JUDGMENT :- This is an application for grant of certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court dated 16-8-1954 in Second Appeal No. 38 of 1952 whereby the decision of the District Judge of Mahasu and Sirmur, was set aside and that of the Senior Sub Judge, Nahan, dismissing the petitioners suit, was restored. 2. The above suit had been filed by Mohi Ram and others against Bansi Lal and others with the allegations that the lands in the suit had been purchased in 1950 Sambat for Rs. 155/8/- out of funds contributed by the villagers of Sangrah. For the sake of convenience, however, the name of Dhayan Singh alone was entered over it as Benamidar. After the death of Dhayan Singh, the defendants continued to hold the property in the same capacity, i.e. as Benamidars. At the time of the settlement Dhayan Singh managed to get the lands entered in his exclusive name by misrepresenting facts. The defendants prevented the plaintiffs from grazing their cattle on this land and also impounded their cattle. Hence the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they, along with the defendants, were the proprietors of the suit lands as well as an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their grazing and other rights. In the alternative, the plaintiffs claimed easement rights over this land. 3. The defendants contested the suit on the grounds : firstly, that the suit lands had been purchased by Dhayan Singh out of his personal funds, secondly, that the plaintiffs had no proprietary rights in this land and thirdly that the plaintiffs had no rights of easement. 4. The Trial Court (Senior Sub-Judge Nahan) found that the suit lands belonged to the defendants and were in their possession as proprietors and not as Benamidars. It further held that the plaintiffs had no easement rights. Consequently it dismissed the suit. 5. The plaintiffs then went up in appeal to the learned District Judge who found in favour of the plaintiffs case. Consequently he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. 6. When the matter came up to this Court in second appeal, I came to the conclusion that the Benami transaction, alleged by the plaintiffs, was not made out and similarly, the easement rights claimed by them were not established. Consequently, I allowed the second appeal and non-suited the plaintiffs. Consequently he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. 6. When the matter came up to this Court in second appeal, I came to the conclusion that the Benami transaction, alleged by the plaintiffs, was not made out and similarly, the easement rights claimed by them were not established. Consequently, I allowed the second appeal and non-suited the plaintiffs. Hence this petition for grant of certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. 7. When this petition came up for hearing on 11-4-1955, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 (Bansi Lal) denied that the market value of the land in suit came to Rs. 20,000/- or more. Thereupon an order was made by this Court directing the Senior Sub Judge, Nahan, to enquire into and report the value of the land in suit. In accordance with that order the Senior Sub Judge has submitted his report to the effect that the total value of the land in suit, along with the grass and trees standing upon it, comes to Rs. 16,490/6/6. To this report objections have been filed by the petitioners who contend that the Senior Sub-Judge was not justified in imposing a cut of 70 per cent. on the valuation arrived at by the Commissioner (Tehsildar Nahan). 8. Arguments of the learned counsel were heard yesterday; I now proceed to deliver judgment. 9. The certificate sought for cannot be granted unless this Court holds : (vide Art. 133 of the Constitution) (A) That the value of the subject-matter of the suit is not less than Rs. 20,000/-; Or (B) That the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court (This Court having reversed the decision of the learned District Judge). 10. As far as (A) is concerned, Mr. Paras Ram, for the petitioners, argued that since the Tehsildar had been appointed Commissioner with the consent of the parties, his finding could not be disputed. He supported his contention by reference to two rulings : (1) Murli Mal-Dayal Chand v. Lachhman, AIR 1914 Lah 339 (2) (A). There the facts were that one Sukh Dayal had been appointed to function both as a receiver and as a local commissioner although he was termed local commissioner only. Subsequently, the plaintiffs contended that Sukhdayal was only a receiver and his proceedings as a Commissioner were ultra vires. There the facts were that one Sukh Dayal had been appointed to function both as a receiver and as a local commissioner although he was termed local commissioner only. Subsequently, the plaintiffs contended that Sukhdayal was only a receiver and his proceedings as a Commissioner were ultra vires. It was in that connection that a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that : "Where the conduct of the parties, and the action of, and expressions used by them and by the Court, made it clear that all parties accepted S as a Commissioner to examine accounts, neither party, in view of S. 99, Civil P. C. could be allowed in the Chief Court to go back upon this." (2) Amrita Sundari v. Munshi Serajuddin, AIR 1924 Cal 620 (B), where a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court remarked that : "Interference with the result of a long and careful local investigation except upon clearly defined and sufficient grounds is improper. It is not safe for a Court to act as an expert and to overrule the elaborate report of a Commissioner whose integrity is unquestioned, whose careful and laborious execution of his task is proved by his report, and who has not blindly adopted the assertions of either party." 11. As Mr. Dalip Singh, for respondent No. 1, rightly pointed out, this ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case, because the learned Senior Sub Judge has given good grounds for not accepting the valuation arrived at by the Commissioner. In my opinion, the Senior Sub Judge was certainly entitled to revise the valuation made by the Tehsildar Commissioner, if he felt that it was not correct. 12. There is no dispute regarding the market value of the land alone, which comes to Rs. 393/10/6 or of the grass which comes to Rs.1591/12/-. It is the value of the trees standing upon the land, around which the controversy centres. The Commissioner valued the trees at Rs. 48349/15/-. The Senior Sub Judge was well within his rights in taking into consideration the fact that the trees in question are situated in a remote and inaccessible part of Tehsil Rainuka. It is the value of the trees standing upon the land, around which the controversy centres. The Commissioner valued the trees at Rs. 48349/15/-. The Senior Sub Judge was well within his rights in taking into consideration the fact that the trees in question are situated in a remote and inaccessible part of Tehsil Rainuka. He has also pointed out that according to the statement of Shri Nagar Mal, Divisional Forest Officer, Rajgarh, ban and brass trees could be used for fuel purposes only and according to Jagmohan Singh, Mohar Singh and Kanthi Ram R. Ws., there was no market nearby for fuel. The only means of transport from the land in suit upto Dadahu (a distance of about 8 miles) is by mules. From Dadahu to Nahan, a distance of 26 miles, motor transport is available in good weather. It is axiomatic that all these factors have to be taken into consideration in assessing the value of these trees. Value means the real market value of the property involved, vide - Poosa Thorai v. Kanappa Chetty, AIR 1918 Mad 1099 (C); - Nawaz Ali v. Allu, AIR 1924 Lah 82 (D) and - Rafi Uddin Ahmad v. Rami Kaniz Abid, AIR 1939 Oudh 1 (E). Under these circumstances I concur with the view of the Senior Sub Judge that the valuation of the trees, as ascertained by the Commissioner, needed drastic reduction. It, therefore, follows that the valuation of the trees as fixed by the Senior Sub Judge (Rs. 14,505/-) cannot be said to be unreasonable. 13. Mr. Dalip Singh, for the contesting respondents, further pointed out that we are concerned not with the value of the entire land in suit, including the trees and grass standing upon it, but only with the value of the plaintiffs share or interest therein. He supported his arguments by citing inter alia, - Shevantibai v. Janardhan Raghunath, AIR 1944 PC 65 (F), wherein their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out "that the High Court was correct in holding that the value of the subject-matter in dispute, on appeal to His Majesty in Council, must be taken to be the value of the share of the joint family property in respect of...... which the plaintiff was claiming. which the plaintiff was claiming. The question as to the title of the plaintiff to the share, which he claimed in the joint property, did not become a question respecting the whole of the joint family estate, merely because if his title was established, it would result in the joint family estate being partitioned." In - Arjun Lal v. Hiralal, AIR 1952 Raj 11 (G), the facts were that the plaintiff sued for partition of his one third share in a joint-family house which was admittedly more than Rs. 20,000/- in value but the plaintiffs share was less than Rs. 2,000/-. The suit was dismissed in all the lower Courts. The plaintiff applied under Art. 134(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. It was held by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, following AIR 1944 PC 65 (F), that the applicant was not entitled to a certificate either under Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of Art. 133(1) as the value of the subject-matter of dispute in appeal will be the value of the plaintiffs share and not the value of the entire joint-family house. 14. Going back to the plaint, I may point out that the plaintiffs claimed not that they were the exclusive proprietors of the suit land but only that they were joint proprietors along with the defendants. As regards the easement rights claimed by the petitioners, Shri Mela Ram, Advocate, for the petitioners, gave a statement before this Court on 11-4-55 admitting that the easement rights claimed by his clients were not of the value of Rs. 20,000/-. The total value of the land in suit, including the grass and the trees, having been found by the Senior Sub Judge to be Rs. 16490/6/6 (and that finding having been maintained by this Court) it follows that the value of the plaintiffs share or interest therein would be very much less. Therefore, it is not possible to grant a certificate to the effect that the value of the subject-matter of the dispute is not less than Rs. 20,000/-. (B) (15) In the alternative Mr. Paras Ram contended that the case was a fit one for appeal under Art. 133(1)(c), Constitution of India. As already pointed out, the dispute is regarding a piece of land, mostly forest, situated in the interior of Rainuka Tehsil. 20,000/-. (B) (15) In the alternative Mr. Paras Ram contended that the case was a fit one for appeal under Art. 133(1)(c), Constitution of India. As already pointed out, the dispute is regarding a piece of land, mostly forest, situated in the interior of Rainuka Tehsil. I am unable to see that the case involves any question of great public or general importance. Before I can certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to show that the case involves any exceptional features. They have not succeeded in doing this. 15-16. ORDER :- The petition fails and is rejected with costs assessed at Rs. 30/-, payable to the respondent No. 1. The costs of the Commissioner would also be paid by the petitioners, if not already paid. Petition dismissed.