JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. The appellant Kashiram has been convicted by the Sessions Judge of Guna under S. 302, I. P. C. for the murder of his wife Kalindari and has been sentenced to transportation for life: He has now appealed to this Court against his conviction. 2. According to the prosecution the appellant used to live in village Mahana with his wife and children Onkar Singh, Mayabai, Sarjubai and Gitabai. Sometime before the occurrence he began showing symptoms of insanity and used to act abnormally and violently. He was twice detained in the Mental Hospital at Lashkar. After his discharge from the Hospital second time, the appellant remained normal for sometime but soon thereafter he again started behaving abnormally and violently. On account of this behaviour of the accused, he was usually kept chained in a room. On the morning of 13th May 1953 at about 8 a.m., while Kalindari was sweeping the courtyard of the house and when the appellants daughters Maya and Sarju had gone to a well to fetch water and Onkar Singh had gone to visit a neighbour, Kashiram managed to free himself, came out of the room where he was kept, picked up an axe lying in the house and with it inflicted fatal injuries on his wifes head, neck and shoulders. Kalindari died immediately on the spot. At this time Maya and Sarju returned from the well. They found the door of the house, which was open when they had left, closed. Maya, therefore, called her mother and asked her to open the door. Thereupon the accused opened the door and stood there silently. Maya then again called out her mother to help her to relieve her of a water vessel which was on her head. When Kalindari did not respond, Maya went inside the house and found her mother dead with her throat cut. She then went out of the house and shouted. On hearing her cries, Gajraj Singh, Karan Singh and Onkar Singh came to the appellant. On seeing Kalindari lying dead, they questioned the accused Kashiram as to what he had done and why he had killed Kalindari. It was said that Kashiram replied Gajraj Singh, Karan Singh and Onkar Singh found Kashirams hands, feet and clothes besmeared with blood. They then tied Kashiram to a Nim tree and directed Ajabshad Chowkidar to lodge a report with the police. It was said that Kashiram replied Gajraj Singh, Karan Singh and Onkar Singh found Kashirams hands, feet and clothes besmeared with blood. They then tied Kashiram to a Nim tree and directed Ajabshad Chowkidar to lodge a report with the police. The Chowkidar made a report in the police station Pachhar, on 13th May 1953 at about 10 a.m. that Kashiram had killed his wife with an axe. The police then took up the investigation, put the accused under arrest, prepared the usual Panchnamas and sent his clothes for chemical examination. The clothes were found to be stained with human blood. The post-mortem examination of the body of Kalindari was conducted by Dr. Pawar on 14th May 1953. The doctor found six incised wounds on the neck, the trachea and Aesophagus cut and the cervical spine fractured. In his opinion Kalindaris death was due to these injuries. 3. The accused was not sent up for medical examination immediately after his arrest. He first appeared before the committing Magistrate on 25th May 1953 when the Challan was presented. The Magistrate found him to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence. He, therefore, stayed the proceedings and sent the accused to the Civil Surgeon of Guna for examination. On the report of the Civil Surgeon, Kashiram was sent to Mental Hospital Lashkar and detained there from 27th July 1953 upto 21st October 1954. He was then brought before the Magistrate on 3rd November 1954 and the committal proceedings began on 9th November 1954 when the Magistrate considered him capable of making his defence. Before the committing Magistrate the accused said that he had deliberately killed his wife because she had sent him to the Mental Hospital declaring him to be a lunatic, and because she used to give away articles belonging to his house-hold to Shankarlal and Pran Singh. He added that he gave to Kalindari only one axe blow and not several. In the Sessions Court he said that he did not know that he had murdered his wife; that at that time he was mad. He also denied having made the statement before the committing Magistrate that he had deliberately killed his wife. 4. In this appeal Mr. In the Sessions Court he said that he did not know that he had murdered his wife; that at that time he was mad. He also denied having made the statement before the committing Magistrate that he had deliberately killed his wife. 4. In this appeal Mr. Bhanu Prakash Asthana has not challenged the occurrence or the prosecution evidence on record, and I think rightly that on the evidence on record there can be no doubt that it was the appellant who killed his wife. He was the only person with Kalindari in the house when Maya and Sarju went out to bring water and Onkar Singh was also away. Immediately after the occurrence he was found in the house with his hands, feet and clothes besmeared with blood. On analysis, the clothes were found stained with human blood. These circumstances have been deposed to by Maya, Gajraj Singh, Onkar Singh and Nathan Singh. I do not wish to attach much importance to the extra-judicial confession of the accused to Gajraj Singh because even without resorting to it the case against the appellant of having caused the death of his wife is amply established. The circumstances are such that though there is no eye-witness, there could not have been anybody but the accused who was responsible for the death of his wife. 5. The only point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant and which was also pressed before the learned Sessions Judge is as to whether the appellant can be given the benefit of S. 84, I. P. C. and acquitted. The circumstances in which a plea of insanity raised by an accused can be allowed have been considered by a Division Bench of this court in Kunwarlal v. The State, Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 1953 (MB) (A) and Dhanal v. The State, Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1952: AIR 1955 NUC (MB) 2993 (B) and other cases. In those cases it has been pointed out that when a plea of insanity is raised under S. 84, I. P. C., the Court has to consider two questions. Firstly whether the accused has shown that at the time of committing the act he was of unsound mind. If he does not succeed in this preliminary issue, the plea of insanity fails. Firstly whether the accused has shown that at the time of committing the act he was of unsound mind. If he does not succeed in this preliminary issue, the plea of insanity fails. Secondly if he was of unsound mind, whether he has established that the unsoundness of mind was of a degree and nature to satisfy one of the knowledge tests laid down by S. 84. The crucial point of time in deciding whether the benefit of S. 84 should be given or not is the time when the offence took place. If at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law, then the accused would be entitled to claim the benefit of S. 84. It must be shown that at the material time the cognitive faculties of the mind of the accused were so impaired that he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he had done was wrong or contrary to law. The burden of proving the existence of circumstances for bringing his case within the exception under S. 84 is under S. 105, Evidence Act on the accused. The circumstances must be proved affirmatively. The accused cannot get the benefit of S. 84 by merely creating a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court about the existence of circumstances bringing his case within the exception. The burden of proof resting on the accused to prove the insanity is no doubt not so onerous as the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution to prove the fact that the accused committed the act with which he is charged. As observed by Viscount Hailsham L. C. in Sodeman v. Rex, 1936-2 All ER 1138 (C), the burden in case in which an accused has to prove insanity may fairly be stated as not being higher than the burden which rests on a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings. As to what is the burden resting upon a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings, can, I think, best be stated in the words of Wiles, J., in Cooper v. Slade, (1858) 6 HLC 746 (D). As to what is the burden resting upon a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings, can, I think, best be stated in the words of Wiles, J., in Cooper v. Slade, (1858) 6 HLC 746 (D). That learned Judge referred to an ancient authority in support of what he termed "the elementary proposition that in civil cases the preponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict. Applying this rule of burden of proof, if on a consideration of the prosecution evidence and the evidence led by the accused the Court comes to the conclusion that there was a probability of the accused being legally insane at the time of the commission of the crime, he would be entitled to be acquitted on the ground of insanity. This is quite different from holding as was held in Prabhoo v. Emperor, AIR 1941 All 402 (FB) (E) a decision with which I do not find myself in agreement that the accused is entitled to be acquitted on the ground of insanity even if a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court whether he is or is not entitled to the benefit of the exception under S. 84. 6. In dealing with cases in which a plea of insanity is taken for exemption from criminal liability, a distinction must be drawn between the cases in which insanity is more or less proved and the question is only as to the degree of irresponsibility and the cases in which an apparently sane person is sought to be shown as insane. In all cases where previous insanity is proved or admitted, a presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the act would be greatly weakened and certain considerations become very relevant. These considerations have been stated in Maynes Criminal Law of India in the following passage: "Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the act; whether it was done in a manner which showed a desire to concealment; whether, after the crime, the offender showed consciousness of guilt, and made efforts to avoid detection; whether, after his arrest, he offered false excuses and made false statements. All facts of this sort are material, as bearing on the test which Bramwell, J., submitted to a jury in such case: would the prisoner have committed the act if there had been a policeman at his elbow?" 7. All facts of this sort are material, as bearing on the test which Bramwell, J., submitted to a jury in such case: would the prisoner have committed the act if there had been a policeman at his elbow?" 7. It is in the light of the above tests that the plea of insanity put forward by the accused has to be considered. The state of the appellants mind has been deposed to by Dr. Balkrishna Kale D. W. 1 and the prosecution witnesses Onkar Singh, Mayabai, Gajraj Singh, Karan Singh and Amar Singh. Dr. Kale, Superintendent, Mental Hospital, Lashkar deposed that Kashiram was detained in the Mental Hospital first from 12th December 1952 to 28th December 1952; then from 12th January 1953 to 7th March 1953; and lastly from 27th July 1953 upto 21st October 1954; that during his second detention he was violent, restless, and abusive and incoherent in his talk; that the treatment of electric shock was administered to him; that there was no lucid period of his mind from 12th January 1953 to 7th March 1953 and that it could not be said that when on 7th March 1953 he was discharged he was completely cured; that he was in a similar condition when he became an inmate of the Mental Hospital for the third time. Dr. Kale examined Kashiram soon after he was brought to the Hospital on 27th July 1953 and put several questions to him and made a note Ex. P. 11 of the answers given by him. In these answers Kashiram told Dr. Kale that after his discharge on 7th March 1953 he was all right only for one day; that thereafter he became of unsound mind again; that in his house he was kept tied with chains and one day he managed to free himself and murdered his wife with an axe. According to Dr. Kale, Kashiram told him that while he was in the hospital, Pran Singh, Gajraj Singh and Prithvi Singh became friendly with his wife and that she gave them away tins of Ghee and cash; that suspected her character; that he was not sorry for having killed her as she deserved the punishment. Dr. Kale could not say whether the accused was in fact insane on 13th May 1953, the day on which the occurrence took place. Dr. Kale could not say whether the accused was in fact insane on 13th May 1953, the day on which the occurrence took place. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses Onkar Singh, Mayabai, Gajraj Singh, Karan Singh and Amar Singh as to the state of the appellants mind is to the effect that before the occurrence Kashiram was kept in the Mental Hospital twice; that after his discharge from the hospital second time, he was all right for sometime but later on he became violent; that he used to jump, abuse, throw away food and often rushed at people for beating them; that he used to tear his clothes and sometimes become naked and climb up to the top of houses; that on account of this behaviour of the accused he used to be kept chained in a room; and that very often he escaped and was chained again. Ajab Singh, Chowkidar, who gave his evidence before the committing Magistrate and thereafter died before his statement could be recorded in the Sessions trial, said that four days before the occurrence, he had seen the accused chained in the house and that at that time he was talking incoherently something of which no sense could be made. The prosecution witnesses also said that even on the day of the occurrence Kashiram was chained and kept in a locked room. From this evidence as regards Kashirams insanity period to the occurrence and after it and from the fact that when the committing Magistrate saw him for the first time on 23rd May 1953 i.e., twelve days after the incident, he was found to be insane and that it was after a stay of nearly over a year in the Mental Hospital that he was considered to be in a fit state to appear and make his defence in the committal proceedings, I think, the inference is irresistible that the appellant who had been in a continuous state of insanity before and after the occurrence was of unsound mind on the day of occurrence. Dr. Kale no doubt could not say whether the accused was insane on 13th May 1953. But it is besides the point whether in the opinion of the doctor the accused was insane on the day in question. Dr. Dr. Kale no doubt could not say whether the accused was insane on 13th May 1953. But it is besides the point whether in the opinion of the doctor the accused was insane on the day in question. Dr. Kale could only furnish the court with data from which insanity could be inferred and the question whether in the circumstances deposed to by him and the other circumstances appearing in the case, the accused was sane or insane on the day of the occurrence is for the Court to decide. If then Kashiram was of unsound mind on 13th May 1953, the question arises whether his unsoundness of mind was such that by reason of it he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act causing the death of his wife or that of knowing that what he did was either wrong or contrary to law. Now there is a distinction between the two grounds of exemptions mentioned in S. 84. As to what is meant by the words incapable of knowing the nature of the Act has been very lucidly pointed out by Mayne in the following passage: "The words incapable of knowing the nature of act may refer to two different states of mind, which are distinguished in the answers of the Judges, and in the English Draft Code of 1879, by the words nature and quality. A man is properly said to be ignorant of the nature of his act, when he is ignorant of the properties and operation of the external agencies which he brings into play. As if, for instance, an idiot should fire a gun at a person, looking upon it as a harmless firework. He is ignorant of the quality of his act if he knows the result which will follow, but is incapable of appreciating the elementary principles which make up the heinous and shocking nature of that result; as if, for instance, an idiot was unable to perceive the difference between shooting a man and shooting an ape. Both of these states of mind are no doubt intended by the authors of the Penal Code to be included under the words they have used. Both of these states of mind are no doubt intended by the authors of the Penal Code to be included under the words they have used. This ground of exemption will hardly ever be found to exist, except in the case of idiots, or of lunatics whose insanity is so complete as to sweep away substantially all the reasoning power which distinguishes a man from a beast." 8. On the evidence on record it cannot be said that Kashirams insanity was so complete that he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act. Immediately after the occurrence Gajraj Singh a nephew of the accused questioned him as to what he had done and the accused said From this statement as also from the reply which the accused gave to Dr. Kale on 27th July 1953 it is plain that he knew that the result of his act of striking Kalindari with an axe was to cause her death. The accused was thus conscious of the nature of his act. The appellant cannot, therefore, avail himself of the first ground of exemption stated in S. 84. The question then arises whether the appellants case falls under the second ground of exemption. In other words whether he was conscious of the criminality of his act. In my opinion the circumstances appearing on record show that at the time of inflicting injuries on Kalindari, the appellant had no idea that his act was wrong or contrary to law. There was no deliberation or preparation on the part of the appellant for the act. The evidence shows that when in response to Mayas calls, he opened the door, he stood silently in the door and did not say or do anything or show any interest in what Maya and others said, and did thereafter. He made no attempt to escape. He did not offer any resistance when he was tied to a Nim tree. He gave no excuses or make false statements. He made no attempt to hide himself or wash his hands and feet or change his blood-stained clothes. He showed no remorse. In my view these circumstances taken with the previous continuous insanity of the accused justify the conclusion that whatever the act the accused did he did it in an irresponsible way and did not know that it was wrong or contrary to law. He showed no remorse. In my view these circumstances taken with the previous continuous insanity of the accused justify the conclusion that whatever the act the accused did he did it in an irresponsible way and did not know that it was wrong or contrary to law. In rejecting the appellants plea of insanity, the learned Sessions Judge was considerably influenced by the fact that the appellant closed the door of the house which was open when Maya went out to fetch water: that when questioned by Gajraj Singh, the accused told him that that he told Dr. Kale that he had killed his wife because she was friendly with some persons; and that before the committing Magistrate the appellant made the statement that he had deliberately killed his wife because she had sent him to Mental Hospital declaring him to be a lunatic and that she was giving away things and articles to Shankarlal and Pran Singh. Now there is no evidence that it was the appellant himself who had closed the door just before killing his wife. On the other hand according to Gajraj Singh, Kalindari used to close the door of the house whenever the accused managed to free himself and this was in order that he should not run away. The possibility, therefore, remains of the door having been closed by Kalindari herself when she found that the accused had freed himself and came out of the room where he had been locked. The fact that the door was found closed when Maya returned cannot, therefore, be taken as indicating that the appellant himself closed the door for the purpose of committing the crime in secrecy. As to the statement said to have been made by the accused to Gajraj Singh it only shows that while the appellant knew that his act had resulted in the death of his wife and that it was wrong to kill someone elses wife, there was nothing wrong in killing ones own wife. His statements to Dr. As to the statement said to have been made by the accused to Gajraj Singh it only shows that while the appellant knew that his act had resulted in the death of his wife and that it was wrong to kill someone elses wife, there was nothing wrong in killing ones own wife. His statements to Dr. Kale and before the committing Magistrate that he had killed his wife because she was friendly with some people whom she had given away some things or because she had sent him to Mental Hospital even though he was not insane, in the context of his continuous insanity before and after the occurrence, only show that he was labouring under the influence of an insane delusion that his wife had done him injury and was responsible for depriving him of his liberty. The previous insanity of the appellant and this persistent delusion of his wife having done him some wrong seems to me to establish conclusively that the appellant who was in other respects completely and utterly insane and who had "glimmering knowledge" of the nature and consequence of his act in striking his wife with an axe was absolutely incapable of realising that it was wrong or contrary to law. It must be remembered that the appellants case is not that of person suffering from partial delusion but sane in other respects. His case is not one to which the answer to the first question in MNaghtens case, (1843) 10 Cl and F 200 (F) can be applied. That answer was expressly limited in its application "to those persons who labour under such partial delusions only and are not in other respects insane. The present case, in my opinion, stands by itself and is a case of homicide by an insane person subject to a delusion, in a paroxysm of insanity. The appellants case is somewhat similar to the case of R. v. Offord, (1831) 5 C and P 168 (G), where the accused labouring under a notion that the inhabitants of a certain place and particularly one person were continually issuing warrants against him with intent to deprive him of his liberty and life, shot the particular person, and it was held that the accused laboured under that species of insanity which was called monomania and was, therefore, not liable for his act. 9. 9. For these reasons I am of the view that the appellant killed his wife but that he is entitled to be acquitted on the ground of his insanity. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge of Gwalior under S. 302, I. P. C. must, therefore, be set aside. The appellant cannot, however, be set at liberty. Following the decision of this Court in Vijay Singh v. The State, Madh-B LR 1952 Cri 161 (H), he must be detained in safe custody in Jail and his case must be reported to the Government for taking such action under S. 471, Cr. P. C. as may be deemed necessary. A copy of the judgment be sent to the Government immediately.