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1956 DIGILAW 108 (RAJ)

Dungardas v. Custodian Rajasthan

1956-04-09

MODI, WANCHOO

body1956
Wanchoo, C. J.—This is an application by Durgadass and another under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Custodian Evacuee Property, Rajasthan, and the Deputy Custo-dian Evacuee Property, Ganganagar. 2. Dungardass case briefly was that certain proceedings were taken against him by the Additional Custodian, Ganganagar, for recovery of a sum of a Rs. 8000/- said to have been deposited with him by one Maulabux who later became an evacuee. There proceedings were dropped in August, 1949. Thereafter, fresh proceedings in the same matter were started by the Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property Ganganagar in October, 1952. Dungardas objected to fresh proceedings being taken on the ground that the matter had already been adjudicated upon in 1949. This objection was overruled and Durgadas was directed to deposit the amount along with 6% interest. He preferred an appeal to the Custodian, which was dismissed. thereafter, he went in revision to the Custodian General, New Delhi, and the revision was dismissed on the 7th of January, 1955. The other applicant Sohan Singh has been joined because during the proceedings in (he Evacuee Department, he became surety for the payment of the amount by Dungardas. The present application was filed in February 1955, after the Custodian General had rejected the revision of the applicant. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised that this Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order against the Custodian General New Delhi, and as the order of the Deputy Custodian, Ganganagar has been upheld and confirmed by the Custodian General in revision, the applicant cannot ask this Court to issue a writ to the Deputy Custodian Ganganagar as that would not be of any help to the applicant. 4. A similar ease borne before this Court in Barkat Ali vs. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property (1). In that case, it was held by the Bench, to which one of us was a party, that where the Custodian General merely dismissed the revision and the order of the Authority in Rajasthan stood as it was, the order, which would really be in dispute in this Court would be the order of the Authority in Rajasthan, and not the order of the Custodian General. It was also held that it would be sufficient in those circumstances to issue a writ to the Authority in Rajasthan, and that would not be necessary to issue any writ to the Custodian General. It was also held that it would be sufficient in those circumstances to issue a writ to the Authority in Rajasthan, and that would not be necessary to issue any writ to the Custodian General. The only case was available at that time was Election Commission, India vs. Saka Venkatarao(2), and in that case the question as to which High Court would have jurisdiction was left open cases where the Authority claiming exercise of jurisdiction over a matter at first instance was located in one State, and the Appellate Court was located in another State. Learned counsel for the opposite parties however submits that since than there have been decision of other Courts which have taken a view contrary to the decision in Barkat Alis case (1), and that the Supreme Court has approved of the view taken by the other Courts. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to Hafiz Mohammad Yusuf vs. the Custodian General Evacuee Properties, New Delhi (3); Azmat Ullah vs. The Custodian, Evacuee Property, Lucknow (4); Burhanpur National Textile Works Union, Burhanpur vs. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay (5) and Joginder Singh Waryam Singh vs. Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepsu Patiala (6). We do not think it necessary to discuss these cases in detail. Suffice it to say that the view taken in these cases is that the order of the Authority which passed it originally is merged in the order of the Appellate or Revisional Court, and if the Appellate or Revisional court is located beyond the territories over which a High court has Jurisdiction, it would not be possible for the High court to issue a writ in such a case. 5. The matter also came for consideration before the Supreme Court in A. Thagal Kunju Musaliar vs. M. Venkatachalam Potti (7).The question was raised whether the Travancore-Cochin High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 in view of the fact that Investigation Commission, which was said to be directing proceedings through some Officer in Travancore-Cochine, was located at New Delhi The learned Attorney General relied on the cases we have cited above, and urged that, in view of these decisions, the Travancore-Cochin High Court had no jurisdiction. The matter was considered by the Supreme Court, and the following observations were made at page 255 with reference to the argument of the learned Attorney General— "These decisions, however, are clearly not in point for,!n each of them, the order passed by the authority within the territories and accordingly within the jurisdiction of the High Court concerned had merged in the order of the superior authority which was located outside the territories and was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of that High Court. In that situation, a writ against the inferior authority within the territories could be of no avail to the petitioner concerned could give him no relief for the order of the superior authority outside the territories would remain outstanding and operative against him. As. therefore, no writ could be issued against the outside authority and as the orders against the authority within the territories would, in view of the orders of the superior authority, have been infructuous, the High Court concerned had, of necessity, to dismiss the petition." Barkat Alis case (1) was unfortunately not cited before the Supreme Court ; but the observations, which we have set out above are, in our opinion, very specific and clearcut and, in view of these observations, we have to hold that the view taken in Barkat Alis case(l) can no longer be substained. 6. We, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection, and dismiss the application. In view of the circumstances, we pass no order as to costs.