JUDGEMENT : The short facts which give rise to this second appeal are that the plaintiff entered the service of the Gwalior State as the Traffic Inspector of the Gwalior Light Railway on 25-4-1933, that while he was serving the Railway as the P. A. to the Manager of the Scindia State Railway (The Gwalior Light Railway subsequently came to be known later on as Scindia Railway), he was dismissed on 2-9-49 by an order of the Minister-in-charge of the Port-folio of Communication. The plaintiff challenged the order of dismissal on two grounds; first that he was dismissed without being given an opportunity to explain the charges against him; two, that in denying him the opportunity to show cause, not only were the principles of natural justice violated, but the act was also against the then prevailing law in the State; third, that the plaintiff being a Gazetted Officer, his case ought to have been referred to the Public Service Commission before his being dismissed. On 1-4-50, the Scindia State Railway was transferred to the Central Government, and, in consequence the suit is filed against the Union of India as represented by the Manager, Central Railways, in which the Scindia State Railway was merged. The written statement submitted on behalf of the Union stated that the plaintiff before his dismissal was given an opportunity to explain the charges against him, that it was after a full enquiry that the plaintiff was dismissed. It was also stated that there was no law in the former Gwalior State according to which the plaintiff was entitled to be accorded such an opportunity. It was also contended that it was not necessary to refer the matter to the Public Service Commission before the dismissal of the plaintiff. The trial Court decreed the suit, holding that the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to explain the charges against him and that though the law existed according to which such an opportunity was to be given to a servant before his dismissal, yet it was not followed. The trial Court did not accept the contention of the plaintiff, that his case should have been referred to Public Service Commission, because it held that he was not a Gazetted Officer, on appeal, the District Judge, Gwalior, upheld the decision of the trial Court. Now this is defendants second appeal. 2. The trial Court did not accept the contention of the plaintiff, that his case should have been referred to Public Service Commission, because it held that he was not a Gazetted Officer, on appeal, the District Judge, Gwalior, upheld the decision of the trial Court. Now this is defendants second appeal. 2. Before considering the point raised in this appeal, I would first of all like to say that although the Central Railway had stated in its written statement that before dismissing the plaintiff a charge-sheet was given to him, and, he was called upon to submit his reply, yet curiously enough before the first appellate Court, the counsel of the Railway conceded that before the plaintiffs dismissal, no charge-sheet was given to the plaintiff, nor was his explanation called. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Nanak Chand has pressed only three points in this appeal : 1. That the notice dated 5-2-51 under S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was defective, in so far as that instead of being served on the General Manager of the Central Railway, it was served on the Secretary, Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 2. That there was no law either in the former Gwalior State or in Madhya Bharat, according to which it was necessary to call the explanation of the plaintiff before dismissing him. 3. That even if the plaintiff was serving in the Scindia State Railway, the Union of India is not liable for it. 4. I propose to deal with these points in the order in which they have been stated. 5. Regarding Point No. 1, namely, the objection about the notice under S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, I find that no objection was ever taken about it in the written statement, and, that after the case had been going on in the trial Court for over two years and when the evidence was almost at an end, the defendants sought permission on 2-11-53 to amend the pleadings to enable them to raise an objection about notice under S. 80. The trial Court said that it was raised at a late stage, and, relying upon Wasant Shripat v. G. M. Khandekar, AIR 1949 Nag 25 (A), in which it was stated that in view of the delay of one year and nine months, the defendant should be deemed to have waived his right to a notice under S. 80, the trial Court held that the defendants must be deemed to have waived the objection and that at that late stage they could not be permitted to raise it. Similarly it has been held in a Bombay case Erach Shaw Hormusji v. Secy. of State, AIR 1943 Bom 160 (B) that when the allegation of notice under S. 80 in the plaint is not traversed in the written statement on the ground of insufficiency or invalidity, it must be taken to have been waived. I agree with the view taken by the lower Courts. But I have one more reason for thinking that the plea of a notice under S. 80 is void of substance. The plaintiff was dismissed on 2-9-49 by an order of the Communication Minister of Madhya Bharat. This order of dismissal is the foundation of the present case. While the Scindia State Railway was still under the management of the Madhya Bharat State, the Secretary, Minister of Communication, Madhya Bharat, received a notice from the plaintiff under S. 80, C. P. C., on 28-2-50. Subsequently to this, the Scindia State Railway was transferred to the Central Government on 1-4-50. In the circumstances was it necessary to give another notice to the Central Government, which had inherited all assets and liabilities of the Scindia State Railway? The obvious answer is no. The cause of action arose on 2-9-49 (on the date of dismissal) and according to the law a proper notice was served on Madhya Bharat Government on 28-2-50, against whom the suit would have been filed had not the transfer of the Scindia State Railway taken place thereafter. The second notice which the plaintiff served on the Secretary, the Ministry of Railways Government of India, was unnecessary and was merely by way of abundant caution. The second notice which the plaintiff served on the Secretary, the Ministry of Railways Government of India, was unnecessary and was merely by way of abundant caution. The cause of action originally did not arise against the Central Government, but the real cause of action arose against the Madhya Bharat Government and the present suit is filed against the Central Government only as a transferee of the Madhya Bharat Government. I do not see why a second notice was necessary, when the first notice was effective. The Central Government has merely stood in the shoes of the Madhya Bharat Government so far as the Scindia State Railway was concerned. I find some authority for the view I have taken in G. I. P. Rly. Co., Bombay v. M. Seeramulu, AIR 1928 Mad 599 (C). The facts of this case were that the plaintiff gave a notice under S. 77 of the Railways Act to the Railway Administration. Thereafter the Railway Administration was taken over by the Secretary of State for India and when the suit was brought against the Secretary of State, it was contended that the suit was bad for want of notice under S. 80, C. P. C. It was held that as the Secretary of State, had taken over the Administration of the Railway, he stood in the shoes of the Railway Administration, which he took over, and, therefore, the suit which was good against the Administration was also good against the Secretary of State. On the analogy of this case, the notice to the Government of Madhya Bharat which was valid and proper, must be deemed to be good and valid against the Central Government also, who took over the administration of the Scindia State Railway. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. S. K. Dar has argued that the second notice to the Secretary, Ministry of Railways, is also good. He says that according to Cl. (a) S. 80, C. P. C., in a suit against the Central Government, the notice is to go to, a Secretary of the Government, except when the suit relates to a Railway in which case, the notice has to go to the General Manager of that Railway. Mr. Dar maintains that the suit does not relate to a Railway. (a) S. 80, C. P. C., in a suit against the Central Government, the notice is to go to, a Secretary of the Government, except when the suit relates to a Railway in which case, the notice has to go to the General Manager of that Railway. Mr. Dar maintains that the suit does not relate to a Railway. He contends that Railway" is not defined in the C. P. C., but when we turn to S. 3, Cl. (4) of the Indian Railways Act, we find that "Railway" is defined as meaning a railway or any portion of railway for the public carriage of passengers, animals or goods and includes - (a) all land within the fences or other boundary-marks indicating the limits of the land appurtenant to a Railway; (b) all lines of rails, sidings or branches worked over for the purposes of, or in connection with, a railway; (c) all stations, offices, warehouses, wharves, workshop, manufactories, fixed plant and machinery and other works constructed for the purposes of, or in connection with, a railway; and (d) all ferries, ships, boats and rafts whice are used on inland waters for the purposes of the traffic of a railway and belonged to or are hired or worked by the authority administering the railway. 7. It is contended that notice to the General Manager of the Railway is only necessary when the suit refers to any of the things mentioned in Cl. (4), S. 3 of the Indian Railways Act. But where a suit does not relate to a matter, enumerated in Cl. (4), referred to above, it is not necessary to serve the Manager of the Railway with a notice and that the notice should go to the Secretary. This argument is somewhat novel but is not without some force. Without, however, expressing any opinion about the soundness of the contention, I have stated it for what it may be worth. I am, for reasons stated above, of the opinion that the objection about the notice, has no substance in it. 8. Regarding the second point, as to whether there was any law in the former Gwalior State or its successor Government, the State of Madhya Bharat, according to which before dismissing a servant, it was necessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to explain the charges against him, I would first of all observe that Mr. 8. Regarding the second point, as to whether there was any law in the former Gwalior State or its successor Government, the State of Madhya Bharat, according to which before dismissing a servant, it was necessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to explain the charges against him, I would first of all observe that Mr. Nanak Chand, the learned counsel for the appellant, gave me the impression that he was not at all familiar with the law, that prevailed in the former Gwalior State. He brushed aside the notification of the Chief Secretary published in Madhya Bharat Government Gazette of 11th September 1948 as a mere administrative order, which was not founded on any statute and as such had not the force of law. He endeavoured to develop a thesis, dwelling on the virtues of dictators, which the Indian Rulers were supposed to be. He urged that "dictatorship" was transferred to the democratic set-up, namely the Madhya Bharat Government, established after the Indian Rulers had surrendered their powers. He contended that this transfer of dictatorship would enable a Minister of the Madhya Bharat Government to ride rough-shod over all principles of natural justice and act even without rhyme and reason. I shall first of all deal with the law as it existed in the former State of Gwalior, on the point under consideration. 9. As far back as year 1918 in the reign of late Highness, Sir Madho Rao Scindia, the Home Department published an Order No. 3 of 6th August 1918, in the Gwalior Government Gazette dated 17th August 1918, which runs thus: 10. A perusal of this Order will show that before taking any step against a Government servant, the Order directed that the person proposed to be dealt with was to be given an opportunity for explaining his conduct. Not only that, the Order further said (and this is the distinguishing feature of it), that any officer found acting in contravention of this Order (namely of not giving an opportunity to the servant) would himself be dealt with and he would have to explain why he contravened it. Not only that, the Order further said (and this is the distinguishing feature of it), that any officer found acting in contravention of this Order (namely of not giving an opportunity to the servant) would himself be dealt with and he would have to explain why he contravened it. This was the law that existed in the Gwalior State and continued to be observed even after the creation of Madhya Bharat, because according to S. 4 of the Madhya Bharat Regulation of Government Act (Act No. 1 of 1948) after merger, all laws, Ordinances Acts, Rules, Regulations etc. of the covenanting States, continued to remain in force until repealed or amended. There is nothing to show that this Order issued by the Home Minister was ever repealed or amended. All that we find is that after the creation of Madhya Bharat the Chief Secretary of Madhya Bharat issued a notification No. 31/CS published in the Madhya Bharat Government Gazette of 11th September 1948 page 77, containing a clear direction that the person against whom action is sought to be taken must be accorded an opportunity to submit his explanation. Thus we have the law of the old Gwalior State in the clearest possible terms and also the notification of the Chief Secretary, Madhya Bharat Government, both directing the giving of an opportunity to a servant, before taking any step against him. This principle, which is in fact a principle of natural justice has also found its way in our Constitution under Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. The principle is that no one shall be condemned unheard. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that although natural justice demanded that the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity before being condemned, yet because the Madhya Bharat Government is successor to the Gwalior Raj, a Minister of the Madhya Bharat Government can act without rhyme and reason, because the rulers of Indian States were autocrats any and everything can be done. Besides being a calumny on the administration of the former Indian States, the argument does not lay down any sound principle worth considering. Besides being a calumny on the administration of the former Indian States, the argument does not lay down any sound principle worth considering. Without entering into any discussion as to whether the notification by the Chief Secretary referred to above has any force of law, I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Supreme Court held that a firman of the Nizam of Hyderabad was binding in the same way as any other law. On that analogy, an Order of the Gwalior Raj issued under the authority of its Home Minister, and, published in the Government Gazette of the State, will have the same force as a piece of statutory legislation. 11. Mr. Nanak Chand, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that according to the principle embodied in S. 279 (Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 22, page 165, Master and Servant), a servant who has been wrongfully dismissed can sue for damages. But in advancing this argument, the learned counsel has overlooked the point that the law of master and Servant governs domestic and personal servants and not the Government servants. 12. In the light of above discussion I agree with the Courts below that the dismissal of the plaintiff was wrongful. 13. The last question to be considered in this appeal is whether the Union of India is liable for the wrong dismissal of a servant of Madhya Bharat Government, serving in the Scindia State Railway. 14. It is urged that the plaintiff had been transferred to the Gwalior Central India Transport Company by an order of the Minister and as such the Railway is not liable for his wrongful dismissal, suffice it to say that the Minister dismissed him as Traffic Inspector, Scindia State Railway, which fact is abundantly clear from the order of dismissal, which is Ex. P-1. He cannot, therefore, be regarded as one serving in the G. C. I. T. Company. It is true that an order, transferring him to G. C. I. T. was passed by the Minister, but the plaintiff had not handed over his charge to anyone and was serving as the P.A. to the General Manager, Scindia State Railway, and while serving the Railway in that capacity, the order terminating his services was served on him. If he had actually gone to the G. C. I. T., then the position would have been different. If he had actually gone to the G. C. I. T., then the position would have been different. Did the Minister dismiss him as a person serving in the G. C. I. T.? The answer is no and the order of dismissal Ex. P-1 speaks for itself. It is also significant that all along he drew his pay till his dismissal from the Scindia Railway Budget, not from the G. C. I. T. Company. 15. In considering the question whether the Central Government is liable or not, I find that on 1-4-1950 the transfer of the Scindia State Railway to the Central Government took effect. The plaintiff remained in the service of the Scindia State Railway till 2-9-1949, i.e., the date of his dismissal. Who then is liable for plaintiffs wrongful dismissal? The unquestionable position is that if the Scindia State Railway had not been transferred to the Central Government, then the Madhya Bharat Government as an owner of the Scindia State Railway would have been liable. Now whether on transfer, the liability for wrong dismissal is also transferred to the Centre will depend upon the effect of the transfer. 16. Mr. Nanak Chand, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to a document known as Yellow Book (Ex. D.B) which contains the recommendations of the Indian States Finance Enquiry Committee and contends that according to S. 11(1) of the Book (Part II Chapter II page 627) the liability of the Centre is confined to only the permanent staff wholly or substantially engaged on the Railway. In other words no liability exists with regard to persons retired or fired. But Mr. Dar, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to page 16 S. 25 of the same Book, and, he contends that according to the recommendations "all assets and liabilities of whatever character" have been taken over by the Centre. Furthermore, Mr. Dar contends that the Railway belongs to the Union list. See Seventh Schedule item No. 22 of the Constitution, and according to Art. 295 of the Constitution of India, all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of any Indian State, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise shall be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of India. See Seventh Schedule item No. 22 of the Constitution, and according to Art. 295 of the Constitution of India, all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of any Indian State, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise shall be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of India. Article 295 is as follows: (1) As from the commencement of this Constitution - (a) all property and assets which immediately, before such commencement were vested in any Indian State corresponding to a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall vest in the Union, if the purposes for which such property and assets were held immediately before such commencement will thereafter be purposes of the Union relating to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List, and (b) all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of any Indian State corresponding to a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule, whether arising out any contract or otherwise, shall be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of India, if the purposes for which such rights were acquired or liabilities or obligations were incurred before such commencement will thereafter be purposes of the Government of India relating to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List ................." 17. This clinches the matter and there is no doubt that the liability of Madhya Bharat in respect of the Scindia State Railway became the liability of the Government of India after the transfer. 18. There are as many as 26 grounds in the memo of appeal. Mr. Nanak Chand has only pressed the above three and the rest he has given up. 19. For reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed with costs.