Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.†-This is a petition by the defendants in O.S. No. 131 of 1954 on the file of the District Munsiff, Tenkasi, to revise the findings of the District Munsiff on issues 6 and 7 in the suit. Those issues run as follows: Issue 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued and correct court-fee not paid ? Issue 7. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? The suit was filed by the plaintiff respondent for possession of his 1/6th share in the plaint 1 and 2 schedule lands including the trees and the well on them. The plaintiff’s mother and guardian had executed two sale-deeds in respect of the plaint schedule properties. Exhibit B-1 dated 8th January, 1938, was a registered sale-deed for Rs. 750 executed by the plaintiff’s mother, Pachaivadivammal, as natural guardian of the plaintiff, in favour of the 1st defendant and others. Exhibit B-2 was sale-deed executed on the same day, by the same lady as natural guardian of the plaintiff for Rs.750 in favour of the 2nd defendant. Within 3 years of his attaining majority, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession of his 1/6th share in the plaint schedule properties from the defendants, for mesne profits from the date of the plaint till the date of recovery of possession at Rs.580 per annum, and for costs. He alleged that his father died in 1937 leaving him behind as his only son, that he was aged 5 years at the time, that his mother Pachaivadivammal, was not well-acquainted with worldly affairs, that she did not know the price or value of the properties and that she was not even in the habit of going out of the house. Her brother, one Kandaswami pillai, and her father, one Namasivayam Pillai, were said to have taken advantage of the plaintiff’s minority and his mother’s ignorance of worldly affairs, and made the plaintiff’s mother execute the two sale-deeds in favour of the defendants for grossly inadequate prices though the properties were at least worth Rs. 3,000 at that time. Kandaswami and Namasivayam were said to have colluded with the defendants and caused two sale-deeds to be effected for Rs. 1,500 by deceiving the plaintiff’s mother and exercising undue influence over her. The first defendant is said to be a brother of the plaintiff’s maternal uncle, Kandaswami Pillai. 3,000 at that time. Kandaswami and Namasivayam were said to have colluded with the defendants and caused two sale-deeds to be effected for Rs. 1,500 by deceiving the plaintiff’s mother and exercising undue influence over her. The first defendant is said to be a brother of the plaintiff’s maternal uncle, Kandaswami Pillai. The plaintiff alleged that, after attaining majority and ascertaining about the fraud played on his mother by her designing brother and father, he asked the defendants to deliver to him the plaint schedule properties. But the defendants did not do so. So, he filed the suit. He valued the suit for jurisdiction and courtfee at Rs. 1,037-3-0 under section 7(v)(b) of the Court-fees Act. The suit was first filed in the District Munsiff’s Court, Tirunelveli, as O.S. No. 341 of 1953. Then it was transferred to the District Munsiff’s Court, Tenkasi. It was after the transfer to that Court that issues 6 and 7 were framed. It was contended by the defendants that the plaintiff ought to have valued the suit under section 7(iv-A) of the Courtfees Act, as he had to get rid of an insuperable obstacle to this prayer for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties, namely, the two sale-deeds to which he was eo nomine a party, and he could not avoid paying court-fee under section 7(iv-A) by simply not asking for the cancellation of the two sale-deeds. Exhibits B-1 and B-2, executed by his mother, by by-passing them, and by asking for mere possession of the properties, and by valuing the suit under section 7(v)(b). It was agreed by both the parties before the lower Court, and was also held by the lower Court that if the suit were to be valued under section 7(iv-A) of the Courtfees Act, it would be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court, as the suit value would be over Rs. 3,000. That is also conceded here. So, the finding on issue 7 would automatically follow the finding on issue 6. The contention of the defendants in the lower Court that at least the market value of 1/6th of the plaint schedule properties should have formed the basis for valuation as parts of survey numbers would be involved when awarding the 1/6th was rejected by the lower Court and was rightly not pressed before me. The contention of the defendants in the lower Court that at least the market value of 1/6th of the plaint schedule properties should have formed the basis for valuation as parts of survey numbers would be involved when awarding the 1/6th was rejected by the lower Court and was rightly not pressed before me. On the main point as to whether section 7(iv-A) would apply, many rulings were cited by both sides before the lower Court. These rulings were somewhat irreconcilable, including Bench Rulings. After discussing them, the lower Court finally held that the ruling of Chandra Reddy, J., in C. Ramaswami and others v. Kunjammal and others 1 , would be the ruling applicable 19th April, 1955. to the facts of this case, and that court-fee need not be paid under section 7(iv-A) as the mother and guardian, who executed the sale-deed making the minor eo nomine a party to it was there also an illiterate woman inexperienced in life and was influenced and deceived by her brother to alienate the property for a very low consideration. Chandra Reddy, J., held in that case, that it was not necessary for a minor in such cases to pray for cancellation of the sale-deed to which he was eo nomine a party and to pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) and that it was sufficient for him to value the suit under section 7(v)(b). The lower Court held, on issue 6, that the valuation of the suit under section 7(v)(b) of the Court-fees Act was correct and the court-fee paid was correct. Consequently it held, on issue 7, that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence this Civil Revision Petition. I have perused the entire records, and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Consequently it held, on issue 7, that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence this Civil Revision Petition. I have perused the entire records, and heard the learned counsel on both sides. It has become obvious to me, after hearing them, that they are right in urging that there are weighty rulings in favour of the view that in such cases court-fee ought to be paid under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act, and also equally weighty rulings that in such cases court-fee need be only paid under section 7(v)(b), and that, as some of the rulings are Division Bench Rulings and even Full Bench Rulings it is necessary to settle the conflict once for all by referring the matter to a Full Bench, as it is a matter of common occurrence and lower Courts should not be left under any doubt regarding the court-fee and jurisdiction in some cases. I shall now briefly mention the rulings on either side. For the view that courtfee need be paid only under section 7(v)(b) of the Court-fees Act, and the plaintiffs need not ask for cancellation of the sale deeds executed by their guardian during their minority even though they were eo nomine parties to such sale deeds, there is, first of all, the ruling of a Bench of this Court consisting of Ramesam and Coleridge, J. in Kamaraju v. C.Gunnayya1. It was held there that in a case of private sale of a minor’s property by his mother and natural guardian, making the minor eo nomine party, the minor had got the right to avoid it, and need not ask for its cancellation. The following observations are relevant in the context: “A judicial sale has to be set aside so far as the persons who are parties to the sale are concerned, and if not set aside, it will be binding on them, for ever. Here, we have not got to do with a judicial sale but with a private sale. The 1st defendant had got the right of avoiding it. By selling the property to the plaintiff, on the footing that the sale by the mother was not binding on him, he has choosen to avoid it, and the result of it is that from his point of view he has got a complete title. The 1st defendant had got the right of avoiding it. By selling the property to the plaintiff, on the footing that the sale by the mother was not binding on him, he has choosen to avoid it, and the result of it is that from his point of view he has got a complete title. The title, no doubt, will only be effective if the Court ultimately finds that the sale by the mother is not binding on him. But, contingent on that event, he has got a complete title and this title is not a bare right to sue, and is therefore assignable.” No doubt, at the time the suit concerned in that case, namely, O.S. No. 78 of 1920, was filed, section 7(iv-A) had not been enacted (it was enacted only in 1922) and therefore there was no need for the learned Judges to hold that court-fee need not be paid under section 7(iv-A). But, as section 7(iv-A) will apply to cases where the plaintiffs have to ask for the cancellation of a sale deed, the ruling in question will be in favour of the non-applicability of section 7(iv-A) and the applicability of section 7(v)(b) to such case, as Mr. Natesan has urged. The next ruling in favour of this view is that of a Bench of this Court consisting of Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., in Veeraragavalu v. Sreeramalu2. In that case, the learned Judges observed as follows: “It has been held in a long series of cases beginning with Unni v. Kanchi Ammal3, (see also Ramaraju v. Gunnaya1), that a minor has not got to set aside the transaction by a guardian in suing to recover the property. He can ignore the transaction and merely pray for possession. That being so, he does not seek cancellation of the instrument. In this respect, his position is different from that of an adult executing the document himself as pointed out in 14 Mad. 26. "Therefore, clause (iv-A) of section 7 of the Court-fees Act, does not apply. We do not agree with the decision in Alagan Aiyangar v. Srinivasa Aiyangar4. “In such cases, it is proper that the plaintiff should not add unnecessary prayers to confuse the Court and himself. When such prayers are unnecessary it is best to expunge them. In the present case, the plaintiff is willing to expunge the words in prayer from the words”setting aside“. “In such cases, it is proper that the plaintiff should not add unnecessary prayers to confuse the Court and himself. When such prayers are unnecessary it is best to expunge them. In the present case, the plaintiff is willing to expunge the words in prayer from the words”setting aside“. If he does so, the court-fee paid by him is enough.” In other words, the learned Judges held that even when the plaintiff had added a prayer to set aside the sale-deed to which his guardian had made him eo nomine a party, such prayer was unnecessary, and should be struck out, as there was no need for him to set aside such a sale-deed. But the curious thing is that in spite of such a strong assertion in favour of the non-applicability of section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and the applicability of section 7(v)(b) the very next year Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar1, held that in a case where a mother and guardian had executed a release deed on behalf of her minor sons making them eo nomine parties to the deed, court-fee should be paid under section 7(iv-A) and not under section 7(v)(b). He remarked: “The question to be decided is: are the plaintiffs bound to get the release deed set aside? If they are, the form of the plaint may be disregarded for in substance, the relief claimed is one for cancellation. The transaction was entered into by the mother of the plaintiffs as their guardian. Can it be said that such a transaction is an absolute nullity? In my opinion, Article 44 of the Limitation Act clearly applies. I am not now concerned with cases which have held, that in the case of alienations by managing members of a Hindu coparcenary it is unnecessary to get the transactions set aside. The case relied upon by the lower Court, Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu2, is a case of this description. In the present case, I am not called upon to consider whether this decision is correct or not. The alienation in question was made by the mother of the plaintiffs, their guardian under the Hindu Law. In such a case, the transaction is voidable, and not void. Then again, the question does not arise whether Article 44 does not apply to an alienaction by an unauthorised person. The alienation in question was made by the mother of the plaintiffs, their guardian under the Hindu Law. In such a case, the transaction is voidable, and not void. Then again, the question does not arise whether Article 44 does not apply to an alienaction by an unauthorised person. In this case, the complaint in short is that on authorised guardian effected an unauthorised transfer An alienation by a guardian must be regularly set aside. See Madugula Latchiah v. Mukkalinga3; Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayan4; Kandasami v. Irusappa5and Arumugam Pillai v. Ambalam6. I am, therefore, disposed to read the plaint as if it contains a prayer for the cancellation of the release deed.” After quoting the wording of section 7(iv-A), he continued: “Can there be any doubt that a sale-deed comes within the terms of this section?” Mr. Natesan, for the plaintiff respondent, urged that Venkatasubba Rao., J.,made a mistake in thinking that the ruling of the Bench in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu2was a case of an alienation merely by the father and managing member of a Hindu coparcenary and asserted that it was by the father as the guardian of his son. He urged that in principle there could be no difference between a father-guardian and mother-guardian of a minor son, especially among the Hindus where the father is the preferential guardian of the minor son, having priority over, the mother. He referred to the ruling and showed that the Bench in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu2, held that even in a case of sale-deeds executed by a father-guardian there was no need to ask for cancellation of the sale-deed and pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) and that it was enough for the minor, when he had become a major to ask for possession by paying court-fee under section 7(v)(b) ignoring the sale-deed. In Venkatakrishniah v. Sheik Alli Sahib7, Wadsworth, J., agreed with the view of Venkatasubba Rao., J. and held that where an alienation was clearly made by the lawful guardian of the plaintiff making him eo nomine a party, the plaintiff had necessarily to attack that alienation as an essential preliminary to any prayer for the recovery of possession, and must pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) and cannot evade doing so by filing a suit for mere recovery of possession and paying court-fee under section 7(v)(b). He too held that the decision in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu2, could not be relied on for paying court-fee under section 7(v)(b) and avoiding the payment of court-fee under section 7(iv-A). He re-affirmed this view in Velliyya Kumar v. Ramaswami Konar8.He observed at page 402, thus: “My attention has not been drawn to any decision which throws any real doubt on the general proposition that when a person seeks to establish title which cannot be established without removing a decree or an instrument to which he is himself a party then,whatever be the garb in which he dresses his suit its substantial character must be a suit for the cancellation of the decree or instrument; but if the establishment of his title is being impeded by the effect of a transaction between other parties he cannot legitimately ask for the cancellation of that transaction but can only ask for a declaration that, so far as he is concerned, it is not binding.” Mr. Natesan urged that the above decisions of Venkatasubba Rao, J., and Wadsworth, J., are wrong and impliedly overruled as a Full Bench of five Judges consisting of Lionel Leach, C.J., and Pandurang Row, Abdual Rahman, Krisnaswami Aiyangar and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in Ramaswami Iyengar v. Ragavachariar1 , has held that, though court-fee must be paid under section 7(iv-A) in respect of decrees passed against the plaintiff in suits in which he had been eo nomine impleaded as a party, with regard to other transactions like sale-deeds, whether the plaintiff is made a party or not, the position is different. At page 41 it is observed thus: “The other transactions of the first defendant, whether the plaintiff is made a party thereto or not, stand on a different footing. He is not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue for a declaration or cancellation in respect of any of them.” Mr. Mani for the petitioners urges that these remarks would apply only to a case where the sale-deeds are executed by a father-manager and guardian. He is not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue for a declaration or cancellation in respect of any of them.” Mr. Mani for the petitioners urges that these remarks would apply only to a case where the sale-deeds are executed by a father-manager and guardian. He further urges that though a father is guardian of his minor sons, and even the preferential guardian under Hindu Law, when he is also the manager of the joint family, his capacity as a manager overshadows his right as a guardian, and he will be presumed to have executed the sale-deeds only as a father-manager and not fatherguardian, and so, the minor sons, when they attained majority, need not ask for cancellation of the sale-deeds executed by him as the father-manager and guardian. But the position, he said, would be different regarding the sale-deeds executed by a mother and legal guardian. He relied on the ruling of a Full Bench of this Court, consisting of Lionel Leach, C.J., and Mockett and Krishnaswami Aiyengar, JJ., in Ghulam Hussain Sahib v. Ayesha Bibi2, where it has been observed that in a case of sale by a de jure guardian (thought not by a de facto guardian) the plaintiff, who has, been made eo nomine a party to the sale-deed, seeking possession must ask for the cancellation of the sale-deed and pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) and that he must do so even with regard to a sale-deed executed by a Court guardian without obtaining the sanction of the Court. Mr. Mani urged that though in that case the mother guardian who executed the sale-deed in which the minor was eo nomine a party happened to be a Court guardian, appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act, the same rules would be applicable to the natural mother-guardian in the present case, though she is not appointed as a guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act. Mr. Natesan relied on two later rulings of single Judges for the view that courtfee need be paid only under section 7(v)(b). One of the rulings was that of Kuppuswami Ayyar, J., in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Mari Goundan3 . Mr. Natesan relied on two later rulings of single Judges for the view that courtfee need be paid only under section 7(v)(b). One of the rulings was that of Kuppuswami Ayyar, J., in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Mari Goundan3 . It was held in that case by the learned Judge that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue for setting aside the partition of 938 effected by his father, and that he need not value the suit under section 7(iv-A) and that he could value the suit as one for partition ignoring the previous partition as not binding on him. He followed the rulings in Kamaraju v. Chanduri Gunnayya4 , and Veeraraghavalu v. Shreeramulu 5 , and dissented from the ruling of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar6; as it was of a single Judge, apparently overlooking the fact that the ruling of the Bench in Kamaraju v. Chanduri Gunnayya4, was given before the enactment of section 7(iv-A). The other ruling relied on by Mr.Natesan was that of Chandra Reddy, J. in Ramaswami and others v. Kunjammal and others7 . The learned Judge held that where the plaintiff alleged that his mother and natural guardian under the Hindu Law was an illiterate woman, inexperienced in life, and was influenced by her brother to alienate the properties for a very low consideration in his favour making the plaintiff minor eo nomine a party, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to value the suit under section 7(v)(b) of the Court-fees Act and that he need not pray for the cancellation of the sale-deed and pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. Mr. Mani attacks Chandra Reddy, J.‘s decision as erroneous. He has pointed out that in a later decision of this Court in Vaduvanatha Pillai v.Raghava Iyengar1, Satyanarayana and Rao, J., relied on the Full Bench decision is Mir Gulam Saheb v.Aiyesha Bibi2, and held that in such a case in spite of the guardian’s alleged illiteracy fraud, etc., court-fee ought to be paid under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-Tees Act though in the particular case before him the plaintiff was eo nomine a party to a decree and not merely to the sale-deed. It is obvious from all this that there is a lot of conflicting views in reported decisions regarding this matter as urged by the learned counsel on both sides. It is obvious from all this that there is a lot of conflicting views in reported decisions regarding this matter as urged by the learned counsel on both sides. My own view is that wherever a minor has been made eo nomine a party to a sale-deed or other instrument by his legal guardian (and not by a mere judgment Family Manager) and seeks to avoid it, and get possession of the lands which have passed to the alinees, he must pray for setting aside such sale-deed and pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. There must be some uniformity regarding these matters which cannot be left to be decided in each case according to the opinion of the presiding Judge. A general rule that persons who are eo nomine parties to the decree, or sale-deeds effected by their natural or legal guardians, should pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) will make it simple to work, and will not operate any grave injustice. It will also make for general convenience and may ultimately be for the benefit of the minors themselves. If every minor can ignore the sale-deeds executed by his legal guardians for his benefit, and claim possession from the alienees, paying merely court-fee under section 7(v)(b) without praying for the cancellation of the sale deeds, it is obvious that very few people will be willing to purchase the properties of minors from their guardians at reasonable prices, and the minors will be the sufferers ultimately. There is a presumption that alienations by legal or natural guardians like a mother will be prima facie for the benefit of the minors, though of course the minors can get them set aside by showing that they were vitiated by fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc., paying proper court-fee under section 7(iv-A). I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Mani that in regard to a sale-deed executed by father as guardian of his minor son, the plaintiff need not pray for setting aside that sale-deed and can pay court-fee under section 7(v)(b) ignoring the sale-deed, and as for mere possession. I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Mani that in regard to a sale-deed executed by father as guardian of his minor son, the plaintiff need not pray for setting aside that sale-deed and can pay court-fee under section 7(v)(b) ignoring the sale-deed, and as for mere possession. It seems to me that father, as a guardian is in a stronger position, under the Hindu Law, than the mother as guardian, though as manager of the family and head of the coparcenary, his alienations can bind other coparceners including his sons only if they are proved to be for family necessity or benefit. Sons asking for partition against a father need not specifically ask of setting aside such alienations. But the matter has not been uniformly decided under the rulings cited above on the simple test of eo nomine or not. Often the father as manager and the father as the guardian have been bundled together, and the father’s capacity as manager alone has been taken into account for this purpose. It is necessary to clearly lay down a rule as to the court-fee payable in such cases of alienations by legal guardians of minors making the minor eo nomine a party. Of course, alienations which are attacked as bogus and nominal will stand on a different footing, as they can always be ignored, as unreal, but alienations which are admitted to be real, though fraudulent and for low consideration, stand on quite a different footing. I therefore direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench to decide the following questions: 1. Has the plaintiff who as a minor, has been made eo nomine a party to a sale-deed or other document of alienation by his mother and guardian to pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and to pray for the cancellation of the sale-deed expressly or impliedly and pay court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act, or can he ignore and by pass such alienation alleging illiteracy, ignorance, lack of worldly knowledge, undue influence, coercion, etc., and pray for mere possession of the lands paying court-fee under section 7(v)(b) of the Court-fees Act? Will it make any difference if the mother executing the sale-deed making him eo nomine a party is a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act? Will it make any difference if the mother executing the sale-deed making him eo nomine a party is a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act? Is the position of a sale-deed executed by a father of the minor, as guardian of the minor son and not as manager of the joint family and head of the coparcenary, any way different from the position of a sale-deed executed by the mother as guardian of the minor? In pursuance of the aforesaid order for reference to a Full Bench the petition was heard by (Govinda Menon, Ramaswami and Ramaswami Gounder, JJ.). T. R. Mani for Petitioner. M. Natesan for Respondent. The opinion of the Full Bench was delivered by Govinda Menon, J.-The following questions have been referred to a Full Bench by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. Has the plaintiff who as a minor, has been made eo nomine a party to a sale-deed or other document of alienation by his mother and guardian to pay Court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and to pray for the cancellation of the sale-deed expressly or impliedly and pay Court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act or can he ignore and bypass such alienation alleging illiteracy ignorance, lack of worldly knowledge, undue influence, coercion, etc., and pray for mere possession of the lands paying Court-fee under section 7(v)(b) of the Court-fees Act? Will it make any difference if the mother executing the sale-deed making him eo nomine a party is a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act? Is the position of a sale-deed executed by a father of the minor as guardian of the minor son and not as manager of the joint family and head of the coparcenary, any way different from the position of a sale-deed executed by the mother as guardian of the minor? As the order of reference deals exhaustively with the facts which have given rise to the reference as well as the decided cases cited before him no further elaboration of factual details is necessary and we can straightaway proceed to discuss the legal points urged before us. As the order of reference deals exhaustively with the facts which have given rise to the reference as well as the decided cases cited before him no further elaboration of factual details is necessary and we can straightaway proceed to discuss the legal points urged before us. At the very outset it is necessary to differentiate between transactions regarding properties which belong to the minor as his own and those in which he is interested as a member of a joint family where either his father or any other relative happens to be the kartha or head. In the latter case where a document is executed on behalf of the family he is only a component part in the entity which has a legal status and a person and therefore such a transaction cannot be deemed to be by the minor individually as such but in the former case where the person who executes the document is the father or the manager of the joint family the mere fact that he purported to execute it also as the guardian of the minor would not make it obligatory on the minor to have it cancelled before obtaining relief on the footing that it is not binding on him. But where the transaction is on behalf of the minor and is entered into by the guardian then the question arises as to whether in order to obtain relief the minor has to get the document cancelled. The law as laid down in Unni v. Kunchi Amma1, and approved by the Full Bench in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar2, is well settled and is to the following effect: “If a person not having authority to execute a deed or having such authority under certain circumstances which did not exist, execute a deed, it is not necessary for persons who are not bound by it, to sue to set it aside for it cannot be used against them. They may treat it as non-existent and sue for their right as if it did not exist.” We are in this case concerned with an alienation of property belonging to the minor by his guardian and the question to be considered is what is the proper Court-fee payable in such a matter. They may treat it as non-existent and sue for their right as if it did not exist.” We are in this case concerned with an alienation of property belonging to the minor by his guardian and the question to be considered is what is the proper Court-fee payable in such a matter. Is it necessary for the minor to seek for a cancellation of the document and pay Court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act or would it be sufficient if he ignores the transaction and seeks possession of the property and values the suit under section 7(v) of the Act. Chandra Reddi, J., in Ramaswami v. Kunjammal3, has taken the view that it is sufficient if the plaintiff values the suit under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act and he need not ask for cancellation of the sale-deed executed by his mother as guardian and pay Court-fee under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. The learned Judge relied on the decisions in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar1 , Kalianna Gounder v. Balasubramaniam 2 , and Kandaswami Udayar v. Annamalai Pillai3, and followed the same. We are now asked to consider the correctness or otherwise of that judgment and in doing so we propose to refer to the conflict in case-law noted by the referring judge. On the side of the petitioners it is contended that in a transaction entered into by a guardian of a minor relating to the property belonging to the minor and in which the minor is eo nomine made a party represented by his guardian it is absolutely essential that in order to get the relief cancellation of the document is necessary for which purpose Court-fee will have to be paid under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees. Act but where the minor is one of the members of the joint family and the transaction is by the kartha or the other members of the family but the minor’s name is added and represented by a guardian in such a case section 7(v) of the Act can be invoked. Act but where the minor is one of the members of the joint family and the transaction is by the kartha or the other members of the family but the minor’s name is added and represented by a guardian in such a case section 7(v) of the Act can be invoked. The matter came to the forefront in the decision in Doraiswami v. Thangavelu4, by Venkatasubba Rao, J. Where the mother as guardian under the Hindu Law executes a release deed on behalf of the minors the release deed is not void but only voidable and as such the minors, if they complain that it is invalid, are bound to-set it aside. Hence if the minors after attaining majority bring a suit praying for a declaration that the release is invalid and for an injunction their suit looking at the substance of it, must be treated as one for cancellation of the instrument and so will come under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. The learned Judge was not inclined to follow the earlier decision in Veeraragavalu v. Sreeramulu5. It is clear from the facts of this case that the alienation was by the guardian representing the minor with regard to the minor’s estate and not by the manager of a joint family in which the minor is only a constituent member. The learned Judge has also referred to the fact that in section 7(iv-A) the words securing money or other property are not happy. In his opinion the release deed is a document securing property and it seems to us that a mortgage or sale of property is also one which secures money or other property. Though an argument has been addressed to us that the words, of section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act are inapplicable to a case where the transaction is one of sale, mortgage or exchange and the person who impugns is a mortgagor, vendor or alienor it is difficult to say that the suit is for cancellation of a document securing money or other property but it has so far been construed in that light and it is too late in the day to question the correctness of that assumption. Wadsworth, J., in Venkatakrishniah v. Alli Sahib6, took a similar view and held that where the suit is to set aside an alienation made by the guardian of the plaintiff during his minority and for possession of the properties alienated Court-fee should be paid under section 7(iv-A). This also proceeds on the footing that the minor is eo nomine a party to the transaction and the consideration is as if the minor himself has executed it. The learned judge refers to the decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J., mentioned above and points out the difference between a case where the alienation is by the lawful guardian of the minor as such and that by a manager of a joint family of which the minor is only a member. The observations of the same learned Judge in Vellayya Konar v. Ramaswami Konar7, are similar. A distinction is clearly made out between a case where the erstwhile minor has to remove an obstacle in his way before getting relief and one in which he could ignore and proceed as if he was not a party. Referring to the earlier case in Venkatakrishniah v. Alli Sahib6 , the learned Judge makes it clear that it was a case of a minor whose lawful guardian on his behalf made an alienation which the minor on attaining majority has necessarily to get the conveyance cancelled before he could get recovery of possession of the properties alienated and that in such a case section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act applies. Though the observations of Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Vaduganatha Pillai v. Srinivasa Raghava Iyengar8, related to the case of of a decree to which the minor was a party represented by his guardian the principle underlying the judgment is where the transaction is by and on behalf of the individual any attempt to get over it should be by means of cancellation of the same. We are in agreement with the learned Judge But a different line of reasoning is discernible in certain cases to the effect that even where the suit relates to the property of the minor alienated by a guardian all that he need do for impeaching the transaction is to sue to recover the property without seeking to set aside the transaction. Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., in Veeraragavalu v. Sreeramulu1, were of the view that a minor has not got to set aside the transaction by a guardian in suing to recover the property. He could ignore the transaction and merely pray for possession. That being so he need not seek the cancellation of the instrument, and therefore clause (iv-A) of section 7 of the Court-fees Act does not apply. The authorities which the learned Judges relied on were Unni v. Kunchi Ammal2and Kamaraju v. Gunnayya3and they differed from the decision in Alagar Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar4. On looking at the facts of the case though the report of the same in the judgment is very meagre from the printed records available in the archives of this Court, it is seen that the suit out of which the Civil Revision Petition arose was with regard to the joint family property and was for partition of the properties. Therefore on the facts of the case the decision is correct though the observations contained in the judgment are somewhat wide and are apt to be misunderstood. Where the suit is for setting aside a partition by a minor after attaining majority and seeking a fresh partition Kuppuswami Ayyar, J., in Kuppuswami Goundar v. Man Goundan5held that Court fee need be paid only under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act relying upon the decision in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar6. Though it was sought to be argued in this case that the minor was represented by a guardian and the partition deed so far as he was concerned, was one executed by the guardian and therefore there should be a prayer for cancellation and Court-fee should be paid on that basis the learned Judge did not accept the contention. Though it was sought to be argued in this case that the minor was represented by a guardian and the partition deed so far as he was concerned, was one executed by the guardian and therefore there should be a prayer for cancellation and Court-fee should be paid on that basis the learned Judge did not accept the contention. One of the further cases where section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act was applied was Kalianna v. Balasubramaniam7in which Bell, J., following the decision in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar6took the view that a suit filed by a mother as the next friend of her three sons who belonged to a joint family (a) for a declaration that a sale-deed executed by their father for himself and as guardian of his sons was not binding on them not having been executed for family necessities, (b) for partition and (c) for recovery of the properties was in effect one for possession of the properties and the appropriate Court-fee payable was under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. The decision in Kandaswami Udayar v. Annamalai Pillai8relates to an alienation by the manager in which case the minor member is only a party in his capacity as a member of the family. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Natesan that in cases when a guardian purporting to act on behalf of a minor, whether it be with regard to the joint family properties of others and the minor or the properties belonging to the minor, it is open to the minor to ignore the transaction and recover possession of the properties on the footing of a void instrument in which case Court-fee is payable only under section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act. He contends that in order that section 7(iv-A) may be made applicable, it must be incumbent upon the plaintiff to seek a cancellation of the instrument and in the case of a Hindu minor when the alienation is by the guardian it is open to the minor to ignore the transaction and avoid it within three years of his attaining majority failing which the transaction becomes perfected. Such ignoring or avoiding need not necessarily be by a suit but an unequivocal act of quondam minor to elect or avoid would be sufficient. Such ignoring or avoiding need not necessarily be by a suit but an unequivocal act of quondam minor to elect or avoid would be sufficient. It is further urged that the power of a guardian under the Hindu Law is very limited and his alienation would be valid only under certain circumstances. It is open to the minor to go to the Court and allege that the transaction does not exist. The result of the analysis of the cases, according to the learned counsel is that if it is found that the document is not binding on the minor it should be as if he was not a party to the instrument at all. The cases cited at the bar can be classified under two heads, namely, those in which the minor’s properties are being dealt with by a guardian and the minor seeks a decision that such dealings are not binding on him and secondly, those in which the father or the manager of the joint family purporting to deal with the family properties acts as the guardian of the minor, who is only one of the members of the joint family. It seems to us that in the former case the minor is eo nomine a party to the transaction and he should seek to cancel the documents in which case Court-fees has to be paid under section 7(iv-A) of the Act. But where the minor was only a member of a joint family and the transaction is on behalf of the joint family, he could always ignore the transaction as not binding on the family and seek to recover possession. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao1, in considering the question regarding the applicability of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, took the view that the minor should be deemed to be a party to the transaction eo nomine. In interpreting the word ‘transferor’ in section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the Judicial Committee held that where the mother and guardian of a minor enters into a contract of sale of immoveable properties of the minor to discharge the father’s debts and puts the transferee in possession, the transferor in such a case, for the application of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, is the minor. The principle deducible from this case is that where the transaction is with regard to the properties of the minor, it should be deemed as if he is eo nomine a party. At page 24 we find the following observation: “Their Lordships think it is clear that the words the ‘transferor’ refer back to the person who contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf. Thus the act of the mother and guardian in entering into the contracts of sale in the present case was an act done on behalf of the minor’ and finally it was held that the person who most aptly answers the description of ‘the transferor’ in the sense in which these words are used in section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is the minor himself”. If the matter is looked at in this way there is no difficulty in reconciling the various cases and we do not propose to analyse at length the large body of caselaw cited at the Bar. The distinction between a void and voidable transaction has been brought out in a number of cases and we need only refer to a few of them: Chingacham Vitil Sankaran Nair v. Chingacham Vitil Gopala Menon2, Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi3, Fakirappa Limmanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu4, Bali Reddi v. Khatipulal Sab5, Ankamma v. Kameswaramma6, Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal7and Vallabhacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu8. There is no doubt whatever that a transaction entered into by a guardian relating to the minor’s properties is not void and if the minor does not sue to set it aside within three years of his attaining majority it becomes valid under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. In such a case the minor is deemed to be a party to the transaction. But where the document is executed by a manager of the family and it is not binding on the family, the minor or any other member can ignore the transaction and recover possession of the property. To such a case section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act will apply. We are here not concerned with decrees to which the minor is eo nomine a party. To such a case section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act will apply. We are here not concerned with decrees to which the minor is eo nomine a party. Our answer to the first question is that if the minor is eo nomine a party to a sale-deed or other document of alienations, he must sue for the cancellation of the document under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and it is not enough if he applies for possession under section 7(v) of the Act; and to the second question our answer is that there can be no distinction whether the father as guardian of the minor and not as the manager of the joint family executes the deed. Even in that case also the document has to be set aside. After expression of the above pinion by the Full Bench, the case came on for hearing and the Court (Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.) delivered the Following Judgment.-The Full Bench has held that Court-fee has to be paid in this case under section 7(iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act. Therefore this Civil Revision Petition must be allowed, and it is allowed with half costs both here and before the Full Bench. Advocate’s fee Rs. 35 here, and Rs. 50 before the Full Bench. It is not known whether the valuation under section 7(iv-A) will come to over Rs. 5,000. The learned District Munsiff will assess the valuation after hearing both sides. If it exceeds his jurisdiction he will return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.