JUDGMENT B.M. Lall, J. - This is a Second Appeal by the Plaintiffs, whose suit has been thrown out by both the courts below. 2. The Appellants own a house which they have let out to the Respondent for a period of ten years. The lease recites the fact that the Respondent has taken the house for establishing a flour mill and a rice husking machine. It is also recited in the lease that the Respondent had made certain constructions in the house at a cost of Rs. 1,275/- that this amount would be set off towards the rent and at the time of vacating the house on the expiry of the period of lease he would not remove the construction. 3. It appears that after taking the house the Respondent constructed two rooms. They are marked "M" and "N" in the sketch attached to the plaint. These rooms are made of pnccka bricks and have corrugated iron sheets in place of roofs. 4. The suit, which has given rise to this second Appeal, was instituted by the Appellants for the Respondent's ejectment and for demolition of the new constructions. The defence was that the Respondent had made the constructions in connection with his business and the constructions were of a temporary nature, and would be removed by the Respondent at his own cost when he would vacate the house. Both the courts below have upheld the Respondent's contention and have dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellants does not press his claim for the Respondent's ejectment. He has confined his argument to the claim for demolition of the new construction. He relies on Section 108(p) of the Transfer of property Act (IV of 1882). This clause lays down that: the lessee must not, without the lessor's consent erect on the property any permanent structure except for agricultural purpose. 6. It may be pointed out that in the lease itself there is no clause either permitting or prohibiting the construction of these structures. It is also a common ground between the parties that the constructions have not been made for and agricultural purpose. Therefore, if the constructions are of a permanent nature, the lessee was not competent to make them. It may be pointed out that in the lease itself there is no clause either permitting or prohibiting the construction of these structures. It is also a common ground between the parties that the constructions have not been made for and agricultural purpose. Therefore, if the constructions are of a permanent nature, the lessee was not competent to make them. On the contrary if the construction are of a temporary character the lessee was within his rights to erect them provided the vacates the property in the same condition in which he received it. It has also not been suggested on behalf of the Appellants that the constructions of these buildings have, in any way damaged the property. 7. The mere circumstance that the two rooms are made of pucca bricks, does not necessarily make them constructions of a permanent nature. A building made of pucca bricks may, in certain circumstances, be a temporary building. On the contrary a building made of mud-walls with a thatch thereon may, in certain circumstances be a work of a permanent nature. Pucca and permanent are by no means synonymous terms. Similarly kuchcha and temporary do not mean the same thing. Suppose a cultivator makes a mud-house in a village abadi and places a thatch thereon with the intention of permanently occupying the house and living therein, he has made the construction of permanent nature although the amount spent by him on the constructions may be a very small one. On the contrary building of pucca bricks may be erected temporarily. It has often been seen that where huge constructions are going on, Engineers and Overseers make temporary sheds in order to accommodate building materials or provide accommodation for the Engineers and Overseers who supervise the construction. The idea in such cases is that such buildings would ultimately be removed. The buildings though made of pucca bricks are nonetheless buildings of a temporary nature. The real criterion, therefore, is not whether the building is made of pucca bricks or of Kuchcha bricks but whether the idea in constructing them is to retain them for over or to demolish them after achieving certain object. 8. Judged from this standard the two rooms made by the Respondent are works of a temporary nature because they will be demolished on the expiry of the terms of the lease. 9. 8. Judged from this standard the two rooms made by the Respondent are works of a temporary nature because they will be demolished on the expiry of the terms of the lease. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has drawn my attention to Clause (f) which says that a lessee cannot make repairs without giving a notice to the lessor. He argues that if ordinary repairs cannot be made without a notice to the lessor, the building of pucca bricks can certainly not be made by the lessee. With this contention I am unable to agree, Clause (f) lays down the circumstances in which a lessee can spend money over repairs and recover it from the lessor. In the present case the lessee does not propose to recover any thing from the lessor in respect of these two constructions made by him. In the circumstances a consideration of Clause (f) does not help the Appellants. 10. On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the opinion that in the present case, the construction was of a temporary nature. The view taken by the courts is correct. I see no force in this appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs. 11. Leave to file a special appeal is granted.