Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal arises out of proceedings before the Cochin District Munsiff's Court to execute a decree of the Krishnapuram District Munsiff's Court and it was referred to a Full Bench for decision by a Division Bench of which one of us was a member. The application before the transferee court was filed admittedly beyond 12 years from the date of the passing of the decree, but the lower Courts proceeded on the basis that the last application before the transferring court was within 12 years thereof. However, they differed in their conclusions as to whether the execution was barred by time or not in that, while the District Munsiff was of opinion that when the court which passed a decree transfers it for execution to another court, the decree holder was bound to make a regular execution application before the transferee court in order that that court might proceed with execution, the appellate court opined that when, as in the present case, the transfer is made during the pendency of an application for execution in the transferring court, no regular application for execution was necessary before the transferee court for execution to be proceeded with and that any application made to that court should be considered only as ancillary to or as one in continuation of the execution application filed before the transferring court. The erstwhile High Court of Cochin had consistently adhered to the former view, while the erstwhile Travancore High Court had taken the latter view -vide XVIII Cochin Law Reports 535 and XXVI Cochin Law Reports 326 on the one hand and XXII Travancore Law Journal 981 and XXX Travancore Law Journal 179 on the other. This conflict of opinion between the two High Courts and the absence of any decision of this Court bearing on the point, as well as the fact that with reference to a further point arising for decision in the second appeal two references to the Full Bench were pending decision, induced the Division Bench to refer this case also for decision by a Full Bench. The common question in all the three cases was whether in the matter of a pending execution, when fresh properties are sought to be attached or otherwise proceeded against after 12 years of the date of the decree, that application even though in form not a regular execution application would constitute a fresh application within the meaning of S.48, Civil Procedure Code. The order of reference in this case was made on 16.1.1956 and since then when another second appeal where the same question arose came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge, his attention was invited to these three references and he therefore referred that case (S.A. No. 103 of 1955) also for decision by a Full Bench. This Full Bench heard all the four cases and in two of them it was found that it was unnecessary for the decision of those cases to pronounce upon the above moot point on account of which the references happened to be made. However in S.A. No. 103 of 1955 (1956 KLT 888) the point was considered and in a judgment delivered on 3.10.1955 we held that except in the case of defective execution application admitted and registered by the Court without calling upon the decree-holder to cure the defects, the court will have no jurisdiction to allow execution against properties mentioned for the first time in a list filed 12 years after the date of the passing of the decree, even though that list happened to be filed when an execution application filed within time was pending. The defect contemplated by the decision is the failure to furnish along with the execution petition a list of properties sought to be attached or otherwise proceeded against and the decision was based on the rule that a litigant cannot be allowed to suffer for the mistake of the court. 0.21, R.17 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, cast certain duties on the court before admitting and registering an execution application and if by failing to comply with those duties the court lulled the decree-holder into a sense of false security, it ought not to refuse him a reasonable opportunity to recover from the false position in which he was placed. 2. Regard being had to the facts of the present case and the decision referred to above (1956 KLT 888), the decision of this second appeal becomes quite simple. 2. Regard being had to the facts of the present case and the decision referred to above (1956 KLT 888), the decision of this second appeal becomes quite simple. A decision on the point whether for the transferee court to proceed with the execution a regular application should be filed before that court even when the transfer of the decree takes place while execution was pending before the transferring court has now become unnecessary. A statement of the relevant facts will bear this out. 3. The decree under execution was passed by the Krishnapuram Court on 29.6.1112 (11.2.1937). Successive execution applications had kept it alive when the last execution application made within 12 years of the date of the decree was filed on 1.5.1124 (15.12.1948) by an attaching decree-holder, the respondent here, whom we shall hereafter refer to as the decree-holder. Defendant 2 had died even before the date of the application preceding that filed on 1.5.1124 and in that earlier application which was made on 3.4.1122 that fact was not only mentioned, but there the legal heirs were also impleaded. In spite of that, the application of 1.5.1124 proceeded as if defendant 2 was alive and the court therefore called upon the decree holder to file a fresh petition showing all the necessary parties. Purporting to comply with that order the decree-holder filed another application on 25.7.1124 (8.3.1949). That application also proceeded as if defendant 2 was alive. The court ignored it and made a further order on the application of 1.5.1124 specifically pointing out the error and asking the decree-holder to file another application mentioning the fact of the death of defendant 2 and impleading his legal heirs also as respondents. This order was complied with on 19.10.1124 (1.6.1949). The Court accepted it as supplement to, or in substitution of, the application dated 1.5.1124. Afterwards on 15.1.1950 the court directed the transmission of the decree to the Cochin Munsiff's Court through the proper channel and later on 20.12.1950 directed the whole file to be transferred to the Cochin Munsiff's Court. There on 13.8.1951 the decree-holder filed a regular execution application seeking to proceed against immovable properties of defendant 2 in the hands of his legal heirs. Objection raised by one of the legal heirs that the execution was barred by limitation found favour with the Cochin District Munsiff's Court and that court dismissed the application. There on 13.8.1951 the decree-holder filed a regular execution application seeking to proceed against immovable properties of defendant 2 in the hands of his legal heirs. Objection raised by one of the legal heirs that the execution was barred by limitation found favour with the Cochin District Munsiff's Court and that court dismissed the application. The decision of the learned District Munsiff was reversed by the Temporary Additional District Judge of the Anjikaimal who heard the decree holder's appeal therefrom and the second appeal is, as already mentioned, from that appellate order. 4. The courts below proceeded on the basis that on the date of the order for transmission of the decree to the Cochin District Munsiff's Court the application then pending on the file of the transferring court was the one dated 1.5.1124. In view of the fact that that court accepted the application of 19.10.1124 as one to supplement the earlier application of 1.5.1124 or as one in substitution thereof, there is nothing wrong in that assumption. However the prayers made in the application dated 1.5.1124 were only to seek to realise the amounts due under the decree by calling upon two garnishees who held certain amounts of the defendant 2 and which are attached, to pay up the decree debt and in the event of their failure to comply with the requisition, to transfer the decree to the Alleppey Munsiff's Court within whose jurisdiction they were residing and also by proceeding against the movable and immovable properties of defendants 2 onwards. The significant thing to be noticed about this application is that no mention is made there of the transfer of the decree to Cochin to proceed against any property of the deceased defendant 2 in the hands of his legal heirs. The amended application dated 19.10.1124, had, however, mentioned that in case the garnishees did not comply with the requisition, the decree should be transferred to Alleppey Munsiff's Court for proceeding against them and if the decree was not satisfied by those steps, execution should be allowed personally against defendants 3 and 4 and in the event of those steps also failing, the decree should be transferred to the Cochin Munsiff's Court for proceeding against the properties of the deceased defendant 2 in the hands of his legal representatives. Though not in so clear terms the first amended application dated 25.7.1124 had also referred to a transfer to the Cochin District Munsiff's Court for proceeding against the properties of the deceased defendant 2. Both these amendments were, however, after 12 years had elapsed from the date of the passing of the decree, they went beyond the scope of the amendment contemplated by the court's orders and introduced reliefs different and distinct from those contained in the last application filed within time. To that extent they have to be treated as fresh applications within the meaning of S.48, Civil Procedure Code and as they were themselves filed out of time it is bootless to consider whether the execution application before the Cochin Munsiff's Court was only ancillary to or in continuation of them. 5. In the light of our decision in 1956 KLT 888 the above is the view to be taken regarding the amended execution applications of 25.7.1124 and 19.10.1124. The transferring court had indeed ignored altogether the amended application of 25.7.1124, but as that is earlier we are taking that also into account lest the decree-holder should be deprived of the benefit if any, of the earliest reference to a transfer of the decree to Cochin. 6. As the last application filed in the transferring court within time did not contemplate the transmission of the decree to the Cochin District Munsiff's Court for being executed through that court, the application filed in that court (13.8.1951) together with a list of properties to be attached, can by no stretch of imagination to be treated as ancillary to or as one to continue that application, but only as an independent application, that is a fresh application within the meaning of S.48. The decree having been passed on 11.2.1937 and the application to the Cochin Court having been made only on 13.8.1951, it was long out of time. 7. So in any view of the matter execution against Cochin properties was certainly barred by time. Either the one or the other of the amended applications filed in the transferring court, or the application filed in the transferee court, cannot be treated as ancillary to or to be in continuation of the application of 1.5.1124 (15.12.1948) filed before the transferring Court. When either possibility is ruled out it is impossible to save the situation for the decree-holder. 8. When either possibility is ruled out it is impossible to save the situation for the decree-holder. 8. We therefore, allow the second appeal, set aside the lower appellate Court's decision and restore the decision of the District Munsiff (Cochin). In the circumstances of the case we make no order for costs. The question whether execution can be continued in the Krishnapuram Court or the decree can now be transferred to Alleppey is a matter the Krishnapuram Court will have to decide, if and when called upon to do so. Order accordingly.