Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the 5th defendant, the Travancore Devaswom Board, against the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 6 of 1951 on the file of the District Court of Mavelikara, whereby the plaintiff, Vanjipuzha Chief obtained declaration inter alia that the property scheduled to the plaint appertained to his Edavagai and not to the Trikkannapurathu Devaswom, represented by the appellant Board. 2. The suit property is a plot of garden land 1 acre 20 cents in extent and bearing S. No. 137/2 of Pandanattu Pakuthy, Thiruvella Taluk, and known as Vadyarmatathil Purayidom. It was demised along with other items on Kanom under Ext. A dated 7.9.1056 by the Vanjipuzha Matom in favour of Thommi Varki, the ancestor of defendants 1 to 3. Ext. B is the Ozhugu form prepared in connection with the settlement and it mentioned in Vanjipuzha Pandarathil to be the registered holder according to the Ozhugu of 1012 and the Ayakattu of the same year, but went on to describe the tenure of the property as "Trikkannapurathu Thevarvaka Thettom". In the patta enquiry, Varki Oommen the son of Thommi Varki was confronted by the sellement authorities with the possible existence of the ownership of the property in the Devaswom as following from the above description of the tenure, but he refused to take derivative title from the Devaswom and insisted on taking Patta as Kanom tenant under Ext. A and Patta was accordingly issued in his favour on 2.10.1080 in respect of the plaint and other properties. See copy of Ext. D settlement enquiry register. In or about 1110, however, the Trikkannapuram Devaswom which had by then been assumed by the Travancore Government, applied for and obtained settlement of jenmikaram in their favour in respect of the plaint property by Ext. II decision of 23.8.1110. The defendants 1 to 3, who were in possession of the plaint property as heirs of Thommi Varki, took advantage of this settlement and failed to pay the Vanjipuzha Matom its due under Ext. A Kanom. The Matom therefore filed O.S. No. 8 of 1118 on the file of the Changanacherry Munsiff's Court against the tenants for declaration of title and for recovery of jenmikaram as herein. But because the Thrikkannapurathu Devaswom was not also impleaded as directed, the court dismissed the suit by Ext. A Kanom. The Matom therefore filed O.S. No. 8 of 1118 on the file of the Changanacherry Munsiff's Court against the tenants for declaration of title and for recovery of jenmikaram as herein. But because the Thrikkannapurathu Devaswom was not also impleaded as directed, the court dismissed the suit by Ext. E judgment dated 19.4.1124 corresponding to 4.12.1948 but without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to file fresh suit in proper form and hence this suit, which was laid on 25.1.1951. The plaint averred that cause of action for the suit arose only in 1946 when, apparently during the course of Ext. E suit, the plaintiff got to know of Ext. II Jenmikaram Settlement decision in favour of the Devaswom. The 4th defendant was impleaded as person in possession under defendants 1 to 3. The suit was contested by the defendants 2 and 4 and also by the 5th defendant, mainly on the question of title and limitation, but the pleas were repelled by the court below and the suit was decreed in terms of the plaint subject only to a small reduction in the rate of the jenmikaram due. Hence this appeal by the 5th defendant as above said. 3. The first question raised by learned Counsel for the 5th defendant-appellant, is that the plaintiff has not established his title to the plaint property. According to the learned Counsel, the description of the tenure of the property as Thrikkannapurathu Thevarvaka Thettom in Ext. B Ozhugu clearly denoted that the property was held under derivative tenure from the Devaswom and there was therefore nothing wrong in the Devaswom having applied for and obtained jenmikaram decision Ext. II in their favour. The case of the 5th defendant before the court below was that the ancestor of defendants 1 to 4 and after him these defendants had been enjoying the property under Kanom arrangement from the Devaswom discharging their liability for the michavaram and other dues in the usual course and that defendants 1 to 4 continued to pay the Jenmikaram dues as settled under Ext. 11. But no document of Kanom nor any Thandaper evidencing receipt of michavaram or jenmikaram was filed in court on behalf of 5th defendant, though Dw.1 the present manager of the Devaswom undertook to produce the Thandaper the next hearing day. It is curious that Ext. 11. But no document of Kanom nor any Thandaper evidencing receipt of michavaram or jenmikaram was filed in court on behalf of 5th defendant, though Dw.1 the present manager of the Devaswom undertook to produce the Thandaper the next hearing day. It is curious that Ext. II decision obtained by the 5th defendant mentions one Kesavan Oonnithan as the tenant in possession under the Devaswom but who this person is, Dw.1 is not even aware of. At any rate it does not contain any mention of the defendants 1 to 4 as the Kanom tenants of the devaswom as now claimed. The defendants 1 to 3 are, on the other hand, the descendants of Thommi Varki referred to in Ext. A kanom by the Chief and in Ext. D settlement enquiry, the only circumstance in favour of the Devaswom is the mention of the tenure as Thrikkannapurathu Thevarvaka Thettom in Ext. B Ozhugu and the doubt raised on basis thereof as to title at the time of settlement, but that after all is in no way decisive. Raman Menon, C.J., dealing with the expression'Thettom' in Augusti v. The Dewan of Travancore, 8 TLJ 438 at pages 443 and 444, observed: "In S.A.17 of 1074, this Court remarked:-'In the sirkar registry of 1011, the plaint property is entered as 'Thettom' in the name of defendants' Tarwad. That expression, according to its ordinary meaning, implies at least a mortgage lien, if not more, as held by this Court in A.S.166 of 1070 and A.S. 285 of 1071. It always implies something more than a simple lease'. In S.A. 61 of 1075, the terms was taken to be generic and to include 'all subordinate tenures falling short of the full proprietory title'. In S.A. 302 of 1075, it was observed that the word 'Thettom', as applied to Nambudiri Jenmies, had been held by this court to mean ordinarily a Kanom. In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:-'The chief ground of the plaintiff's second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. In S.A. 48 of 1076, Vencoba Chariar, C.J. and Mr. Justice Kunhiraman Nair construed the words thus:-'The chief ground of the plaintiff's second appeal is that in arriving at this finding the lower courts have not given sufficient weight to the fact appearing from the Ext. B - an old Revenue account - in which the land in dispute is entered as 'Thettam' from plaintiff's Illom; but the word 'Thettom' is a somewhat ambiguous one and though, as remarked in the case in 15 TLR 161 and in other cases, it is generally used in the Revenue accounts to signify the Kanom tenure under Jenmies, it is also sometimes used to denote other subordinate tenures'. In S.A. 343 of 1078, we find the following remarks:-'Thettom ordinarily means a'Kanom', and in any case, a derivative title when used in connection with Brahmaswam or Devaswom properties, as in the present case'. Lastly, in A.S. Nos. 59 and 101 of 1083, Sadasiva Iyer, C.J., and Sankara Menon, J., observed thus:-'Mr. Kochukrishna Marar quotes 15 TLR 161 and says the word 'Thettom' means a Kanom or mortgage. No doubt, in the case of Jenmies, it has been so held; but we doubt whether in the case of non jenmies, any meaning other than the ordinary meaning of the word can be given to the word 'Thettom'. The plaintiffs are Nairs and the tenure claimed is not Jenmom. The ordinary meaning of the word is acquisition. We are inclined to hold that a word 'Thettom', in cases of this sort, means only sale'." The above decision was referred to with approval, to hold that the ordinary meaning of the word 'Thettom' is acquisition. See Sreedharan Moosad v. Narayana Iyen, 28 TLJ 510. We are here dealing with an Edavagai Chief who held a principality independent or quasi-independent until the conquest and consolidation of the State in the 18th century. There is no reason, therefore, to think that the expression 'Thettom' in Ext. B Ozhugu, assuming it to be a correct description, meant anything other than 'acquisition'. It follows therefore that the 5th defendant had not made out any title in the Devaswom so far as the plaint property is concerned and the finding of the court below on this matter is perfectly right. 4. Learned Counsel next said that the suit must be held to be barred by limitation because the settlement decision in Ext. It follows therefore that the 5th defendant had not made out any title in the Devaswom so far as the plaint property is concerned and the finding of the court below on this matter is perfectly right. 4. Learned Counsel next said that the suit must be held to be barred by limitation because the settlement decision in Ext. II was on 23.8.1110 and the suit for declaration was filed on 25.1.1951, more than 12 years later. According to leaned Counsel, the period of limitation was either 12 years under Art.131 or 6 years under Art.120, both periods commencing from Ext. II date and in such view the suit was out of time. The court below got over the difficulty by saying that the 12 years rule applied but the suit must be take to be a continuation of the earlier suit O.S. No. 8 of 1118 filed within 12 years, for Ext, E judgment of dismissal in that case had proceeded on wrong ground of non joinder of parties. This attempt of the court below to get over limitation is certainly wrong. But the assumption of learned Counsel about the terminus a quo, whether you apply the 12 years rule under Art.131 or 6 years rule under Art.120, is obviously unjustifiable. For, to constitute a refusal within the meaning of Art.131 there must be a definite demand and refusal and the mere fact that the plaintiff had, as in this case, not exercised his right is not enough. And similarly the starting point of limitation under Art.120 is the accrual of the right to sue and there is no right to sue until there is an infringement thereof or an unequivocal threat to infringe and you cannot place it here beyond 1118 in any event when the prior suit was filed. See for a full discussion of this topic in Varkey v. Govindan,1956 KLT 427. 5. Learned Counsel finally argued that Ext. A did not in fact evidence a Kanom and therefore the question of Jenmikaram Settlement could not arise. But it seems to us that this argument is not available to the 5th defendant. The plaintiff's right as against his tenants was settled by the court below as on the basis of a Kanom right and the tenants have acquiesced. A did not in fact evidence a Kanom and therefore the question of Jenmikaram Settlement could not arise. But it seems to us that this argument is not available to the 5th defendant. The plaintiff's right as against his tenants was settled by the court below as on the basis of a Kanom right and the tenants have acquiesced. So far as the 5th defendant is concerned, the question is only of rival ownership and that, we have found, amounts to nothing. Even otherwise, there is no reason to say that Ext. A is not in the nature of a real kanom as found by the court below. 6. The appeal has no merit and it is dismissed with costs.