Taluk. We express no opinion on the questions whether that revision petition is maintainable under S.9 of the Board of Revenue Act and whether the Government had before transferring the revision petition of 17.6.1122 to the Board of Revenue condoned that delay in filing it, and leave those questions open so that the parties may agitate their respective cases in respect of the said questions before the Government. Counter-petitioner 1 will pay the costs of the petitioners including an Advocate's fee of Rs. 100. Other parties will bear their respective costs.