Judgment :- 1. These Civil Revision Petitions arise from an order impleading the counter-petitioner in the two Revision Petitions in place of the deceased plaintiff and refusing to implead the petitioners in C.R.P. No. 37 as the plaintiff's legal representatives. The suit was by one Marthanda Pillai for cancellation of a gift deed executed by him. He died on 8.11.1954 and the counter-petitioner applied by C.M.P. No.316 dated 17.1.1955 to be brought on record as additional plaintiff on the strength of a settlement deed executed by Marthanda Pillai on 13.3.1954. The petitioners in C.R.P. 37 also made an application C.M.P. 1319 of 1955. They claimed to be the heirs and legal representatives of Marthanda Pillai. The defendant filed objections to both the applications. C.M.P. No. 316 was allowed while C.M.P. No. 1319 of 1955 was dismissed. The petitioner in C.R.P. No. 37 is filed by the applicants in C.M.P. No. 1319. The two revision petitions were heard together. 2. Although the only objection taken in the court below was that the settlement deed relied on by the counter petitioner was vitiated by fraud, learned counsel for the defendant raised a point regarding the competence of the counter-petitioner to get himself impleaded in place of the original plaintiff. His contention is that the counter-petitioner being a transferee of Marthanda Pillai is not entitled to come in as legal representative under O. XXII R.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The specific provision of law under which C.M.P. No. 316 was filed was not stated in the application but it is clear from the affidavit accompanying the same that the counter-petitioner sought to get himself impleaded as assignee of Marthanda Pillai and that his application was one under O. XXII R.10 of the Code. O. XXII, R.3 cannot apply to the case of a transferee from the original plaintiff as the right does not devolve on him by reason of the death of the plaintiff. The real question for decision is whether the counter-petitioner is entitled to be impleaded under O. XXII, R.10 on the strength of the settlement deed executed by the original plaintiff. Reliance was placed by the defendant on the decision of the Patna High Court in Gobardhan v. Saligram (AIR 1936 Pat. 123). This decision cannot be of any help in deciding this case as the points which were decided are entirely different. Reliance was placed by the defendant on the decision of the Patna High Court in Gobardhan v. Saligram (AIR 1936 Pat. 123). This decision cannot be of any help in deciding this case as the points which were decided are entirely different. One Matangini died after instituting a suit informa pauperis. After her death, one Gobardhan filed an application stating that he had acquired from Matangini before her death a lease of the properties involved in the suit for a term of 99 years and that he should be impleaded in her place. This application was dismissed on the ground that Matangini had only a limited interest in the properties. This order was allowed to become final. Thereafter he filed another application for getting himself impleaded on the strength of a deed obtained from Priyasakhi, daughter of Matangini. He also prayed in that application that Priyasakhi should also be impleaded. This application was also dismissed and the matter went up in revision before the High Court. It was urged by Gobardhan that he was entitled to come in under O. XXII, R.3 read with S.146 or under O. XXII, R.10, either as representative of the original plaintiff or of her daughter. The decision was that he could not come in under O. XXII R.3 as the right claimed by him did not accrue to him on the death of Matangini and that he was not therefore a legal representative. O. XXII, R.10 was also held not to apply, as Priyasakhi from whom he obtained a deed was not a party to the suit as provided in that rule. As regards the prayer to get himself impleaded as transferee of Matangini, the same was refused on the ground that the earlier application on that basis was dismissed and that the order had become final. It will thus be seen that the question whether a transferee from the plaintiff is entitled to get himself impleaded under O. XXII R.10 after the plaintiff's death did not arise for decision in that case. It was pointed that this decision was followed by this Court in Chacko Pyli v. Ipe Varghese 1955 KLT 739 (FB). This was only in support of the proposition that the transferee in a transfer inter vivos cannot be considered to be a legal representative of the transferor. It was pointed that this decision was followed by this Court in Chacko Pyli v. Ipe Varghese 1955 KLT 739 (FB). This was only in support of the proposition that the transferee in a transfer inter vivos cannot be considered to be a legal representative of the transferor. A question similar to the one in this case arose in Prakash Chandra Das Gupta v. Shama Charan Dutt and others (AIR 1925 Cal. 467) Suhrawardy and Duval, JJ. held: "The simple question of law that arises in this case irrespective of those facts, is whether when there are two devolutions - the death of a party and the transfer by him of his interest in the suit - the transferee has the right to be brought on the record in place of the deceased transferor. It seems to us on going through the several sections of the Code, dealing with the matter, that the two devolutions which have occurred in this case are distinct and are governed by different considerations. The death of the plaintiff after the assignment of his interest should not take away the assignee's right to be substituted in the suit. If effect is given to the contrary contentions the result will be that if a plaintiff after selling his interest in the subject-matter of the suit dies before the assignee could make an application for the substitution under 0.22, R.10, the assignee will have no right to be brought on the record and the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff having no interest in the subject-matter there will be no representation in the suit, and the assignee will be deprived of the benefit of his purchase through no fault of his. The true view is what was taken in the case of Rajaram Bhagwat v. Jibal (1885) 9 Bom.151." 3. Of the two devolutions, one by death and other by assignment the latter has to be given effect to under 0. XXII, R.10. In a later case, Anil Chandra v. Gopinath (AIR 1950 Cal. 376) the Calcutta High Court differed from the view taken by the Patna High Court in the case referred to earlier. Of the two devolutions, one by death and other by assignment the latter has to be given effect to under 0. XXII, R.10. In a later case, Anil Chandra v. Gopinath (AIR 1950 Cal. 376) the Calcutta High Court differed from the view taken by the Patna High Court in the case referred to earlier. It was held that in the case of an assignment by the legal representative of a deceased party, the assignee could get impleaded by virtue of the provisions of S.146 of the Code which provides that an application or proceeding of a like nature can be taken by the transferee as could have been taken by the transferor. The argument that the transferee in such circumstances could apply only for impleading the legal representatives of the transferer was effectively disposed of by pointing out that if the legal representative could make an application to get himself impleaded it was not clear why his transferee could not do so under S.146 of the Code. With great respect, I follow the view laid down by the Calcutta High Court in preference to that of the Patna High Court. The decisions of the Madras High Court cited by the learned counsel for the defendant have no application to the facts of this case. The conclusion reached by the learned judge that the counter-petitioner was entitled to be impleaded as additional plaintiff on the strength of the settlement deed is fully supported by the decision in Prakash Chandra Das Gupta v. Sharma Charan Dutt and others (AIR 1925 Cal. 467). In considering an application under O. XXII, R.10, the Court has to consider whether leave should be granted to the transferee to continue the suit. There is no material in this case for holding that the transfer was not a bona fide one. It necessarily follows that the application of the counter-petitioner was rightly allowed and that C.M.P. No. 1319 by the legal representatives had to be dismissed. 4. In the result the order of the court below is confirmed and the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed with costs.