Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This application in revision is by the plaintiff against an order setting aside an ex parte decree passed in his favour on the 19th of March, 1952, in Title Suit No. 57 of 1950 in the Court of the Munsif, Giridih. 2. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff petitioner for declaration of his title to and for possession over a piece of land measuring 2 Kathas 13 dhurs bearing holding No. 917 of Ward No. 3 of the Giridih Municipality & survey Plots Nos. 2834 and 2835, as having been acquired by him by purchase from defendants 9 and 10. Different sets of defendants filed written statements on different dates and the suit was fixed for final hearing on the 18th of March 1952. On that date, the defendants lawyers informed the Court that they had no instruction, and the suit was adjourned to the next date viz., the 19th of March 1952, for hearing. On that date also, the defendants did not take steps and the suit was heard ex parte but in presence of minor respondents 3 and 5, who were represented by guardians appointed by Court. The ex parte decree was also passed in the suit on the same date. On the 21st October 1952, defendant No. 1 filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree and the Court below, after hearing the parties, set it aside by its order stated above. Being, thus, aggrieved, the petitioner has come up to this Court in revision. 3. On the facts stated above, it is manifest that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was made more than thirty days after the passing of the decree. The main question which, therefore fell to be decided in the case was whether the application was barred by limitation. The Court below held that defendant No. 1, the applicant before it. got knowledge about the ex parte decree, only in October 1952 on his return from Madhupur, where he was suffering from tuberculosis and, as such, the application filed by him on the 21st October 1952 was not barred by limitation and was within time. The Court below held that defendant No. 1, the applicant before it. got knowledge about the ex parte decree, only in October 1952 on his return from Madhupur, where he was suffering from tuberculosis and, as such, the application filed by him on the 21st October 1952 was not barred by limitation and was within time. The period of limitation prescribed for filing an application for setting aside an ex parte decree is provided in Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act, according to which such an application should be filed within thirty days from the date of the decree or, where the summons was not duly served, from the date on which the applicant got knowledge of the decree. It is, thus, manifest that, if summons had been served on the defendant, the application must be made within thirty days from the date of the decree itself. In the present case, the application which was made under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree was not based on the ground that no summons had been served on the applicant. It was admittedly based on the only ground that the applicant, due to his illness, was prevented from appearing before the Court when the case was called out for hearing. The case, therefore, proceeded on the footing that summons had been served on the applicant. In that view of the matter, Part 1 of Article 164. which provides the counting of the period of thirty days from the date of the decree, will be applicable and not the other part which provides the period to be counted from the date of knowledge. This view was taken by Rai J., sitting singly, in Jogia v Commr. of the Darbhanga Municipality, C. R. No. 605 of 1950, D/- 8-5-1951 (Pat) (A) Following this decision. I sitting singly in Mt. Bibi Rafiquan V/s. Gopi Mahton, 1953 BLJR 442 : ( AIR 1953 Pat 399 ) (B), took the same view. Nothing has been placed before us on which I can take a view of the law on the subject different from what I took in this case. The language of Article 164 is plain and no authority is required to understand it. Nothing has been placed before us on which I can take a view of the law on the subject different from what I took in this case. The language of Article 164 is plain and no authority is required to understand it. The Article clearly says that the thirty days will be counted from the date of the knowledge of the decree where summons was not duly serv- ed; but, if there is no case of non-service of summons, then the period is to be counted from the date of the decree itself as already observed. The (view that I have taken gains support from a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Tara Sankar Ghose V/s. Nasaruddi, AIR 1916 Cal 651 (C) and a Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Manindra Chandra V/s. Churamani, AIR 1949 Assam 5 (D). It is, thus, clear that the application filed for setting aside the ex parts decree was barred by time. 4. Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad has contended that the Court had inherent power under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex parte decree, though it was out of time, for the ends of justice. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Mt. Balmati Kuari V/s. Jagbandhan Nath Tewary, AIR. 1950 Patna 497 (E). That case, in my opinion, is of no assistance to Mr. Prasad. In that case, a Suit for partition was dismissed and an appeal was preferred to this Court. The parties came to terms and the case was disposed of on compromise. According to the compromise, the High Court passed a decree on the 1st of March 1946 and remitted the case for ascertaining the net income of the family properties regarding which the suit was brought. After the remand, the lower Court issued a writ to a commissioner and, on receiving a report from him on the 28th January 1948, it passed an ex parte final decree. On the 30th July 1948, one of the defendants applied to the Court for setting aside the final decree on the ground that the commissioner calculated mesne profits for six years in direct contravention of the consent order passed by the High Court and that there had been an abuse of the process of the Court. On the 30th July 1948, one of the defendants applied to the Court for setting aside the final decree on the ground that the commissioner calculated mesne profits for six years in direct contravention of the consent order passed by the High Court and that there had been an abuse of the process of the Court. The lower Court set aside the final decree under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an application in revision was filed in this Court against that order. It was contended before this Court that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte final decree in exercise of its inherent power beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. It was held that the commissioner made a gross mistake in not ascertaining the total net income according to the terms of the compromise decree which the High Court recorded and, therefore, the Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the final decree so passed. After considering various cases, their Lordships held that Sec.151 could not be invoked more appropriately than for the purpose of correcting a miscarriage of justice appearing on the face of the proceedings and preventing an abuse of the process of the Court. In the case before us, there is no question of any abuse of the process of the Court or any miscarriage of justice appearing on the face of the proceeding itself. In Ajoyhya Mahton V/s. Mt. Phul Kuer ILR 1 Pat 277 : (AIR 1922 Pat 479) (P), a Bench of this Court has clearly laid down that an ex parte decree cannot be set aside in exercise of the Courts inherent powers under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that, where a definite period of limitation has been provided by law within which action must be taken, a Court Is not entitled to extend such period by purporting to act under Sec.151 of the same Code. There is, thus, no merit in this contention. 5. Lastly, Mr. There is, thus, no merit in this contention. 5. Lastly, Mr. Prasad has argued that the Court below, after considering the evidence of the parties, has set aside the ex parte decree and this Court should not exercise its discretionary power under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with that order and, in support of that contention, he has drawn our attention to a passage in my judgment in Mt. Bibi Rafiquans case (B) referred to above, which runs as follows :- "..... but the circumstances of the present case, as will be discussed presently, are such that I am not inclined to exercise my revi-sional power to interfere with the order of the learned Subordinate Judge. From the rent schedule Ext 2 filed in the case it appears that the rent of the holding was commuted to Rs. 115-6-0 and, therefore, the claim for two years rent would amount to Rs. 230-12-0, besides costs and interest. But the plaintiffs had obtained an ex parte decree on the bhaoli basis for a sum of Rs. 1,800/-for the two years. ..... In view of the fact that instead of about Rs. 230/. the plaintiffs had obtained a decree for Rs. 1,800.00 and in view of the fact that the case now goes back on remand, the parties are perfectly entitled to support their respective claims without prejudice to any one I think, the order though erroneous, has only prevented an injustice, and I do not now wish to perpetuate an injustice by setting aside that order." From the quotation referred to above, it is clear that great injustice had been done to the defendants by passing a decree for a huge sum of Rs. 1,800, whereas the claim of the plaintiffs, at best, could be only Rs. 230-12-0. I therefore, did not feel inclined to interfere with the order of the lower Court, though it appeared to be erroneous, because, by doing so, I would have acted in aid of injustice In the present case, however, no material has been placed before us to show that, by our interference with the order of the Court below, defendant No. 1, at whose instance the ex parte decree was set aside, would suffer such damage that we should not interfere with the order of the Court below. On calculation, it appears that defendant No. 1 would suffer a damage of Rs. 25/- only if the ex parte decree is not set aside. It is not, therefore, possible for us not to interfere with the order of the Court below, which is apparently wrong and without jurisdiction, on the principle enunciated in the passage quoted above. 6 No other point has been raised before us. It is, thus, manifest that the order of the Court below setting aside the ex parte decree is wrong and without jurisdiction, as the application that was made for setting it aside was hopelessly barred by time. The application is accordingly allowed and the judgment and the order of the Court below dated the 31st March 1953, setting aside the ex parte decree, are set aside. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Hearing fee Rs. 32. Dayal, J. 7 I agree.