ORDER : This revision against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Ujjain, in Civil Regular Appeal No. 154 of 1952 comes up for hearing under the following circumstances. 2. The applicants-plaintiffs filed Civil Original Suit No. 155 of 1951 in the Court of the Additional City Civil Judge, First Class, Ujjain, Shri P. D. Gupta against the non-applicant defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 492/2/- on account of damages suffered by the plaintiffs due to the falling of the defendants wall on the plaintiffs wall. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit only for Rs. 50/- and dismissed the rest. Against this decree the plaintiffs preferred a Civil Regular Appeal in respect of the dismissed portion of their claim and the defendant preferred cross-objection in respect of the portion of the claim decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. This appeal came up for hearing before the learned Additional District Judge, Ujjain, who dismissed the plaintiffs suit in its entirety accepting the cross-objection of the defendant. The plaintiffs, therefore filed the second appeal. This came up for hearing on 24th September, 1956, when Mr. S. L. Dube, learned counsel for the defendant, raised a preliminary objection that under S. 102, C. P. C. no second appeal is competent in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 500/-. Now, "suit of the nature cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes" is nowhere defined and whether a suit is of such a nature can only be determined by a reference to Ss. 15, 16, 27 and the Schedule in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which correspond to Ss. 12, 13, 19 and the Schedule in the Madhya Bharat Small Cause Courts Act (No. 46 of 1949). A perusal of these sections led to the conclusion that it was in fact a suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, as the value of the subject-matter of the original suit did not exceed Rs. 500/-. Clearly, it was hit by the provisions embodied in S. 102, C. P. C. 3. Mr. A perusal of these sections led to the conclusion that it was in fact a suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, as the value of the subject-matter of the original suit did not exceed Rs. 500/-. Clearly, it was hit by the provisions embodied in S. 102, C. P. C. 3. Mr. S. R. Joshi, learned counsel for the applicants, at first thought that a second appeal was competent; for, when a first appeal was not provided for and even then it was heard, hence he urged that the second appeal would be competent. He placed reliance on Gangadhar v. Shekharbasini, AIR 1917 Cal 320 (A), where it was held that where jurisdiction is usurped by a Court in passing an order against which an appeal would lie if it had been passed with jurisdiction, an appeal against the order cannot be defeated on the ground that the order was made without jurisdiction. This case is one of several cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 (B), a criminal case, where in para 26 it is laid down that if a Court acts without jurisdiction, its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, that is, an appeal would lie to the Court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction. Mr. Joshis contention was that if a first appeal, by mistake, was heard on merits, then a second appeal would be competent. He also placed reliance on Veeraraghavulu v. Venkata Narasimha, AIR 1914 PC 87 (C); Banka Das v. Srinivas Padhi, AIR 1941 Pat 616 (D) and on Lakhpat Lal v. Makhan Ram, AIR 1942 Pat 369 (E), where it has been held that where a District Judge entertains an appeal which does not lie to his Court, a second appeal would be competent against his decision. No doubt, these decisions lend support to Mr. Joshis contention but it was pointed out to him that the principle underlying these decisions will be applicable only where there is nothing mentioned about a second appeal; but these cases would not be applicable where there is a definite prohibition against the second appeal as in S. 102, C. P. C. On this, Mr. Joshis contention but it was pointed out to him that the principle underlying these decisions will be applicable only where there is nothing mentioned about a second appeal; but these cases would not be applicable where there is a definite prohibition against the second appeal as in S. 102, C. P. C. On this, Mr. S. R. Joshi learned counsel for the applicants, made an application for converting the appeal into an application for revision of the decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Ujjain. As the appeal was filed within 45 days of the decree, the appeal was allowed to be converted into revision on payment of costs. It is in this way that the revision comes for hearing before me. 4. The main contention in this revision by Mr. Joshi is this that the suit ought to have been tried as a Small Cause Court suit and not in the regular way, and an appeal against the decree of the Small Cause Court would not be competent. Therefore, he urges that both decrees of the Additional District Judge, Ujjain, and of the Additional City Civil Judge, Ujjain, should be set aside and the plaint should be ordered to be presented to the proper Court. Mr. S. L. Dube on the other side, contends that no objection as to jurisdiction was raised by the parties either in the trial Court, so the decree of the first appellate Court cannot be interfered with. 5. Now, in this case, Mr. P. D. Gupta, the Additional City Civil Judge, First Class, Ujjain, was also invested with Small Cause Courts powers upto Rs. 500/- but he tried this case as a regular suit, and nobody objected to his jurisdiction at that time; nor anybody objected to the jurisdiction of the first appellate Court. Mr. Dube contends that now it is too late to attack the decree of the first appellate Court when no objection to jurisdiction was taken before it. He placed reliance on pages 49 to 51 in Saxenas Commentary on the Provincial Small Cause Courts Acts. There are some cases which support Mr. Dube. Mr. Dube contends that now it is too late to attack the decree of the first appellate Court when no objection to jurisdiction was taken before it. He placed reliance on pages 49 to 51 in Saxenas Commentary on the Provincial Small Cause Courts Acts. There are some cases which support Mr. Dube. The first is Ramlal v. Kabul Singh, ILR 25 All 135 (F), where Knox and Blair, JJ., held that parties should not be assisted to set aside decrees upon points which they did not raise before the Court which tried the matters in issue, and of which they gave no notice to the opposite parties. After sometime one of the learned Judges, Sir George Knox, in Abdul Majid v. Bedyadhar Saran Das, ILR 39 All 101: (AIR 1917 All 159) (G) expressed the view that where a Small Cause Court suit is tried by a Munsif on the original side and his decision is reversed on appeal, the High Court is bound to set aside the appellate decree as being passed without jurisdiction. So ILR 25 All 135 (F) may be taken to have been dissented from in later rulings. 6. The next case is Suresh Chunder Maitra v. Kristo Rangini Dasi, ILR 21 Cal 249 (H). The Calcutta High Court in this case took the view that both parties having submitted to the jurisdiction of the ordinary Court, it was not competent to either of them on second appeal to plead the want of jurisdiction, so as to render the proceedings taken in the suit void. This view has since then been dissented from, especially in Indra Chandra v. Srish Chandra, ILR 40 Cal 537 (I) and so ILR 21 Cal 249 (H) cannot be held to be an authority today. 7. The decisions in ILR 25 All 135 (F) and ILR 21 Cal 249 (H) have been followed in Kamruddin v. Mr. This view has since then been dissented from, especially in Indra Chandra v. Srish Chandra, ILR 40 Cal 537 (I) and so ILR 21 Cal 249 (H) cannot be held to be an authority today. 7. The decisions in ILR 25 All 135 (F) and ILR 21 Cal 249 (H) have been followed in Kamruddin v. Mr. Indrani, AIR 1924 Nag 17 (J) by Baker, J. C., and the latter case, that is, ILR 21 Cal 249 (H), has been followed by Staples, A. J. C. in Ganpat Laxman v. Nathu, AIR 1934 Nag 121 (K), where it was held that where a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court has been tried against the provisions of S. 16 as an ordinary suit by a Judge who is not invested with Small Cause Court powers, the parties to the suit having raised no objection to the trial, it should not be considered as a Small Cause Court suit, and appeal would lie from the decision. As this decision is mainly based on the former Allahabad and Calcutta view as expressed in ILR 25 All 135 (F) and ILR 21 Cal 249 (H), which have since then been dissented from, the Nagpur decision cannot be held to have laid down correct law. There is no discussion of the main principles in these cases and, therefore, with respect I should say that the decision are not at all convincing. They have also ignored the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Ledgard v. Bull, 13 Ind App 134 (PC) (L) where at page 145 it was observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that when the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. The Privy Council followed this decision in Minakshi v. Subramanya, 14 Ind App 160 (PC) (M), where it was held that a right of appeal from the decision of a Judge must be given by statute or an equivalent authority; and where there was an inherent incompetency in the appellate Court to deal with the question before it, omission to raise before that Court the question of jurisdiction does not operate as a waiver of right to raise it before a higher Court and that consent could not confer on the appellate Court a jurisdiction which it never possessed. It was on the basis of these two Privy Council rulings that it has subsequently been laid down in a chain of judicial decisions that the mere circumstance that the party did not raise the plea of jurisdiction in the appellate Court will not clothe that Court with a jurisdiction not given to it by law (See Bibi Ladli Begani v. Bibi Raje Rabia, ILR 13 Bom 650 (N)). Mr. Dube also placed reliance on Mahadeo v. Budhairam, ILR 26 all 358 (O). This decision only laid down that where a suit is a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes, the second appeal would not be competent. It does not discuss at all the question whether the decrees of the first Court and of the Court below were competent. On behalf of the appellant in this case, the High Court was asked to set aside the decrees of the Courts below and to direct the plaint to be returned. Their Lordships (Blair and Banerji, JJ.), observed that after having considered the terms of the decree and the award, they did not see any reason to exercise their discretion in favour of the appellant. Here, it will be obvious, that the decree was based on an award and, therefore, the High Court thought it proper not to interfere. 8. The last case which Mr. Dube, cites is Mathura Prasad v. B. B. and C. I. Rly. Co., AIR 1924 All 691 (P), where a suit of a Small Cause Court nature was tried by the Munsif of Kasgunj. It was decreed. The District Judge heard on merits and dismissed the suit in toto. On a revision application under S. 115, C. P. C., Sulaiman, J., (as he then was) refused to interfere. Co., AIR 1924 All 691 (P), where a suit of a Small Cause Court nature was tried by the Munsif of Kasgunj. It was decreed. The District Judge heard on merits and dismissed the suit in toto. On a revision application under S. 115, C. P. C., Sulaiman, J., (as he then was) refused to interfere. The question whether the District Judge had or had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal was neither raised nor decided in this case. The only view expressed by his Lordship was that gross errors of law are not revisable under S. 115, C. P. C. though they are revisable under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. So these two Allahabad cases also do not help Mr. Dube. 9. The question came up before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kollipara Seetapathy v. Kankipati Subbayya, ILR 33 Mad 323 (Q) where it was held that where a small cause suit is tried by a Munsif on the original side and his decision is reversed on appeal, the High Court is bound to set aside the appellate decree as having been passed without jurisdiction. This has been followed in District Board, Tanjore v. Kuppuswami Konar, AIR 1947 Mad 382 (R) by Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., and practically by every High Court in India, and represents the correct view. 10. Mr. S. R. Joshi, on behalf of the applicants, is, however, not satisfied with this position but desires that the decree of the City Civil Judge, Ujjain, should also be set aside, as, according to his arguments the City Civil Judge Ujjain lacked inherent jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the suit. He placed reliance upon a number of rulings. In my opinion, all these rulings can be divided into two classes. In some cases, the Munsif who tried the case of a small cause nature according to the ordinary procedure was invested with Small Cause Courts powers; whereas in the other class, he was not so invested with those powers, but there was another Judge in the station invested with such powers. Examples of the latter class may be found in Municipal Board of Benares v. Shambhu Nath, AIR 1928 All 38 (S) and in Jodha Bijal v. Maganlal Chhaganlal, AIR 1930 Bom 80 (T). Examples of the latter class may be found in Municipal Board of Benares v. Shambhu Nath, AIR 1928 All 38 (S) and in Jodha Bijal v. Maganlal Chhaganlal, AIR 1930 Bom 80 (T). In both these cases, the decisions of the appellate Court and that of the Munsiff were swept aside and the plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. It will be obvious that these were the cases where the Munsiff lacked inherent jurisdiction to try a suit of a Small Cause nature. But the same principle has not been held applicable to those cases where the Munsiff or the trial Court possessed both jurisdictions, ordinary as well as the jurisdiction of Small Cause Court. Both these jurisdictions are no doubt separate and distinct and the Small Cause Court jurisdiction is in its nature exclusive. The position of the Court having such double jurisdiction was explained by Mr. Justice (Birdwood, J., concurring) in Pitamber Vajirshet v. Dhondu Navapa, ILR 12 Bom 486 (U), where the view was expressed that having the small Cause Court jurisdiction the Judge must be taken to have dealt with the case under that jurisdiction, even if he was not quite alive to it at the time. A suit taken cognizance of in this way does not cease to be a suit tried under the Small Cause Court Act because of some divergence from its summary procedure. A surplusage of form and elaborateness does not change the character of the decision for the purpose of its finality. In Shankarbhai v. Somabhai, ILR 25 Bom 417 (V), a Division Bench (Candy and Whitworth, JJ.), of the Bombay High Court laid it down that the character of the suit was not altered by the mode in which the subordinate Judge had exercised his jurisdiction and that his decision being final was not appealable to the District Court. This decision has been followed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Carnduff and Beachcroft, JJ.), in ILR 40 Cal 537 (I) and by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Chandaverkar and Heaton, JJ.), in Narayan Raoji v. Gangaram Ratanchand, ILR 33 Bom 664 (W). This decision has been followed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Carnduff and Beachcroft, JJ.), in ILR 40 Cal 537 (I) and by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Chandaverkar and Heaton, JJ.), in Narayan Raoji v. Gangaram Ratanchand, ILR 33 Bom 664 (W). In the later case ILR 12 Bom 468 (U) has been referred to; and it has been observed that the entering of the suit in the file of the regular suits could not take it away from the category of Small Causes, nor could the fact that the Judge tried the suit under his ordinary jurisdiction deprives it of its character as a small cause. In U. K. Seal v. Aramugam Chettyar, AIR 1938 Rang 35 (X), Dunkley, J., explained the position more clearly by observing that there is no provision of law which prevents the Judge of a Small Cause Court from recording the evidence given at any trial before him at full length, or from delivering a full and considered judgment such as is ordinarily passed in a regular suit. Therefore, the proceedings before the trial Court in such cases cannot be held to be entirely without jurisdiction or mere nullity. 11. On the basis of these decisions it must be held in the present case that the decree of the trial Court cannot be held to be a nullity, but it should be taken to be a decree of a Small Cause Court, Ujjain, and the decision, being final, was not appealable to the Additional District Judge, Ujjain. The learned Additional District Judge ought to have rejected the appeal. He has, however, interfered with the decree passed in a suit of a small cause nature which is not permitted by law. 12. I, therefore, allow this revision and set aside the decree of the Additional District Judge, Ujjain, and restore that of the trial Court. In the circumstances of the case when the mistake is common to all the parties and to the Court, there will be no order as to costs here and before the Additional District Judge, Ujjain.