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1956 DIGILAW 12 (GAU)

Miksha v. State of Manipur

1956-02-21

BRIJ NARAIN

body1956
ORDER The petitioners are hillmen residing in the villages of Champhung, Ngaimu, Phadang. Somdal non-christian, Talloi non-christian within the Ukhrul Sub-division in the hill area of Manipur State and are free citizens of Indian Union, while respondents 2 to 6 are the respective chiefs of the aforesaid villages. As respondents 2 to 6 have been claiming forced labour in respect of their respective villages from the petitioners and they had been illegally exacting forced labour from the villagers in respect of these villages from time immemorial and this forced labour has been declared to be against the fundamental rights of free citizens of Indian Union under Art. 23(1) of the Constitution of India and also under Ss. 73, 74, 75, 76 77 and 78 of the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947, but respondents 2 to 6 have obtained decrees in Civil Suits Nos. 108 of 1951-52, 139 of 1951-52, 685 of 1952-53, 105 of 1954-55, 41 of 1955-56 and 42 of 1955-56 in the Court of the S.D.O., Ukhrul, claiming damages from the respective villagers in lieu of the compulsory forced labour, the present petitioners have prayed for a writ of certiorari or a writ of like nature or an order directing the respondents to show cause why the aforesaid orders should not be set aside and for quashing the said orders. 2. Respondents 1 and 7 have not filed any written reply to the present petition. Respondents 2 to 6 have contended that the present writ petition is not maintainable according to law and the petitioners have no right to challenge the decisions mentioned above, Exs. 1-6 as they have failed to seek their proper remedy, if any, by way of appeal. It has further been contended that the petitioners and the contesting respondents are hill-men and are being governed by the natural laws of custom and usages from the times of their forefathers and the petitioners rendered free service in accordance with the custom only on one day in a year to Khullakpa (Chief) by way of Khutlang (free service rendered in lieu of services Which have already been rendered by the Chiefs-opposite parties). The petitioners could, if they so desired, according to the custom pay money compensation to the Chiefs, if they did not want to render free service and as the petitioners have been served toy the Khullakpa in all dangerous times and also toy way of deciding of their cases by the Khullakpa, they cannot legally describe the custom as illegal under Art. 23(1) of the Constitution. 3. It has not been disputed before me that the custom of Khutlang has prevailed amongst Kukis and Tangkhuls from times immemorial. The petitioners contended that they have been forced to render services to the Chiefs, but as the Constitution of India has now provided under Art. 23(1) that traffic in human beings and forced labour is against the fundamental rights of free citizens of Indian Union, the decrees in questions Exs. 1 to 6 should be quashed. 4. Article 23 of the Constitution of India runs as follows : "(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. (2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them". 5. This article creates the fundamental right against exploitation. The article catagorically prohibits all traffic in human beings and taegar and other similar forms of forced labour. Further, it makes any contravention of this prohibition an offence punishable in accordance with law. vide Chitaleys Constitution of India, Vol. I, page 631. 6. In the present case there is no question of trafficking in human beings and so the ruling reported in - Srinivasa v. Annasami, 15 Mad 323 (A), on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners, has no application to this case. 7. The only question which is material for the decision of this case is whether the orders in question seek to impose forced labour on the petitioners. Respondents 2 to 6 are admittedly chiefs (khulakpas) and in this capacity they have to discharge a number of onerous duties in order to secure the well being and peaceful living of the petitioners. The only question which is material for the decision of this case is whether the orders in question seek to impose forced labour on the petitioners. Respondents 2 to 6 are admittedly chiefs (khulakpas) and in this capacity they have to discharge a number of onerous duties in order to secure the well being and peaceful living of the petitioners. They have to protect the people living in their villages and they give dispassionate consideration (bichar) to their cases will the result that in majority of cases the petitioners have not to take recours to the law Court and in lieu of the services which are rendered by the Khulakpa from times immemorial to the general residents of the villages, each villager renders free service for only one day in a year to his chief and if he does not want to render actual service, he is allowed by the custom to pay money compensation. The mere fact that there has been no direct contract between the present petitioners and their Khulakpa, will be of no consequence. Where a person entered into a contract to perform certain service, it will (not ?) amount to forcing him to perform any service if he is only held to his civil liability under the contract. In such a case, there is no attempt to coerce him or to punish him for not performing the service. This service has not been made any offence so far by any law and Section 73 to 78 of the Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation, 1947, on which reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioners merely lay down the mode by which the Circle Authority is allowed to take work in case the officers of the State travelling on duty go to any particular village. Similarly, in case of construction and maintenance of bridle paths and bridges, the provision is made that an arrangement may be made by an agreement between the Circle Authority and the villages so that the work may be executed voluntarily or the costs of the work may be apportioned as may seem suitable between the villages and the dues may be recovered as if they were State revenues. If it were made an offence under any law to refuse to perform the alleged service then the demand for such service would amount to a demand for forced labour. If it were made an offence under any law to refuse to perform the alleged service then the demand for such service would amount to a demand for forced labour. But this is not the case here. The petitioners continue to receive the service of the Khulakpa even now and they can have no justification for refusing to render free service for one day only in a year or to pay the compensation, to the Khulakpa and the custom in question cannot be deemed to be amounting to imposition of forced labour. As such this free service for one day in a year or compensation in lieu thereof does not amount to any begar and it does not contravene, in any way, the provision of Article 23(1) of the Constitution. There appears to be absolutely no good reasons for holding that the alleged custom is bad in law and so the ruling reported in - Rajah Vurmah Valia v. Ravi Vurmah Kunshi Kutty, 1 Mad 235 (PC) (B) doss not help the present petitioner. So long as the petitioners continue to receive the service of Khulakpa, appointed under Section 6, Manipur State Hill Peoples Regulation (Administration), 1947, they cannot refuse to compensate them and so the decrees Exs. 1 to 6 cannot be legally quashed, in this proceeding. 8. The result is that this petition fails and it is hereby dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.