JUDGMENT Agarwala, J. - This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying that the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated the 9th August, 1955, be quashed. The facts in brief, are as follows: The applicant, Smt. Beti, was the sir holder of certain sir plots and was also the exproprietary tenant of certain other plots. In the year 1946 she let out the sir and ex-proprietary plots to the opposite parties Nos. 2 to 8. The lease was for a period of five years and the term expired in 1951. On the 6th of June, 1951, before the expiry of the term the Petitioner executed a deed of gift of her property including the aforesaid plots in favour of one Maharaj singh and some other persons, who seem to be her relations. The donees applied for their names being mutated in place of the Petitioner. The Assistant Collector refused to give effect to the deed of gift so far as the sir and the exproprietary plots were concerned on the ground that the gift being a permanent alienation was contrary to the provisions of Section 24 of the U.P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act (No. XIV of 1940) and was consequently void. The name of the Petitioner continued to remain recorded in the revenue papers as before, namely as sirholder of certain plots and as exproprietary tenant of the other plots. The donees submitted to this decision of the Assistant Collector and did not appeal. 2. Then the Petitioner filed a suit u/s 202 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act, which has given rise to these proceedings, in the court of the Asstt. Collector for ejectment of the opposite parties as asamis on the ground that she had become a bhumidhar of the plots, whereas the opposite parties had become asamis under the aforesaid Act. The Plaintiff withdrew the suit qua the plots of which she was an exproprietary tenant and confined the suit for the ejectment of the opposite parties from the sir plots alone. 3. The suit was dismissed by all the revenue courts, including the Board of Revenue. The Plaintiff withdrew the suit qua the plots of which she was an exproprietary tenant and confined the suit for the ejectment of the opposite parties from the sir plots alone. 3. The suit was dismissed by all the revenue courts, including the Board of Revenue. The view taken by the Board of Revenue was that since the Petitioner had executed a gift of the plots in dispute and though the gift was a permanent alienation, and did not take effect by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act, yet by virtue of Section 25 of the said Act it took effect as a mortgage, and that as such, the donees became mortgagee in possession and the Petitioner became an exproprietary tenant of the sir plots, and consequently she acquired sirdari rights u/s 19 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act and became entitled to regain possession from the mortgagees; and that, therefore, she could not bring a suit for the ejectment of the asamis before she ejected the donees who had become mortgagees. Against this decision the Petitioner has come up to this Court and on her behalf, Mr. Pravin Chaturvedi has urged that the view of the law taken by the Board of Revenue is manifestly erroneous. He has urged that the deed of gift, being bad in law u/s 24 of the U.P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act, became void and that u/s 25 of the aforesaid Act it did not take effect as a mortgage because under that section a gift could not be deemed to have become a mortgage. He has urged that the words "permanent alienation" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Act could not be held to include a gift. He has further urged that in this view of the matter the Petitioner acquired bhumidhari rights and not sirdari rights in the plots in dispute and since the donees never came into possession of the plots the possession being with the opposite parties she was under no necessity to eject the mortgagees and was entitled to bring a suit for the ejectment of the opposite parties. 4. We consider that the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner must be accepted. 4. We consider that the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner must be accepted. Section 2 of the U.P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act defines a permanent alienation as follows: In this Act, unless there is something (sic) in the subject or context-- "permanent alienation" means a transfer by sale, exchange, or gift but does not include a transfer by gift for charitable purposes or a transfer by will. 5. According to the definition a gift is included within the meaning of the words "permanent alienation except when the gift is for a charitable purpose or is a transfer by will." There is, however, a further exception to the definition and it is to be found in the opening words of Section 2 "unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context." If the context in which the words "permanent alienation" are used shows that if a gift were included within the definition, it would be repugnant to the provisions of the section, then in that case a gift will not be included within the meaning of the term "permanent alienation". Section 24 of the Act says-- A proprietor who wishes to make a permanent alienation of the whole or any part of his protected land shall apply for permission to the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division in which his protected land or that part of it which is assessed to the largest amount of local rate is situated. 6. It then provides that-- the assistant collector after making such enquiry as appears to be necessary shall decide the application in accordance with rules made by the Provincial Government in this behalf. 7. This section is followed by Section 25, Sub-section (1) of which says-- where a permanent alienation of protected land has been made otherwise then in accordance with the provisions of this Act, it shall take effect as a mortgage in the form prescribed by Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13. 8. The question is whether a gift becomes a mortgage under this section. 9. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. 9. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. In a mortgage there must be a pecuniary liability for the payment of which an interest in specific immovable property is transferred. If there is no liability there can be no mortgage. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the U.P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act which prescribes the form of the mortgage mentions that-- every mortgage of protected land shall be made only in one or the following forms, namely-- a usufructurry mortgage for which the mortgagor delivery proprietary possession of the land to the mortgagee and authorises him to retain such possession and to receive the rents and profits of the land in lieu of interest and towards payment of the principal, on the condition that after the expiry of such term not exceeding twenty years as may be agreed upon, the land shall be redelivered to the mortgagor. 10. In this form also the existence of a loan is necessary. In the case of a gift, however, there is no question of any consideration and if there is no consideration there can be no loan. In a sale, the sale consideration may be treated as a loan and then the sale can be converted into a mortgage. This however, cannot be done in the case of a gift pure and simple. This is, therefore, a case in which the context of the provisions of Section 25 excludes the possibility of a gift being treated as a permanent alienation within the meaning of those words as used in the section. It must, therefore, be held that the words "permanent alienation" in Section 25 do not include a gift. Consequently, the gift made by the Petitioner being contrary to the provisions of Section 24 and not being capable of being treated as a mortgage u/s 25, was totally ineffective. This was indeed the view which the Assistant Collector took when he refused the mutation in favour of the donee and rejected his application. Consequently, the gift made by the Petitioner being contrary to the provisions of Section 24 and not being capable of being treated as a mortgage u/s 25, was totally ineffective. This was indeed the view which the Assistant Collector took when he refused the mutation in favour of the donee and rejected his application. The view of the Board of Revenue that the Assistant Collector's dismissal of the application for mutation was unauthorised and illegal is with respect, erroneous. The remarks that apply to the meaning of the expression "permanent alienation" in Section 25 also apply to the same expression in Section 26. 11. We think the order of the Assistant Collector was perfectly correct. 12. The position, therefore, is that the gift did not take effect and the do lees in spite of the admission of the Petitioner that she had delivered possession to them were not in possession, because actual possession was with the opposite parties and constructive possession was not obtained by the donees as their names were not mutated and it is admitted that they never realised rent from the opposite parties. In these circumstances, the Petitioner must be deemed to have remained in possession over the plots in dispute as the holder of sir. u/s 10 of the U.P.Z. A. and L.R. Act the opposite parties did not become the hereditary tenants of the land because under Clause (2) of that section the landholder Petitioner was a woman. Consequently, the Petitioner became a bhumidhar u/s 18 of the Act and the opposite parties became asamis u/s 21, Clause (h) of the aforesaid Act. The opposite parties were thus liable to be ejected u/s 202 of the Act. It was not necessary for the Petitioner to bring a suit for the ejectment of the donees in the civil court. 13. In the result we quash the order of the Board of Revenue dated the 9th August, 1955 and direct that court to readmit the appeal to its original number and to decide it in accordance with the directions mentioned above. The applicant will have her costs of these proceedings from the opposite parties Nos. 2 to 8.