JUDGMENT : 1. This is defendant's second appeal against a decree of the Additional District Judge, Nimar, Mandleshwar, dated 12-7-1951, reversing the decree of the Civil Judge, First Class, Khargone, by which the latter dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The defendant has now come in second appeal. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for mandatory and permanent injunction alleging that the plaintiffs owned and possessed two sets of lands- Nos. 139, 141 and 142 on the west and Nos. 192 and 193 to the east near a Nala- in the village Pipri, Tehsil Khargone. The defendant also possessed a piece of land (Survey No. 187) lying near Nos. 192 and 193 of the plaintiffs'. Now the slope of the rain water was from plaintiffs' western lands, that is, Nos. 139, 141 and 142 towards the east over the defendant's fields- Survey No. 187- and then the water would go to join the Nala on the east side. Near the Nala are the plaintiffs' land (Survey Nos. 192 and 193). The rain water, as stated above, would not touch these fields but from defendant's No. 187 it would pass on to the Nala. It was alleged by the plaintiff in his plaint that on the west side of the Khata of the defendant, the defendant dug the path and removed the elevated barrier and erected a new Pala (a miniature dam) thus changing the course of the flow of the rain water so that the water would flow from this Pala to the plaintiffs' eastern fields- Survey Nos. 192 and 193, and would cause damage to these fields. The plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the Pala should be removed, the original condition of the path and the flow of water be restored and the pits dug by the defendant on the path should also be removed. The trial Court thought that it was a suit only for restoring the original condition of the path and as it did not belong to the plaintiff's, the trial Court took the view that the suit was not maintainable, and so dismissed it. The appellate Court reversed this finding and took the view that the erection of the Pala had caused water to flow down the plaintiff's' fields causing damage to the crops and to the fields; and, therefore, it reversed the decree and decreed the suit. 3. The appellate Court reversed this finding and took the view that the erection of the Pala had caused water to flow down the plaintiff's' fields causing damage to the crops and to the fields; and, therefore, it reversed the decree and decreed the suit. 3. Now it has been found by the two Courts below that before the construction of this Pala water used to flow from the plaintiffs' fields to the defendant's No. 187 and would pass on to the Nala on the east side. The land on the path was on a higher level and by the erection of the Pala, level has been altered by the defendant and by the construction of a bund on the western boundary of his field No. 187, the natural flow of water has been diverted on to the plaintiffs' fields Nos. 192 and 193. This diversion caused damage to the plaintiffs crops sown in fields Nos. 192 and 193. 4. Mr. Pande, learned counsel for the appellant, urges that there was no cause of action to the plaintiffs as the defendant protected his own field No. 187 by erecting a Pala. In this connection, he invites my attention to para 347 at p. 223 of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (1954 Edition) where it is observed that a landowner may lawfully erect a barrier to prevent flood water from coming on his land, although the natural consequence of his doing so is to cause more water to flow on to his neighbour's land. It makes no difference that he erects the barrier inside his boundary, leaving part of his land unprotected from the floods. If the flood waters collect on that area and subsequently discharge themselves on to his neighbour's land, he will not he liable so long us he does not actively assist their discharge nor obstruct a regular channel. Mr. Pande emphasizes the words : "so long as he does not actively assist their discharge nor obstruct a regular channel." In the present cane, it is obvious that a regular flow of rain water and not flood water was obstructed by the defendant for protecting his own field. And therefore, the principle enunciated in the beginning does not fully apply to the case. On the other hand, even according to this principle the defendant must be held liable. And therefore, the principle enunciated in the beginning does not fully apply to the case. On the other hand, even according to this principle the defendant must be held liable. Explaining the principle in such cases in 'Nield v. London and North-Western Rly. Co., (1874) 10 Ex. 4 (A)', Bramwell B. observed that the law allows what may be termed a kind of reasonable selfishness in such matters. It says "let everyone look out for himself and protect his own interest." If this view were not adopted, the result would be that a man could not reasonably use his property lest some neighbour of his might complain that lie had caused him an injury. The true principle is that where the owner of land, without wilfulness or negligence, uses his land in the ordinary manner, though mischief thereby accrues to his neighbour, he is not liable for damages, but if with a view to use the land in an unusual manner, he brings upon his land water which would not naturally have come upon it, he will be liable for damages for the escape of the water into the land of his neighbour. This view was followed by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ.) in 'Kenararn Akhuli v. Sristidhar Chatterjee', 15 Ind Cas 543 (Cal) (B). 5. In 'Sarju Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad', 1932 All 573 (AIR V 19) (C) after reviewing the whole case-law on the point, Young, J. laid it down that the true rule is that where any alteration is made from the normal in land, the owner of that land is liable for any damage which may accrue to his neighbour, if there has been want of care by the landowner in making the alteration. In that case a landowner had dug a trench and by failing properly to cover it, permitted water to accumulate in the trench in such quantities that it naturally percolated through the soil into his neighbour's ground and damage was caused thereby. It was held that the landowner was responsible for all the damage so caused. In that case a landowner had dug a trench and by failing properly to cover it, permitted water to accumulate in the trench in such quantities that it naturally percolated through the soil into his neighbour's ground and damage was caused thereby. It was held that the landowner was responsible for all the damage so caused. In 'Hussain Sahib v. Subbayya', 1926 Mad 449 (AIR V 13) (FB) (D), it was observed that the owners of the adjoining lands at a lower level can improve their lands to any extent they please even to the extent of raising the level of their lands, provided that they make suitable arrangements for carrying off the water from their neighbour's land. In 'Ramnath v. Kalanath', 1950 Nag 241 (AIR V 37) (E) the facts were that the defendant had constructed a part of bund as a result of which the rain water inundated the plaintiffs fields. It was contended by the defendant that though the plaintiffs suffered a damage, the defendant's act did not in law amount to an injury, for, the defendant exercised only his lawful right and his act was not an invasion on any right possessed by the plaintiffs under the law. This contention was repelled and it was observed that the first principle to be applied in such cases is that an owner of land exposed to inundation from water flowing along a fresh water channel or from inroad water of the sea has a right to protect his land by constructing a bulwark, but then the bulwark, must be actually necessary, appropriate and such as not to prejudice the rights of owners of adjacent land. The second principle is that an owner of property has no right to actively let off water which has naturally accumulated therein even for the purpose of its preservation from damage therefrom in this will have the effect of transferring his misfortune to the property of another. It was added that from these two principles it would follow that the right of a person to dam up water or divert the course of naturally flowing water or provide a particular channel for the flow of accumulated water is not an unrestricted right. It is subject to the obligation of seeing that no injury was caused to the property of another. It is subject to the obligation of seeing that no injury was caused to the property of another. With respect I concur in these observations, and these principles, in my opinion, fully apply to the present case. I, therefore, hold the defendant liable for his act and I think the plaintiffs' suit was rightly decreed. The first contention of Mr. Pande could, therefore, not succeed. 6. The next contention of Mr. Pande is about the period of limitation. He thinks that the suit is time-barred. In my opinion, there is no substance in it. According to the plaint, the cause of action accrued in May, 1945, and the suit was instituted in April, 1947, that is, within less than two years. In my opinion, the diverting of the water on to the plaintiffs' fields constituted a recurring cause of action, so that no question of limitation can arise in regard to a suit for the restoration of the surface of the flowing water. Article 23, in my opinion, would govern such a suit as it was a continuing wrong independent of a contract. 7. The third contention of Mr. Pande is about a finding of the Court below that the contention of the defendant that he had erected this Pala in consultation with the plaintiffs is without foundation. Now, there is ample direct evidence from the plaintiffs on which the Court below has replied negativing the defendant's contention; and, in my opinion, this finding cannot be challenged in second appeal. 8. Last of all, Mr. Pande contended that it was a case cognizable only by the Revenue Court and a Civil Court could not have taken cognizance of it. He places reliance on Ss. 131 to 133, Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act No. 1 of 1931). The two sections that are relevant are Ss. 8. Last of all, Mr. Pande contended that it was a case cognizable only by the Revenue Court and a Civil Court could not have taken cognizance of it. He places reliance on Ss. 131 to 133, Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act No. 1 of 1931). The two sections that are relevant are Ss. 131 and 133 which run as follows : "Section 131 :- In the event of a dispute arising as to the route by which a holder of land shall have access to his fields or to the waste or pasture lands of the village, otherwise than by the recognised roads, paths or common land, or as to the course by which he may avail himself of water, to which he is entitled, from, a tank, well or other source, an Amin may, after local enquiry, decide the matter with reference to the previous custom in each case and with due regard for the convenience of all the parties concerned. "Section 133 :- If an Amin finds that any obstacle has been erected, impeding the free use of a recognised road, path or common land of a village or obstructing a route or water-course which has been the subject of a decision under S. 131, he may order the person responsible for erecting the obstacle to remove it; and, if such person fails to comply with the order, may cause the obstacle to be removed and may recover from such person the cost of removing it." Section 136(1) then lays down that no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which Government are, or a Revenue Officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, Mr. Pande contends that the suit, in fact, was about the obstacles put in the path and, therefore, it comes under S. 131 and the Civil Court could not have taken cognizance of it. It is conceded that this point was not raised in the two Courts below, but as it is a question of law going to the root of the case, I have allowed Mr. Pande to argue it. It is conceded that this point was not raised in the two Courts below, but as it is a question of law going to the root of the case, I have allowed Mr. Pande to argue it. I, however, feel that S. 133 can come into operation only if there has been a decision under S. 131 and, the latter section is concerned with disputes arising "as to the route by which a holder of land shall have access to his fields" or "to the course by which he may avail himself of water." The facts of the case do not show that there was any dispute as to the route by which the plaintiffs would have access to their fields or as to the course by which they may avail themselves of water. Consequently, these sections do not apply at all to the case. 9. This case is about a tortious liability and as such the Civil Court rightly took cognizance of it and a mandatory injunction has rightly been granted to restore things to status quo ante, and as it is impossible to restore the status quo unless the defendant is made to undo the wrong which he has committed, an injunction has been granted to demolish the new Pala, to restore the elevation, which was dug out by the defendant, and, to restore the level of the ground so that the flow of water towards Khasra No. 187 may not be obstructed. In the decree it has, of course, been added that the defendant should not put obstruction in the path used by the plaintiff for their bullock-carts. In my opinion, this portion of the decree was unnecessary and unwarranted on the facts of the case and would be deleted. 10. With this modification, I confirm the decree of the first appellate Court. The defendant will pay the costs of the plaintiffs. Order accordingly.