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1956 DIGILAW 134 (BOM)

KILACHAND DEOCHAND AND CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, MADHYA PRADESH,

1956-10-18

SEN

body1956
JUDGMENT The applicant, Messrs Kilachand Deochand and Co., filed this petition on 8th July, 1954, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The non-applicants are (1) Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, (2) Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, and (3) Sales Tax Officer, Amravati. The material prayer claimed by the applicant is as follows :- "The Honourable Court be pleased to grant a writ of certiorari and quash the order, dated 31st December, 1952, passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Amravati District, Amravati, and the Appellate Order, dated 29th April, 1954, passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, and also grant a writ of mandamus, requiring the non-applicants Nos. 1 to 3 to withdraw several notices including the notice demanding tax of Rs. 8,636-15-0 and they be permanently restrained and prohibited from assessing and levying sales tax and demanding the same from the petitioner." The non-applicants filed return opposing the application. 2. On the 3rd December, 1955, the applicant filed an application for amendment of the main petition. The stand of the applicant in respect of the amendment is that the Commissioner of Sales Tax was not competent to call upon the applicant to deposit the full amount of unpaid tax, namely, Rs. 8,636-15-0, before admitting the appeal, as the period covered under the assessment from 11th April, 1949, to 30th September, 1949, was governed by the old section 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. I allowed the amendment prayed for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 as also the amendment of the relief in the alternative in the interests of justice. 3. The applicant had filed two quarterly returns on 20th August, 1949, and 11th October, 1949, in respect of the quarters ending on 30th June, 1949, and, 30th September, 1949 respectively. I allowed the amendment prayed for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 as also the amendment of the relief in the alternative in the interests of justice. 3. The applicant had filed two quarterly returns on 20th August, 1949, and 11th October, 1949, in respect of the quarters ending on 30th June, 1949, and, 30th September, 1949 respectively. Section 22(1) of the Act before it was amended on 25th November, 1949, by Act LVII of 1949, read as follows :- "Any dealer aggrieved by an order under this Act may, in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority against the order : Provided that no appeal against an order of assessment, with or without penalty, shall be entertained by the said authority unless it is satisfied that such amount of tax or penalty or both as the appellant may admit to be due from him, has been paid." The proviso to section 22(1) as amended reads as follows : "Provided that no appeal against an order of assessment, with or without penalty shall be admitted by the said authority unless such appeal is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax, with penalty, if any, in respect of which the appeal has been preferred." The question is whether the applicant can be required to pay the entire tax under section 22(1) before his appeal is heard by the Commissioner of Sales Tax. I am of opinion that the matter is governed by the old section 22(1) under which the party which wished to prefer an appeal was required to deposit the amount of tax which he admitted as due from him. The reason is that the returns in this case were filed before the section was amended. This follows from the decision of the Supreme Court in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others ([1953] 4 S.T.C. 114 at p. 124; [1953] S.C.R. 987). Their Lordships observed at page 1000 : "For the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself. Their Lordships observed at page 1000 : "For the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself. For all the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the appellant's appeal should not have been rejected on the ground that it was not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the assessed tax." I may also refer to the decision of this Court in Raojibhai Ambalal and Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Nagpur and Others ([1956] 7 S.T.C. 552). In that case, the returns were filed in May 1948, Therein it was held : "Though the amended section 22(1) made a clear distinction between a first appeal and a second appeal, the unamended section was wide enough to embrace both. Therefore, although the rules providing a second appeal were made only subsequent to the filing of the returns, they could be read along with the provisions of the old section. The assesses was therefore entitled to prefer a second appeal before the Commissioner and contend that he was not bound to deposit the tax assessed on him except the amount which was admitted to be due by him." 4. For the reasons given above, I hold that the applicant is not liable to deposit Rs. 8,636-15-0 and the order of the Commissioner passed on 22nd June, 1954, should be quashed. I grant the alternative prayer claimed by the applicant. 5. The result is that the order of the Commissioner passed on 22nd June, 1954, is quashed and he is directed to hear the appeal without demand of deposit of tax by the applicant. The petition is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to him. Petition allowed.