Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the State and is directed against the acquittal of the accused in C.C. No. 3281 of 1954 on the file of the 2nd Class Magistrate of Kanayannur. The accused was charged for offences under S.279 and 338, Indian Penal Code, and under S.3(1)(iv) of Motor Vehicles Act, IV of 1939 and R.319(1) framed under the same read with S.112 of that Act. It was alleged that the accused drove a heavy transport vehicle without holding a license for the same on 18.11.1954 at about 10 P.M. in a rash and negligent manner and caused hurt to one George. The learned Magistrate found that offences under S.279 and 338 I.P.C. had not been made out by the prosecution. As regards the offence under the Motor Vehicles Act in driving a transport vehicle without a proper license for the same, while finding that the accused had not a license as required held that as the accused is a public servant employed in the Transport Department of the State the prosecution launched without the necessary sanction under S.197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was vitiated. Hence the accused was acquitted. On behalf of the State it is contended that the lower court went wrong in holding that S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable to the case as the accused who was only a mechanic in the Transport Department was found driving a public service vehicle on the public road without the requisite license and as the same did not form part of his official duties. The appeal is only with regard to this. So the only question that arises for consideration here is as to whether sanction under S.197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was necessary in the present case. What is stated in S.197(1) is that: "When any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a 'State Government' or the 'Central Government' is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty no court shall take cognisance of such offence except with the previous sanction" etc. What is contended on behalf of the State is that here as the accused was not a driver of the Transport Bus when he drove it he was not acting in the discharge of his official duty as contemplated under the section. As pointed out by the Magistrate the evidence here is to the effect that the duty of the accused who was a mechanic in the State Transport Department was to repair, refit and see that defective buses are made roadworthy and for that purpose he was to carry out tests of the vehicles by driving them along the road. In the face of that evidence it is idle to contend that when he was driving the particular bus at the time of occurrence he was not acting in discharge of his official duty as contemplated under S.197. Here we are concerned only with the question of sanction. So there is no need to consider as to how the Transport Department was allowing employees without proper licenses as required under the Motor Vehicles Act to drive their vehicles through public road. Appren v. State (1953 KLT 57) deals exhaustively with the question of sanction under S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and refers to the principles laid down in H.H.B. Gill v. The King (AIR 1948 PC 128). As pointed out there, in all these cases "the test may well be whether the public servant if challenged can reasonably claim that what he does he does in virtue of his office". When such a test is applied here it is clear that sanction is necessary. The accused was an employee of the Transport Department and it is found that he was expected to test the vehicles by driving them along the roads as he was doing at the time of the incident. So he can rightly contend that he was acting in discharge of his official duties at that time. In 1953 KLT 57 at page 66 it is observed as follows: "While these form the main procedural facts the point of substance insisted upon by these decisions is that there must be something in the nature of the act complained that attached it to the official character of the person doing it". In 1953 KLT 57 at page 66 it is observed as follows: "While these form the main procedural facts the point of substance insisted upon by these decisions is that there must be something in the nature of the act complained that attached it to the official character of the person doing it". In the present case it is seen that the act of the accused in driving the transport bus at the relevant time was connected with his official duties. So the learned Magistrate was quite right in holding that the prosecution was vitiated for want of sanction as contemplated under S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence there is no merit in this appeal. 2. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.