Govinda Menon, J.-These nineteen appeals arise out of suits tried together by the learned Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in all of which the plaintiff was the same while the defendants in the various suits were different. Since the questions for trial and decision were identical in all the suits, by consent of parties evidence both oral and documentary was recorded only in one of the suits, viz., O.S. No. 75 of 1949 and the same was treated as evidence in the other suits as well. The learned Subordinate Judge delivered a common judgment in all the suits. With the consent of the parties the same procedure is adopted in this Court also and hence we propose to deliver a common judgment in all these appeals. The appellant in these appeals was the plaintiff in the Court below who aggrieved by the dismissal of his suits by the trial Court has come up here questioning the correctness of the learned Judge’s conclusions. Appeal No. 223 of 1951 arises out of O.S. No. 75 of 1949 and Appeal No. 224 of 1951 arises out of O.S. No. 77 of 1949. Against the dismissal of the above two suits appeals have been preferred directly to this Court where as the remaining seventeen appeals which had been preferred to the District Court, West Tanjore, have been transferred to this Court to be heard along with Appeals Nos. 223 and 224 of 1951. Reference to the plaintiff in this judgment would mean the appellant in all the appeals and the defendant should be understood as the respective defendant or defendants in the several suits. The properties in dispute in Appeal No. 223 of 1951 consist of seventeen items of an area of 56 acres and 10 cents in inam Pannimangalam village, Mannargudi taluk, West Tanjore District as is seen from Exhibit B-8. Record of Rights Register relating to inam Pannimangalam village, and these seventeen items are admittedly part of Orathur padugai which is either a whole inam village or a minor inam forming part of 199 villages popularly known as the Tanjore Palace Estate. Likewise the items of properties comprised in the other suits also are included in the Orathur padugai. Record of Rights Register relating to inam Pannimangalam village, and these seventeen items are admittedly part of Orathur padugai which is either a whole inam village or a minor inam forming part of 199 villages popularly known as the Tanjore Palace Estate. Likewise the items of properties comprised in the other suits also are included in the Orathur padugai. The suits were for ejectment of the respective defendants from the suit lands and for damages for use and occupation for a period of four years before the date of the suit at the rate of Rs. 50, per acre on the ground that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the lands and hence entitled to recovery of possession. It is stated in the plaint that under Exhibit A-145 dated nth November, 1948 the plaintiff purchased these items from one S.S. Chockalingam Chettiar who in his turn acquired title to them as a result of a sale certificate issued to him when these items were sold under E.P. No. 63 of 1937 in O.S. No. 3 of 1919 on the file of the District Court, West Tanjore. Exhibit A-146 dated 14th April, 1945 is the sale certificate issued in favour of the plaintiff’s vendor, S.S. Chockalingam Chettiar. Under Exhibit A-167 dated 7th August, 1946, the plaintiff’s vendor took delivery of the properties. The contention on behalf of the defendants is that what was sold in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 3 of 1919 was only the melvaram right which a landlord under the Madras Estates Land Act has and that the defendants in the various suits are kudivaramdars not liable to be ejected. In other words, the lands in question are parts of an estate as contemplated by the Madras Estates Land Act in which case the plaintiff’s suits will have to be dismissed. The learned Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden that lay upon him to prove that the lands in question are private lands and since that onus has not been discharged and as the defendants are entitled to occupancy rights, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits and hence all the suits were dismissed. That the disputed lands are part of Orathur padugai comprised in one of the villages forming the Tanjore Palace Estate has not been questioned in these appeals and what has now to be considered is whether they lie in an estate or not. The main allegations in the plaint are: that the defendant is a trespasser having no right to remain in possession as the lands are not governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, and they do not come within the definition of the Estate, and they lie in a minor inam. It was further alleged that there has been no letting of the plaint lands to the defendant and there has been no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff or his predecessors-in-title and the defendants. It is also alleged that the lands are private lands in which no right of occupancy can be claimed by any length of possession. The defendant is a fugitive occupant and not being a cultivating tenant has no right of occupancy. The lands are padugai lands forming part of the river bed or bund and cannot become ryoti lands. On the other hand, the plea raised on behalf of the defendants is that the suit lands along with other lands formed part of Tanjore Palace Estate which is said to be an inam and is governed by the Madras Estates Land Act ; they cannot be private lands of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title; neither the plaintiff nor his predecessor-in-title had ever cultivated the lands either by hired labour or by themselves, nor did they exercise any act of possession or enjoyment. The melvaram in the suit lands alone was enjoyed by the successive receivers who were in charge of the Tanjore Palace Estate and after division by the owners thereof. The defendant further submitted that the suit lands being ryoti lands situate within an estate, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment. The village where the lands in question are situate is a separate village for which separate revenue accounts are maintained with a record of rights prepared for it. In any event it is contended that the village in question is an estate under the extended meaning of the term defined in Madras Act VIII of 1934 and XVIII of 1936 and, if that is so, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. In any event it is contended that the village in question is an estate under the extended meaning of the term defined in Madras Act VIII of 1934 and XVIII of 1936 and, if that is so, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The allegation in the plaint that the lands lie in a minor inam is denied and even granting that it is a minor inam, it is nevertheless an estate. The decision of the appeals has, therefore, to depend upon the question whether the lands are included in an estate as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act or whether they are private lands as claimed by the plaintiff. It is no body’s case that there is an intermediary stage. The main issue framed in all the suits by the trial Court was “whether the suit lands are either minor inams or private lands as alleged by the plaintiff or whether they are ryoti lands in an estate as contended by the defendant?” The learned Subordinate Judge held this issue in favour of the defendants. The history of what is ordinarily known as the Tanjore Palace Estate has been described in decisions by the highest judicial authority and they are found in the various reported decisions of the Madras High Court and the Privy Council, beginning with Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba1. A recent decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar2, gives a succinct description of the same at pages 233 and 234. In 1799 the then Raja of Tanjore Sarabhoji consented to resign the Government of the country wholly in to the hands of the East India Company provided they made a suitable provision for the maintenance of his rank and dignity and a treaty was entered in to between the Raja and the East India Company. Under this treaty Tanjore became a British province and the Raja had ensured to him a fixed annual allowance of one lakh of pagodas or three and a half lakhs rupees with a fifth of the net revenues of the country ; Raja Sarabhoji enjoyed his rank and dignity with the pecuniary benefits attached to it for thirty four years and on his death in 1832, the same honours and privileges were continued to his son Sivaji until his death in 1855. No reservation was made in the treaty as to any territory except the Fort of Tanjore being retained by the Raja in his possession ; it so happened that Raja Sarobhoji was permitted to retain a number of villages and lands with the palaces situated in the different parts of the country. The landed property thus retained by him at the cession of the country, with certain additions subsequently made to it by purchase by Rajas Sarabhoji and Sivaji are stated to constitute the 199 villages, the nature of which is now in dispute. After Sivaji’s death in 1855 these villages were taken over by the East India Company and they remained in the possession of the company for nearly seven years when in 1862 the possession of the same was made over to the widows of the last Raja. One of the questions for decision in these appeals is with regard to the character of the lands in the possession of the heirs of the last Raja. Whereas on the side of the plaintiff, it is contended that these villages formed the private properties of the Raja’s family and that on relinquishment by the East India Company in 1862 assumed the character of private property and as such, it cannot be an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, the respondents contend that even if the original villages constituted private or separate property of the Raja giving back all of them to the heirs of the Raja would not be any relinquishment by which the original rights in the property were restored but that the grant constituted a fresh inam by the then Government and if that is so, the villages would come under the provisions of the Estates Land Act at least as amended in 1936. It may be mentioned that at page 825 of the Tanjore District Manual, 1871, these villages are stated as constituting the private property of the Raja’s family. In the Gazetteer of the Tanjore District, Volume 1, at page 192, published in 1906, the following description is found:- “The private estate of the late Raja is still enjoyed by his family and is managed by a receiver subordinate to the District Judge. In the Gazetteer of the Tanjore District, Volume 1, at page 192, published in 1906, the following description is found:- “The private estate of the late Raja is still enjoyed by his family and is managed by a receiver subordinate to the District Judge. These mokasa villages are chiefly to be found in the Tanjore and Kumbakonam taluks but there are also a fair number in Mannargudi and a few in all the taluks except Nannilam. There are 199 villages so classified as well as some detached pieces of land amounting in all to over 35,000 acres. The only items of revenue paid by these are a small police fee, the water rate for irrigating dry lands with Government water and cess.” Such being the case, we have to find out how the judicial decisions have dealt with the nature of these estates. On behalf of the appellant, as stated, it is argued that the properties of the last Raja of Tanjore which had been seized by the East India Company as an act of State but were restored to his heirs did not constitute an inam as there was no grant at all but amounted only to a relinquishment by the East India Company in favour of the heirs with the result that the properties did not assume the character of an inam but retained the character of private property in the hands of the heirs of the last Raja of Tanjore. If the properties are not inams, then it is not possible to apply the amending Act XVIII of 1936, to the lands in question. We propose, therefore, to review as succinctly as possible the various decided cases on the subject and then proceed to discuss the evidence in the case. The decision in the Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba1, arose out of an appeal from the decree on the equity side of the Supreme Court at Madras by which it was declared that the eldest widow of the late Raja of Tanjore who, as stated already, was without issue became entitled to inherit and possess his private and particular estate, real and personal, left by him at the time of his death and which the East India Company, representing the British Crown, had seized on 18th October, 1856. The Secretary of State for India appealed against that decision and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, by their judgment delivered by the Right Hon’ble Lord Kingsdown, held that as the seizure was made by the British Government acting as a sovereign power through its delegate, the East India Company, it was an act of State, and a municipal Court had no jurisdiction to enquire into its propriety. The 199 villages which later on came to be known as the Tanjore Palace Estate were among the properties seized by the East India Company. The nature of these villages did not come up for decision but from the statement of facts reported at page 482 it is seen that in the letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras to the Government of India there was the following statement:- “Thirdly there are some valuable villages belonging to the Raja in different parts of the province, some retained by the Sevajee when the country was assumed by the British Government and some subsequently acquired by purchase. These should be examined and any claims to or liens upon them considered. Fourthly some dues by the late Raja to private parties or claims on behalf of the members of the family still remain to be settled.” The distinction between public and private property of a Hindu sovereign was noticed in the sense that upon his death his private property goes to one set of heirs and the Raja and the public property to the succeeding Rajah. At page 495 from the extracts of the Judgment of the Chief Justice, Sir Christopher Rawlinson, it is seen that Rajah Sivajee died possessed of both private and self-acquired property both real and personal. Then again at page 503 in the same judgment with regard to the seizure, it has been described as an indiscriminate seizure both of public and private property and at page 504 the learned Chief Justice observes: "that an order having been issued to take possession of public property, private property was taken, and is now detained and that such detention cannot be considered an act of State". The Privy Council did not differentiate between the kinds of properties seized and it only expressed the opinion that since the seizure was an act of State the municipal Courts could not entertain any action regarding that and therefore reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Madras the suit by the plaintiffs was dismissed. Thereafter there were certain proceedings in India. On receipt of the judgment of the Privy Council the minute by the Honourable the President Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, dated 8th November, 1859, was appended to that. There is some discussion about the nature of the landed property seized in paragraph 14, at page 546: "The bulk was retained by the Rajah contrary to the provisions of the Treaty by which the Province was ceded to the East India Company in 1779; but according to my view as expressed in the early part of this minute, it matters not in what manner the property came into the possession of the Rajah. Whatever actually belonged to the Rajah at the time of his death is included in the escheat, and now belongs to the Government." There is still further discussion regarding the 14 villages claimed by the mother of the late Rajah as having been granted to her by her late husband, Rajah Sarabhoji and the minute showed that since the villages were not only managed but their proceeds were appropriated by the Rajah they were treated after 1827 entirely as his own property and therefore the question of these villages should form the subject of the escheat. We need not refer more to this decision because it was after 1862 that there was a re-grant or restoration of the villages to the Rajah’s heirs. The next decision relating to this estate is in Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba1, which arose out of a suit by two widows of the late Rajah against the senior widow and an alleged adopted son of the late Rajah for a division of the immoveable properties which had been made over by the Government of Madras to the senior widow and for cancellation of the adoption, made after the death of the Rajah. The High Court held that during the time the Government held the estate that is, during the interval between the death of the Rajah until the restoration of the estate by an act of State, it was held in absolute ownership in the Government and, therefore, the suit by the two widows could not be maintainable. Evidence regarding restoration or relinquishment is extracted in the statement of facts at page 428 which is as follows: "In Colonel Durand’s letter above recorded, the Government of India have furnished their instructions with reference to the disposal of the landed property of the Tanjore Raj regarding which this Government addressed them under, date the 17th May, last. Their decision is to the affect that since it is doubtful whether the lands in question can be legally dealt with as State property and since the plea in equity and policy for treating them as the private property of the Rajah is so strong that it commands the unanimous support, of the members of the Madras Government, the whole of the lands are to be relinquished in favour of the heirs of the late Rajah." In the judgment of the Court we find at page 445 the following expression of opinion: "For these reasons we are of opinion that this Court is bound to consider the transfers under the order as a grant of grace and favour by the Government in right of their absolute sovereign ownership, just as if it had been thought proper to make the disposition in favour of persons who were not the nearest representatives and consequently that the widow’s and daughter’s proprietary rights are derivative from the Government and have no relation back to inheritance on the death of the Rajah. It is only on the ground that the Government had confessed themselves completely in the wrong in regard to possession of the property and passed the order as a reparation that the Court could hold differently, and we think the contrary of that inconsistent and" most unlikely position appears". An argument is put forward on behalf of the appellant that the effect of the restoration or relinquishment is only the undoing of a wrong and therefore if the villages were the private properties of the Rajah at the time of the seizure then the same character is maintained when they were handed back to his widow. An argument is put forward on behalf of the appellant that the effect of the restoration or relinquishment is only the undoing of a wrong and therefore if the villages were the private properties of the Rajah at the time of the seizure then the same character is maintained when they were handed back to his widow. There does not seem to have been any judicial pronouncement regarding the nature of these villages for nearly fifty years until the matter came up for discussion before a Full Bench in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, where the order of reference to the Full Bench was in very wide terms as to whether the Tanjore Palace Estate is an “ Estate” within the meaning of section 3(2) of Act 1 of 1908. The Civil Revision Petitions out of which the Full Bench reference arose were filed against the returning of the plaints filed in the Court of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kumbakonam, under section 77 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1 of 1908, on the ground that the revenue Court had no jurisdiction. Ayling, J., in formulating the question for reference to the Full Bench did not express any opinion on the point. Seshagiri Aiyer, J., in a more elaborate discussion referred to section 3(2) of Act 1 of 1908 in order to find out under what provision of the sub-sections to the main section the villages came in. During the arguments before the Full Bench, Sir John Wallis, Chief Justice, stated that it was not possible to go back on the decision in Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba2, which stated that there was a grant and that resumability was not the essential sine qua non of an inam. It was also argued before the Full Bench that since inams were registered under Regulation XXXI of 1802 and the Palace Estate was not registered as such, it could not be considered to be an inam within the meaning of the definition ‘Estate’ under the Act. It was also argued before the Full Bench that since inams were registered under Regulation XXXI of 1802 and the Palace Estate was not registered as such, it could not be considered to be an inam within the meaning of the definition ‘Estate’ under the Act. In his judgment, Sir John Wallis, C.J., traced the history of these 199 villages and referred to the earlier decisions to which we have already alluded and since it was admitted before him that the kudivaram right in the village which was the subject-matter of the appeal and in almost all the other villages, did not belong to the estate he came to the conclusion that the villages should be deemed to be inams within the definition in section 3(2)(d) of the Act, and therefore answered the question in the affirmative. He was of the opinion that the nature of the inam was a peculiar one and though commonly known as mokhasa grant it cannot be said to have been granted on what is known as mokhasa but was intended to be regarded as an inam of a dignified character. He held the view that section 3(2)(d) of Act I of 1908 brought within its ambit inams which were irresumable in character. In the end the learned Chief Justice came to the conclusion that all the villages constituting the Tanjore Palace Estate came within the definition of the “ Estate” in section 3(2)(d) of the Act. Seshagiri Ayyar, J., agreed with the learned Chief Justice while Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in assenting to the proposition that the particular village, namely, Mokhasa Ullikadai village was an estate restricted the scope of the reference to that village alone and did not want that the decision should be understood to cover all the villages comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate. Mr. Kesava Ayyangar for the appellant commented upon this decision by contending that it could not be that the decision of the Full Bench is applicable to the entire estate by supposing that resumability is necessary in all the inams and that because it was conceded in that case that the kudivaram right in Mokhasa Ullikadai village did not belong to the estate the scope of the Full Bench decision should be restricted to that particular village only. He also contended that the correct way of interpreting the decision in Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba2, is by stating that the original nature of the properties was restored by the relinquishment or restoration and if that is so, what was the private property of the Rajah retained its character as such and they became the private properties of the grantees after 1862. It cannot be disputed that the adjudication in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, can apply only to the parties to that litigation and any question regarding the nature of any of the other villages could not be res judicata by reason of the Full Bench decision. Such being the case the Full Bench decision can only be a source of great authority. Let us now see how this case was understood in subsequent judicial pronouncements and also how later decisions have discussed the nature of the other villages comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate. In S.A. No. 1413 of 1924 Phillips, J., came the conclusion that the Full Bench decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, did not mean to decide and in fact did not decide that the whole of the Tanjore Palace Estate was an “ estate” within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of Act 1 of 1908 because the Full Bench did not definitely say that their answer to the reference should refer to all the villages comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate but that it should be confined to the particular village in question. The finding of the lower appellate Court in that case was that the Palace Estate had both melvaram and kudivaram rights in the lands comprised in the litigation. The learned Judge understood the Full Bench decision as not being conclusive with respect to other villages forming part of the Tanjore Palace Estate. There was a Letters Patent Appeal against that decision wherein the view taken by Phillips, J., was confirmed. In an earlier Judgment reported in Raja Ram Rao v. Sundaram Iyer2, Sankara Nair, J., had to consider the nature of Vennur Ramaswami Thottam which formed part of the Tanjore Palace Estate. There was a Letters Patent Appeal against that decision wherein the view taken by Phillips, J., was confirmed. In an earlier Judgment reported in Raja Ram Rao v. Sundaram Iyer2, Sankara Nair, J., had to consider the nature of Vennur Ramaswami Thottam which formed part of the Tanjore Palace Estate. Accepting the finding of the lower Court that both the warams have been admittedly in the enjoyment of the Ranees who were the grantees under the grant of 1862 he held that the lands in question could not come within the definition of “estate” in section 3(2) of Act 1 of 1908. Krishnan, J., in an observation in Nallauthu Padayachi v. Srinivasa Iyer3, seems to have interpreted the Full Bench decision as laying down that the whole of the Tanjore Palace Estate was an estate under the definition in section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act but there is no discussion about the merits of the question. Succession to the Tanjore Palace Estate had been the subject of litigation which came up to the High Court in the case reported in Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer4, and there are observations in the judgment of both the learned Judges with regard to the nature of the holding of these 199 villages. Though the point in dispute in that litigation related to the claims of rival heirs the history of the Tanjore Palace Estate had been considered by the learned Judges. Spencer, Offg. C.J., at page 25, remarks that he was unable to follow the learned Judges in Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba5, in their conclusion that what was relinquished at the time in 1862 was a grant of grace and favour than a restoration of the property to those entitled to it by right of succession. The learned Judges seemed to think that the regrant meant to restore to the parties the rights which were in the property at the time of seizure. This case is important only in this respect, that is, that it was not definitely taken for granted that the relinquishment was a regrant. The learned Judges seemed to think that the regrant meant to restore to the parties the rights which were in the property at the time of seizure. This case is important only in this respect, that is, that it was not definitely taken for granted that the relinquishment was a regrant. The other learned Judge, Kumaraswami Sastri, J., at page 98, after quoting the letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, dated 23rd June, 1862, discussed the matter at pages 113 and 114 and expressed the opinion that though the relinquishment made by virtue of the seizure in the professed exercise of the sovereign rights may have the effect of a fresh grant, still the position when the Government resolved to relinquish the property was to give it back to the heirs of the Rajah, that is to say, to the persons who would have taken the property on the death of the Rajah had there been no seizure. There is a definite pronouncement as regards the rights conferred by the letter of relinquishment. The decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Chota Raja Saheb v. Sundaram Iyer6, which confirmed the decision in Maharajah of Kolhapur v.Sundaram Iyer1, does not contain any specific opinion regarding the nature of the regrant. After the decision in Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba2, the next time when the nature of the estate was considered in the reported decisions was in Srinivasa Iyer v. Nallamuthu Padayachi3, by Walter and Madhavan Nair, JJ., and in their order calling for a finding the learned Judges stated that the lower appellate Court in that case misunderstood the Full Bench decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer4, as referring to the whole of the Palace Estate and not to one village alone and directed the Subordinate Judge to submit a finding whether the disputed lands were a village as contemplated in section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act or whether apart from the Act the defendant had any occupancy rights. The reasoning of that case shows that the relinquishment in 1862 restored the anterior rights of the parties and since at the time of seizure the Rajah was entitled to both the warams the lands in question did not form an estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(d). The reasoning of that case shows that the relinquishment in 1862 restored the anterior rights of the parties and since at the time of seizure the Rajah was entitled to both the warams the lands in question did not form an estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(d). The impression that can be gathered from this judgment is that if both the warams vested in the Rajah with regard to any particular village then the relinquishment or regrant would not deprive the landlord of those rights. Though, therefore, they understood the Full Bench decision in Sundaram Iyer v . Ramachandra Iyer4, as referring only to a particular village it was considered necessary to find out the nature of the rights in each of the villages separately. Venkataramana Rao, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench in the case reported in Jagannatha Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar5, understood the Full Bench decision as containing a general finding with regard to the whole estate. After referring to the earlier judgments it was observed that if the Full Bench decision is to be given full effect there could only be one answer and that is, the village in question was an estate. Despite that expression of opinion the learned Judge discussed the evidence regarding it for coming to the conclusion that it was an estate. One thing is clear and that is that despite a disposition on the part of the learned Judges to take the view- that the Full Bench decision laid down a general proposition that the villages comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate would be ‘estate’ within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, still they considered it necessary to discuss the evidence regarding each village as and when it came up for consideration to find out whether the Full Bench decision can correctly be applied to that. The learned Judges also relied on the fact that the Full Bench decision will not be binding upon the parties other than those who were before the Court in that case. The Privy Council had to consider the nature of the properties in Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar6, with regard to the village of Someswarapuram comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate when considering the applicability of the Madras Irrigation Cess Act (VII of 1865) to that village. The Privy Council had to consider the nature of the properties in Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar6, with regard to the village of Someswarapuram comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate when considering the applicability of the Madras Irrigation Cess Act (VII of 1865) to that village. Sir Madhavan Nair, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, referred to the history of the grant at pages 233 and 234 in extenso and formulated the question whether the Tanjore Palace Estate which came into being as a result of the grant by the Government on 21st August, 1862, constituted an engagement with the Government entitling the grantees to take water for free irrigation. The contention put forward on behalf of the Government was that the grant of the village conveyed to the holders of the Tanjore Palace Estate only the right to collect full land revenue, that is, melwaram due on the lands and that it did not constitute an assignment of the land. The discussion at pages 239 to 241 of this judgment indicates that the relinquishment in 1862 restored to the grantee full proprietary rights over the properties but their Lordship held that they were not called upon to express an opinion as to whether the villages are estates within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. Though the decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer4, was cited before them the correctness of it had not been adjudicated upon in the judgment. The word ‘relinquishment’ has been interpreted as restoration of the private property of the Rajah to his heirs in all its integrity and without any reservation of any kind of right in favour of the Government. That the Full Bench decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer 1 , had not even the implicit approval of their Lordships is sufficiently obvious and it seems to us that if it were necessary to decide whether the 199 villages are estates within the meaning of section 3(2)d) of the Estates Land Act the Judicial Committee might have taken a different view. They refer to the decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, for the purpose of remarking that the grant was an irresumable one and conclude that having regard to the nature of the grant of 1862 the Tanjore Palace Estate, if treated as an inam must be treated as a peculiar kind of inam and the estate appears commonly to have been spoken of as a Mokhasa grant which it is not. There was also an underlying implication to treat these villages as the private property of the Rajah. But one thing is abundantly clear and that is having in more than one place referred to the decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1 and also having considered the question as to whether the land revenue alone had been granted without the kudiwaram rights by the grant of 1862, the Privy Council has expressly refrained from approving of the correctness of the decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1. Then again the history of the nature of the Tanjore Palace Estate has been noticed by Wadsworth, Offg. C.J., in Jagadesam Pillai v. Kuppammal 2 , when considering whether Kaduveli village forming part of the Tanjore Palace Estate had become an estate by reason of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act XVIII of 1936. Adverting to the Full Bench decision in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, the learned Judge observed that it was not necessary to determine whether or not the village of Kaduveli formed an estate within the definition of the Estates Land Act as it stood before the amendment of 1936. The learned Judge observed at pages 700 and 701 as follows: “The Full Bench which decided Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, answered in the affirmative the question whether the Tanjore Palace Estate was an estate under the Madras Act 1 of 1908. This decision has in some cases been distinguished on the ground that only one village was then under the consideration of the Court ; but in terms the answer of he Full Bench appears to include the whole of the estate. This decision has in some cases been distinguished on the ground that only one village was then under the consideration of the Court ; but in terms the answer of he Full Bench appears to include the whole of the estate. There is much to be said for the view that, when the grant is considered as a whole, it must be regarded as a grant of the land revenue to a person not owning kudiwaram in the lande although it can be shown that in the case of individual lands in the estate the kudiwaram intereswhich had been previously owned by the Rajah was included in the rendition to his heirs. What ever be the effect of the application of the Madras Act 1 of 1908 to this estate all doubt is removed by the passing of the Amending Act in 1936.” In regard to Nadhupadugai Melpathi one of the villages forming part of the Tanjore Palace Estate this Court decided following Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, that it was an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act for the reason that all the villages pertaining to the Tanjore Palace Estate v ere granted in inam by the Government to the heirs of the Rajah of Tanjore. The learned Judges, Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., in Abdul Rahim v. Swaminatha3, interpreted the Full Bench decision as direct authority for the conclusion that the entire body of the villages pertaining to the Tanjore Palace Estate should be held as inams. They refer to the earlier decisions which we have considered above in which this question came up for consideration including Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppammal 2 , and distinguished Nallamuthu Padayachi v. Srinivasa Iyer4, and Srinivasa Iyer v. Nallamuthu Padayachi5, followed Jagannatha Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar6, and held affirmatively that the Full Bench decision was authority for holding that the entire Tanjore Palace Estate is an estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Act. It has to be noticed that though this judgment was pronounced on the 4th February 1954, no reference has been made in the judgment to the decision in Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar1. The decree and judgment of Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., are now pending in appeal before the Supreme Court as a result of leave granted by Panchapakesa Ayyar and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., in S.C.C.M.P. Nos. The decree and judgment of Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., are now pending in appeal before the Supreme Court as a result of leave granted by Panchapakesa Ayyar and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., in S.C.C.M.P. Nos. 6623 and 6625 of 1954 by their order, dated 25th February, 1955, in which Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., has observed that the ruling in Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar1, was not cited before Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., and therefore the question involved is of sufficient importance to be taken to the Supreme Court. A Bench to which one of us (Govinda Menon, J.) was a party noticed the conflicting decisions as considered above in S.A. No. 1513 of 1948 and observed that in the state of authority it was unnecessary to express any opinion regarding the entire estate and confined the decision only to the question as to whether the hamlet under consideration, Pattiswaram Thattimalapadugai, a part of Thenampadugai, is an estate within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1936 and on the evidence it was found that it was an estate. In his order calling for a finding in S.A. No. 2465 of 1948 on the 19th March, 1953, Satyanarayana Rao, J., has also discussed all the cases and he was inclined to take the view that the decision in Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar1, has not, in fact, cast a doubt on the wide proposition laid down in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer2, and in regard to lands which were under consideration in that litigation, he held that it was an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. A finding was called for from the lower appellate Court as to whether the lands in question were private lands and not ryoti lands and the Deputy Collector, Kumbakonam, submitted a finding that the lands were not ryoti and hence the plaintiff was not entitled to get any patta under section 55 of the Estates Land Act. That finding was accepted by this Court by one of us (Govinda Menon, J.). That finding was accepted by this Court by one of us (Govinda Menon, J.). Raghava Rao, J., in S.A. No. 2343 of 1947 took the view while agreeing with the decision in Srinivasa Iyer v. Nallamuthu Padayachi3, that it cannot be said that every piece of land situated in any village in the Tanjore Palace Estate can be regarded as an estate within the meaning of the definition and that evidence must be gone into to decide whether any particular village had both the warams or not. It is pertinent to remember that the land in question in that second appeal was situated in the Pannimangalam village which has been considered as a whole inam village by the learned Judge. The disputed lands in these appeals which we are now considering are in Orathur padugai which is also a part of Pannimangalam village. Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Iyer for the respondents urges that even if at the time of the seizure the 199 villages formed part of the private estate of the Rajah of Tanjore in which he held both the warams by the very nature of the relinquishment or regrant it has not revived the old state of things and, therefore, the rights of the parties should be decided as and from the grant itself which according to the learned counsel can only be that when the sovereign makes a grant it is only in respect of the right to collect revenue and, therefore, the grantee is entitled only to melwaram right alone. It is argued that since the restoration of the lands was a grant by the Crown a construction most strictly against the grantee and more beneficial to the Crown should be adopted and if so nothing will pass to the grantee but by clear and express words. He relies upon certain pronouncements which show that after there has been a confiscation, seizure or exchange or regrant either to the heirs of the original owner or to third parties the only inference that can be drawn is that the grant conveyed nothing but the right to collect the revenue and the new title conferred should naturally be deemed to be on the terms of the grant. The question which their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had to consider in Nawab Nalka Jahan Sahiba v. Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow4, was with respect to the effect of confiscation of certain properties as a result of the Mutiny in 1857 and the consequent regrant to the former owners. Their Lordships held that the effect of Lord Canning’s proclamation of the 15th March, 1858, was to divest all the landed property from the proprietors in Oudh and to transfer it to and vest it in the British Government. Consequently all who since that day claimed title to such property must claim through the Government. Where the regrant is made to a former owner the new title will depend entirely on the terms of the regrant and if such regrant is made for life only no suit can be maintained to certify the alleged mistake. There cannot be any resuscitation or revival of the old things. At page 74 we find the following observations: “Those rights, whatever they were, were confiscated and the sole question is what interest, if any was regranted to her. Looking at the whole of the proceedings which have been concluded, it appears to their Lordships abundantly clear that no more was granted to her than a permission to occupy the palace for her life. If the acts which she seeks to impugn on the part of the officers of the Government were nullities it would follow she has no interest at all but that her property remains in the British Government to which it was confiscated.” From this it is urged that we have to look at the substance of the regrant and nothing more. Another case on which great reliance was placed was Sirdhar Bhagwan Singh v. Secretary of State for India1, which held that seizure by right of conquest must be regarded as an act of State and is not liable to be questioned in a municipal Court, following The Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba2. The observation at page 44 regarding the effect of certain directions to the East India Company after the conquest of Punjab which was contemplated to make what may be called a tabula rasa of tenures of a particular kind and to regrant them upon terms entirely at the discretion of the British Government were relied upon. The observation at page 44 regarding the effect of certain directions to the East India Company after the conquest of Punjab which was contemplated to make what may be called a tabula rasa of tenures of a particular kind and to regrant them upon terms entirely at the discretion of the British Government were relied upon. It is, no doubt, true that in more than one place the judgment refers to the effect of regrant but we are not able to find much analogy between that case and what we have to consider. Learned counsel also brought to our notice the decision in Vajesingji Joravrarsingji v. Secretary of State for India in Council3, which also dealt with the question of seizure of certain lands. The next case cited was the well known case Cook v. Sprigg4, where the Judicial Committee held that where the British Crown annexed certain lands such annexations being an act of State any obligation assumed under a treaty to that effect either to the ceding sovereign or to individuals is not one which municipal Courts are authorised to enforce, following The Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba2. The other cases on which the learned counsel relies are Secretary of State v. Bai Raj Bai5, and Rahas Behari Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal6. In the earlier case it was held that if before the ceding of any territory to the British Crown by a feudatory prince there had been any legal subsidiary rights created in others by such a prince such rights cannot exist after the cession. The only legal enforcible rights are those which by agreement express or implied or by legislation the new sovereign chose to confer upon them, following the Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba2, and Cook v. Sprigg4. There are observations in Rahas Behari Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal6, in practically the same strain. It is not necessary to discuss that case in great detail. We may also refer to Secretary State v. Rustom Khan7. Mr. There are observations in Rahas Behari Lal v. Kanhaiya Lal6, in practically the same strain. It is not necessary to discuss that case in great detail. We may also refer to Secretary State v. Rustom Khan7. Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Iyer further contends that according to certain observations in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer8, the 199 villages could not have been the private estate of the Rajah but must have been the adjuncts of his sovereignty and whatever might be the reason for his retention of these villages after the cession of the Tanjore Raj when once they are seized by the East India Company on behalf of the British Crown all the previous tenures and rights that existed must be deemed to have been wiped out and that the grant of 1862 should be considered as opening a new chapter and writing on a clean slate. If that is so, it could not be that by the regrant both the warams could in any event have been granted to the successors of the Rajah. He particularly refers to the concession made by the counsel in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, that the kudivaram interest did not belong to the estate at all. This is made clear from the arguments of the learned counsel in that case. Sadasiva Iyer, J., at page 399 in Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1, refers to the new grant as of Government revenue alone. In these circumstances the learned counsel contends that the kudiwaram rights could never have passed to the grantees. In our view, Sundaram Iyer v. Ramachandra Iyer1 cannot be understood as laying down a conclusive decision that all the villages constituting the Tanjore Palace Estate are estates within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act in that only melwaram alone vested in the Rajah. Even in all those cases where the Full Bench decision is understood as laying down a general law evidence was gone into to find out whether the kudivaram right vested in the tenants. Jagannatha Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar2, Abdul Rahim v. Swaminathan3, and S.A. No. 2465 of 1948 reveal the fact that the learned Judges who decided each one of them did not proceed to base their conclusion on the Full Bench decision alone. Jagannatha Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar2, Abdul Rahim v. Swaminathan3, and S.A. No. 2465 of 1948 reveal the fact that the learned Judges who decided each one of them did not proceed to base their conclusion on the Full Bench decision alone. It is, therefore, clear that because the Tanjore Palace Estate consisted of a number of villages it is not right to treat the entire estate itself for the purpose of the definition of the Madras Estates Land Act as one single inam village falling within the provisions of section 3(2)(d) of the Act so that whatever land is situated within any of the villages comprised in the estate would necessarily be land situated within the estate under the Estates Land Act. But one thing is clear and that is, that none of the decisions regarding any of the villages comprised in the Tanjore Palace Estate has so far, decided that the entire area comprising the 199 villages belonged to the Rajah as his private property, that is property, situated in the ryotwari area paying land revenue to the Government. In Secretary of State for India v. Thinnappa Chettiar4, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee treated the grant as an inam of a peculiar kind and there was no question of treating the same as the private property of the Rajah. Though therefore, there are expressions of opinion here and there in some of the judgments to the effect that the lands were originally the property of the Rajah, still we have to take it that the restoration or relinquishment or regrant should be considered to be the root of a new title. Such being the case, the issue has to be decided on the evidence as to whether the plaintiff in each of these suits is entitled to both the warams. Learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice that the lands in question are not comprised in a whole inam village as there has been no grant as such but that they are grazing fields or padugais without any human habitation and without any village site and argued that such being the case, it cannot be said that there was a grant of the village. We shall deal with this aspect of the case later on. We shall deal with this aspect of the case later on. But before doing so, it is necessary to advert to the argument that the lower Court has thrown the onus of proof wrongly in putting the burden on the plaintiff to show that he has a right to eject the tenant. The complaint is that in more than one place the learned Subordinate Judge has proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff has not discharged that onus that lies oh him to prove that the lands in question are private lands. See the beginning of paragraphs 29 and 35 and the end of paragraphs 40 and 41 of the lower Court’s judgment. It is no doubt, true that the learned Subordinate Judge has dealt with the question of the burden of proof in the manner stated but he has also gone into the evidence before coming to the conclusion though not as elaborately as should have been the case. According to Mr. Kesava Iyengar, under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code a civil Court has got the right to adjudicate a civil dispute which is within the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of that Court and any party that denies that jurisdiction should affirmatively prove it. Learned counsel suggests that the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of burden of proof is tantamount to a denial of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to hear the suits. We do not think that there is any question of jurisdiction involved in these cases. What has to be considered is whether in the circumstances of the case the burden of proof is on the plaintiff or not. A large body of case law has been cited at the Bar but in our view there is no such cut and dry element of proof. It is urged that if the lands in question are part of an estate then since under the Madras Estates Land Act a suit for ejectment is not maintainable in a civil court, the defence put forward amounts to an ouster of jurisdiction and therefore the party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court must establish his right to do so. In that case the burden will be on the defendant. See the decision in Srimath Jagannathacharyalu v. Kutumbarayudu1. In that case the burden will be on the defendant. See the decision in Srimath Jagannathacharyalu v. Kutumbarayudu1. The observations in the well known case in Naina Pillai Maracair v. Ramanathan Chettiar2, where their Lordships held that it is for the defendants tenants, to prove that they had the right of occupancy under the Estates Land Act where the title of the landlord had been admitted was specifically relied upon. Various passages from that judgment where the matter is discussed were brought to our notice. The decision in Srimath Jagannathacharyalu v. Kutumbarayudu1, was accepted by the Judicial Committee in Ramayya v. Lakshminarayana3. At page 452 their Lordships say that the burden is on the party who maintains that the general rule namely, section 9, Civil Procedure Code is not applicable Our attention was also drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in The District Board Tanjore v. Noor Mohomed Rowther4, where Mahajan, J., refers to the fact of the late Mr. Somayya, learned counsel for the tenants in that case conceding that the burden of proof that certain lands constituted an estate is upon the party who sets up that contention. At page 104, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., also considers that the burden is on the tenant to establish that what was originally granted was an estate. Raghava Rao, J., refers with regard to the burden of proof in similar terms in Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna5. Moreover in The District Board, Tanjore v. Moor Mahomed Rowther4, their Lordships cited with approval the judgment of this Court in Janakirama v. Gopalan6. Ramayya v. Lakshminarayana3, and The District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Mahomed Rowther4, were relied upon by Satyanarayana Rao, J., for holding that the burden of establishing the nature of the occupancy rights is undoubtedly on the tenants who claim them. On the other hand we were pressed with the authority of the Privy Council in Lakshmanna v. Venkateswaralu7, where the Judicial Committee held that in a suit by a holder of a minor inam to evict the tenant from the holding the burden is on the plaintiff to make out the right to evict by proving that the grant included both the melwaram and the kudivaram interests or that the tenant or his predecessors were let into possession by the inamdar under a terminable lease. Their Lordships distinguished the case in Naina Pillai Maracair v. Ramanathan Chettiar2, by stating that the decision does not contravene the principle that in a suit for ejectment the burden lies on the inamdar as plaintiff to prove his right to evict and is not inconsistent with the decision in Chidambara v. Veerama Reddi8. Their Lordships further held that the judgment in Naina Pillai Maracair v. Ramanathan Chettiar2, read as a whole does not support the conclusion that the proposition of law laid down therein as regards the burden of proof is a general proposition. The discussion at pages 577 and 578 was specifically relied on. In the present case we do not wish to rest our decision merely on the principle of the burden of proof. Elaborate evidence has been let in on both sides and our conclusion will be based on the analysis of that evidence and not merely on the academic question regarding burden of proof for as has been remarked very often by the Courts of the highest authority when once the entire evidence is before the Court the onus of proof is only a matter of minor interest as the case has to be decided mainly on the evidence. If the village in question is a minor inam then the decision of the Privy Council in Lakshmanna v. Venkateswaralu1, will be applicable. If on the other hand it is an estate as claimed by the defendants the Supreme Court decision in the District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Mahomed Rowther2, will be applicable. Under these circumstances the question we have to decide is whether the village of Orathur padugai is an estate or not. The question of the nature of the lands in dispute has to be viewed in two aspects and they are firstly whether Orathur padugai is an estate and secondly even assuming that the lands are situated in an estate whether they are private lands and not ryoti lands. If it is the former, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed and if it is the latter, the suits will have to be dismissed. In order to establish that the lands lie in an estate which admittedly is in the nature of an inam, we have to find out firstly whether there is a grant of an mam and thereafter whether such a grant is a grant of the whole village . In order to establish that the lands lie in an estate which admittedly is in the nature of an inam, we have to find out firstly whether there is a grant of an mam and thereafter whether such a grant is a grant of the whole village . In this case there is no documentary evidence in regard to the grant. Nor is there anything to show the nature of the inam. But from certain earlier documents a contention is put forward that there was no grant of the lands as such. Exhibit A-128 dated 6th April, 1800 is a letter to the Secretary to the Government, Madras, from the Resident of Tanjore with regard to the arrangement for the case and comfort of the Rajah who had ceded his territory to the East India Company. There is reference to Pannimangalam in which according to the plaintiffs the present Orathur padugai is situate. The statement there is that the fields of Pannimangalam to the westward of Tanjore which from time immemorial have been reserved for the pasture of the circar cows (Rajah of Tanjore)remained in the Rajah’s possession. There is neither village nor cultivation on these lands. In answer to this letter a communication from the Chief Secretary to the Government to the Resident of Tanjore, Exhibit A-129, dated 5th July, 1800, was sent and in paragraph 5 of that letter it is stated that the fields of Pannimangalam containing neither village nor cultivation shall remain in the hands of the Rajah for the pasturage of His Excellency’s cows. From this, it is argued that whatever might be the present condition of the lands in question, in 1800 they were merely pasture lands without any kind of habitation, intended for the grazing of the Rajah’s cattle. On the other hand, Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Iyer contends that in Exhibits A-128 and 129, Pannimangalam is described as situated to the westward of Tanjore whereas the exact location of these lands is admittedly not westward of Tanjore town and the cattle belonging to the Rajah could not have been grazed in the lands which are situate at least thirty miles away from Tanjore town, in Mannargudi taluk. Even with regard to the name given to the fields there seems to be some difference between Exhibits A-128 and A-129, in the former document the description is Pannimangalam whereas in the letter it is Pucanyamangalam. Even with regard to the name given to the fields there seems to be some difference between Exhibits A-128 and A-129, in the former document the description is Pannimangalam whereas in the letter it is Pucanyamangalam. It is, therefore, difficult so contends the learned counsel for the respondents, to fix the identity of the properties referred to in Exhibits A-128 and A-129 as the disputed lands. Moreover, the fact that the Rajah was allowed to keep the Strotnum village and adjust two hundred pagodas being the income from that village towards Mokhasa, one fifth of the revenue due to him, shows that the fields of Pannimangalam were not considered as productive of any income for, if that had been the case, some deduction should have been made towards that also. Learned Counsel for the respondents urges that the fields of Pannimangalam or Pucanyamangalam referred to in Exhibits A-128 and A-129 could not, therefore, be padugai lands in Mannargudi taluk but may refer to the high level pasture lands now seen to be situated to the west of Tanjore town through which the railway lines pass. That there was Orathur village in existence even as early as 1830 is clear from Exhibit A-151 because in describing certain boundaries of another village it is mentioned as to the north of assessed Orathur village Nadappukarai (bund pathway). It is clear that there was a village by the name of Orathur and that was assessed. That being the case as early as 1830, it seems that the village was not a grazing ground. The other documents in the case show that from 1880 up to the present day there is no doubt, that Orathur padugai village in Pannimangalam vattam is an independent entity paying assessment and has never been considered as pasture ground. That the word vattam refers to a group of villages is now clear and Pannimangalam vattam, therefore, consists of a number of villages of which Orathur padugai is one. If, therefore, these lands were never considered as pasture lands it could not be that the properties referred to in Exhibits A-128 and A-129 are identical with the disputed lands. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the Orathur village had been assessed as early as 1830 and that it is situate in Mannargudi taluk and not to the west of the Tanjore town. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the Orathur village had been assessed as early as 1830 and that it is situate in Mannargudi taluk and not to the west of the Tanjore town. The inference is, therefore, possible that the fields referred to in Exhibit A-128 and A-129 do not refer to these lands. In this connection it has to be mentioned that these two documents are printed sheets of paper containing no signatures nor even stating that they are true copies of the originals certified as such by anyone. We have examined these documents in question, with a view to find out their nature and, though there is no reason to cast any suspicion upon the genuineness of these documents from a strictly legal point of view, it would seem that they cannot be admitted in evidence as there is no certification of the true nature of the copies. From the very nature of things, these documents cannot be the originals and it is not pretended that they are such. We, therefore, feel that Exhibits A-128 and A-129 cannot help the case of the appellant to show that the lands in question are the private lands of the Rajah. If even they are considered as assessed lands as early as 1830, they should have become the public property belonging to the sovereign state of Tanjore over which the Rajah exercised his suzerainty and could not be his private property and if the entire Raj had been handed over to the East India Company under the treaty they continued to have the same features attached, such as liability to pay Government revenue out of which one-fifth was paid over to the Rajah. There is, nothing, therefore, to show that the character of these lands as Raj would not have continued till 1855 when seizure took place. We shall discuss the point regarding whether Orathur padugai was at least from 1830 recognised as a whole inam village at a later stage, but before doing so, it is necessary to refer to various documents on which Mr. Kesava Ayyangar relied to show that the lands in question were lands over which the Tanjore Palace Estate had absolute domain. We shall discuss the point regarding whether Orathur padugai was at least from 1830 recognised as a whole inam village at a later stage, but before doing so, it is necessary to refer to various documents on which Mr. Kesava Ayyangar relied to show that the lands in question were lands over which the Tanjore Palace Estate had absolute domain. What he contends is that because there is no entry in the Huzur inam register relating to Orathur Thottam of Pannimangalam vattam, Mannargudi taluk, as is seen from Exhibit A-150, it must be taken that the padugai in question is not a village and, if that is so, what was granted was not a whole village but only a block of lands, and therefore, according to the decision of Bavanarayana v. Venkatadu1, they cannot form an estate. Great reliance is placed upon Exhibit A-147 dated 25th August, 1930 which is an abstract showing the paimash land measurement in Orathur thottam, Sithamalli Keelpathi vattam, Nidamangalam firka, Mannargudi taluk, for fasli 1240. In considering the measurements the description is given as Orathur thottam dittam. There are recitals to the effect that in the thottam, there are forests and that by way of grass tax, mattu thotti, ilandai fruit lease and fire wood the palace gets an annual income of Rs. 50. In the above thottam natham kudiyeruppu (village site, residential quarters do not exist). The four boundaries are also given and the thottam is described as ekhabhogam thottam, that is, thottam in which the proprietorship vests in the owner. According to the appellant this document would show that the Rajah was the sole owner of the lands and there was no grant whatever of a village. We are asked to say that by a combined reading of Exhibits A-128, A-129 and A-147 the Orathur thottam was the private estate of the Rajah. We have already stated that Exhibits A-128 and A-129 do not refer to the suit lands and with regard to Exhibit A-147 the recitals there are not conclusive. We are asked to say that by a combined reading of Exhibits A-128, A-129 and A-147 the Orathur thottam was the private estate of the Rajah. We have already stated that Exhibits A-128 and A-129 do not refer to the suit lands and with regard to Exhibit A-147 the recitals there are not conclusive. That, up to 1875, there was no cultivation as such in Orathur padugai is sought to be established from Exhibits A-8 to A-10 of which Exhibit A-8 dated 17th August, 1872 is a lease muchilika executed by a tenant for having taken these lands lor me purpose of grazing cattle and for cutting grass for a term of five years from fasli 1282 to 1286. The description of the leased property is Periakadu Orathur Siddhamalli padugai attached to Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal and the lessee agrees to surrender the property after a period of five years. Exhibits A-9 and A-11 are D.C.B. accounts for Orathur periakadu attached to Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal and it is stated therein that the lands are padugai waste and the bens for cutting grass for a period of five years is Rs. 63 and there are other indications there to show that the lands were waste. Exhibit A-11 is also a similar D.C.B. account showing that the Orathur padugai was tharisu (waste). Similarly Exhibit A-10 is the Jamabhandhi account for Orathur periakadu attached to Pannimangalam Thattimal and that shows that it was waste land leased out for cutting grass for a period of five years. In all these documents there are indications to show that other than grass, by sale of certain kinds of fruits and withered trees, etc., smaller sums of monies were realised. No doubt these four documents show that between 1872 and 1875 Orathur padugai consisted of waste lands also but in view of what is found in Exhibit A-151 that as early as 1830 some portions of the lands in Orathur village were assessed, nothing conclusive can be gathered from the fact that the other portions nearly half a century later were let out for pasture purposes. Whether the Orathur padugai was an estate according to the definition of the term in section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act as it originally stood or whether it becomes an estate by reason of the amendment introduced by the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 by which Explanation (1) was added will have to be considered next. According to the operative part of the section as it originally stood "any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government or any separated part of such village." is an estate. The amended section lays down "that any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors-in-title of the grantee or grantees.‘ is an estate. By the Explanation, what is meant by a whole inam village is made clear and it is this:- "Where a grant is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subjectmatter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes." The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents is that Orathur padugai is a whole inam village according to unamended section 6 and in any event after the amendment by the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 the village is an estate under section 3(2)(d) and the Explanation thereto. In regard to the assessed nature of the lands in 1830 reference was already made to Exhibit A-147 and until 1880 it is alleged that Orathur padugai was regarded as a village in Pannimangalam Thattimal. Exhibit A-4 of 1868 which is a D.C.B. account relating to Orathur padugai attached to Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal shows that there are irrigation areas under tank and thottam, nanja and punja lands. It is clear from this that the entire village except the waste lands was assessed. Exhibit A-4 of 1868 which is a D.C.B. account relating to Orathur padugai attached to Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal shows that there are irrigation areas under tank and thottam, nanja and punja lands. It is clear from this that the entire village except the waste lands was assessed. From Exhibit A-5 dated 4th September, 1870 it is seen that the punja lands in Orathur village were taken on lease from the Collector of Tanjore who was the receiver and manager of the Estate of the Raja of Tanjore for a period of five years on payment of a total sum of Rs. 122-9-3. Exhibits A-7, A-8, A-12, A-13, A-14 A-15 A-16 and A-18 are either adaiyolai muchilikas or lease deeds for the leasing of the lands in Orathur padugai village for a term granted by the Collector of Tanjore from which it is seen that they are agricultural lands on which crops were raised, and in all these documents the description is that the lands are situate in Orathur padugai in Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal. They range between years 1870 to 1875. Exhibit A-16 contains a recital that for plantain cultivation one mah of land was assessed at Rs. 4-2-1 in addition to the other details of cultivation. That the tenants themselves were residing in Orathur village as such can be gathered from the description of the executants of the various Adaiyolais. See the description of the tenants in Exhibits A-21, A-22, A-23, A-30 and A-33 and all these were between 1874 and 1877. It is clear, therefore, that even at that period, the village contained human habitation. In Exhibit A-63 which is the individual-war settlement register for Pannimangalam vattam for fasli 1296 against column 6 it is stated that the income in the matter of the amani cultivation of sugarcane, etc., on 95 kullis is Rs. 4 and it is in Orathur padugai village, Pannimangalam vattam. That amani cultivation is waram cultivation has been laid down in Varada Reddi v. Srinivasa Mudaliar1, Exhibit A-61 is the D.C.B. account of Orathur padugai, Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal vattam for fasli 1294 and the entries there show the lands cultivated, amani income and various other details just like any other inhabited and cultivated village. That amani cultivation is waram cultivation has been laid down in Varada Reddi v. Srinivasa Mudaliar1, Exhibit A-61 is the D.C.B. account of Orathur padugai, Mokhasa Pannimangalam Thattimal vattam for fasli 1294 and the entries there show the lands cultivated, amani income and various other details just like any other inhabited and cultivated village. Similarly in Exhibit A-64 the individual-war settlement register for Pannimangalam vattam, Mannargudi taluk column 3 relating to the village of Orathur states that the Orathur padugai is a village and the vattam is Pannimangalam. Exhibit A-65 is the settlement register for Pannimangalam vattam for fasli 1297 wherein Orathur is described as a padugai and the total assessment remission for the previous fasli is Rs. 356-12-9. There can be no doubt that during all these years Orathur padugai was treated as a separate village. Paragraph 8 of Exhibit A-152 speaks about the repairing of the channel, etc., by the lessee stated to be residing in Orathur and the lease was for a period of seven years. Among the villages constituting the Pannimangalam vattam which is a group of villages the first place is given to Orathur padugai as is seen from Exhibit A-78(a) the village-war settlement register of Pannimanagalam vattam. In Exhibit A-79 the village-war settlement register for Pannimangalam vattam for fasli 1309 the village of Orathur is described as Orathur padugai and is styled as a village and the particulars contained in column 2 speak of the lands as being to the north of Orathur limits. Exhibit A-80 is the individual-war jamabandhi register for Pannimangalam vattam for fasli 1309 and herein, Orathur padugai is described as a village. Exhibits A-80, A-82 and A-84 contain similar descriptions of the Orathur village in Pannimangalam vattam. Exhibits A-153, A-155 and A-157 are all lease deeds between the years from 1901 to 1906 relating to lease of lands in Orathur padugai. They contain a clause to the effect that in case the tenant plants any trees and rears them on the expiry of the lease they shall belong to the estate. Transactions such as lease entries in revenue accounts as well as other deeds referred to above and discussed show that the Orathur padugai is a separate village in a group of villages or vattam called Pannimangalam vattam. It will be noticed that from 1868 right up to 1907 Orathur padugai was considered as a separate village. Transactions such as lease entries in revenue accounts as well as other deeds referred to above and discussed show that the Orathur padugai is a separate village in a group of villages or vattam called Pannimangalam vattam. It will be noticed that from 1868 right up to 1907 Orathur padugai was considered as a separate village. The contention of the respondents is that prior to the Estates Land Act the village was considered as a separate one. That the same continued to be a separate village even after the passing of the Estates Land Act can be gathered from a number of other documents. The description of the lands as set out in Orathur padugai village, Mokhasa Pannimangalam vattam in Exhibit A-158 and in a number of other documents such as Exhibits A-98, A-104, A-105, A-159, A-106, A-116, A-161, B-17, A-117, A-118, A-119, A-120, B-18, A-121, A-162 and A-163 are strongly relied upon by the counsel for the respondents as justifying that even after the Estates Land Act, Orathur padugai was treated as a separate village. Exhibit B-20 series are receipts granted by the Receiver Tanjore Palace Estate to the father of the defendants ranging from 1930 to 1935 for having received payment of rent in respect of lands in Orathur village in Pannimangalam vattam. Exhibit B-27 series, B-22 series and B-10 series are similar receipts where description in the above manner that the village of Orathur is situated as a village in Pannimangalam vattam are contained. B-9 series and B-11 series contain similar descriptions. The other receipts are, Exhibits B-19, B-25 and B-28. The Receiver of the Tanjore Palace Estates executed conveyances of kudivaram rights after the passing of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936 to the various tenants and in those documents Orathur padugai is treated as a separate village. They are Exhibits B-6 and B-31 to B-33. Under the decree in O.S. No. 44 of 1932 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai, a receiver had been appointed for the management of the Tanjore Palace Estate and that receiver auctioned out to the highest bidder permission to cultivate the lands in the various villages and thereafter muchilikas had been executed by the highest bidders for permission to cultivate. Notice of auction sale of lease had been printed and published. Notice of auction sale of lease had been printed and published. Exhibit A-130 is the list of proclamation of sale of lease of lands conducted by the receiver and in that document Orathur padugai is treated as a separate village. The names of the old lessees are also given in the last column. Similar auction notices are Exhibits A-132, A-135, A-138, A-137, A-140 and A-139. In some of these sale notices Orathur padugai is shown as a separate village situate in Pannimangalam vattam. The lease granted by the receiver in O.S. No. 44 of 1932 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai, dealt with this particular village in the same manner. In Exhibits B-7 and B-12 Orathur padugai is treated as a separate village. Subsequent notices of auction sale of lease, bidders’ list as well as receipts where the village of Orathur padugai is treated as a separate village are Exhibits A-142, which is the bidders’ list in the auction sale of lease, Exhibit B-29 which is a receipt granted by the receiver, Tanjore Palace Estate to the defendant in O.S. No. 30 of 1950, Saminatha Pandaryar and Exhibit A-141 which is the notice of sale, Exhibit A-143 which is the list of sale proclamation of sale of lands for fasli 1354, Exhibit A-144 which is the bidders’ list, Exhibit A-146 the sale certificate and Exhibit B-5 deed of absolute sale of kudivaram rights-all these documents treated Orathur padugai as a distinct village. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the respondents that during the earlier periods the Adaiyolai muchilikas and subsequently the leases from the Collector of Tanjore as receiver of the Tanjore Palace Estates and thereafter from the Court receiver show that Orathur was a separate village. We have also receipts from 1917, the D.C.B. accounts, the jamabandi accounts and the individual-war accounts showing that the village of Orathur was treated as a distinct village. From this the inference is possible that even the original grant was of a single village as is seen from the muchilikas. Water cess was always collected from the tenants which is a decisive factor in considering whether the kudivaram right vested in the tenants. From this the inference is possible that even the original grant was of a single village as is seen from the muchilikas. Water cess was always collected from the tenants which is a decisive factor in considering whether the kudivaram right vested in the tenants. As against this line of argument the appellant has invited our attention to a large body of documents, mainly leases taken from the Receiver of the Tanjore Palace Estates wherein the lessees admit that they are bound to surrender the property at the expiration of the lease period. If the kudivaram right had vested in the tenants there could be no such agreement that the lands would be surrendered at the end of the lease period. So argues the learned counsel for the appellant. There are also recitals in the lease deeds that the lands in question did not form an estate within the meaning of Act 1 of 1908. As a typical instance reference may be made to Exhibit A-158 dated 7th October, 1909 which is a counter lease by one of the parties to the present litigation to the Receiver of Tanjore Palace Estates for a period of seven years from fasli 1319 to 1325 at the rate of Rs. 55-8-0 per fasli. Paragraphs 12, 16, 17, 21 and 23 of this document are important. In paragraph 21 it is stated that the lease does not come within the definition of the word “ Estate” under the Madras Act 1 of 1908. Recitals in similar leases such as Exhibit A-159 paragraph 22, paragraph 25 in Exhibit 119 dated 24th July, 1919, paragraphs 16,17, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33 of Exhibit A-162 dated 9th February, 1923 and paragraphs 16, 17, 25 28 and 31 of Exhibit A-163 dated 25th September, 1923 are relied on for showing that the lessees agreed to surrender their leasehold rights at the expiry of the stipulated period and also for showing that they contained expressions that both the warams are vested in the landlord. In Exhibit A-131 the description of the property is to the effect that the land belongs to the Tanjore Palace Estate which possesses both the warams and that it does not come within the definition of an estate under Act 1 of 1908. Particular stress is laid on the fact that the lessees are some of the defendants in the suits. Particular stress is laid on the fact that the lessees are some of the defendants in the suits. There are other exhibits wherein the tenants admit that both the warams are vested in the Tanjore Palace Estate and also that the lands do not come within the purview of Act 1 of 1908. They are Exhibits, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141, A-143 and A-144. Learned counsel for the appellant points out that special importance should be attached to the agreements contained in documents subsequent to 1936 wherein the tenants have admitted that the lands do not come within the ambit of Act 1 of 1908 for the reason that if in fact they had occupancy rights at least after the passing of the Amending Act XVll of 1936 it would be impossible to have such recitals in the various documents. The answer given by the respondents counsel is that in most of these sales the bidders are the old tenants and they would not have cared about what recitals were contained in the lease deed so long as their possession on lease was not disturbed. In this connection Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Iyer has analysed the various documents to show that one and the same individuals continued to be the purchasers at the various auctions ; for example Ganes Iyer defendant in O.S. No. 78 of 1949 and respondent in A. S. No. 279 of 1952 is a party to Exhibits B-10, B-11 and B-12 and he has proved Exhibits A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141, A-143 and A-144 as D.W. 2. Similarly Sevu Servai defendant in O.S. No. 79 of 1949 and respondent in A.S. No. 2.64 of 1952 is connected with Exhibits B-18 and B-19 and is a purchaser in auction-sale evidenced by Exhibits A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141 and A-143 and it has to be remembered that Kathan Ambalagaran is the elder brother of Sevu Servai whose name appears in some of these transactions. Similarly Singara Solagar defendant in O.S. No. 80 of 1949 and respondent in A.S. No. 265 of 1952 is connected with Exhibits B-20 and B-21 and is the auction-purchaser of the leases in Exhibit A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141, A-143 and A-144. He was examined as D.W. 4. Similarly Singara Solagar defendant in O.S. No. 80 of 1949 and respondent in A.S. No. 265 of 1952 is connected with Exhibits B-20 and B-21 and is the auction-purchaser of the leases in Exhibit A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141, A-143 and A-144. He was examined as D.W. 4. Nataraja Pillai and others, defendants in O.S. No. 81 of 1949, respondents in A. S. No. 266 of 1952 are connected with Exhibits B-22 and the auction sales evidenced by Exhibits A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141 and A-143. Nataraja Pillai was examined as D.W. 3. Srinivasan Pillai defendant in O.S. No. 21 of 1950 and respondent in A.S. No. 269 of 1952 is a lessee of one acre 10 cents of land in S. No. 38 and is the purchaser in auction evidenced by Exhibits, A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141 and A-143. Sivasami Thevar and Vadivelu Thevar are defendants in O.S. No. 25 of 1950, respondent in A.S. No. 272 of 1952 and are connected with the auction sales evidenced by Exhibits A-130, A-132, A-135, A-137, A-139, A-141 and A-143. Kumaraswami Manniar defendant in O.S. No. 24 of 1950 and respondent in A.S. No. 271 of 1952 is connected with the auction sales evidenced by Exhibits, A-137, A-139 and A-141 and A-148. Sivasankara Udayar and Ramu Pillai defendants in O.S. No. 77 of 1949 and respondents in A.S. No. 224 of 1951 are connected with auction sales evidenced by Exhibit A-144. Thus it will be seen from the above enumeration of the bidders’ list that at one and the same auction any of these tenants had bidden and purchased portions of the lands for cultivation on lease but the important factor to be noticed is that for a long time either the same individual or his predecessors have been purchasing the same lands at the auction. There is therefore some justification for the arguments of the learned counsel that the tenants did not care what the recitals in the lease deeds they were executing were so long as the lands continued to be in their possession and cultivation. As can be gathered from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Buchayya v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao1, which confirmed the decision of this Court such admissions by the tenants should not be taken to be absolutely binding on them. As can be gathered from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Buchayya v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao1, which confirmed the decision of this Court such admissions by the tenants should not be taken to be absolutely binding on them. The documents referred to above also show the continuous occupation of the lands by the defendant. The next argument of Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Iyer is that assuming Orathur padugai is not a complete village in itself but is part of a bigger village still under the amendment of 1936 it is an estate. Exhibit B-8 is the Record of Rights Register relating to Inam Pannimangalam village prepared in the year 1935 and according to that there can be no doubt that the entire Pannimangalam is a whole inam village. Under the heading “Situation of the village and its hamlets” it is stated that the village lies in the Vennar Delta,ten miles north-east of Mannargudi and that it has no hamlets. Though in the second paragraph it is stated that the village is not governed by the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act such a description was given before the Amending Act of 1936 came into force. Items 32 to 38, 41, 42, 43, 46, 48 and 75 to 81 in Exhibit B-8 are the suit lands and it is seen from the entries in column 8 viz., “name of the landholder” that except a very few items, the entire land is owned and held by the Tanjore Palace Estate. With regard to the remaining lands some are held by a temple to which they have been dedicated, and the rest by the owners who are the purchasers from the Receiver of the Tanjore Palace Estate. In C.M.P. No. 8435 of 1955 we have admitted a sale deed dated 29th March, 1932 executed by one of the claimants to the Tanjore Palace Estate in favour of the Daivasigamani Udayar. The vendor is described as landlord. That being the case it must be deemed that the whole village was a whole inam village at the time of the grant. We have also to remember that the East India Company could have granted only the melwaram right for it could not be imagined that the Company would have cultivated the lands as such. That being the case it must be deemed that the whole village was a whole inam village at the time of the grant. We have also to remember that the East India Company could have granted only the melwaram right for it could not be imagined that the Company would have cultivated the lands as such. So whatever might have been the nature of the holding prior to 1862 the grant during that year could not be anything but only of the melwaram. Exhibit B-35 is the proceedings of the Settlement Officer IV Tiruchirapalli and it relates to inam Pannimangalam village. The opening sentence in the order of the Settlement Officer is:-“This is an entire inam village in Mannargudi Taluk, Tanjore District” and in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order the Settlement Officer discusses the question in extenso and comes to the conclusion that the village is an estate under section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. In the concluding portion of the order it is stated that the oral and documentary evidence in the case clearly proves that this village has become an estate by virtue of the amended Act of 1936. It is also seen that the customary rents alone were collected from the tenants and not the actual rents even from very early times. See the rent fixed in Exhibit A-12. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the grant is of a minor inam to which the Amending Act of 1936 will not apply because according to him only portions of the 199 villages were given and that there was no grant of the whole inam as such. If that is so, section 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act cannot apply. We have already dealt with the question regarding the existence of other land-holders in Exhibit B-8. In our view Exhibit B-8 relates to the whole inam village. As an alternative argument learned counsel for the appellant puts forward the contention that assuming that Orathur padugai may be termed to be an estate under section 3(2)(d) of the Act still the question has to be decided as to whether the lands in question are ryoti lands or private lands. As an alternative argument learned counsel for the appellant puts forward the contention that assuming that Orathur padugai may be termed to be an estate under section 3(2)(d) of the Act still the question has to be decided as to whether the lands in question are ryoti lands or private lands. According to him the preponderance of documentary evidence showing the course and conduct and the dealings for over a hundred years can point only to one inference and that is that at no time were the lands considered as ryoti lands. Reference was made to Exhibit A-147 in this connection. It has already been stated that Exhibit A-128 and A-129 cannot refer to the suit lands and in regard to Exhibit A-147 though the words Ekabogam thottam and proprietor appear, one has to remember that the estate formed part of the Raj and the subsequent course of conduct indicates no such conclusion. In Naina Pillai Maracair v. Ramanathan Chettiar1, the expressions rokhaguthagai miras and ekabogam villages are stated to mean that it was a rokhaguthagai village and that all the lands in the village were the property of one proprietor. Founding his argument on these expressions in that judgment, Mr. Kesava Ayyangar wants the Court to infer that because ekabogam thottam is used in Exhibit A-147, the entire lands must be deemed to be under the sole proprietorship of the land-holder. There may be something to be said for this argument but Exhibit A-147 is a century and a quarter old and even though there were some recitals of that kind in 1830, subsequent to 1862 there is nothing to show that such a proprietorship vested in the grantees from the Crown. It is next urged that in Exhibit B-8 under column 8 “name of the land-holder” while the name of Kalidasa Iyer who was the Receiver of the Tanjore Palace Estate is given, in column 9 “ name of the ryot and where there is no ryot, name of the occupier” there are no entries at all. That being the case we are asked to say that at least with respect to such lands both the warams vested in the owner. But with regard to other lands where the name of the land-holder is given as Raja Sri Pratapa Simha Raja Sahib in column 9 the names of the ryots have been given. That being the case we are asked to say that at least with respect to such lands both the warams vested in the owner. But with regard to other lands where the name of the land-holder is given as Raja Sri Pratapa Simha Raja Sahib in column 9 the names of the ryots have been given. The contrast according to the appellant is significant, and what is urged is that under section 167 of the Estates Land Act there must be a presumption as to the correctness of the record-of-rights. It is also argued that in the Land Register, Exhibit A-134 in column 7, "Whether Tanjore Palace Estate has melwaram right only or both the melwaram and the kudiwaram the entry is both the warams and the entry against the column. “ Number and name of Pattadar or inamdar” is “The cases in which the Tanjore Palace Estate has not kudiwaram rights shall be entered as the Tanjore Palace Estate”. We do not think that these documents are of any use in considering the question whether the lands in question are private lands. There is a distinctive difference between the owner having both the warams vested in him and the zamindar keeping some of the lands as his domain or private lands the nature of which has been described in the judgment of Wadsworth, J., in Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kubbammal1, where despite similar indications it was held that after 1936 the village became an estate. We may now note the various documents on which the appellant’s counsel attempted to lay the foundation for his arguments regarding the private character of the lands in question. But in our opinion they do not afford any basis for a definite conclusion. A group of documents such as Exhibits A-5, A-8, A-12 to A-60 ranging over a period from 1870 to 1879 styled as Adaiolai muchilikas containing agreements were prominently brought to our notice to show that the transactions in those documents were such as would be between an ordinary lessor and a lessee. Of them in Exhibit A-6, dated 4th September, 1870, recitals as those contained in an ordinary lease regarding payment, of rent, ownership of the lessor and the liability of the lessee to surrender the lands at the expiry of the lease period are contained. In Exhibit A 7 also there are similar provisions. Of them in Exhibit A-6, dated 4th September, 1870, recitals as those contained in an ordinary lease regarding payment, of rent, ownership of the lessor and the liability of the lessee to surrender the lands at the expiry of the lease period are contained. In Exhibit A 7 also there are similar provisions. Exhibit A-8 shows that the lands were taken on lease for the purpose of grazing cattle and cutting grass for a period of five years In a like manner there are recitals in Exhibits A-12 and A-13. It may be that to some extent the recitals in these leases support the case of the appellant but the fact remains that the grant was of the whole inam village and viewed in that light there will be great difficulty in accepting the contention that the lands in question are private in nature. None of these arguments show that if the village is an estate the lands in question are private lands. We are then called upon by the learned counsel for the appellant to consider the various leases ranging from 1895 till 1945 evidenced by Exhibits A-160, A-152 A-153, A-154, A-155, A-158, A-99, A-104, A-159, A-106, A-109, A-110, A-161, A-170, A-118, A-119, A-162, A-163 and A-130. Of these leases Exhibits A-116 A-152, A-153, A-154 and A-155 are between 1895 and 1908 and therefore prior to the Estates Land Act of 1908 containing covenants and agreements that are found in an ordinary lease with reference to private property. Exhibit A-158, dated 7th October, 1909, which came into existence very soon after the passing of the Estates Land Act (1 of 1908) contains a statement in paragraph 21 that the lands leased do not come within the definition of the word “estate” under the Madras Act 1 of 1908. In Exhibit A-99 there is a condition that at the expiry of the lease period the lessee shall put the estate in possession of the landholder. Exhibit A-104 is a lease which was granted after obtaining the orders of the Court regarding the granting of the lease and at the bottom of this document there is an endorsement by the receiver addressed to the Karnam, Pannimangalam vattam. Exhibit A-104 is a lease which was granted after obtaining the orders of the Court regarding the granting of the lease and at the bottom of this document there is an endorsement by the receiver addressed to the Karnam, Pannimangalam vattam. There is also the direction of the Subordinate Judge that the lease of the land may be resold by the Revenue Inspector after the Court was appraised of the fact that the sale may be confirmed in the name of one Rasoo Udayan the highest bidder. In Exhibit A-159, clause 22 is to the effect that the lease land did not come under the definition of the word ‘Estate’ under the Madras Act 1 of 1908. The sale to the highest bidder as is seen from the bidder’s list in Exhibit A-104 is confirmed and there is also the order of the Subordinate Judge at the foot of the document. See also Exhibit A-109, sale proclamation and sale account of lease of lands. The auction-sales of the lease-hold rights similar in character are mentioned in Exhibit A-116, dated 12th February, 1916, Exhibit A-161, dated 16th July, 1917, Exhibit A-117, dated 21st April, 1919, Exhibit A-118, dated 30th December, 1919 (with regard to the right to fish in the Palaya Koranjara), Exhibit A-119 dated 24th July, 1919 (where the land is described as private punja). In some of them there are clauses to the effect that the lease lands do not come within the definition of ‘Estate’ in the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908 and there are also agreements to surrender the leasehold rights after the expiry of the term of the lease. Some of the bidders’ lists contain endorsements by the Court confirming the bid. The preamble portion of Exhibit A-162, dated 9th February, 1923, states that the land belongs to the Tanjore Palace Estate with rights to both the warams both previously and also at the time of the leasing of the land. Particular stress is laid on such a recital to show the conduct and consciousness of the landlord and the tenants in 1923 to the fact that no occupancy rights vested in the tenant at all. Exhibit A-163, dated 29th September, 1923, is another lease containing clauses relating to the surrender of the land after the expiry of the lease period and also to the non-applicability of the provisions of the Estates Land Act. Exhibit A-163, dated 29th September, 1923, is another lease containing clauses relating to the surrender of the land after the expiry of the lease period and also to the non-applicability of the provisions of the Estates Land Act. There are also other clauses in this document such as would be found in an ordinary lease under the Transfer of Property Act. In addition to these even after the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 was passed there have been leases: Exhibit A-130, dated 8th March 1938, which is the notice of auction sale of lease by the receiver. When the receiver applied to the Court on the 7th of November, 1936 for permission to recognise certain tenants as kudiwaramdars the District Judge of West Tanjore passed an order on 18th November, 1936, that before granting occupancy rights the receiver should satisfy himself thoroughly in each case an application is made that the tenant is entitled to such rights under the law and that the previous permission of the Court should also be obtained. Permission to the receiver to confer kudiwaram rights on certain tenants was accorded only on these conditions. The only inference that can be drawn according to the learned counsel for the appellant from the above documents is that prior to the Act of 1936 no kudiwaram right had vested in the tenant at all but it was considered necessary by the receiver to get permission of the Court to grant kudiwaram rights to the tenants. Therefore, there was no question of Orathur padugai being considered an estate under Act I of 1908. Subsequent dealings by the receiver were also pointed out as explanatory of the way in which the rights existed prior to 1936 and a number of documents relating to them were referred to. It is not necessary to consider in any detail the relevant portions of the various documents relating to transactions subsequent to 1936 except to note that in some of them there are statements to the effect that the Tanjore Palace Estate has right to both the warams, and that the lands do not come Within the definition of the word ‘Estate’ under the Estates Land Act (1 of 1908). Exhibits A-135, dated 27th February, 1940, A-136, 137, A-138, A-139, A-140, A-141, A-142, A-143, A-144 and A-133 evidence transactions after 1936 where recitals are contained to that effect. Exhibits A-135, dated 27th February, 1940, A-136, 137, A-138, A-139, A-140, A-141, A-142, A-143, A-144 and A-133 evidence transactions after 1936 where recitals are contained to that effect. Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously argues that there is no question of any occupancy rights being vested in the tenants at all. As stated already, Exhibits B-2 to B-29 are receipts granted to the various tenants during a long period and though some of them relate to years prior to 1936 a large majority of them are acknowledgments of payments of rent subsequent to 1936 It is seen that Exhibits B-1 is dated 18th January, 1936 and Exhibit B-29, is of the year 1945. How payments of rent on the conditions mentioned in these receipts could be justified if the lands in question are part of an estate could not be properly explained according to the learned counsel for the appellant, except on the hypothesis that the tenants had during this period admitted that both kudiwaram and melwaram vested in the owner of the land. The respondent’s counsel counters by inviting our attention to the fact that in Exhibit A-160 which is as early as 6th May, 1895 and the subsequent lease-deeds Exhibits A-161 and A-162 the tenant has agreed to repair the channels which irrigate the lands, he has taken on lease and maintain them in good condition always and also pay water cess if necessary. Such a state of things would not be explainable unless it Toe that the tenant has kudiwaram right. The observations of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Periannan v. A.S. Amman Kovil1, where the learned Judge says at page 106 that if the lands are private lands repairs would be effected by the landlord are relied on. That not being the case here the contrary position should be accepted here. That padugai lands cannot be treated as ryoti land is evident from the statements contained in the decision in Sethu Chettiar v. Sarangapani Ayyangar2, where Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., expressed the opinion that even though such lands may not be part of the river bed they may form part of the river bank in which case also as in the case of river beds the lands cannot come within the definition of ryoti lands. The respondent also contends that the fact that in some of the lease deeds and receipts both the warams are mentioned as belonging to the landlord does not necessarily mean that such lands are private lands though in all private lands the landholder may own both melwaram and kudiwaram but it is possible to have ayan lands having such descriptions: Vide the observations of Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Periannan v. A.S. Amman Kovil1 (at page no). It has also to be remembered that conveyancing in these areas has not reached that level of perfection where terms can be understood in a scientific manner. We are inclined to think that there is some force in this contention. See also the observations of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in Govindaswami Naidu v. T. P. Devasthanam.3 It is next urged that under Exhibit B-6 the receiver himself transferred the kudiwaram right to the tenants which could not be the case if no such right vested in the landlord and the appellant purchased the properties subject to the sale made by the receiver and pattas granted as evidenced by Exhibits B-30, B-31 and B-33. The receiver himself has made a distinction between lands where the occupancy rights existed and those in which there were no such rights. We are not much impressed by these arguments for unless it be as a basis for estoppel any acquiescence by the tenants in certain actions of the landlord would not take away from the tenants the benefit conferred on them by Act XVIII of 1936. The fact that subsequently the villages were treated as estates within the meaning of the term under the Act even if some of the documents justify that conclusion, would not make them an estate because the subsequent treaty cannot put an end to the nature of the lands under the original grant. So argues the learned counsel for the appellant and relies upon Janakirama v. Gopalan4, and Chinna Basavayya v. Satya Bhigna Theerthaswamulu Varu5, and also the observations of the Supreme Court in The District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Mahmed Rowther6. We do not think that these decisions help us in any manner for any conclusion to be arrived at on the facts of the case. We do not think that these decisions help us in any manner for any conclusion to be arrived at on the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the appellant points out that in examination-in-chief, P.W. 1 states that the lands were iruwaram lands and that Orathur padugai land was divided on iruwaram basis. We do not think that this statement of P.W. 1 carries the case of the appellant any further. On the other hand Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Iyer for the respondents has referred to section 3, sub-clause 10(b) of the Estates Land Act where private land is defined and what is private land within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of section 3(2) is contained in sub-clause (b) of clause 10 and under section 185 of the Act the presumption is that the lands in an inam village are not private lands and the case has to be decided on evidence adduced to hold whether a particular land is private land or not. What is private land is explained in the headnote of the Full Bench decision in Periannan v. A. S. Amman Kovil1, which is to the effect that mere proof, that the landholder is the owner of both warams does not necessarily mean that it is private land. Passages at pages 81, 89, 90, 97, 105 and 108 were also relied upon. We are satisfied that on the evidence there is no question of the lands being private. We have already referred to the fact that though the leasing rights were auctioned periodically, one and the same tenant continued to bid at the auction and become the lessee and it did not matter to him so long as he was allowed to occupy the lands whether an annual auction was held or not. This is evident from the evidence of the Karnam of Pannimangalam village examined as D.W. 1. His testimony is to the effect that Orathur padugai is an inam village and that the tenants continued to cultivate the land without break or a change and that some of them resided in the village itself while the rest lived in neighbouring villages. D.W. 2, defendant in O.S. No. 78 of 1949 speaks to the continuous possession of himself and his father from a very long time. D.W. 2, defendant in O.S. No. 78 of 1949 speaks to the continuous possession of himself and his father from a very long time. P.W. 7, T.N. Kalidasa Iyer, who was receiver of certain lands belonging to the 31st defendant in O.S. No. 3 of 1919 is not able to give any specific explanation and P.W. 2 states that except defendants in O.S. No. 75 of 1949 no one used to bid at the auction. P.W. 4’s evidence is also significant. In these circumstances we are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the fact that there were periodical auctions of the right to cultivate lands on lease and that some of the tenants purchased that right did not necessarily deprive the tenants of the occupancy rights which they were enjoying. The above discussion disposes of almost all the points elaborately argued on both sides and our conclusion, therefore, is that with regard to the nature of the lands in question prior to 1856 no definite conclusion is possible but that the grant of 1862 so far as the village of Pannimangalam is concerned, is of the whole inam village which became an estate under the Madras Act XVIII of 1936. Exhibit B-8 is a very important document evidencing that no acceptable explanation has been or could be offered by the appellant’s counsel about that. In addition the proceeding of the Settlement Officer, Tiruchirapalli, evidenced by Exhibit B-35 treating Pannimangalam as an entire inam village cannot seriously be disputed. We have, therefore, to hold that the plaintiff’s suits are not maintainable. With regard to the onus of proof a distinction has to be made as regards eviction and the jurisdiction to maintain the suit. This distinction is brought out in the decisions in Venkatarama v. Venkayya1, Virabhadrayya v. Sonti Venkanna2, Ramamurthi Sastri v. Ammanna3 and Lakshmanna v. Venkateswaralu4. We are not satisfied that the learned Subordinate Judge has erred in thinking that the onus has not been discharged. If we hold that the grant of 1862 was with regard to a whole inam village and that in any event by the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 the village became an estate within the meaning of the Act there is no necessity to deal separately with the four survey numbers S. Nos. 34, 1, S. Nos. If we hold that the grant of 1862 was with regard to a whole inam village and that in any event by the Madras Act XVIII of 1936 the village became an estate within the meaning of the Act there is no necessity to deal separately with the four survey numbers S. Nos. 34, 1, S. Nos. 35, 37 and 43 as with regard these items the case of the plaintiff stands on a more slender footing. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee of Rs. 75 in each appeal. P.R.N. ----- Appeals dismissed.