Ramaswami, J.-This is an appeal preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Mayuram in O.S. No. 77 of 1951. The facts are: Muhammad Abdul Kadir Malumiar created a private trust on 19th November, 1918, i.e., subsequent to the Mussulman Wakf Validating Act of 1913. The Wakf comprised of 12 acres 80 cents of land near Nagore, portion of a house bearing door No. 3 in Nagore Town, and cooking-vessels, etc., mentioned in wakf deed. The trust was created for the purpose of meeting the expenses of a Mouluth to be performed in the month of Rabiul-avul when 40 marakals of rice should be cooked and distributed to relatives, friends and the poor and another Mouluth to be performed in the Mohurram month of each year in the Hussainia Moulatkhana belonging to the settlor when 25 marakals of rice have to be cooked and distributed to poor Muslims. This poor feeding is a valid object of a wakf: Baillie (1) 550 ; Hidaya 240 ; Fatma Bibi v. Advocate-General of Bombay1, Asoobai v. Noorbai2, Kuttayan v. Ravuthan3. The vessels were for use on those occasions and it is provided that at the time of the Mouluths the entire house referred to above was to be vacated by the persons occupying the portion. The expenses have to be met from out of the income of the lands after paying the melwaram due to the Nagore Durgah. The wakf deed also provided that three-fourths of the net income from the lands was to be spent for the trust, but, in order to provide for the due performance of the trust, in years when there may be a failure of crops, a reserve fund was to be kept sufficient to enable the trust being performed for one year ; and, subject to the said provision being made for the regular performance of the charity every year, one-fourth of the income was to be distributed among the founder’s santhathi, male and female. The first defendant, the eldest son of the dedicator, and the second defendant, his son-in-law were constituted trustees, but after them or even during their lifetime, any santhathi of the settlor, who was a male, who was a proper person, and who was capable of performing the charity, could be the trustee. The first defendant, the eldest son of the dedicator, and the second defendant, his son-in-law were constituted trustees, but after them or even during their lifetime, any santhathi of the settlor, who was a male, who was a proper person, and who was capable of performing the charity, could be the trustee. And, any trustee, who misconducted himself, could be removed from office, at the instance of a santhathi of the settlor. There are other terms prohibiting alienations and gifting of the wakf property and for building up of reserves. Thus this was a permanent dedication by a Muslim of properties partially for the maintenance and support of his family, children and descendants and for purposes recognised by Musalman Law, religious, pious or charitable. Syed Ahmed v. Juliha Bivi1, (Patanjali Sastri and Bell, JJ.) A.S. 92 of 1945 High Court (to which Govinda Menon, J., was party); Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das2, Mahommed v. Amar Chand3, Abdul Fata v. Rasmaya4 Alima Ammal and others v. Mohammed Hussain Marcair and others5, (Govinda Menon and Chandra Reddi, JJ., dated 27th March, 1951, where a similar wakf by a Malumiar from East Tanjore came up for consideration). This Abdul Kadir Malumiar so long as he was alive was carrying out the terms of the wakf deed. Subsequently after his death, according to the plaintiff, what happened was as follows: The first and the second defendants colluding with the sixth defendant purposely allowed arrears of rent to the Nagore Durgah to accrue when the nanja lands were fetching 130 kalams of paddy as the tenant’s share, and a fraudulent revenue sale was held in 1939 and the bulk of the properties even then worth about Rs. 5000 and now worth Rs. 15,000 was sold for Rs. 401. This included a bungalow in item 1 and the tank which could not be sold for arrears under the Madras Estates Land Act. After the said revenue sale of the bulk of the properties, defendants 1 and 2 purported to convey by a private sale the remaining properties covered by the D and E Schedules to the plaint to the self-same auction purchaser, viz., Haja Abdul Hameed Sahib. This Haja Abdul Hameed Sahib died four years ago and the third defendant is widow and legal representative. This Haja Abdul Hameed Sahib died four years ago and the third defendant is widow and legal representative. This Haja Abdul Hameed Sahib in his turn purported to make a wakf of the properties which he had purchased, prescribing similar celebrations and made the fourth defendant his trustee. The fifth defendant is the daughter of the first defendant who has purported to gift to her a portion of the house No. 3 as stridhanam on the occasion of her marriage in September, 1946, entirely overlooking the terms of the wakf deed prohibiting any alienation or gift. In these circumstances the plaintiff, who is the son of the founder of the trust and is in the line of trustee appointed by the founder and interested in seeing that the properties are not lost to the trust and who is also a beneficiary of the surplus one-fourth which has to be distributed by the trustee amongst the heirs of the original founder, has filed this suit in 1951 in the pauper form alleging that on account of his suffering from mental illness he came to know of these alienations about one year prior to the filing of this suit, for the reliefs of directing possesion of the suit properties mentioned in B, C, D, E and F Schedules to the trust created by the plaintiff’s father as per wakfnama, dated 19th November, 1918. The suit is stated to be not barred under section 10 of the Indian Trusts Act and that even otherwise it had been instituted within a year of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the fraudulent alienations. The contest raised by contesting defendants is reflected in the following issues: (1) Did the whole of B, D and E Schedule properties belong to Muhammad Abdul Kadir Malumiar? (2) Is the sale in E.P. No. 27 of 1938 on the file of the Sub-Collector’s Court liable to be set aside for any of the reasons set out in the plaint? (3) Was the C Schedule property not liable to be sold by the Revenue Court? (4) Is the sale of D and E Schedule properties to the third defendant’s husband by defendants 1 and 2 valid and binding on the trust? (5) Has the plaintiff right to sue? (6) Is the suit, as framed, unsustainable? (7) Is the suit in time? (8) Is the suit barred under section 47, Civil Procedure Code? (4) Is the sale of D and E Schedule properties to the third defendant’s husband by defendants 1 and 2 valid and binding on the trust? (5) Has the plaintiff right to sue? (6) Is the suit, as framed, unsustainable? (7) Is the suit in time? (8) Is the suit barred under section 47, Civil Procedure Code? (9) Is the suit barred under section 92, Civil Procedure Code? (10) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? The learned Subordinate Judge found under issue 1 that B, D and E Schedules belonged to the trust excluding 2 acres 19 cents covered by Exhibit B-2; under issue 2 that, as the revenue sale was due to collusion and fraud between defendants 1 and 2 and Haja Abdul Hameed Sahib, the purchaser and that as the revenue sale held has been shown to be null and void, the sale in E.P. No. 27 of 1938 on the file of the Sub-Collector’s Court was liable to be set aside for the reasons set out in the plaint ; under issue 3 that the C Schedule property could not be sold by the revenue Court; under issue 4 that the private sale under Exhibit B-29 was clearly invalid; under issue 5 that plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit, though recovery of possession can be ordered only in favour of and on behalf of the trust and which possession was accepted by the plaintiff; under issue 6 that the suit as framed is maintainable under issue 7 that the suit is not barred as it is governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act when the revenue sale in favour of Haja Abdul Hameed Sahib has been found to be invalid from the very beginning ; under issue 8 that the suit is not barred under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; under issue 9 that the suit is not barred under section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure and under issue 10 that the plaintiff would be entitled to the following reliefs ; “In the result, the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff, for recovery of possession, on behalf of the trust created under Exhibit A-1, of the plaint B, C, D, E and F schedule properties, excluding, however, the properties (2 acres 19 cents) delivered under, covered by and specified in Exhibit B-2 as against all the defendants. The plaintiff will have proportionate costs’ of suit from defendants 1 and 2 and the estate in the hands of defendants 3 and 4. Defendants 1, 2 and 4 will pay the Court-fee payable on the plaint, proportionate to the success of the plaintiff, to the Government; and, the plaintiff will pay the balance of Court-fee due to the Government.......” The defeated defendants 3 and 4 have preferred this appeal. On a review of the entire circumstances of the case, we have come to the same conclusion as the learned Subordinate Judge on all the three points which were pressed before us, viz., that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the suit; secondly, that the revenue sale was held properly and cannot be set aside; and thirdly, that the suit is barred by limitation. Here are our reasons; Point 1: That the plaintiff can maintain the suit as it stands framed can admit of no doubt whatsoever. Under the terms of Exhibit A-1 the plaintiff is entitled to share in the surplus one-fourth remaining after the performance of the charities. So he is certainly a beneficiary within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, i.e., one of the persons for whose benefit the confidence is accepted by the trustee from the author of the trust. Secondly, under the terms of Exhibit A-1 during the lifetime of defendants 1 and 2, if there was a proper male issue of the founder capable of management, he can be a trustee. It follows, therefore, that if defendants 1 and 2 were to be removed from the trusteeship, which is the only possible result of out confirming the decree and judgment of the Lower Court, this plaintiff would be entitled to become a trustee. The law relating to suits for recovery of wakf property has been summarised by K. P. Saxena (Muslim Law, III Edn., 1954) as follows: “A worshipper can enforce his individual right in connection with a mosque, but he cannot sue for the recovery of an unauthorised alienation of wakf property; the mutawalli alone can have the right to institute a suit for its recovery: Debendra Nath Mitter v. Sheikh Safatulla1. A Mutawalli can maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the wakf property against a trespasser although it does not vest in him. A Mutawalli can maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the wakf property against a trespasser although it does not vest in him. A representative suit by two worshippers to set aside an alienation by the mutawalli, is, however, maintainable even without the sanction under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, or section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act: Azhrof Ali v. Mahomed Nurojomma2; Noor Mohammad v. Karima Bibi3. The wakf property may, like other trust properties, be recovered from third persons under circumstances referred to in the Indian Trusts Act, Section 63. In case of an unlawful alienation or a mortgage of the mosque property by its manager, any person interested may seek remedy in a Civil Court and restore the property to the trust, and the same is true also in case where wakf property is auctioned in execution of a decree not binding on the trust; Afiman v. Hamiduddin4; Mahomed Ghouse v. Moideen Siddikh5; Hamiuddin v. Court of Wards6”. The principles which regulate the right to institute suits in relation to trust properties are well settled as pointed out by Venkataramana Rao, J., in Ahmed Kutty v. Ayithraman Kutty1. “Where there is a lawful trustee for an institution, he is the person competent to institute a suit in relation to the property of the institution, to take the necessary steps for safeguarding and preserving it and to eject a trespasser and recover possession thereof for the trust, but the recovery of the property is only for and on behalf of the institution which he represents. But where a trustee has alienated the trust property and therefore would not proceed to recover possession of the same or has disabled himself otherwise from maintaining a suit in respect thereof or declines to institute a suit, it cannot be said that the institution is without a remedy. The worshippers, who are the beneficiaries entitled to participate in the benefits of the institution, are entitled to maintain a suit for preserving the trust property or restoring the property to the trust either by instituting a suit for declaration or for an injunction or even for possession; but whether the worshippers are entitled to claim all or any of the reliefs which a trustee is entitled to do in a properly framed suit would depend on the circumstances of each case. It is desirable and necessary to make the trustee a party to the suit, and where he is made a party it is open to the Court to mould the relief as the circumstances may require. If the suit is one brought for possession by the worshippers the Court can, after declaring the property to be trust property and setting aside the alienation, direct delivery of possession to the trustee. In cases where there is no trustee, it is open to the Court to direct delivery of possession to the worshippers on behalf of the trust; Rangaswami Naidu v. Krishnaswami Aiyar2. Again, in certain circumstances it is competent to the worshippers to maintain an action for a declaration that a certain property is trust property and for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their right of worship, which is a personal right, without making the trustee a party to the suit. This would not offend the principle that a trustee alone is competent to maintain a suit to eject a trespasser; Kuvarbai v. Mir Alam Khan3.” Even a worshipper can recover possession of trust properties on behalf of the trust so that when proper proceedings are instituted for the management of the trust property and a trustee is appointed, he might hand over possession to the trustee. The general principle applicable to Muslim Wakf is the same as that applicable to the property of a Hindu idol. The rule of Hanafi Law that Wakf property is taken to have ceased to be held in human ownership is applied to all such property even if the wakf be a wakf-alal-aulad or wakf for the benefit of the descendants; Muhammad Jafar v. Taqi Khan4. So when a wakf property is unlawfully alienated any person interested in the objects of the wakf may institute a suit to set aside the alienations and for the enforcement of the provisions of the wakfs, Kazi v. Balkrishna5. In this case the plaintiff is not a mere worshipper but an actual beneficiary interested in the trust and what is more an heir entitled to be appointed under the terms of the trust deed as a trustee in certain circumstances. Therefore, this plaintiff is clearly entitled to maintain the suit, though any recovery of possession ordered in his favour can only be on behalf of the trust. Therefore, this plaintiff is clearly entitled to maintain the suit, though any recovery of possession ordered in his favour can only be on behalf of the trust. The beneficiary’s right to sue embodied in section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is an illustration of the maxim “A trust shall not fail for want of a trustee”: Halsbury’s Laws of England, Hailsham edition, Volume XXXIII, Pages 134-135 and authorities cited therein; Lewin on Trusts, 14th Edition, P. 723. Turning to the other branch of the argument, it is not necessary that a representative suit should be filed with the permission of the Court under Order 1, rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff himself can file a suit and recover possession on behalf of the trust. In Maulavi Muhammad Fahimul Huq v. Jegat Ballay Ghosh6, which was a case of Muhammadan Wakf, it was held that the beneficiary of a trust, in respect of a Muhammadan Wakf, interested in the maintenance of a mosque or other charitable institution, may, without having recourse to Order 1, rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure, and without suing in a representative capacity, on behalf of the other beneficiaries, sue for recovery of possession of property, wrongfully alienated by the trustee, and for the incidental declaration that the properties are the subject of the trust and that they cannot be alienated. The beneficiary has the right under section 59 of the Indian Trusts Act subject to the provision of the instrument of trust that the trust property shall be properly protected and held and under section 63 follow the trust property into the hands of third persons. The savings of the rights of transferees are embodied is section 64 Indian Trusts Act. Therefore Point 1 has been rightly decided in favour of the plaintiff. Point 2.-This rent sale has undoubtedly been brought about by fraud and collusion between defendants 1 and 2 and the sixth defendant and was a regular hole-andcorner affair without observing the mandatory provisions of section 117 of the Estates Land Act. These are proved by the following circumstances. The lands in question, nanja and punja with a building and tank, were undoubtedly fetching on an average 130 kalams per year; see Exhibits B-31 and B-27 and the evidence of D.W. 4. These are proved by the following circumstances. The lands in question, nanja and punja with a building and tank, were undoubtedly fetching on an average 130 kalams per year; see Exhibits B-31 and B-27 and the evidence of D.W. 4. Defendants 1 and 2 have not gone into the box to give their own version regarding the income from the properties. On these lands the melwaram of 42 kalams was payable to the Nagore Durgah and 10 kalams to the Perumal temple. Therefore, there was not less than a surplus of 60 kalams per year for the performance of the charities which were nothing more than two feedings of the poor on two occasions in a year which would not have required more than 16 kalams of paddy. It is clear therefore that defendants 1 and 2 with ulterior objects of their own were allowing the arrears to accrue in order that the lands might be sold in collusion with another to ensure secret benefit to themselves. Secondly, that these defendants 1 and 2 were making preparations for this mala fide rent sale is evident from the testimony of P.W. 2. P.W. 2 states that in the year 1938, prior to 1939, one Syed Mohideen came to him and asked him to bid for the property benami for the benefit of defendants 1 and 2, that he actually did so and that subsequently the sale was set aside on deposit by Muhammad Gani Nachiar. Exhibits A-7 and A-8 show the refund of the amount on 19th July, 1938, to P.W. 2, who says that he deposited the total amount of Rs. 390 and odd in his Kumbakonam Bank account as evidenced by Exhibit A-10. He also swears that when the sale was set aside on deposit by Muhammad Gani Nachiar, who filed her petition, Exhibit B-5, Syed Mohideen came to him and he gave him back Rs. 60 cash and also a cheque as shown by Exhibit A-9-a. Exhibit A-9-a and A-10-a corroborate the evidence of P.W. 2. The testimony of P.W.2 shows that in the next year also there was an attempt to make him take the property in revenue sale benami for the benefit of the first and second defendants as Hajee Abdul Hamid wanted a larger profit. The testimony of P.W.2 shows that in the next year also there was an attempt to make him take the property in revenue sale benami for the benefit of the first and second defendants as Hajee Abdul Hamid wanted a larger profit. This witness states that he refused to fall in with their wishes this time as he seems to have felt compunction about this spoliation of wakf properties dedicated to charity. This witness whom the learned Subordinate Judge has seen in the box has been believed by him as a person of means who had purchased properties under Exhibit A-11. Then we have the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 5. According to P.W. 4 defendants 1 and 2 approached him in 1939 before the disputed revenue rale as they wanted to resort to a device to be able to deal with the charity properties and they wanted him to create a revenue sale being taken in his name and that he refused to fall in with their wishes. Then we have the evidence of P.W. 5, a broker, who states that defendants 1 and 2 wanted him to raise a loan on the security of the properties, that he went and asked one Pakiri Sultan Maraikayar on behalf of defendants 1 and 2, but that person refused to advance any loan as the properties were wakf properties. This witness adds that subsequently defendants 1 and 2 told him that they had allowed the properties to be sold in rent sale and some amounts were due from Hajee Abdul Hameed Sahib the purchaser and requested this witness to go and get the balance from that Hajee Abdul Hamid. On witness enquiring Hajee Abdul Hamid he was told that there might be some balance and that he will pay up. In other words, the testimony of P.Ws. 2, 4 and 5,which has been accepted by the learned Subordinate Judge, clearly shows the preparation made by defendants 1 and 2 to get these properties sold in revenue sale with a collusive auction-purchaser in order to obtain secret benefit to themselves. Subsequent to this sale we have the significant fact that no endeavour has been made by defendants 1 and 2 to raise and deposit money to set aside the sale, which is consistent only with the sale being a collusive and fraudulent one. Subsequent to this sale we have the significant fact that no endeavour has been made by defendants 1 and 2 to raise and deposit money to set aside the sale, which is consistent only with the sale being a collusive and fraudulent one. This receives corroboration from another significant circumstance that not only did defendants 1 and 2 make no endeavour to get the sale set aside but they even sold the remaining properties of the trust under Exhibit B-29. dated 24th June, 1939, which is sometime prior to the date of the sale certificate Exhibit B-11, dated 5th July, 1939, for Rs. 300 reciting that as the bulk of the properties had been sold away in auction and the remaining properties, were insufficient for proper performance of the charity, the trustees were selling the remaining properties. It is stated that the learned advocate who appeared for defendants 3 and 4 found this too much on this being pointed out to him and frankly conceded that he could not at all support the sale Exhibit B-29 in the face of the express provision in the wakf deed, Exhibit A-1. It need not be pointed out that if mutawalli transfers property without any authority of the wakf or the Court the alienation is void and he is guilty of committing a breach of trust for which he may be removed: Ahmed Sahah v. Attah Khan,1 Shama Churn v. Abdul Kabeer2, Mahim Jan Bibi v. Mir Rahim3, Jabeda v. Mahomamed4, Badal v. Tinkori5, Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das6, Abdul Rajah v. Ali Baksh7. This receives further corroboration from another circumstance that the first defendant has gifted the F Schedule properties to his daughter, when there is an express provision in Exhibit A-1 against gifting or alienating wakf properties. These defendants 1 and 2 remained ex parte throughout. There can be no doubt in these circumstances that defendants 1 and 2 had got hold of the sixth defendant in order to dispose of these trust properties and this collusion is finally shown from the fact that documents Exhibits B-5 and B-10, which should be in the custody of the second defendant came from the custody of the contesting defendants 3 and 4. It has been argued that this Hajee Abdul Hameed is a stranger, therefore no fraud could be inferred. It has been argued that this Hajee Abdul Hameed is a stranger, therefore no fraud could be inferred. But it should not be overlooked that in the very nature of things, as has been repeatedly pointed out, fraud is secret in its origin and inception and the means adopted for its success and fraudulent motive or design cannot be proved to the very hilt and that it should be inferred from the circumstances placed before Court. Each circumstance by itself may not mean much, but taking all of them together, they may reveal a fraudulent or dishonest plan. In addition to the circumstances pointed out above which show collusion between defendants 1 and 2 and Hajee Abdul Hameed, we have the further fact that the circumstances and the manner in which the revenue sale was held show that the auction-purchaser must also have been a party thereto. There was no publication in the Gazette as required by the mandatory provisions of section 117 of the Estates Land Act: See Exhibits A-5 and A-14. The defendants have filed only a publication after the sale as per Exhibit B-25. Secondly, there was no appointment of a selling officer; see Exhibits A-12-b to A-12-h. Thirdly, for a paltry arrears of Rs. 100 and odd, the entire B Schedule properties were brought to sale: see the suit register extract, Exhibit A-4. It is extremely unlikely that this Hajee Abdul Hameed would have been a genuine auction-purchaser when the sale took place under such circumstances and what is more in a hole and corner fashion inside the house of the village munsif. The properties are found from their extent and income to be worth at least Rs. 2,000 then and now must be worth much more. According to the P.Ws. the properties were worth Rs. 5,000 in May, 1939 and it is significant to note that in Exhibit A-1 of the year 1914 the properties are stated to be worth Rs. 5,000. It is a well known fact that in wakf documents, to escape stamp duty, there will be only under-valuation and not over-valuation. We have already alluded to the net income of the properties and their extent. The fact that they have been knocked off for a sum of Rs. 401, is eloquent testimony of the fraudulent and collusive character of the sale. We have already alluded to the net income of the properties and their extent. The fact that they have been knocked off for a sum of Rs. 401, is eloquent testimony of the fraudulent and collusive character of the sale. Therefere, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the correct conclusion that this sale, null and void from the very beginning, was brought about by fraud and collusion between defendants 1 and 2 on the one hand and Hajee Abdul Hameed on the other hand. Point 3.- It is contended by the learned advocate for the appellants that Article 12 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply to this case and that this suit has been filed long after the sale was confirmed and the sale certificate was issued. In advancing this argument it is overlooked that Article 12 applies to suits to set aside sales referred to therein. A sale can be set aside by a person only if it is said that it is binding on him unless and until it is set aside. This Article will not therefore apply to cases where the plaintiff would not be bound by the sale even if it were not set aside. Now a person may not be bound (i) either because he is not a party to the decree or proceeding in which the sale is held, or (ii) because the sale itself is null and void and without jurisdiction. In the first case the sale cannot in fact be set aside by a third party because as between the parties to the decree or other proceeding the sale will be valid and binding. In the latter case there is nothing to be set aside. The plaintiff in such a case can get a declaration that the interests of the trust are not affected by the sale. In fact it has been held that even if the plaintiff sues to set aside such a sale it will be regarded as being in effect a suit for such a declaration. Such a suit for a declaration is not governed by Article 12. Further, in such a case the plaintiff can ignore the sale. The only restriction is that the purchaser should not have prescribed title by adverse possession and limitation for over the statutory period of 12 years after getting possession of the property. Such a suit for a declaration is not governed by Article 12. Further, in such a case the plaintiff can ignore the sale. The only restriction is that the purchaser should not have prescribed title by adverse possession and limitation for over the statutory period of 12 years after getting possession of the property. Therefore, the proper Article to be applied in this case is Article 144 of the Limitation Act and this is evident from the following Madras decisions: Venkateswarlu v. Veeraswami1, (Case under Madras Estates Land Act) Satyanarayana v. Rayalamma2, Lakshmadu v. Ramudu3, Venkata Narasiah v. Subbamma4. See also Rupa Jagshet v. Krishnaji Govind5, Nasar Ali v. Kedarnath6, Bulaqi Das v. Kesri7, Mulk Rakj v. Nanak8, Purnachandra v. Dinabandu9, Ganashyam Chaudhary v. Basdebsha10, Khairajmal v. Daim11, Rambhai Govind v. Raghunath12, Maharaj Singh v. Budhu Chamrar13. The plaintiff also relied upon Article 95 of the Limitation Act. But having found that Article 144 applies and the suit is within time, it is unnecessary for us to canvass the merits of this claim because though there is some evidence that P.W. 1 on account of his mental illness was going from Duragh to Duragh and was not in a position to accurately comprehend the collusive and fraudulent sale which took place in 1939 there also is some evidence that P.W. 1 was always or frequently in Nagore and could not have escaped having knowledge of this revenue sale. It is unnecessary therefore for us to consider whether Article 95 of the Limitation Act would apply to this case. The decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, however, require modification on two points, viz., that we consider in the circumstances of this case, the decree should not be given to the plaintiff on behalf of the trust without making him firstly liable to reimburse the legal representatives of Hajee Abdul Hameed in a sum of Rs. The decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, however, require modification on two points, viz., that we consider in the circumstances of this case, the decree should not be given to the plaintiff on behalf of the trust without making him firstly liable to reimburse the legal representatives of Hajee Abdul Hameed in a sum of Rs. 401 and secondly equating the interest and mesne profits up to the date of suit and thirdly permitting the legal representatives of that Hajee Abdul Hameed to establish in execution the value of improvements said to have been effected by them and set it off against the mesne profits subsequent to the date of suit and liable for the balance, if any, as this will shorten the litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits and save the trust funds and do complete justice between the parties. The plaintiff on behalf of the trust will take immediate possession of the properties and the question of accounting need not await the delivery of possession. To this course the plaintiff and defendants can have no objection and have no objection. In regard to the extent of the property mentioned as comprised in Exhibit B-2 both sides agree that the decree mentioned 2 acres 19 cents whereas it ought to be 2 acres 67 cents. In assessing the quantum of mesne profits prior to the decree of the lower Court the amount spent under the wakf created by the third defendant on services prescribed under Exhibit A-1 will, as proved be given credit to. Subject to these modifications the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge are confirmed and this appeal is dismissed, and the costs of both parties (plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4) including Court-fee both as awarded in the Lower Court and here will come out of the estate. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.