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1956 DIGILAW 111 (MAD)

State of Madras by the Collector of South Arcot Dist. v. Muniyappa Chetty

1956-03-08

BASHEER AHMED SAYEED

body1956
Judgement ORDER :- This civil revision petition arises out of the order of the learned District Munsif allowing the amendment of the plaint prayed for by the plaintiff in IA No. 811 of 1954 in O. S. No. 718 of 1951. The suit itself has had a chequered career. It was dismissed in the first instance, and an appeal was taken and in the appeal, the suit was remanded, with a view to enable the plaintiff to apply for a commissioner to measure the properties of both the parties, and to find out the extent in the possession of each, and place all the data before the Court to enable it to come to a conclusion whether there was an encroachment by the plaintiff or not. After the suit was remanded the plaintiff filed the application for amendment of the plaint, and it is out of that petition that this revision has arisen. 2. In para 10 of the plaint, the plaintiff averred that the suit A schedule property was the absolute property of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest were in possession of the property for more than 60 years, and were enjoying the same as part and parcel of the remaining buildings, and forming a continuous residential house described in the B schedule. 3. In para 12 of the plaint, the plaintiff averred that the defendant had no right or interest in the suit property and even if he had any, the right was lost to him for non-user for over 60 years, and that the plaintiff had perfected his title by adverse possession to the knowledge of the defendant in any view of the case. 4. The amendment now sought to be made is at the end of para. 4. The amendment now sought to be made is at the end of para. 12, and is in the following terms : "The plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest have been in enjoyment of the suit property from time immemorial in their own rights, the origin of which is not now traceable and it for any reason the Court finds that the suit property forms part of the railway poromboke, the plaintiff respectfully submits that it should have been granted to them and that it should be presumed to have been lost in antiquity, and not traceable now, and that the right should be field to be a lost grant in law." It is this amendment that the learned District Munsif has allowed to be made to the plaint, and against which this revision has been filed by the State of Madras. 5. One preliminary point was, however, raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, that the amendment having been allowed, and costs having been ordered, the costs were drawn out by the respondent, and therefore, it was not open any more for the respondent in the lower Court to contend that the amendment was wrongly allowed. Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar, appearing on behalf of the respondents has invited my attention to a decision in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Chidamabaram Chettiar, AIR 1927 Mad 1009 (2)(A), which is a judgment of Jackson, J. (single). But subsequent to this, in Komaraswami Pillai v. Venkataramarao, 1956-1 Mad LJ 40 : ( AIR 1956 Mad 105 )(B) a Bench, of this Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Somasundaram, J. have held that the drawing out of the costs ordered when an amendment is allowed will not be a bar to the filing of a revision petition, if, by the amendment, the party is aggrieved. I think, with all respect, that the principle laid down in this decision is the correct one, and has to be followed. In its form, I do not find any substance in the preliminary point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. 6. The real point to be considered is where an amendment has been sought for and allowed, whether it does or does not create a new case which is different from the one that has been set up in the original plaint. In the original plaint, the case, as could be gathered from paras. 6. The real point to be considered is where an amendment has been sought for and allowed, whether it does or does not create a new case which is different from the one that has been set up in the original plaint. In the original plaint, the case, as could be gathered from paras. 10 and 12 is that the property in question had become an absolute property of the plaintiff by reason of adverse possession for over 60 years, enjoyed by the plaintiff against the State Government. But the present amendment seeks to put the case on a different footing, as could be gathered from the amendment that has been sought to be allowed. In this amendment, the averment is that the plaintiff is not in a position to say when his right to the property was first acquired owing to the passing of several years, though it is presumed that it is an ancient grant last in antiquity, and it is that position which the plaintiff seeks to make out clear in the pleadings, by means of the amendment. If a case of a lost grant is set up as against a case of perfection of title by adverse possession, there could be little doubt that the two cases are quite different and that if the amendment is allowed it will certainly change the character of the case as was originally put forward by the plaint. I do not think that the learned District Munsif has come to the right conclusion when he held that notwithstanding the fact that the amendment sets up a new and inconsistent case, it is just and necessary that the amendment should be allowed. There is no need for me to refer to any decisions which have ruled that by means of an amendment, no party should be allowed to set up a new, or an inconsistent case, with the one with which he first came to Court. 7. It is a well known proposition, and though the learned counsel for the State Government has invited my attention to the decisions in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung, 48 Cal 832 : (AIR 1922 PC 249) (C). 7. It is a well known proposition, and though the learned counsel for the State Government has invited my attention to the decisions in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung, 48 Cal 832 : (AIR 1922 PC 249) (C). Seshacharyulu v. Lakshminara-yanacharyulu, 1945-2 Mad LJ 542 : ( AIR 1946 Mad 105 ) (D) and Elaya Pillai v. Ramaswami Jadaya Goundan, 1946-2 Mad LJ 373 : (AIR 1947 Mad 165) (E), I do not think it is necessary for me to deal with those cases for the purpose of this revision petition. This revision petition is therefore allowed, and the order of the learned District Munsif is set aside. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.