JUDGMENT N. Varadaraja Iyengar, J. 1. The first two of the three appeals herein are against the same appellate judgement and decree on the trial side, in O. S. No. 921 of 1123, on the file of the District Munsiff's Court, Shertallai, and are filed by the tenth defendant and the plaintiffs respectively. The third appeal arises from an appellate order in execution of the decree in the case as regards delivery. The suit, O. S. No. 921 of 1123, was for recovery of the plaint item with arrears of rent. Mathoo Varkey was the original tenant under Ex. C lease dated 28-8-1108. His rights were sold in court auction and purchased by the defendants 3 to 5. The tenth defendant had taken sublease of portion of plaint item 1 from Mathoo Varkey and had besides, constructed thereon the chapra or factory building, viz., item 2 of the plaint schedule, for the manufacture of coir mattings. The suit was contested on various grounds by the defendants, but it was ultimately decreed in favour of the plaintiff by both the courts below subject to payment of more or less amounts towards value of improvements. We are concerned in the first two appeals mostly with the quantum of improvement value due to the defendants 3 and 10. We will now take up the appeals one by one. 2. S. A. No. 735 of 1955 : The question here is whether under the general provision contained in S.4 of the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act VIII of 1950, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession in execution of decree, as held by the lower appellate court, overruling the executing court in the matter. The plaintiffs had relied before the Munsiff on the two grounds mentioned in proviso to S.4, viz.; default in payment of rent and wilful waste, and thirdly that the land was owned by Government within the meaning of S.3(a) of the Act and therefore the Act did not apply at all. The first two grounds were found against by the Munsiff. The first two grounds were found against by the Munsiff. The Munsiff, however, found in favour of the plaintiff on the third ground, because, according to the court, the land in question belonged to the Shertallai Devaswom and it was given to the first plaintiff's illom in consideration of their services as thantries in temple 'and S.2 of the Act VIII of 1950 enacted that the Ordinance shall not apply to lands owned by government or by devaswoms managed by the Devaswom Board'. This reference to S.2 of Act VIII of 1950 was obviously wrong. For the relevant section is S.3 (a) of the Act which refers to the matter and that restricts the exemption, to lands owned by government only. The learned Dt. Judge on appeal the defendants, concurred with the Munsiff in respect of the grounds under the proviso to S.4 but differed from him in the applications of section on 3 (a). For Government Land as defined in S.3 of the Land Conservancy Act exempted Service Inam lands and the land in question was without doubt Tantra Viruthi Service Inam. Mr. K. P. Abraham, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, says that that this Tantra Viruthi tenure is brought by the compiler of the Land Revenue Manual under the category of Pandaravagai tenures and therefore the ultimate ownership of the land rested with Government. Accord-to the learned counsel, the fact that the Devaswom was subsequently handed over by Government under and by virtue of S.3 of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act XV of 1950, in favour of the Travancore Devaswom Board, would not militate against the conclusion that the land was still Government land within the meaning of S.3 (a) of Act VIII of 1950 and he drew our attention to the passage in Narayanan Nambooripad v. Varki (16 T. L. J. 44 FB) where the nature of this very land came up for consideration before the Travancore High Court in connection with a land acquisition case. There are no doubt, certain general observations of the kind but they seem to be of no significance, when the ozhuku of the property is itself referred to in other portion of the judgement, as describing the property as the 'Devaswam Vaka' which means that the land is Devaswom and not Sirkar land. There are no doubt, certain general observations of the kind but they seem to be of no significance, when the ozhuku of the property is itself referred to in other portion of the judgement, as describing the property as the 'Devaswam Vaka' which means that the land is Devaswom and not Sirkar land. S.28 (3) of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act makes it also clear that whatever may be the original tenure of the service inam lands, it is the Devaswom Board that has the power to resume such lands. It follows there that the land concerned is not exempted from the operation of Act. VIII of 1950. The general provision in S.4 of the Act consequently applies and execution by recovery under the decree cannot be had. 3. Learned counsel for the defendants 3 to 5 respondents, suggested that S.3 (a) could apply only if the lease in question was by Government and in respect of their interest in the land. So if the lessor was any one other than Government, e. g., the first plaintiff Namboodhiri and the leasehold comprised the interest of such lessor, the fact that the land appertained to Government did not matter. But there is no warrant for this suggestion, particularly in view of the several exceptions contained in S.3. The classification, it is clear, is not on any uniform basis. Clause (a) refers to the ownership of the land concerned while clause (b) refers to the person of the lessor apart from ownership. Clause (c) refers to the nature of the property while clauses (d) and (e) refer to the purposes of the lease. The emphasis under clause (a) would thus seem to be Governmental ownership of the land leased. Reference may be made in this connection to Batia Co-operative Housing Society v. D. C. Patel, AIR. 1953 Supreme Court 16 which related to the applicability of S.4 (1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (47of 1947) to similar effect that the Act would not apply to premises belonging to Government or local authorities. The contention that was raised in that case that the Act would apply only to cases of Government and their lessees and not to cases between lessees and sublessees. The contention that was raised in that case that the Act would apply only to cases of Government and their lessees and not to cases between lessees and sublessees. Their Lordships overruled the contention to hold that the exemption was with respect to a class of lands and not with respect to persons dealing with such lands. 4. There is therefore no substance in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.