Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. In this case, the petitioner, Shrimati Sita Devi, has moved this Court, under Article 226, of the Constitution of India, for a writ, in the nature of certiorari to call up and quash the order of the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division dated 20th February, 1954, passed under Sec.18B of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947), hereinafter called "the Act". 2. The petitioner has a pucca house at Por-besganj, which was let out on rent to the Chairman, District Board, Purnea, opposite party No. 2 for locating Veterinary hospital and for the residence of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, opposite party No. 3 on a monthly rental of Rs. 25/-. The petitioner, on the 19th April, 1950, made an application before the Controller under Sec.11(1) (c) of the Act for eviction of opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 from the house on the ground of personal necessity because of an impending marriage of her daughter. This application was rejected on the 17th June, 1950. The petitioner, thereafter., made a second application for eviction under Sec.11(1)(c) & (d) of the Act on the ground of non-payment of rent and personal necessity before the Controller. The Controller, who was the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Araria, by his order dated the 27th May, 1953, found that the opposite party had "defaulted in month to month payment of rent from July, 1951" and further that the petitioner needed the house for her own use and therefore, he passed an order of eviction against the opposite party under Sec.11(1) of the Act. Against this order of eviction, opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 took an appeal to the Collector under Sec.18 of the Act, and, the Collector, Purnea, by his order dated the 21st December, 1953, upheld the order of the Controller, and, dismissed the appeal of the opposite party. They, then, moved the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, under Sec.18B in revision against the aforesaid order. The Commissioner, by his order dated the 20th February, 1954, disagreed with the Controller and the Collector, and found that there had been no default in the payment of the rent and the plea of bona fide requirement was not established, and, therefore, he set aside the order of eviction passed by the two courts below, and allowed the application of the opposite party. Against this order, the present application under Article 226 has been made by the petitioner. 3. Mr. B. C. Ghose, appearing for the petitioner, has attacked the order of the Commissioner dated the 20th February, 1954, on the ground that the learned Commissioner has committed an error on the face of the record in reversing the orders of the Controller ana the Collector. His contention is that it was admitted that the opposite party did not pay the rent, and, as such, to continue his argument, the Controller was bound under Sec.11 to order eviction of the opposite party. In support of his contention, he has relied on the following observation of the learned Controller: "It is admitted that the O. P. did not actually pay the rent from July, 1951, onwards. The case of the O. P. is that he sent the rent of the house to the landlady for July, 1951, which she did not accept on which he remitted the rent for July by postal M. O. The date of remittance, as appears from the postal receipt Ext. E/1 is 18-9-51 which shows that the O. P, had defaulted in timely payment of rent for the month of July, 1951." 4. Mr. Ghose, therefore, contends that it was admitted that the opposite party did not actually pay the rent to the petitioner, and, as such, the Controller was In duty bound to order eviction of the opposite party. In my opinion, there is a fallacy in this line of argument, because what was admitted was the fact that the opposite party had not actually paid the rent to the petitioner; but on the facts alleged by the opposite party they contended that the deposit of rent by them, under the order of the Controller, to the credit of the petitioner, amounted, in law, to payment of rent, and, as such, there had been no default in the payment of rent. The Controller himself, in his order, has observed as follows: "Ext. H is the challan showing deposit of rent for the months of July to October, 1951, through Challan No. 1 A dated 9-4-1952 Letter no, 106 dated 5-5-52, Ext. J, has been proved by the Veterinary Assistant Surgeon showing that the S.D.O. and the House Controller, Araria, was intimated about the deposit of Rs. H is the challan showing deposit of rent for the months of July to October, 1951, through Challan No. 1 A dated 9-4-1952 Letter no, 106 dated 5-5-52, Ext. J, has been proved by the Veterinary Assistant Surgeon showing that the S.D.O. and the House Controller, Araria, was intimated about the deposit of Rs. 225/- as rent from July, 1951 to March, 1952, by 3 Challans." 5. The question, therefore, before the Controller was whether the irregular deposit of the rent with the Controller by the opposite party to the credit of the petitioner amounted to payment of rent, or not. This question was a mixed question of fact and law, and, the Commissioner was perfectly entitled in law to decide this question, and to reverse the finding of the Controller and the Collector on this point. It is true the Controller as Well as the Collector considered the irregular deposit of the rent amounting to non-payment of rent. They further found, that the personal requirement of the house by the petitioner had been made out, but the Commissioner did not agree with the above findings of the courts below, and, therefore, reversed their findings, and came to the conclusion, on the materials on the record, that there had been ho non-payment of rent, and the plea of personal requirement was not bona fide. In this connection, he made the following observation: "It is true that the deposits in some cases have been made after one or two months. When rents have to be deposited, petitions have to be filed, permission obtained, and these formalities, certainly take some time. I would not, therefore, consider that the delay in deposit in the treasury should be construed as default in payment of rent. It is not denied that no arrears are due at present." This, in my opinion, is a clear finding that the non-payment of rent by the opposite party has not been established, and, therefore there has been . no default in payment of rent. The learned Commissioner, further, found : "I would not accept also the plea of bona fide requirement." in my opinion, the learned Commissioner was perfectly justified in law in coming to his own conclusion and finding, on the material before him, whether non-payment of rent, and plea of bona fide personal requirement by the petitioner, had been made out. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Ghose has, however, contended that the order of the Commissioner is vitiated, because he considered that a notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, was necessary, if any arrear was due on account of the Veterinary Hospital Dispensary, and, further, he considered that the deposit made by the opposite party with the Controller could not be questioned subsequently on the ground that the Controller should not have allowed that to be done. In my opinion, these two wrong observations of the learned Commissioner do not, in the least, vitiate his findings on the question of non-payment of rent and personal necessity of the petitioner. The order of the Commissioner, therefore, cannot be assailed. It has not, therefore, been shown that there is any error on the face of the record in the order of the learned Commissioner, and, as such, it cannot be challenged on that ground. I would, therefore, overrule the contention of Mr. Ghose. 7. Mr. Ghose relied on Waryam Singh V/s. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 : ( AIR 1954 SC 215 ) (A) in support of his contention that the Commissioner acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for ejectment against the opposite party, when it was admitted that the rent had not been paid. In my opinion, this case has no application, because in the Supreme Court case the tenant, in his written statement, admitted the non-payment of rent, but pleaded that the landlords application was barred by reason of the rejection of the previous application for eviction made by the landlord. In the present case, however, that is not the position. No doubt, the fact that no rent was actually paid into the hands of the petitioner by the opposite party is admitted, but the opposite party has pleaded that, in law, there has been no non-payment of rent, because the opposite party deposited the rent in court, and, as such, it cannot be said that non-payment of rent was admitted both in fact and in law in the present case. 8. Mr. Ghose cited Kusum Kumari Devi V/s. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bihar 1954 BLJR 148 : ( AIR 1954 Pat 238 ) (B), Bidhubhusan Sen V/s. Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna 1955 BLJR 654 : ( AIR 1955 Pat 496 ) (C), & Om Prakash Agarwala V/s. Additional Commr. 8. Mr. Ghose cited Kusum Kumari Devi V/s. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bihar 1954 BLJR 148 : ( AIR 1954 Pat 238 ) (B), Bidhubhusan Sen V/s. Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna 1955 BLJR 654 : ( AIR 1955 Pat 496 ) (C), & Om Prakash Agarwala V/s. Additional Commr. Patna Division, Patna, 1956 PLR 136 : ( AIR 1956 Pat 305 ) (D) for the proposition that the High Court under Article 226 can Issue a writ of certiorari to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order. In my opinion, this proposition of law cannot be disputed. It is now well established, by series of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court that the scope of a writ of certiorari is very wide. A writ of certiorari lies not merely when the inferior tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction, but also when the tribunal commits an error of law patent on the face of the record. It is also well settled that what is an error apparent on the face of the record, that is, what is "speaking order calling for an interference, is a question that has to be decided on the facts of each case. "Speaking order" is one which, on mere perusal, springs to ones mind as being erroneous and does not require a careful and elaborate argument to establish that there has been an error of law. Therefore, where an order passed by an inferior court or tribunal rests on errors which speak for themselves and are apparent on the face of the record, it is amenable to a writ of certiorari and must be quashed. But the question in the present case is: is there such a manifest error apparent on the face of the impugned order of the Commissioner? in my opinion, no such error of law has been shown in the present case. All the contentions raised by Mr. Ghose are, therefore, rejected. 9. In the result, no case has been made out for the issue of a writ for quashing the impugned order of the Commissioner. The rule is, therefore, discharged, and, the application is dismissed with costs; hearing fee Rs. 100/-. The cost will be paid to the District Board, opposite party 2nd only. Ramaswami, J. 10 I agree.