JUDGMENT H.P. Asthana, J. - The applicant Daya Ram has been convicted u/s 4(2) read with Sections 42 and 43 of the U.P. Pure Food Act, 1950, for selling adulterated dahi or curd on 9-2-1954 at about 11 a.m. in north Jhusi, area Kumbhnagar, Allahabad, during the Kumbh Mela and has been sentenced to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 120 by a Magistrate 1st Class of Allahabad, which conviction and sentence has been upheld in appeal by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Allahabad. He has now come up in revision. 2. It appears that on 9-2-1954 Dr. Ram Shanker Srivastava who was the Medical Officer of Health incharge of the Kumbh Mela, bought 4 1/2 chhataks of curd from the applicant, divided (sic) in three parts, packed and sealed them in three different packages and sent one of the packages to the Public Analyst for examination and report. The report of the Public Analyst was that the curd was deficient by 50% in fat content and was adulterated. The Appellant was, thereupon, sent up for trial. 3. The applicant did not dispute that the curd which was being sold by him in the Kumbh Mela was not pure curd containing the requisite percentage of fat. His case was that he used to sell curd which had been prepared from skimmed milk and that the used to inform his customers at the time of the sale that it was skimmed milk curd. He, however, did not inform Dr. Srivastava at the time of sale of (sic) chhataks to him that it was curd of shimmed milk and not of pure milk. The lower courts found that the applicant did not give out at the time of the sale that the curd had been prepared from skimmed milk nor the container bore any such label on it. They also found that he was selling the curd at the rate of Re. 1 per seer. They, therefore, convicted and sentenced him as above. 4. It was contended before me in revision that the report of the Public Analyst had not been proved and as such, it was not admissible in evidence. In my opinion this contention has no force. 1 per seer. They, therefore, convicted and sentenced him as above. 4. It was contended before me in revision that the report of the Public Analyst had not been proved and as such, it was not admissible in evidence. In my opinion this contention has no force. Section 10(2) of the Pure Food Act clearly provides that in any proceeding under this Act the certificate of the Public Analyst given under Sub-section (1) shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. In view of this provision it was not necessary for the prosecution to produce the Public Analyst, or any other official, to prove that the certificate which had been sent by him was his certificate. This provision has obviously been made in order to prevent harassment to the Public Analyst from being summoned in the different courts in order to prove his certificates. This provision is analogous to the provisions contained in Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which makes the report of the Chemical Examiner admissible in evidence without any formal proof. 5. It was next contended that the certificate of the Public Analyst was not in the prescribed form and, as such, it could not be accepted in proof of the facts contained therein. I have looked into Form No. 3 which has been prescribed under the Act and have also seen Section 10, and in my opinion there does not appear any defect in the certificate. Section 10(l) says that every Public Analyst to whom any article of food has been submitted for analysis shall analyse it as soon as practicable and give the person by whom it was submitted a certificate specifying the result of his analysis in the form to be prescribed. The result of the analysis was that the curd was found deficient in fat content by 50%. I am not able to understand what further was required from the Public Analyst in respect of the sample of curd which had been sent to him for examination. The rules framed under the Act prescribe a certain percentage of fat in case of pure curd. I am not able to understand what further was required from the Public Analyst in respect of the sample of curd which had been sent to him for examination. The rules framed under the Act prescribe a certain percentage of fat in case of pure curd. Instead of mentioning in the certificate that the percentage of fat requisite in case of dahi was so much and that the sample which was sent to him contained so much percentage of fat, the Public Analyst mentioned that the fat content was deficient by 50% of the required percentage. In my opinion there is no defect in the form of the certificate sent by the Public Analyst and it has been rightly accepted. The question, however, is not of much importance in view of the admission of the applicant that the curd which was being sold by him was not curd of pure milk but of skimmed milk and, in the circumstances, it did not contain the requisite percentage of fat. 6. The next question is whether the applicant when selling the curd informed his customers that it was of skimmed milk and not of pure milk. The finding of both the courts below is that he did not give any such information and this finding of fact is binding on me in revision. It is admitted that the container did not bear any label on it that the curd was of skimmed milk and not of pure milk, as was required under the rules framed under the Act. I am, therefore, of opinion that the applicant has been rightly convicted u/s 4(2) read with Sections 42 and 43 of the U.P. Pure Food Act, 1950. 7. The last contention on behalf of the applicant was that the sentence of 6 months' rigorous imprisonment in addition to the fine was severe. It is a matter of common knowledge that the sale of adulterated food and spurious medicines has become very common these days, endangering public health and safety, and in order to put a stop to such practice it is necessary that exemplary punishment should be given to those who indulge in it. It is a matter of common knowledge that the sale of adulterated food and spurious medicines has become very common these days, endangering public health and safety, and in order to put a stop to such practice it is necessary that exemplary punishment should be given to those who indulge in it. It is with difficulty that the persons indulging in such practices are caught and if after they are caught and found guilty they are dealt with leniently it is not likely to have a salutary effect upon others who indulge in such practices. It is likely to encourage them. However, in view of the fact that the applicant has got no previous conviction in respect of this offence I do not wish to send him to jail. I, therefore, set aside his sentence of 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and in lieu of it I sentence him to a fine of Rs. 500, and in default of payment of fine to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment. Thus the total fine which the applicant is liable to pay is Rs. 620. I am informed that he has deposited the fine of Rs. 120 which was imposed on him by the lower court. He shall, therefore, pay the fine of Rs. 500 within one month, failing which he shall undergo 6 months' rigorous imprisonment. 8. This revision is, therefore, dismissed with this modification that the sentence of 6 months' rigorous imprisonment is set aside and in lieu of it the applicant is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 500, and in default of payment of fine to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment. This fine of Rs. 500 is in addition to the fine of Rs. 120 which has been imposed on him by the lower court. The applicant shall remain on the existing bail till payment of fine, for which a period of one month is allowed to him. 9. It appears that due to an oversight the applicant was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 500 for contravention of Section 4 read with Section 42 of the U.P. Pure Food Act of 1950 when the maximum fine which could have been imposed on the applicant is only Rs. 200 as is mentioned in Schedule I to the aforesaid Act. This fact was not brought to my notice at the time of the hearing of the revision. 200 as is mentioned in Schedule I to the aforesaid Act. This fact was not brought to my notice at the time of the hearing of the revision. I have heard the learned Counsel for the State and also for the applicant and they both agree that the applicant could not have been sentenced to a fine of more than Rs. 200. 10. In the circumstances, I modify my order of 14-3-1956 to this extent that the applicant is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200 inclusive of the fine of Rs. 120 imposed by the lower court, and in default of payment of fine he shall undergo 3 month's rigorous imprisonment. The applicant is allowed 1 month's time for payment of the fine if not already paid.