JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal from a decree dismissing his suit for a declaration that the property specified in the plaint is the property of the Plaintiff and Defendants second set, that Defendants first set had not acquired any right in that property by means of the sale dated 20-8-1943 and that the sale dated 20-8-1943 was null and void. The Plaintiff and Defendants second set were admittedly members of a joint Hindu family. Defendant No. 3 is the grand-father of the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 5 is his father. Defendant No. 6 is his real uncle. Defendant No. 4 is his grandfather's brother and Defendant No. 7 is the son of the latter. All these Defendants together with Smt. Godawari, the next friend through whom the Plaintiff had brought the suit and Smt. Radhika Kuar, wife of Defendant No. 4 filed an application u/s 4 of the EE Act as members of a joint Hindu family on 9-5-1936. 2. The Plaintiff alleged that he was born before that application had been filed, but he filed no claim in those proceedings u/s 11 of the EE Act nor was he ever joint with the parties to those proceedings. It was, therefore, pleaded that the sale which took place in those proceedings was not binding on the Plaintiff-Appellant. It was further pleaded that the debts which were proved in the EE Act proceedings and those debts in which the property in suit was sold were immoral debts contracted by Ram Lakhan Defendant No. 3, grand-father of the Plaintiff, and Jai Kishun Das Defendant No. 4 grand-uncle of the Plaintiff. It was urged that on this ground those debts were not binding on the Plaintiff and consequently the property of the undivided Hindu family could not be sold for the satisfaction of those debts. 3. The suit was dismissed on the finding that the debts were for legal necessity and were not contracted for any immoral purpose so that they were binding on the Plaintiff and further that the suit was barred Under Sections 11 and 47 of the EE Act. These findings of the lower court have been challenged in this appeal. 4. So far as the question relating to legal necessity and immorality of the debts is concerned the findings given by the lower court are clearly justified on the evidence produced in this case. These findings of the lower court have been challenged in this appeal. 4. So far as the question relating to legal necessity and immorality of the debts is concerned the findings given by the lower court are clearly justified on the evidence produced in this case. No question of legal necessity could arise when the debts were contracted by the Plaintiff's own father and grandfather. Under Hindu Law, unless those debts were immoral, the Plaintiffs were bound by those-debts. The allegation about immorality was made in the plaint against Ram Lakhan, the grand-father of the Plaintiff-Appellant as well as against his grand-uncle Jai Kishun Das. During the evidence, however, no attempt at all was made to support the allegation which had been made against Jai Kishun Das. Attempt was, however made to show that Ram Lakhan, grandfather of the Plaintiff-Appellant was immoral and had contracted the debts for immoral purposes. It is to be noticed that the property had been sold for satisfaction of debts in respect of which decrees were passed u/s 14 of the EE Act and which were shown in the list prepared u/s 19, a copy of which is Ex. D-3 on the record. According to this list there is only one debt which has been incurred by the grand-father of Plaintiff viz., Ram Lakhan. The rest of the debts were not incurred by him. They were incurred by Jai Kishun Das, grand uncle of the Plaintiff Nageshwar Prasad, his father Mohan Lal his real uncle, Bhagelu, son of Jai Kishun Das, Smt. Radhika Kuar, the wife of Jai Kishun Das and Smt. Godawari Kuar, the mother of the Plaintiff-Appellant. None of these debts had been challenged on the ground of immorality or want of legal necessity. The allegations are only against Ram Lakhan. In support of the allegation that Ram Lakhan had contracted the debts for immoral purposes, three witnesses were examined on behalf of the Plaintiff. These witnesses are Smt. Godawari, the mother of the Plaintiff through whom the suit has been filed, Sulaiman and Hira Singh. These three witnesses only made general statements that Ram Lakhan Prasad was immoral and debts had been contracted when there was no need to take any loans as the family had sufficient funds. These witnesses are Smt. Godawari, the mother of the Plaintiff through whom the suit has been filed, Sulaiman and Hira Singh. These three witnesses only made general statements that Ram Lakhan Prasad was immoral and debts had been contracted when there was no need to take any loans as the family had sufficient funds. In order to hold that any particular debt is tainted with immorality, evidence is required to show that the amount taken by contracting that debt was actually taken for immoral purposes and spent for such purposes. None of the three witnesses relied upon on behalf of the Plaintiff, made any statement definitely that the loan taken by Ram Lakhan, grand-father of the Plaintiff-Appellant, had been taken for a particular immoral purpose or had been spent for any immoral purpose. The assertion that the family being well-to-do did not need money and so Ram Lakhan should not have taken the loan does not appear to be correct. As mentioned above loans were taken by other male members also as well as by female members of the family including the mother of the Plaintiff through whom the Plaintiff brought this suit. These debts have not been challenged on behalf of the Plaintiff. This circumstance itself shows that occasions did arise for taking loans and money was borrowed by members of the family, who were not at all immoral, or at least by members against whom there was no suggestion of immorality. If so, there is no reason to hold that Ram Lakhan Prasad must have taken loans only for immoral purposes and not for moral purposes. The finding of the learned Civil Judge on this point must, therefore, be upheld. 5. In view of this finding given by us above that the debts were for legal necessity and not tainted with immorality, it is clear that those debts were binding on the Plaintiff and were enforceable against the joint family property. It is true that in the EE Act proceedings, the Plaintiff was not impleaded as one of the applicants u/s 4 of the EE Act, but this, it appears was immaterial. It is true that in the EE Act proceedings, the Plaintiff was not impleaded as one of the applicants u/s 4 of the EE Act, but this, it appears was immaterial. Learned Counsel urged that failure to implead any member of a join Hindu family without a declaration that the landlord applicant intended to separate from the joint family and without stating the names and addresses of the remaining members of the family who would be entitled to get a share on partition of the family property, would operate as a bar against entertainment of an application u/s 4 and proceeding taken on any such application must be held to be without jurisdiction and altogether null and void. Section 4 of the EE Act no doubt requires that either all the members of a joint family should join in the application u/s 4 or they should express an intention to separate from the remaining members giving their names and addresses and indicating their shares, but failure to do so would only be a defect in the application which would not go to the extent of barring the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the application. This fact is made clear by Sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act. That Sub-section requires that the objection, if any, to a defect in the application u/s 4 of the Act must be taken before the Collector or the Special Judge and, if it is found that the application was defective and the objection is upheld, the Collector or the Special Judge must at the request of the landlord applicant amend the application in accordance with the provisions of the CPC and then proceed with the case. Clearly the power to entertain an amendment application and to allow it and then to proceed with the case could only be exercised by the Collector or the Special Judge if they had jurisdiction to proceed with the case pending before them even when the defect was already existing. If the defect had gone to the root of the jurisdiction and had resulted in the Collector or the Special Judge losing all jurisdiction to continue proceedings, they could not even entertain an application for amendment and then proceed with the case. If the defect had gone to the root of the jurisdiction and had resulted in the Collector or the Special Judge losing all jurisdiction to continue proceedings, they could not even entertain an application for amendment and then proceed with the case. The defect cannot therefore, be held to be a defect which goes to the root of the jurisdiction or a defect making the proceeding before the Collector or the Special Judge ab initio null and void. The effect of such an omission has not directly been considered by this Court or by the Chief Court of Oudh in any case so far but in a collateral matter this point came up before a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile Chief Court of Oudh in the case of AIR 1943 134 (Oudh) . In that case, an objection was taken before the Special Judge that the application u/s 4 of the EE Act was incompetent and therefore, the proceedings before the Special Judge should be quashed. The learned Single Judge held that the proceeding could not be quashed by the Special Judge but only by the Collector as the Special Judge could not sit as a court of appeal or revision on a decision, decree or order of the Collector. It was for the Collector to decide whether the application u/s 4 of the EE Act should be entertained or not. This decision of the learned Single Judge again indicates that the view taken by him was that the proceedings before the Special Judge were not to be treated as ab initio without jurisdiction and they could only be terminated if objection was taken before the Collector and allowed by him. Had he been of the view that the proceedings were without jurisdiction altogether and ab initio null and void, his decision would have been that the Special Judge could not further continue the proceedings and must quash them on that ground. That case, therefore, indicates that the view accepted was that the proceedings may be liable to be quashed by the Collector on the ground that all members of a joint Hindu family had not been joined as landlords applicants and the application was defective u/s 4 of the EE Act, but if the proceedings are not quashed on that ground they would be valid proceedings. 6. 6. In the case before us, no objection at all was taken at any stage of the proceeding under the EE Act that the Plaintiff who was also a member of the joint Hindu family had not joined as an applicant in the application u/s 4 of the EE Act. The Plaintiff has sought to challenge the proceedings on the ground that they were null and void being without jurisdiction altogether on account of this defect. On such a ground, those proceedings cannot now be held to be null and void and ignored in this suit. The proceedings under the EE Act have to be treated as valid proceedings for purpose of this suit and hence the sale which was held by the Collector in this proceeding cannot now be quashed in this suit in view of the bar imposed by Section 47 of the EE Act. The learned Judge of the lower court relied on Section 11 of the EE Act for holding that the declaration made by the Special Judge that the property in suit was liable to attachment and sale in the debts of the landlord applicants was final and conclusive. This view was challenged by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. In our opinion however it is not at all necessary to enter into the question whether the declaration made by the Special Judge about the liability of this property to attachment and sale in the debts of landlord applicant is binding on the Plaintiff-Appellant because the proceedings have gone to the stage of sale of the property by the Collector. There can be no doubt that that sale cannot now be challenged as Section 47 of the EE Act prohibits the challenge of such a proceeding by any court other than courts which could be moved to exercise their powers u/s 45 or 46 of the EE Act. It is also not material whether the Plaintiff-Appellant could or could not move the appropriate courts Under Sections 45 and 46 of the EE Act. As long as he did not in fact move any court and did not have the sale set aside, that sale cannot now be set aside in this suit. Since the sale cannot be set aside, the relief sought by the applicant cannot be granted to him. 7. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.