JUDGEMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. This appeal was preferred by the plaintiff appellant against Vinayakrao and Shriniwasrao, legal representatives of the original defendant Yeshwantrao Mukutrao deceased. It appears that after the death of Yeshwantrao, Vinayakrao, Shrinivasrao and Rajendra were brought on record as legal representatives of the said defendant. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court and an appeal was instituted in this Court on 9-1-1953. In the copies of the judgment and the decree of the Court below, the name of Rajendra amongst the defendants was not mentioned; and, therefore, the appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against the two defendants Vinayakrao and Shriniwasrao only. When the mistake in the certified copies of the judgment and the decree of the Civil Judges Court came to his notice, the plaintiff made an application to this Court on 27-3-1953 to allow him to add the name of Rajendra in the list of respondents. This application remained pending for nearly two years and it has now come for hearing. 2. Mr. Pande, on behalf of the respondents, draws our attention to the words of S. 22, Limitation Act which provide that the date when a party is added is to be deemed to be the date of the institution of the suit or appeal so far as they are concerned for purposes of limitation; and as the appeal against Rajendra is barred by limitation he requests that the addition of his name amongst the respondents may not be allowed, as it is a substantive right of a very valuable kind of which he should not be lightly deprived. Mr. Mr. Pande also places reliance on the wordings of O. 41, R. 20, Civil P. C., which runs as follows : "Where it appears to the Court at the hearing that any person who was a party to the suit in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made a party to the appeal, is interested in the result of the appeal the Court may adjourn the hearing to a future day to be fixed by the Court and direct that such person be made a respondent." The learned Counsel also refers to the observations of the Privy Council in - Chokulingam Chetty v. Seethai, 55 Ind App 7 : AIR 1927 PC 252 (A), where their Lordships of the Judicial Committee hold that where one of the holders of a decree has not been joined as a respondent to an appeal and the time limited for appealing has elapsed, he is not "interested in the result of the appeal" within the meaning of O. 41, R. 20; the rule, therefore gives no jurisdiction to the Appellate Court to join him. The observations made by the Privy Council in this case have been interpreted differently by different Courts. Some support the view that the result of an appellants failure to implead some of the respondents who are necessary parties to the appeal, within time is that they cannot be regarded as persons interested in the result of the appeal within the meaning of O. 41, R. 20, Civil P. C., and consequently they cannot be made respondents. Some support the view that the result of an appellants failure to implead some of the respondents who are necessary parties to the appeal, within time is that they cannot be regarded as persons interested in the result of the appeal within the meaning of O. 41, R. 20, Civil P. C., and consequently they cannot be made respondents. Others have taken the view that the Privy Council ruling cannot be taken as laying down that no person against whom the right of appeal has become barred can ever be added as a respondent under the provision of O. 41, R. 20, Civil P. C. It seems, therefore, proper to reproduce the observations of the Privy Council below : "As regards the rest of the case, owing to the plaintiffs failure to make these defendants respondent within the time limited for filing an appeal, these appeals so far as they are concerned are prima facie barred by limitation, and they are entitled to hold the decrees in their favour, which, as pointed out by their Lordships in a very recent case, is a substantive right of a very valuable kind of which they should not lightly be deprived. When parties are added by the Court after the institution of a suit under O. 1, R. 10 (2), S. 22, Limitation Act, provides that the date when they are added is to be the date of the institution of the suit so far as they are concerned for purposes of limitation, and the rights which they may have acquired under the Limitation Act are, therefore, sufficiently safeguarded. The addition of a respondent whom the appellant has not made a party to the appeal is expressly dealt with in O. 41, R. 20, on which the plaintiff relied both in the appellate Court before their Lordships. That rule empowers the Court to make such party a respondent when it appears to the Court that, "he is interested in the result of the appeal". Giving these words their natural meaning - and they cannot be disregarded - it seems impossible to say that in this case the defendants against whom these suits have been dismissed, and as against whom the right of appeal has become barred are interested in the result of the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the other defendants. Giving these words their natural meaning - and they cannot be disregarded - it seems impossible to say that in this case the defendants against whom these suits have been dismissed, and as against whom the right of appeal has become barred are interested in the result of the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the other defendants. It was for the plaintiff appellant, who applied to the Court to exercise its powers under this rule, to show what was the nature of their interest and this he has failed to do." 3. In Abar Husain v. Ahmad Raza, AIR 1937 All 82 (B) there was difference of opinion between Niamatullah, J., and Smith, J., and the case went to the Chief Justice Sir Sulaiman. It was held in this case that where a decree is a joint decree in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant, who has been left out, the omission to implead him would be fatal, and an appellate Court would not have power to implead him after the period of limitation has expired but where the decree is in fact not a joint one such a defendant may be impleacied. A similar view was expressed by Sulaiman, C.J., in Attar Singh v. Debi Sahai, AIR 1937 All 243 (C). 4. In Swaminatha Odayar v. Gopalaswami Odayar, ILR (1938) Mad 52 : ( AIR 1937 Mad 741 ) (D) the view taken was that the Privy Council ruling cannot be taken as laying down that no person against whom the right of appeal has become barred, can ever be added as a respondent under the provision of O. 41, R. 20. The Privy Council ruling, then, came for interpretation in Alabhai Vajsurbhai v. Bhura Bhaya, ILR (1937) Bom 602 : (AIR 1937 Bom 401) (E) and the Bombay High Court observed that the assumption that the Privy Council decision lays down an inflexible rule of interpretation of the expression "interested in the result of the appeal" in O. 41, R. 20 is erroneous. The High Court expressed the view that if a party to the original proceeding is proposed to be added as a party to the appeal and the time for appeal against him has expired, the question whether the interest of such person proposed to be added still survives in the appeal must depend on the nature of the litigation, the decree passed, the subject-matter of the appeal and the effect of the decision in appeal in his absence. In our opinion this view is more sound and reasonable than the Allahabad view, for the Privy Council in their observations had added that "it was for the plaintiff appellant, who applied to the Court to exercise its powers under this rule, to show what was the nature of their interest: and this he has failed to do". The significance of this sentence in the context is obvious. 5. In United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begam 1940 FCR 110 : ( AIR 1941 PC 16 ) (F), the Federal Court expressed the view that the language of O. 41, R. 20 does not show that it is exclusive or exhaustive so as to deprive a Court to exercise the powers which it may possess and which have been saved by S. 151. This ruling has been followed by Tek Chand and Beckett, JJ., in Shantilal v. Firm Hira Lal Sheo Narain, ILR (1942) Lah 603 : (AIR 1941 Lah 402) (G) and by Teja Singh, J., in Munshiram v. Abdul Aziz, AIR 1943 Lah 252 (H). With great respect we concur in this view. 6. All those cases were of mistakes committed by the appellants in making necessary parties as respondents. In the case before us, the mistake of the plaintiff appellant was due to the mistake of the Copying Department; and it is well-settled that no litigant should be allowed to suffer through the mistake of any official of the Court who is connected with the administration of justice. In the case before us, the mistake of the plaintiff appellant was due to the mistake of the Copying Department; and it is well-settled that no litigant should be allowed to suffer through the mistake of any official of the Court who is connected with the administration of justice. It was observed by Cairas L.C. in Rodger v. Comptoired Rscomte de Paris, (1871) 3 PC 465 at p. 475 (I) that : "One of the first and highest duties of all the Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression the act of the Court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lower Court which entertains the jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case." These observations were quoted and reiteral ed by the Privy Council in Jai Berham v. Kedarnath Marwari, 49 Ind App 351 : ( AIR 1922 PC 269 ) (J). Since then it has become very well settled that such mistakes can be corrected under Ss. 151 to 153, Civil P. C. The Court has inherent power to rectify its own errors inadvertently committed and the language of S. 153 is wide enough to cover the correction of mistakes and errors in any proceeding in a suit. As the appellant filed the application for adding Rajendras name amongst defendants at a very early stage, we think that this is eminently a fit case in which we should exercise the powers vested in under Ss. 151 to 153, Civil P. C., and allow the appellant to add the name of Rajendra in the list of respondents. 7. The facts of - Bishna v. Sucha Singh, AIR 1934 Lah 402 (2) (K) are somewhat similar to these of the present case. In that case the attested copy of the judgment given to the appellants did not show Nandsingh as one of the plaintiffs. Bishna and Indar alone were shown as plaintiffs in that copy. The copy of the decree sheet, however, gave the names of all the plaintiffs. In that case the attested copy of the judgment given to the appellants did not show Nandsingh as one of the plaintiffs. Bishna and Indar alone were shown as plaintiffs in that copy. The copy of the decree sheet, however, gave the names of all the plaintiffs. The District Judge observes that as the appeal was to be filed from the decree and not from the judgment, the failure to include the name Nandsingh amongst the appellants due to the gross negligence of the counsel who filed the appeal. From the District Judges order an appeal was instituted in the Lahore High Court and Abdul Rashid, J., who heard the appeal repelled this contention of the District Judge and obsereved that "it must be remembered that litigants, and members of the legal profession, have the right to expose that the heading of attested copies of the judgments would show the names of the parties correctly." Under these circumstances, his Lordship pointed out that the copying department was to a great extent responsible for the omission of the name of Nandsingh from the list of the appellants. The appeal was allowed and the District Judge was directed to implead Nandsingh in the appeal as a respondent. 8. In the case before us, the name of Rajendra has been omitted not only in the attested copy of the judgment but also in that of the decree-sheet given to the appellant and the observations made in the Lahore case fully apply to the present case. Mr. Pande, however urges that it was the duty of the appellant and his pleader to read the judgment carefully and to compare the names of the numerous parties given in the title with those in the original plaint; and if that had been done the omission would have been brought to light. In our opinion, this argument is devoid of substance. The pleader for the appellant had with him copies of the decree as well as of the judgment and he could not have known the reason why Rajendras name had been left out in the judgment as well as in the decree-sheet. In our opinion, this argument is devoid of substance. The pleader for the appellant had with him copies of the decree as well as of the judgment and he could not have known the reason why Rajendras name had been left out in the judgment as well as in the decree-sheet. A similar argument was advanced in ILR (1937) Bom 602 : AIR 1937 Bom 401 (E), and Wassoodev, J., observed at page 614 of ILR (at p. 406 of AIR) that the necessity for that comparison would arise only upon the assumption that the Courts establishment had failed to carry out its order. That would be an unreasonable assumption having regard to the normal course of business and the limited opportunities for comparison which a lawyer possesses in such matters." In our opinion, these observations give a direct reply to Mr. Pandes contention, and we think it would be an injustice in the circumstances of the case, to dismiss the prayer of the appellant for amendment of the record when neither plaintiff appellant himself nor his lawyer is the offender. 9. We, therefore, grant the application of the plaintiff and allow him to add the name of Rajendra in the list of respondents in this appeal. 10. SAMVATSAR, J. :- I agree.