Govinda Menon, J. - I agree. As leave to appeal had also been granted under section 411-A(1)(b), it is open to this Court to assess the evidence for itself and having done so, I am of the view that the convictions are justified. Having perused the testimony of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 in the light of the strong criticism levelled against their veracity, I feel that all the three of them are witnesses of truth. P.Ws. 5 and 6 corroborate the eye-witnesses’ testimony to a large extent. In these circumstances on an analysis of the evidence there is no ground whatever for holding that the convictions are wrong. I agree to the confirmation of the convictions as well as the modification of the sentences. Ramaswami, J. - These are appeals preferred by Moorthy and Mani, accused 2 and 1 respectively in Sessions Case No. 10 of the Fourth Criminal Sessions of 1955 of the Madras High Court, against their convictions, under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, in the case of accused 1 and under section 302, Indian Penal Code, in the case of accused 2, and the sentences of death. [His Lordships then elaborately set out the facts which are not necessary for the purposes of this report.] In these appeals the learned advocates for the appellants press three points, viz., that the majority verdict of the Jury is opposed to the weight of evidence and the probabilities of the case; secondly, that the learned trial Judge’s charge to the Jury suffers from serious misdirections and non-directions amounting to misdirections resulting in miscarriage of justice; and thirdly, that the trial has been vitiated by material irregularities. We shall now consider them one by one. Point No. 1: On the evidence on record, we cannot agree that the majority verdict of the Jury which the learned trial Judge has accepted was against the weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. [His Lordship then discussed the evidence and concluded:- ] Therefore, the verdict of the Jury is certainly based on the weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. Point No. 2.- The misdirection on which reliance is placed is that in various places of his charge the learned trial Judge has used strong expressions about the truthful character of the prosecution witnesses, practically making up the mind for the Jury. Point No. 2.- The misdirection on which reliance is placed is that in various places of his charge the learned trial Judge has used strong expressions about the truthful character of the prosecution witnesses, practically making up the mind for the Jury. It is quite true that the trial Judge in a sessions case under section 298(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure may, if he thinks proper, in the course of his summing up express to the Jury his opinion upon any question of fact. But still it is well settled that the Judge ought not to express any decided opinion because the decision on the questions of fact is left entirely to the Jury. The Judge in his charge to the Jury ought not to express his own opinion in terms too dogmatic even though he informs them that they are not bound by any opinion of his. The warning, even oft-repeated, that the members of the Jury are not bound by the opinion of the Judge cannot be considered to be a magic formula to cover up dogmatic assertions and tendentious suggestions. The object is that the Judge should not impress his own opinion indelibly on the minds of the Jury and thus give them no option but to arrive at a decision which he himself has arrived at. But at the same time in a protracted narrative of facts, the determination of which is ultimately left to the Jury, it must needs be that the view of the Judge may not coincide with the views of others who look upon the whole proceedings in black type. It would, however, be not proper to treat such cases as cases of misdirection if upon the general views taken the case has been fairly left to the Jury’s province. This has been the case here notwithstanding the dogmatic and repeated expressions of opinion regarding the credibility of the witnesses to be found in the charge to the Jury here and there. We are not prepared therefore to hold them to be misdirections bringing about miscarriage of justice. In regard to non-direction, it is settled law that mere non-direction is not necessarily misdirection. Bui in order to justify the appellate Court to set aside the verdict of the Jury, the finding that there are certain omissions or non-directions is not enough. We are not prepared therefore to hold them to be misdirections bringing about miscarriage of justice. In regard to non-direction, it is settled law that mere non-direction is not necessarily misdirection. Bui in order to justify the appellate Court to set aside the verdict of the Jury, the finding that there are certain omissions or non-directions is not enough. The Court of appeal must be satisfied on a perusal of the charge and the material evidence in the case that the omissions are so important that it may reasonably be stated that they have led to an erroneous verdict. In this case the learned trial Judge, it is pointed out, did not draw the attention of the Jury that the first information report in this case mentioned that only one of the assailants stabbed the deceased. It was not necessary for the learned Judge to do so because the first information report itself has been read out to the Jury: and secondly, the first information report in this case was given not by an eye-witness but by one who had learnt that two persons had set upon the deceased and that the deceased had collapsed on the pavement with injuries and was unable to give any coherent information. Then it is said that the learned trial Judge has failed to point out that since the bichuva M.O. 2 is traced to accused 2 even if accused 1 Mani was the person who held the deceased he did not stab the deceased according to the first information report. This does not follow, because accused 1 might have made away with the weapon which he is stated so have used like a pen-knife, before he was arrested. Thirdly, it is pointed out that the learned trial Judge had failed to place before the Jury the fact that the eye-witnesses P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 who alleged that they saw the occurrence at close quarters, within a distance of 15 feet, and P.Ws. 3 and 4 practically from the same place, failed to notice one another as between themselves. The learned trial Judge might have placed this before the Jury and also mentioned that when an occurrence of this nature takes place suddenly, the attention of each one of the eye-witnesses is riveted upon the ghastly tragedy and they would not be looking about to see who else was there. The learned trial Judge might have placed this before the Jury and also mentioned that when an occurrence of this nature takes place suddenly, the attention of each one of the eye-witnesses is riveted upon the ghastly tragedy and they would not be looking about to see who else was there. In fact if they are not witnesses of truth they would easily have said that they noticed one another. Therefore, these alleged non-directions and others of similar nature pointed out to us neither singly nor cumulatively make out that they could reasonably be said to have led to an erroneous verdict. Point No. 3.- There is no doubt that the learned advocates for the appellants are on a very strong ground when they argued that the learned trial Judge has admitted inadmissible evidence in the shape of statements of identifiers at the identification proceedings. There is also no doubt that though the identification proceedings in this case were held by a Honorary Magistrate with all legitimate precautions to ensure a fair identification still, it was arranged at the G-2 Police Station by the investigating Police Officers and that throughout the Police Officers have been present and in fact the entire show has been under the Police auspices and could hardly be described as anything else than a Police identification parade. Quite different would have been the case if after arranging the identification parade the Police had completely obliterated themselves and the Honorary Magistrate was left solely in charge of the parade and in which case the statements made by the identifiers would be outside the purview of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this case not only was evidence let in of the statements given by the witnesses that particular persons were identified then, but the learned Judge to discredit a defence argument impeaching the value of Mr. Bonnell’s evidence had the deposition of the Honorary Magistrate read over once again during the delivery of the charge, apparently to refresh the memory of the Jurors. Bonnell’s evidence had the deposition of the Honorary Magistrate read over once again during the delivery of the charge, apparently to refresh the memory of the Jurors. In doing so the learned Judge overlooked that excepting, as pointed out by Bhagwati and Venkatarama Ayyar, JJ., in Ramakishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay1, the identifier would be entitled to give evidence in regard to his mental act of identification by way of corroboration of his identification of the accused at the trial, the other evidence regarding the process of identification by identifying witnesses at test identification parades, directed and supervised by Police Officers involving statements by witnesses, express or implied, including signs and gestures, that particular persons were identified, would attract the operation of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and would make that evidence inadmissible as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. There can be no doubt that in this case inadmissible evidence hit by section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, has been allowed to be let in and it is to be hoped that in future identification parades, though they may be arranged by the Police, would not be directed and supervised by them and that after arranging test identification parades the Police would completely obliterate themselves and leave the Honorary Magistrate and the Panch witnesses solely in charge of the parade so that the statements made by the identifiers would be outside the purview of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the mere fact, however, that inadmissible evidence has been admitted, should not be made a pretext for either ordering re-trial or for acquitting the appellants because as laid down in the very Supreme Court decision just now referred to, though the admission of inadmissible evidence would amount to a misdirection, what has to be done, in cases where inadmissible evidence has been admitted and incorporated in the charge to the Jury, is to exclude the inadmissible evidence from the record and consider whether the balance of evidence remaining thereafter is sufficient to maintain the conviction and it is for the Court of appeal to take the whole case into consideration and to decide for itself whether the conviction could be maintained, and not act upon vague suppositions as to the extent to which the minds of the Jury might have been affected by the adduction of inadmissible evidence or, in other words, instead of seeking shelter in an idle skepticism as was said by Lord Cockburn, C.J., in the Tichborne case in another connection which weakness readily adopts, analyse the evidence and find out whether the other evidence in the case establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, we have examined the evidence in this case from the standpoint laid down by the Supreme Court and have come to the conclusion that even if this evidence of statements of identification at the identification parade is excluded, there were sufficient materials for the Jury as narrated above and which need not be repeated, to come to the conclusion that these two appellants were the assailants of the deceased Krishnaswami Naidu. Therefore, beyond expressing our regret that the learned State Prosecutor did not bring to the notice of the learned trial Judge this ruling of the Supreme Court which we are bound to follow and especially so when their Lordships have specifically mentioned that the Madras decisions to the contrary have been overruled and since such disregard of these rulings, as has been repeatedly pointed out by our High Court and other High Courts would amount even to dereliction of duty (See Raghava Mannadiar v. Theyunni Mannadiar1, Rex v. Ram Dayal2, Beevathumma v. Lakshmi Amma3, Karam Hussian v. Mohammad Khalil4, and Dodda Subba Reddi v. Gunturu Govinda Reddi5, we find that, on the balance of evidence remaining thereafter, there is sufficient and satisfactory evidence to maintain the convictions of these appellants. The convictions are therefore correct. In regard to the sentence of death, the learned trial Judge himself has stated whether it was not for the Government to consider, in view of the fact that accused 3, Bhima Pillai, the principal instigator has been acquitted, this is a proper case to act under section 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We do not agree that this would be an extenuating circumstance. But in view of the fact that these appellants who are young men have come under the influence of the older man, viz., Bhima Pillai, and would not have committed this offence but for that baneful influence upon them, we consider that the ends of justice do not require that we must confirm the extreme penalty of law awarded to them. The sentences are reduced to imprisonment for life. We suggest that the attention of all Judges and Magistrates in this State might be suitably drawn to this Supreme Court decision and the executive authorities may also do the same in regard to Police Officers so that by a careless disregard of the implications of this ruling valuable evidence might not be lost and opportunities given for soliciting for wholly unmerited re-trials or acquittals. R.M. ----- Sentences reduced.